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(Photo The Courier) MEETING POINT: Alpha Konaré 
How is democracy faring in Mali, two 
years after the bloody events which pre-
cipitated the fall of the country's 23-year 
old dictatorship? What problems face the 
new regime elected by the people? The 
Courier put these questions to Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, the man whom the 
Malians chose as their leader in April 1992. 
Pages 2 to 4. 
COUNTRY REPORTS 
JAMAICA: The limited damage sus-
tained in Jamaica's recent earthquake 
— a relatively rare event on the island 
which happened to coincide with The 
Courier's visit — revealed that the 
buildings have good foundations. But 
what of the country's economic and 
social foundations? Jamaica has seen 
some hard times in the recent past and it 
still faces a number of formidable 
challenges. However, there are signs 
that the 'green shoots' of recovery are 
beginning to emerge as the country 
adapts to a new, liberal economic 
environment. Pages 9 to 30. 
ZAMBIA : A year and a half ago Zambia joined the club of new 
democracies in Africa when years of one-party rule ended after free 
elections. The international community has rallied behind the new 
government, whose head, Pre-
sident Frederick Chiluba, talks to 
The Courier about his vision of a 
political and economic system in 
which all Zambians have a part to 
play. As a rigorous economic 
reform programme is applied, 
ordinary people are being asked 
to make difficult sacrifices, but 
the country looks forward to 
setting up a successful free-
market economy. Pages 31 to 54. 
DOSSIER: Africa's new democracies 
As, one after another — and with varying degrees of commitment — the 
countries of Africa embark on the path of democracy, doubts are 
beginning to set in. People are increasingly asking whether the process can 
succeed and are even beginning to question whether the Western 
democratic model is a suitable one for Africa. Pages 62 to 88. 
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ALPHA KONARE 
President of Mali 
'You need time to learn 
about democracy' 
It took three days of bloodshed and revolt f or the people 
to overturn a dictatorship of 23 years. It took a national 
conference two weeks to give vent to all the pent-up 
frustration and adopt the basic texts of a State to be 
governed by the rule of law. It took 15 months of transition 
to organise the elections. And, when the elections were over, 
a soldier handed over power to a civilian, as if it were the 
most normal thing in the world. Those, briefly, are the fact s 
of the Malian move to democracy which arouses so much 
admiration and envy in countries such as Zaire and Togo, 
where the democratic process has ground to a halt. 
It is two years since the fall of the Moussa Traoré régime 
and a few weeks since the former leader was sentenced to 
death for his part in the killings in March 1991. Where is the 
young democracy now? Mali's new President, Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, answered The Courier's question in a 
consciously didactic style, betraying the fact that, not so 
long ago, he was teaching history in the classroom. 
► Mr President, the elections have 
taken place as planned, and the institutions 
are there. Does this mean that the people 
have really understood what democracy is 
all about ? 
— Mali was able to hold multi-party 
elections for the first time in 1991 and 
they were run in an orderly manner too, it 
should be pointed out. Everyone involved 
in politics knew that we had to be able to 
take the country into a democratic 
process without trouble of any kind. The 
institutions, the President of the Re­
public, the Government and the National 
Assembly, are there now and we won't 
have to wait long for the rest, the 
Constitutional Court that is to say, whose 
job is partly being done at the moment by 
the Supreme Court, the Economic and 
Social Council and the High Council of 
the local authorities. The people felt the 
wind of change for the first time when 
they voted in these elections because it 
was the first time since independence that 
they had had the opportunity to choose 
for themselves. One of the main things 
our people wanted after the events of 
March 1991 was to be able to choose, to 
be able to say no if they wanted to. That is 
their greatest achievement, but they still 
have to be educated in the ways of 
democracy, because there has been a 
single-party system for years. That is why 
we said that, after the elections and 
whatever our score, the management of 
the country had to be based on an 
agreement on the essential issues. De­
mocracy needs time. It would be wrong to 
say that everyone who voted for us has 
been won over to democracy or is in fact a 
democrat, so there is an effort to be made 
to educate our people in the ways of 
democracy. 
► Is this absence of a democratic 
tradition the reason behind the anarchic 
behaviour at the moment : in other words, 
people tending to confuse democracy with 
a licence to do whatever they like? 
— It's a difficult situation and we must 
show some understanding, because after 
25 years of single-party culture, it is a 
rude awakening when the authority of the 
State is seriously undermined and claims 
are made on all sides. Ironically enough, 
just when you hear that there is supposed 
to be free private enterprise and less State 
involvement, people from every walk of 
life are expecting the State to meet their 
demands and to do so at once. We aren't 
going to complain about them wanting 
their rights, but it is important to under­
stand the situation the country is in and 
realise just what sort of effort the nation 
must make to achieve practical solutions. 
Those who really fought for democracy 
are also those who must set the bounds to 
stop any slide towards anarchy — even if 
this means taking time to educate people 
for democracy and taking time to listen to 
them and discuss. 
► Since you took over from a regime 
which, as everyone knows, ended up 
ordering repression, isn 't your room for 
manoeuvre rather limited? 
—Yes it is, which makes our situation 
difficult. The greatest danger is the 
temptation to set up a repressive, author­
itarian State. But there is another choice 
— that of having confidence in the 
democrats, making them realise how 
complex the situation is and asking them, 
who alone made the change of system 
possible, to set about taking the de­
mocratic process further. Democrats 
must understand that it is not overthrow­
ing a regime or organising elections that 
makes the system last. Now is the time for 
the real democratic reflex to appear in an MEETING POINT 
ability to listen and in an ability to discuss 
things — and in the major choice we 
made to concentrate on setting up elec­
tions. Because if you take power and 
don't have elections, there is nothing to 
stop you giving in to every temptation, 
including that of believing that the course 
of events can always be changed by 
taking to the streets. At that rate, you'd 
never have a regime. If pressure from the 
street can put paid to those who got the 
power because of all the problems, they 
can do the same to the new arrivals. That 
is why we need a lot of tolerance and 
open-mindedness in our present situ­
ation. 
'You achieve nothing permanent 
without vigilance' 
► Yet politicians are forever saying 
that the Malians will never again agree to 
live in a dictatorship — which could mean 
that democracy is here to stay ? 
— It means that there is a clear 
awareness of the need for democracy, 
although you know as well as I do that, in 
many countries, democracy can easily 
backslide. It also means — and I am quite 
sure about this — that we can't just do 
what we like in the Republic of Mali 
without someone objecting any more. 
Those days are over... although that is not 
to say that we won't have a completely 
retrograde regime tomorrow. You 
achieve nothing permanent without vigil­
ance, particularly freedom. 
► Talking recently about the press, you 
said that it was the educated writing for the 
educated. Isn 't it much the same with 
democracy in Africa, particularly Mali? 
— It is for all those reasons that I said 
that we needed time to learn democracy. 
Our democratic foundations will never be 
consolidated without the large-scale in­
volvement of people in rural areas. They 
will be fragile as long as the literacy rate in 
the Republic of Mali is so low. Learning 
to read and write is an act of freedom. It is 
a sine qua non of greater involvement in 
the democratic management of affairs. 
The situation in this country is dramatic. 
We fought for democratic change, but 
fewer and fewer people are getting a 
proper schooling and that is a very 
serious blow to democracy. I agree with 
you that guaranteeing the democratic 
process means improving and extending 
the basic system of education. More men, 
women, children and old people must be 
able to read and write — and that is where 
the democrats come in. They must not 
believe that a minority can do what it 
wants, by itself, for long, because hostile 
forces may turn the very people who need 
democracy most against it. 
► There is one thing you haven't 
mentioned and that is the need to get rapid 
results on the economic front, so that 
people can see a proper improvement in 
their standard of living. 
— That's absolutely right, and, basi­
cally, I think, that will be decisive. 
Freedom is vital. Democracy is a key to 
development with solidarity, justice and 
fairness, but, if things stay as they are, 
with poverty mounting and justice lack­
ing, the whole lot will topple. This month, 
I admit, the first Government of the 
Third Republic has been playing fireman, 
putting out lots of fires which it didn't 
light at a time when there are arsonists 
about. And there are genuine problems 
for which we have to find rapid answers, 
with the help of the people. 
► Is there one special area where you 
hope to make rapid progress to have 
something tangible to show? 
— Yes there is. We must put a very 
clear spotlight on the changeover to 
stringent management and the repression 
of fraud. There are also guarantees we 
could give the rural areas — we could 
provide access to credit, ensure better 
marketing of production and offer what it 
needs in the way of facilities to form 
associations and get its point of view 
across. What we have to do, in fact, and 
very soon, is change the way the country 
is administered. That is part of develop­
ment too and it means going for regional 
integration and for decentralisation to 
involve the people more. You know as 
well as I do that people in the rural areas 
had the burden of the poll tax to bear. We 
have stopped that, but there is the whole 
burden of a petty, meddlesome and 
corrupt administration to bear too and it 
can't just be changed by decree. The 
people have to feel involved because they 
are able to take part and have some 
control over those who administer them. 
► But there is afine dividing line there 
too, because the people could feel that they 
don't need any discipline. 
— That is the whole problem. In the 
misguided views of some, democracy is 
laisser-aller and laisser-faire, whereas, as 
we see it, it is the beginning of shouldering 
responsibility. 
► Have your development partners 
realised that the new democratic regime 
needs to get rapid economic results? And 
does the aid channelled into Mali reflect 
this? 
— I believe that our development 
partners have understood that the key to 
the country's future is the democratic 
process and that we need economic 
results if we are to strengthen it. They are 
already very sensitive to what we say. I 
think we shall be seeing changes in 
behaviour, even when it comes to the sort 
of solutions our partners put forward. 
Some of the solutions, to our mind, are 
not right and it should be possible for 
alternative solutions which come from us 
to be taken into account when it comes to, 
say, the process of privatisation and 
voluntary retirement and the education 
policy and employment for young people. 
For example, we all agree that basic 
education should be provided for all. But 
approaches may differ. The solutions 
proposed so far have not led to any 
progress, even with the structural adjust­
ment programmes, for it has been more a 
case of day-to-day management than 
proper medium- and long-term develop­
ment options. In other words, choices are 
made as to how funds should be spent, 
but they don't really help the country's 
development and that is disastrous. 
'It takes economic results to 
strengthen the democratic 
process' 
► Mr Love, the new head of the DA C, ' 
claims it is dangerous for new democracies 
to be over-dependent on foreign aid be-
cause it limits their room for manoeuvre. 
— We agree with him, which is why 
problems may arise with people thinking 
that the State has money, that the State is 
rich. But the State of Mali is extremely 
poor. You cannot set a democratic 
process on its way unless it is founded on 
a national drive and on the nation's 
ability to suggest alternative solutions. 
That is undeniable. However much good-
Development Assistance Committee (OECD) 
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'Democracy is a key to development with solidarity, justice and fairness' 
will the partners may have, at home is 
where it all has to start. 
► At the beginning of our talk, you 
insisted on the institutional framework, 
didn 't you ? Edgard Pisani, whom I think 
you know well, said just recently that the 
new democracies in Africa did not have the 
resources to run the institutions they were 
setting up. hi fact he gave Mali as an 
example and said he was worried about it. 
— There are real financial problems 
attached to setting up some institutions, 
and it would be silly to try to hide the fact. 
In most cases, we need a lot of foreign 
money to organise our elections and all 
democrats have to see very clearly what is 
involved. If tomorrow, say, you had early 
elections in a country in the throes of a 
democratic process, you would need to 
know who was going to pay for them. It's 
a question we all have to answer. For if 
the people you ask decline to finance your 
elections when you want them to, your 
democracy will have been taken hostage. 
That is why we have to do our utmost to 
get the extraordinary opportunity before 
us today under control. There is no doubt 
that institutions cost money, which is why 
you have to know how to run them with a 
high degree of national responsibility. I 
am convinced that one day, once these 
institutions are in place and the internal 
discussion among democrats develops, 
we will find various ways of surmounting 
their 'teething' troubles. 
► The big problem in Africa's new 
democracies is that they have to run 
political and economic reforms at the same 
time. Have you come up with a recipe for 
this in your seven months in power? 
— It's a dilemma and no mistake. 
There is no magic formula. Our way of 
settling all the questions people may be 
wondering about is to aim for the 
broadest possible basis of democrats and 
patriots, who can pool their resources, 
think together and put forward alternat­
ive policies. It involves making sure that 
there is unrestricted room for self-ex­
pression and freedom of enterprise. If we 
were to move over to a single-party 
system now, obviously we would very 
soon be saying good-bye to every poss­
ibility of finding answers to these ques­
tions. However, if there is room for more 
self-expression and freedom of enterprise 
as every day goes by, and more and more 
people go in for them, obviously there 
will be fewer problems. 
'We must allow for a certain 
number of mistakes if we are to 
progress' 
► But how can the opposition do its 
duty and criticise a government in which it 
is involved? And how can you encourage 
the emergence of leaders to ensure the 
alternation without which there is no true 
democracy ? 
— That is something all democrats are 
careful about. You can be part of the 
majority without agreeing with it. In this 
country, political activists have to take 
responsibility for their ideas — this is 
something else we have achieved. No-one 
can claim he is forced to be a minister or a 
director under the present system. It's not 
true. If you don't agree with something or 
you don't like it, you can resign. That is 
another right which 26 March gave us 
and the people must take it seriously. 
When differences are basic and funda­
mental, there are conclusions to be 
drawn. But when the differences can be 
handled through debate, you have to 
know how to do it that way. Of course, 
there is the whole problem of majorities 
and oppositions. We live in a country 
where everyone has been affected by the 
single-party culture and the majority has 
to understand that, in a democracy, the 
minority has rights too. That is the 
strength of the system. The opposition 
also has to allow the majority to govern 
and to be judged by its results. You 
cannot be in opposition and govern at 
one and the same time. As things are in 
our countries at the moment, the majority 
and the opposition have to get together to 
identify the basic problems demanding a 
national effort and for which there are 
not hundreds of solutions, and put them 
into practice without resorting to de­
magogy. Otherwise, everyone will be 
faced with these questions in exactly the 
same way. The new democracy we are 
building will not be built by the majority 
in power alone. The majority and the 
opposition together will light the path to 
Mali's new democracy. That is what will 
guarantee that the principle of alternate 
governments is applied tomorrow. I am 
in this office today and the greatest thing I 
can achieve is free elections at the end of 
my five-year term of office. It doesn't 
matter if I win or lose. The essential thing 
is for the process to continue. The great 
thing for the democrats today is not to 
have different teams succeeding each 
other at unspecified intervals. It is to have 
the present team carrying on right to the 
end of its term of office and organising 
free elections. 
► Alternation is the big test of whether 
democracy has taken root here, isn't it? 
— Yes it is — alternation or periodic 
elections in the same peaceful conditions 
as we had a few months back. That is 
vital, because there are huge problems in 
all the countries in the region at the 
moment. If we are to avoid our countries 
breaking down and splitting along ethnic, 
regional or religious lines, the democrats 
have to realise just what their responsibi­
lities involve. They have started a process 
and they must do all they can to keep it 
going. They must not think in terms of the 
victors and the vanquished, or nurture 
personal resentments. While the process 
is under way, everything should work. 
We all have to admit that there is a want 
of professionalism and the taint of the 
single-party system in some of our po­
sitions and I should go so far as to say 
that we should allow ourselves a certain 
number of mistakes if we are to prog­
ress, o Interview by Amadou TRAORE ACP - EEC 
Veterinary services in Africa 
The EOF approach 
by Jan MULDER * 
Since the start of the European De­
velopment Fund in the early 1960s, 
considerable importance has been atta­
ched to the financing of rural develop­
ment projects in Africa. The main em­
phasis has been on increased agricultural 
production, of which animal production 
is an integral part. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, a 
division was created within the EC 
Commission with the job of evaluating in 
a systematic way, the various projects 
which had been the subject of EDF 
financing. 
As regards animal production projects, 
the conclusions of the evaluation which 
was undertaken were set out in a docu­
ment produced in 1984 entitled: 'Basic 
Principles of Livestock Development'. 
This contained numerous recommend­
ations, amongst which were: 
— Sectoral policy concerning the de­
velopment of livestock resources should 
be focused on the livestock producer and 
his family with particular attention being 
paid to the role of women. 
— The scale of financial resources to be 
allocated to such efforts must be in 
reasonable proportion to the livestock 
sector's potential and its current contri­
bution to national wealth. 
— Every possible effort should be made 
to promote and encourage private initia­
tives of all kinds in the provision of the 
goods and services — such as drugs, 
animal feed, credit and marketing of 
livestock products — which are needed 
by the livestock producer. 
— It is essential to formulate and imple­
ment a pricing policy for inputs and 
livestock products alike. 
It was around the same time that the 
EDF was confronted with numerous 
demands to finance a vaccination cam­
paign against rinderpest. In fact, one of 
the earliest EDF interventions in the 
development of African animal resources 
had been in this area, when the Com­
munity participated in the financing of 
* Adviser, DG VIII (Development), EC Commis­
sion. This is an abridged version of a speech given by 
the author to a group of African veterinarians at a 
recent conference in Côte d'Ivoire. 
'Joint Programme 15'. Together with 
other donors, a vaccination campaign 
had been financed in several African 
countries over a period of about 15 years. 
Indeed, the programme envisaged the 
eradication of rinderpest in Africa and it 
almost succeeded. It was thought, when 
donor financing stopped towards the end 
of the 1970s, that rinderpest was under 
control, if not eradicated, but in the 
event, it was too early to claim victory. 
During the early 1980s, it was clear that 
rinderpest outbreaks were occurring on a 
large scale in various African countries. 
What was the reason for the recurrence of 
this disease, despite the massive financial 
investments which had been made in the 
earlier campaign? 
Several explanations were advanced 
although it was clear that these were not 
all applicable in the same way to each of 
the countries concerned. These included : 
— The fact that the allocation of govern­
ment budgets to agriculture and, in 
particular, to livestock development, had 
not reflected the importance of this 
sector's contribution to the national 
economy. 
— The practice whereby all veterinary 
graduates were automatically recruited to 
the state veterinary service, the major 
part of whose budget was utilised for 
salary payments rather than operations in 
the field. 
— The policy of almost all governments 
of carrying out vaccination campaigns 
free of charge and of subsidising to a large 
extent, other forms of veterinary inter­
vention. 
It was, therefore, concluded that the 
essential point was not to provide funds 
for a specific campaign against a specific 
animal disease, but rather to establish a 
policy directed at finding additional or 
alternative financing for the veterinary 
services. And it was not just these services 
that needed attention. There was also the 
question of better financing for livestock 
services, bearing in mind the object of 
increasing animal production in Africa to 
meet the needs of an expanding popu­
lation. The problems of adequate nutr­
ition and the overgrazing associated with 
it required no less attention than those 
arising from the outbreak of contagious 
animal diseases. 
The Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and, in particular, its Inter-
African Bureau of Animal Production 
proved to be an interested partner in the 
development of new policies which en­
visaged the establishment of better live­
stock services for farmers. 
In 1986, a Financing Agreement was 
concluded between the OAU and the 
Commission of the EC. The agreement 
set out two approaches: 
— Those countries which were con­
fronted at that time with outbreaks of 
rinderpest would be assisted immediately 
in stemming the spread of the disease. 
— For all other countries, financing 
agreements for the purpose of rendering 
livestock services more effective would 
only be concluded after the successful 
conclusion of a policy dialogue aimed at 
making more adequate finance available 
for those working in such services. 
The Financing Agreement set out five 
options for achieving the latter. These 
options, and subsequent experience with 
them may be summarised as follows : 
Direct payment for services rendered. This 
policy aims at a situation whereby far­
mers contribute to all services provided 
by the government. The degree of govern­
ment subsidy can vary but should, in the 
course of a project period, be adapted. 
This approach is now almost univers­
ally accepted in Africa, as far as the 
provision of drugs and non-compulsory 
vaccinations is concerned, although the 
degree of subsidy varies from country to 
country. 
Proceeds from the sale of drugs and 
vaccines are put into a revolving fund. 
Sometimes, however, the operation of 
these funds is problematic. In certain 
countries, inflation is high and prices are 
not adapted accordingly, while the time 
which elapses between purchase and sale 
of new drugs can sometimes be too long. 
The purchase of new drugs and vac­
cines may also pose difficulties as not all 
African currencies are easily convertible 
into those currencies that are required for 
buying new inputs. In addition, there is 
sometimes the problem that drug import­
ing is the exclusive responsibility of a 
state company which is saddled with old 
debts, although a solution to this could be 
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of private companies. EDF financing can 
be used for both purposes. 
There are, however, countries that 
prefer to continue with the provision of 
services which are subsidised or free of 
charge. The latter is sometimes the case 
with compulsory vaccination campaigns. 
If the budgetary resources of the govern­
ment are insufficient, it cannot simply be 
left to the donor to fund these subsidies 
on a permanent basis. Instead, a system 
could be developed in line with the other 
'dialogue points' from the OAU-EC 
Financing Agreement. 
Direct or indirect taxation for services 
rendered. In several countries, taxes 
levied on the livestock sector already 
exist. For various reasons, however, the 
sums collected are not put back into the 
sector itself. There are good reasons for 
adhering to the principle of a con­
solidated fund (unified finance) for 
government budgets. However, in some 
countries and under certain conditions, it 
should be possible to introduce specific 
taxes and levies to be used to finance 
specific actions. For example, it might be 
possible to form a livestock development 
fund. If such a fund were set up at 
national level, it could suffer from the 
same problems as those which character­
ise existing revolving funds (for example. 
complex administrative procedures). A 
better approach might be to establish 
these funds at regional or even district 
level, in order to simplify procedures. It is 
important, after all, to ensure that where 
a farmer is paying special taxes, he can sec 
the benefit in the form of better services. 
And when special funds are developed at 
a local level, the next step, as outlined in 
the 'dialogue point' of the Financing 
Agreement which follows, is a small one. 
Development of farmers' associations, 
pastoral associations or cooperatives. 
Instead of the Government being re­
sponsible for the provision of veterinary 
or other services, farmers themselves 
could be encouraged to organise the 
provision of these services. An obvious 
precondition is that the law must permit 
the formation of such associations and 
cooperatives. The law must also regulate 
the conditions under which these organis­
ations can be formed and should protect 
their members. 
Despite the fact that African cooperat­
ives already have a long history, the EDF 
has only limited experience of encourag­
ing the organisation of livestock services 
in this way. Elsewhere, the picture is 
somewhat different. By way of example, 
the responsibility for maintenance of 
watering points constructed in dry areas 
has increasingly been laid on the shoul­
ders of the users. 
EDF funds can be used to provide 
better veterinary infrastructure for the 
benefit of members of societies who. in 
turn, are obliged to recruit qualified 
personnel for veterinary and extension 
services. 
This is one step in the direction of 
privatisation. The 'dialogue point" which 
follows suggests moving towards this 
goal in a more general way. 
An EDP financed cattle vaccination 
centre in Niger 
Privatisation of the veterinary profession. 
Of all the 'dialogue points', this is the one 
that has attracted the most attention. 
There is considerable enthusiasm for it. 
The establishment of the system in 
practice, however, has proved to bea long 
and cumbersome process, although the 
prospects in some regions are still 
thought to be good. There is. after all, no 
reason to believe that in Africa, contrary 
to the situation elsewhere in the world, it 
is impossible for private veterinarians to 
earn a living in rural areas. 
Experience has shown that a number of 
conditions are helpful in starting a 
privatisation programme. In the first 
place, it is necessary to have a national 
professional organisation with powers to 
decide who should be allowed to set 
themselves up in veterinary practice and 
to regulate their activity. It is the profes­
sion itself that must control the quality of 
the services it provides. Secondly, the 
legislative framework must exist to allow 
private veterinarians to operate. There 
must also be an assurance from the 
government that there is not unfair 
competition from their own services 
which are often subsidised. 
The role of the donor is in the provision 
of credit. It can form a fund which 
guarantees the loans that banks provide 
to selected veterinarians and could also 
consider giving premiums to encourage 
veterinarians to leave government service 
and establish themselves. The donor 
might also give loans for associated 
activities in recognition of the fact that, at 
the outset, it might not be possible to 
generate sufficient income solely from the 
practice or from veterinary pharmacy. 
Of course, it is also essential for the 
development of private practice that the 
market generates an income for farmers 
which is sufficient to allow them to pay 
for the services they receive. The OAU-
EC Financing Agreement recognises this 
in the last 'dialogue point'. 
Imposing a special levy on imports of 
animal products which distort the local 
market. This points addresses the prob­
lems which arise from the dumping of 
animal products on African markets. A 
levy should prevent this from happening. 
Ideally, the proceeds of such a levy should 
be used to finance services provided by 
the government but the principle of 
'unified finance' prevents this in most 
countries. 
* 
In the preparation of EDF interven­
tions in the livestock sector, all of the 
above 'dialogue points' need to be con­
sidered, but it should be recognised that 
there is no solution which is universally 
applicable. Solutions will always have to 
be adapted to the specific conditions of 
the country or region or perhaps even the 
individual location concerned. The Euro­
pean Commission has an open approach 
on this which is aimed at finding the best 
system in each case.o J.M. A CP-EEC 
Community combats AIDS in the ACP countries 
by Achim KRATZ * 
Silence, discovery, mobilisation and 
consolidation. These are the four stages 
of the AIDS control campaign so far, says 
the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
The first of them, which began in the 
mid-1970s, was the time of the 'silent 
pandemic' during which HIV took hold 
in almost every continent, with barely 
anyone noticing. 
In 1981, a description of AIDS signal­
led the end of this era of silence during 
which the human immuno-deficiency 
* In charge of the anti-AIDS programme at the 
European Commission. 
virus and its methods of transmission had 
been identified. 
In phase three, which began in 1986, 
the human resources to run the campaign 
were mobilised first of all in the form of 
emergency aid and then as medium-term 
structured aid. 
Yet another phase, consolidation, has 
just begun in which emergency aid is 
giving way to longer-term activities which 
are more structured, better thought-out 
and better coordinated, both nationally 
and internationally. The Commission's 
programme is being reorganised to reflect 
the urgency of operations and there is 
long-term planning and a drive to ensure 
that all the national partners in the 
different sectors concerned take an active 
part in the national programmes. 
This means that specific AIDS control 
schemes have to be better coordinated 
and integrated in the EC's development 
aid programmes, particularly with the 
health components of the national in­
dicative programmes and the counterpart 
funds (mainly accruing from the struc­
tural adjustment programmes). 
Information and educational material produced in Oyo State, Nigeria, is displayed at 
an EC-Nigeria seminar on methods of fighting AIDS and other sexually 
transmissible diseases 
Aims 
The prime aim, now and in the coming 
years, is to prevent the sexual, intraven­
ous and perinatal transmission of AIDS. 
Prevention is undeniably the most 
important aspect of international 
strategy, because it is the only way of 
limiting the human consequences and 
social and economic cost of HIV infec­
tion. But it is, alas, highly unlikely that 
any efficient, affordable vaccine will be 
available by the end of the century, so yet 
another job in the coming years is to 
reduce the individual, social and econ­
omic impact of the advancing pandemic. 
EC priority is on completing and 
consolidating the ongoing operations and 
making plans to extend them if this is 
called for. There are two important 
criteria for new AIDS control projects. 
Firstly they must be part of health 
schemes which the countries are running 
with EC cooperation and, secondly they 
must be part of national AIDS control 
campaigns — which all ACPs now have. 
Lomé financing 
The Commission aims to spend at least 
ECU 50 million of Lomé IV funds on 
AIDS, of which at least ECU 30m is to 
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come from the ACP States' national 
indicative programmes and ECU 20m 
from the regional funds for all ACPs. 
This is new, because the ECU 39m of the 
previous Convention were entirely 
financed from the regional monies, a 
decision which the Commission took at 
the beginning of the AIDS programme, in 
1987, for two main reasons. 
First of all, it was vital to get over the 
political and psychological hesitations 
about the programme in the ACP coun-
tries, since some of them even refused to 
admit that there was any trace of the 
pandemic on their territories. The addi-
tion of regional funds to the national 
programmes was enough of a financial 
incentive to overcome this. 
Secondly, the AIDS operation was 
something entirely new, and uniform 
design and action were vital from the 
outset to ensure that the right strategy 
could be developed, on the basis of 
experience gained. 
Once this was achieved, there was no 
longer any need to go on financing the 
whole of the AIDS control programmes 
from the all-ACP regional funds. There 
were financial reasons for this (i.e. there 
was a limit on the all-ACP action funds), 
but the most important thing was that 
ACP government leaders were now fully 
aware of the gravity of the situation and 
financing AIDS campaigns from indicat-
ive programmes gave the governments 
more responsibility for actually running 
the projects. This is important because 
the EC drive can never do more than back 
up the national efforts of the individual 
States. 
Administrative structures 
In the emergency phase which began in 
1987, these activities were new, the 
Commission lacked expertise and so the 
AIDS Task Force was set up outside to 
identify, define and set up specific AIDS 
control operations. Given the advance of 
the pandemic and the fact that the disease 
is clearly a long-term problem, the 
Commission of the European Com-
munities' role in the AIDS campaign was 
stepped up and the Task Force main-
tained as it stood. 
A special AIDS campaign coordi-
nation and monitoring unit is now being 
set up in the Commission to oversee 
coordination with the Member States and 
other funders (especially the WHO) and 
ensure that AIDS-specific activities are 
consistent with health and development 
schemes in general. The unit will rep-
resent the Commission in international 
meetings and conferences on the pan-
demic and establish contact with research 
institutes, consultants and specialised 
NGOs. 
On 1 January, the AIDS Task Force 
became a technical assistance group, 
based in Brussels, to back up the new unit 
and help the ACP countries define 
national and/or regional AIDS control 
policies and prepare and help run specific 
projects to be submitted for Commission 
financing. Ο Α.K. COUNTRY REPORTS 
JAMAICA 
Harnessing the winds of change 
. 
The earthquake which struck Jamaica during The Courier's recent visit in 
connection with this Country Report was a jolt in more than merely the literal sense. 
Mercifully, casualties were light and damage was limited but the event brought sharply 
into focus the capacity of mother nature to thwart humanity in its quest for 
development, prosperity and progress. 
In fact, seismic disturbances do not appear particularly high on the scale of 
development challenges facing this Caribbean island country. Devastating 
earthquakes are rare and, as those who experienced the terrible effects of Hurricane 
Gilbert in 1988 will testify, tropical storms pose a much more serious threat. And, of 
course, there are the man-made challenges or at least those in which mankind is not so 
much the helpless spectator as the central participant. There is no shortage of these in 
Jamaica as the country strives to come to grips with a range of economic and social 
problems in the last decade of the 20th century. In this Report, we examine some of the 
key issues facing this friendly 'island in the sun' and look at the efforts which are being 
made to tackle them. 
It is fair to say that Jamaica's economic 
performance, in the thirty years since 
independence, has not lived entirely up to 
expectations. During the first decade, the 
island's traditional dependence on sugar 
and banana production was reduced as 
the bauxite sector continued to grow and 
new investments were made in cement 
and clothing manufacture. Growth was 
not spectacular, however, and the high 
birth rate tended to offset these gains. 
Government finances were shaky and 
unemployment remained persistently 
high. 
In the 1970s, these economic dif­
ficulties were exacerbated by the first 'oil 
shock'. Jamaica relies heavily on imports 
for its energy needs and the crisis was 
reflected in foreign exchange shortages, 
further increases in unemployment and 
general economic stagnation. The Peo­
ple's National Party (PNP), which had 
defeated the incumbent Jamaica Labour 
Party (JLP) in 1972, also chose this time 
to pursue a more active socialist agenda. 
Some important social reforms were 
introduced but the economic situation 
continued to deteriorate. There was a 
flight of capital from the island and many 
qualified Jamaicans also left. The vitally 
needed stability, which local businesses 
require for expansion and outside inves­
tors demand before they will commit 
funds to new ventures, was also no­
ticeably absent. Indeed, political polaris­
ation, reflected in widespread violence at 
election times, appeared to threaten the 
democratic fabric of the country. 
The 1980s saw a return to JLP rule and, 
as the decade progressed, a significant 
decline in political tensions. The new 
government introduced a programme of 
economic liberalisation with a series of 
structural adjustment measures suppor­
ted by the IMF and the World Bank. 
However, the problems proved to be 
more intractable than the government 
had hoped and, although there were some 
signs of progress, not all the targets were 
met. Modest economic growth was re­
corded in 1987 but Hurricane Gilbert 
delivered a major setback the following 
year, causing serious damage to infra­
structure. 
Jamaica's balance of payments deficit 
— aggravated in the early 1980s by an 
investment policy which drew in capital 
imports — was financed through over­
seas borrowings and, as a result, the debt 
servicing burden grew alarmingly. By the 
end of 1990, the situation had recovered 
somewhat but the country's foreign debt 
still amounted to some US$4.6 billion, or 
almost USS2000 for every Jamaican. 
On the political front, the pendulum 
swung once again with the election of the 
People's National Party in 1989. By this 
time, however, the winds of change 
elsewhere in the world were already 
sweeping away the monoliths of cen­
trally-planned economies. The PNP had 
recognised this and, in adapting to the 
new situation, had abandoned many of 
the elements of its previous 'socialist' 
programmes. As a result, there was no 
policy 'U-turn' and the new adminis­
tration continued with a broadly liberal 
economic strategy and a stringent policy 
as regards public finances. 
When The Courier last reported on 
Jamaica in 1988, we concluded that 'the 
recovery is still fragile and, given the 
openness of the economy, it remains 
vulnerable'. A number of things have 
changed since then, but in essence, the 
same conclusion remains valid today. In 
overall terms, the Jamaican economy has 
been expanding slowly over the last five 
years although GDP per capita actually 
fell slightly in 1991 as the population 
increase outstripped economic growth. 
(Population grew by 0.9% in 1991, a 
figure which is well below the ACP 
average). In the same year, the balance of 
payments deficit fell to US$132 million, a 
significant improvement on the US$340 
million deficit of the previous year. 
The unemployment figures continued 
to make for depressing reading. Whilst 
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A potted history: 1494-1962 
As nations in the post-Communist world 
move increasingly in the direction of a single, 
'free-market', economic model, and global 
telecommunications networks beam the same 
messages to all the continents, there are many 
who regret the apparent 'homogenisation' of 
human society, and what appears to be the 
decline in cultural diversity as the 'global 
village' takes shape. For such people, 
Jamaica should provide at least some en­
couragement. This is not because it is a 
society which has successfully resisted outside 
interference — indeed the sad fate of the 
original Arawak Indians illustrates the op­
posite phenomenon — but because, from a 
recent history dominated by external in­
fluences, it has carved out something which is 
new and distinctly Jamaican. 
Europe's first contact with Jamaica was in 
1494 when Christopher Columbus made a 
landfall during his second voyage of explor­
ation to the Americas. Colonisation by Spain 
began in the early 1500s and the Arawak 
inhabitants died out shortly afterwards — 
victims of ill-treatment, slavery and also 
European diseases to which they had little or 
no immunity. The Spanish brought in the first 
African slaves to replace them, introducing in 
the process, a new and ultimately central 
component in the ethnic make-up of the 
island. The Spanish colonists devoted them­
selves mainly to agriculture and were re­
sponsible for introducing the banana, one of 
the two crops which would subsequently 
form the basis of so much of the island's 
wealth. 
Spanish rule lasted until 1655, although 
other European powers and pirate ships 
staged raids from time to time in the 
intervening period. The island's capture by an 
English expeditionary force sent by Oliver 
Cromwell was something of a historical 
accident. The original plan had been to seize 
Spain's main base at Santo Domingo but the 
attack failed and lightly-defended Jamaica 
was then chosen in an attempt to salvage 
something from the hitherto ill-fated oper­
ation. In 1658 Spain tried unsuccessfully to 
wrest the island back and in 1670, the Treaty 
of Madrid saw Jamaica formally ceded to the 
now restored British Crown. 
Although British rule was to last for three 
centuries, the story of Jamaica during that 
period is far from uneventful. Many of the 
tales that are told about Sir Henry Morgan, 
buccaneer turned colonial governor, are 
undoubtedly apocryphal, but his bold, and it 
must be said brutal, forays from his base in 
Jamaica against Spanish settlements in the 
Caribbean clearly helped to alter the balance 
of (European) power in the region. 
Nor were the French idle during this 
period. They mounted an unsuccessful inva­
sion attempt at the end of the 1600s and 
whenever France and Britain were at war — 
which they were for much of the 18th and 
early 19th centuries — naval battles were 
fought in the Caribbean. 
In Jamaica itself, the most significant event 
was the introduction of sugar during the 
second half of the 17th century. Always a 
strategically important location for military 
reasons, the island now became a source of 
enormous wealth in its own right and, as 
such, one of Britain's most important over­
seas possessions. Sugar was also the basis for 
fundamental demographic change as addi­
tional slaves were brought from Africa in 
large numbers to harvest the crops on the 
burgeoning estates and plantations. 
The story of slavery is clearly a shameful 
one and the terrible treatment meted out to 
the captives, with many dying in appalling 
conditions before the slave ships even reached 
their destinations, compounded that shame. 
Slave revolts were not uncommon despite the 
harsh treatment of those who rose against 
established authority. However, the influence 
of the institution of slavery on the history of 
Jamaica and the Caribbean more generally 
can hardly be disputed. It explains, somewhat 
self-evidently, the current ethnic make-up of 
the West Indies and the presence of African 
elements in culture and language. It must 
have influenced political thinking in a society 
which places great emphasis on freedom of 
expression, the value of education and the 
protection of workers' rights (although 'free-
market imperatives' may now be eroding the 
last of these). And it may help to explain the 
strong cultural identity which Jamaica enjoys 
today. Slavery, of course, involved the 
suppression of identity — based on the 
family, village hierarchies, customs, language 
and so on — but the creative responses of 
successive generations have given the island a 
new, and some might say even stronger, 
cultural foundation. 
Slavery ended in the first half of the 19th 
century but emancipation did not im­
mediately improve the lot of the plantation 
workers. Indeed, the sugar industry went 
rapidly into decline, leaving large numbers of 
impoverished labourers to scratch a living as 
best they could. In 1865 there was a rebellion, 
prompted by the desperate economic plight 
of the poorer sections of the population, and 
this was brutally suppressed by the then 
colonial governor. 
It was not, in fact, until the period between 
the two world wars that Jamaican political 
consciousness truly crystallised. Once again, 
it was an economic crisis — this time the 
Great Depression — which provided the 
catalyst, and within a short space of time 
Jamaica had two active and highly organised 
trade unions, each with its associated political 
party. These organisations under the leader­
ship of Jamaica's two undisputed founding 
fathers — Alexander Buslamante and 
Norman Manley — were highly effective in 
pressing for reforms, the principal one being 
the 1944 Constitution which introduced a 
new legislature elected by universal adult 
suffrage. The end of the colonial era was now 
in sight and, after a failed attempt to establish 
a West Indies Federation in 1958, the country 
moved to full independence in 1962.0 
the official rate declined from almost 
26% in 1985 to under 16% in 1991, the 
trend is now back in the other direction. 
There are various reasons for this — 
government austerity measures, cuts in 
the manpower of newly privatised or 
commercialised undertakings and the 
more general problem of confidence 
which tends to inhibit private-sector 
investment during periods of economic 
uncertainty. In the new free market 
environment, it is the same private sector 
which must be relied on to re-establish a 
falling jobless curve and there are some 
early signs that confidence is growing. It 
is something of a paradox that, despite 
the high level of unemployment, the 
island also suffers from a skills shortage. 
Efforts to reduce budgetary imbal­
ances have been stepped up by the 
government in recent times, with a range 
of expenditure cuts — including politi­
cally sensitive subsidies — and tax 
changes. Dr Omar Davies, who is 
Director-General of Jamaica's Planning 
Institute explained some of these changes 
to The Courier. Acknowledging the fra­
gility of the country's revenue base, he 
spoke of the heavy burden which had 
been placed on income-tax payers and 
stressed the government's aim of spread­
ing the burden more widely. In pursuit of 
this, a new General Consumption Tax 
(GCT) was introduced in 1991. This is a 
value-added tax which is currently being 
levied at 10% and, while it may not have 
been popular among ordinary voters, it 
certainly shows that the government is 
serious in its determination to put the 
national finances on a sounder footing. 
One of the biggest problems facing the 
authorities in the budgetary field is the 
size of the public debt burden. In 1991-92, 
more than JS10 billion out of a total 
Dr Omar Davis, Director-General of 
the Planning Institute 
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recurrent expenditure of J$l7.4 billion 
had to be set aside for debt servicing. 
Of course, government expenditure 
cuts inevitably involve pain for those 
affected. O.D. Ramtallie, who is Minister 
of Construction, admitted that the recent 
austerity measures had had a negative 
impact on his department's budget and 
the result was a curtailment — hopefully 
only temporary — in road and construc­
tion programmes. Grass-roots discontent 
was reflected in a series of public-sector 
strikes during 1992. 
Measures to commercialise or privatise 
a range of state-owned entities have also 
been undertaken. The National Water 
Commission, which is responsible for the 
country's water and sewerage systems, is 
one such body which has been forced to 
adapt to the new economic evironment. 
Claude Stewart, who is the new President 
of the Commission, explained the plans 
to restructure the state-owned utility in 
order to make it more commercially 
viable and responsive to its customers. 
(There are no plans to privatise.) The 
service is being decentralised and, al­
though there has been a reduction in 
staffing levels from 5000 in 1989 to fewer 
than half that number at the end of 1992. 
Mr Stewart is confident that the service 
can be placed on a sounder footing, with 
improved maintenance and more ef­
ficient collection of charges. Overseas 
funders are active in this sector in the 
provision of new infrastructure. 
Currency turmoil 
GDP, the balance of payments, un­
employment and the government budget 
are all important issues but in 1992, the 
economic news was dominated by what 
was happening in the currency markets. 
The story of the Jamaican dollar's fall 
and rise is a dramatic and fascinating one 
which would not be out of place in a 
Jeffrey Archer novel. 
During the latter half of the 1980s, the 
dollar was held stable — at what was 
probably an artifically high rate of 
roughly 5.5 to the US dollar. As pressures 
built up, the government chose initially to 
devalue and then to liberalise the cur­
rency trading system, allowing the dollar 
to float. In September 1991, all remaining 
controls were removed and within a short 
space of time the Jamaican dollar had 
plummeted to a rate of almost 30 to the 
US dollar. The story of how Butch 
Stewart, a local tourism entrepreneur, 
'came to the rescue' is recounted in the 
box article on the next page. It is a tale 
which will doubtless enter Jamaican 
folklore, but suffice it to say here that the 
rate bounced back to J$22.20:US$1 
where it subsequently stabilised. 
In an economy which is highly de­
pendent on imports, the tribulations of 
the currency have inevitably had an 
impact on inflation. This reached 80.2% 
in 1991, having been at a modest 8.5% 
only three years previously. The rate fell 
equally rapidly during the latter half of 
1992 as the 'one-off effects of the dollar's 
fall worked through the system. In 
November 1992, year-on-year inflation 
stood at 39.4% and the annualised rate 
for the fiscal year (beginning in April) was 
down to 17.3%. 
O.D. Ramtallie, Minister of 
Construction 
'Programmes curtailed' 
Claude Stewart, President of the 
National Water Commission 
'Adapting to the new environment' 
For a private sector view of recent 
economic events, The Courier turned to 
Dennis Lahr who is Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of the ICWI Group, 
one of the Caribbean's leading financial 
conglomerates. In an upbeat assessment, 
Mr Lalor described the decision to 
liberalise the currency, as 'possibly the 
most important decision since emanci­
pation'. He believed that the Jamaican 
dollar had been overvalued for far too 
long and the new rate was now very 
tempting for exporters — although he did 
acknowledge the importance of the Butch 
Stewart initiative in stabilising a situation 
which had threatened to get out of hand 
because of the activities of the spec­
ulators. 
Mr Lalor also praised the liberalisation 
of import controls. In the past, import 
licences were needed for more than 1000 
items, but most of these had now been 
removed, making it far easier for com­
panies to obtain inputs from overseas. 
While he was enthusiastic about recent 
liberalisation measures, Mr Lalor recog­
nised what he called 'the continuing 
fragility of the economy'. The most 
important element in strengthening the 
position was a continuing atmosphere of 
stability and a genuine 'spirit of cooper­
ation'. As he wryly concluded, 'you catch 
more flies with honey than with vinegar'. 
It certainly appears that the macro-
economic indicators are nudging in a 
positive direction, but a sustained re­
covery depends — more than ever before 
in the new economic environment — on 
the extent to which the private sector 
seizes the opportunities which have been 
presented to it. 
Notwithstanding the successful econ­
omic diversification mentioned earlier, 
Jamaica, in common with many other 
small countries, has nevertheless tended 
to rely for its prosperity on a relatively 
narrow range of economic activities. A 
slump in one vital sector, which may be 
accomodated with greater ease in a larger 
economy, can therefore have serious 
ramifications. Although the island is 
clearly less vulnerable than some of its 
smaller Caricom partners, there are still 
three main sectors whose performance 
can have a big impact on the wider 
economy. 
In financial terms, the most important 
of these is nowadays the tourist sector 
(which is discussed in more detail in a 
separate article later in this Report). 
Tourism has seen sustained growth over 
the last decade and this has been reflected 
in new hotel investments creating addi­
tional employment and in the successful 
expansion of a variety of ancillary ac­
tivities. Although the tourist 'product' is 
not something that can be quoted on the 
world's commodity markets, it is evid­
ently susceptible to external events 
whether it is war in the Persian Gulf or a 
recession in the United States. There is 
not much that Jamaica can do to in­
fluence such events, but local tourism 
entrepreneurs can and do work hard to 
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'The man who saved the dollar' 
When, in 1992, the recently floated Jamaican dollar was 
plummeting on the foreign exchanges, there were many people 
who were beginning to wonder whether it — and by extension 
the national economy — might in fact have been holed below 
the waterline. 
The dollar, which had been traded at around 14 to the US 
dollar prior to the collapse (and which not long previously had 
stood at the rate of J$5.5 to US$1) had lost more than half of 
its value. The currency liberalisation, intended to free 
businesses from the restrictions which had hampered their 
ability to invest and grow, was threatening instead to provoke 
an inflationary spiral, destroying business and consumer 
confidence in the process. 
Step forward Gordon 'Butch' 
Stewart, Jamaican patriot and 
businessman extraordinaire. In 
an initiative which must be 
almost unique in the cut-throat 
world of free-market capita­
lism, he announced that he 
would purchase US$1 million 
in Jamaican dollars every week 
at the rate of 25:1, at a time 
when the market rate was 
Gordon Butch Stewart nearer 30:1. In short, he was 
prepared to 'lose' almost five million Jamaican dollars a week 
in a gamble designed to stabilise his country's currency. As a 
wealthy entrepreneur whose business interests are principally 
in the hotel sector, Stewart clearly has access to substantial 
amounts of hard currency, but he was still taking a big risk, 
because, rich though he may be, he alone could not pull the 
dollar back from the brink. What was needed was a 
bandwagon effect with sufficient momentum to overwhelm 
the currency speculators. And this is precisely what happened. 
Other entrepreneurs joined the crusade — cynics suggest 
they were shamed into doing so but their motives were 
probably more mixed. Stewart himself claimed to be acting out 
of 'enlightened self-interest', pointing out that if the dollar's 
decline could not be arrested, there was a danger of social 
upheaval, which could seriously damage the tourist trade. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the business people who came 
in to support the initiative were motivated by a similar desire 
for stability. 
Nor did the campaign stop there. Battle was joined by a 
popular talk-show host who urged ordinary Jamaicans to cash 
in their US dollars — at the lower rate. Queues rapidly formed 
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at the banks as thousands of people came forward with their 
small denominations of US notes while Jamaicans abroad 
joined in by sending American dollars in the post to their 
relatives. In theory, these people could have got a higher rate, 
but who would dare ask for one in such a charged patriotic 
atmosphere. And when the dust had settled, the Jamaican 
dollar had been 'saved' — indeed, it actually rose to 22.20 to 
US$1 before stabilising. 
Did Butch Stewart really save the dollar? Was the 
bandwagon that he provoked really responsible for the 
stability which now exists today? No-one can be sure of the 
answer, but the general consensus among those whom The 
Courier spoke to is that, in conjunction with government 
measures taken at about the same time to squeeze liquidity, it 
had a significant positive impact. 
Of course, this is not the end of the story. As Europeans 
know only too well from recent experiences, large scale 
speculation on currencies can undermine the best-laid plans. 
Inflation in Jamaica is higher than in the US and the current 
unofficially 'fixed' rate may not be sustainable in the longer 
term. In fact, the American embassy subsequently succeeded 
in selling US dollars through one of the banks at a higher rate, 
although this turned out to be a diplomatic faux pas which 
drew considerable opprobrium from the Jamaican public. In 
the final analysis, however, the Jamaicans have good reason to 
be satisfied. They may still face important economic challenges 
but by their remarkable concerted response to this particular 
crisis, they have shown what united action can achieve and, in 
the process, have given added meaning to their country's 
motto — 'out of many, one people'. 
And what of Butch Stewart? He continues to run his 
businesses and embark on new ventures. But now he is 
something of a folk hero. As one Jamaican was reported as 
saying in the local press: 'Him can run for any political party. 
Him get my vote.' 
provide a competitive and quality pro­
duct designed to keep the visitors coming. 
In the primary sector, the country's 
principal product is bauxite and the 
alumina which is processed from it. The 
bauxite mining industry is subject to 
cyclical trends and, in particular, the level 
of economic activity in the main western 
markets for aluminium, which is the end 
product. In 1991, Jamaica produced and 
exported more than 11.5 million tonnes 
of bauxite, which represented a 6% 
increase over the previous year. Produc­
tion has been on a rising trend since 1986, 
when fewer than 6 million tonnes were 
mined. Alumina production has doubled 
over the same period from 1.5 million 
tonnes in 1986 to more than 3 million  Banana production has bounced back 
tonnes in 1991. The main export markets 
for this product were North America 
(1.3 million tonnes) and Europe (1.2 mil­
lion tonnes). The trading relationship 
which Jamaica previously had with the 
Soviet Union (see the interview with 
Senator David Coore), which included a 
barter arrangement involving bauxite for 
Lada cars, has been interrupted because 
of the political and economic upheavals 
in that former country. 
The impressive growth in bauxite and 
alumina production has, unfortunately 
for Jamaica, not been fully reflected in the 
economic returns. Indeed, income fell 
during 1991 as the average price of 
primary alumina slumped by almost 20% 
on the London Metal Exchange. It is 
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nevertheless worth noting that in 1991. 
more than 11% of GDP was generated 
from this source. In 1986, the figure was 
less than 7%. 
Agriculture 
Traditionally, Jamaica's wealth has 
been founded on its agricultural produc-
tion, with a particular focus on sugar and 
bananas. For a time, it looked as if both 
crops might be in terminal decline. Sugar 
production dropped from half a million 
tonnes in 1965 to well under 200 000 
tonnes in the mid 1980s. For bananas, the 
fall was even more dramatic with exports 
slumping from 150 000 tonnes in the 
1960s to as low as 20 000 tonnes two 
decades later. Both sectors have re-
covered in recent years, however, with 
sugar production at a 12-year high in 
1991 (237 000 tonnes), and banana ex-
ports bouncing back to 75 000 tonnes. 
And while, in overall GDP terms, their 
contribution is modest, they continue to 
be important to the country in terms of 
both foreign exchange and employment. 
Under the old system of Common-
wealth preference, these two products 
had access to an otherwise protected 
United Kingdom market and were lar-
gely shielded from the pressures of 
international competition. Shortly after 
Britain joined the European Community, 
new provisions were negotiated in a series 
of protocols to the Lomé Convention 
which largely preserved the preferential 
access arrangements. Indeed, quantities 
of sugar up to a certain level were given a 
guaranteed market at a guaranteed price 
(related to the prices set under the 
Common Agricultural Policy for the 
Community's own beet sugar). Bananas 
were to be protected in their 'traditional' 
markets, which in practice, for Jamaica, 
meant the UK, while rum. an associated 
Dr Marshall Hall, Managing Director 
of Jamaica Producers' Group Ltd 
'Producers can live with the EC banana 
proposals' 
product of sugar, also benefited from a 
duty-free quota. 
It is widely thought that, without these 
arrangements, the banana and sugar 
producers would not have been able to 
withstand the international competition 
and that large-scale production in the 
country would, by now, have ended. 
Recently, such a possibility did, in fact, 
appear as a dark cloud on the horizon, 
due to two separate events — the GATT 
negotiations and the creation of a single 
European market. The fact that, for the 
first time, agricultural products were 
included in the world trade negotiations 
put a question mark over all forms of 
protectionism including those rules which 
gave substance to the preferential access 
enjoyed by certain ACP products in the 
Community. The EC's own single market 
programme seemed to pose a particular 
threat to the banana trade since the 
special arrangements vis-à-vis 'tradi-
tional' markets were not consistent with 
the establishment of a genuinely frontier-
free Europe. 
At the time of writing, the GATT 
negotiations remain stalled but full trade 
liberalisation in the agricultural sector is 
clearly a longer term process and there 
does not appear to be any immediate 
threat to the special arrangements which 
Jamaica and other ACP countries have 
with the European Community. As re-
gards the specific issue of bananas, a new 
Community-wide solution has been pro-
posed which purportedly seeks to balance 
the interests of the ACPs, Community 
growers and the 'dollar-zone' producers. 
This was still subject to intense debate in 
the Council of Ministers at the time of 
going to press. 
When Dr Marshall Hall, who is the 
Managing Director of the Jamaica Pro-
ducers' Group Ltd (formerly the Jamaica 
Banana Producers' Association), spoke 
to The Courier, he was ready to put a 
brave face on the most recent Community 
proposals for a new banana regime. 
These proposals would provide reason-
ably generous tariff-free quotas for each 
banana-producing ACP country. 
Cheaper dollar-zone bananas would also, 
in effect, be granted a quota, although 
subject to a tariff of 100 ECUs per tonne. 
For imports above the determined 
quotas, a high tariff of ECU 850 would be 
levied. According to Dr Hall, 'Jamaican 
producers can live with this scheme' but 
he recognised the need for the local 
industry to become more efficient and 
competitive. He also pointed out that it 
was only access, and not prices, which 
would be guaranteed. In fact, the price of 
bananas in the Community dropped by 
almost £100 a tonne in 1992 as dollar-
zone producers stepped up their exports 
to the EC in anticipation of the single 
market, and this is obviously a source of 
concern to producers in Jamaica and 
elsewhere in the Caribbean. 
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Bauxite mining 
Production has risen hut income has fallen 
Jamaican rum 
Preferential access under the Lomé Convention 
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'Aiming to expand student numbers' 
Only a rash person would predict 
where the island's banana sector might be 
in five years' time, but the Jamaicans 
themselves have clearly recognised the 
precariousness of this particular export 
business. Diversification is seen to be the 
key. It is not coincidental that the 
Jamaica Producers' Group Ltd has drop­
ped 'banana' from its title and the 
company has successfully moved into the 
export of citrus fruits and other produce, 
although bananas remain as its core 
activity. 
Among the country's so-called 'non-
traditional' crops, yams to the value of 
almost US$ 10m were exported in 1991 
while other products traded included 
mangoes and cut flowers. Other 'tradi­
tional' crops which are exported in 
modest quantities include coffee, co­
conuts and pimentos. 
Social implications 
Although there is considerable en­
thusiasm in the private sector for recent 
liberalisation measures, the social impli­
cations of these changes — at least in the 
short term — are an obvious source of 
concern. Jamaica is certainly not unique 
in having to grapple with a serious crime 
problem but the apparently inexorable 
rise in violent criminal behaviour and, of 
course, the chronic drug problem, are 
now among the most serious challenges 
which the government must tackle. And 
while the underlying reasons are un­
doubtedly complex, only the most re­
actionary observer would fail to see at 
least some connection with poverty and 
unemployment. In an attempt to come to 
grips with the problem in the short-term, 
the government has focused on improv­
ing enforcement. The police force is not 
widely respected and reforms to this 
service are being considered. The army — 
whose discipline and reputation are much 
higher — has been brought in tem­
porarily to increase security on the streets 
and they are operating in tandem with the 
police. A recent decision to end a defacto 
of the private sector is to grasp new opporti 
moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty has also been applauded by many 
Jamaicans but it has attracted some 
criticism both internally and from out­
side. No executions had been carried out 
at the time of writing. 
For the longer term, the Government 
clearly hopes that economic improve­
ments, feeding down to the poorest levels 
of society, will have a positive impact on 
crime rates. Unfortunately, the evidence 
from more developed countries, most of 
which are also battling with ever-rising 
criminality, is less than encouraging. 
On a more positive note, Jamaica, in 
common with most of its Caribbean 
neighbours, puts a lot of emphasis into 
education and training. The outreach of 
the school system is on a par with most of 
the industrialised world and literacy rates 
are high as a result. Professor Gerald 
It may sometimes seem like an uphill 
struggle but Jamaicans appear ready to 
rise to the challenge 
Lalor of the University of the West Indies 
confirmed that his institution had largely 
escaped the government's budget cuts 
and talked of plans to expand the Mona 
Campus, which is the UWI's base in 
Jamaica, to accommodate a 50% increase 
in student numbers. He also spoke of the 
growing interest of businesses in edu­
cational investment, a fact which was 
reflected in the endowment of four 
university chairs by the private sector. 
The high level of educational attain­
ment is to be seen in many areas of 
Jamaican life but most notably in the 
wide range of cultural activities on the 
island. 
Looking to the future 
When one experiences the beauty of 
Jamaica, the hospitality of its people and 
the vibrancy of its culture, one is sure to 
be captivated. This is clearly a country 
with a great deal to offer but also, it must 
be said, a great deal to do. After years of 
economic stagnation — by no means all 
of which has been self-inflicted -- the 
signs are that, at last, it may be turning 
the corner. A new economic reality 
prevails and a new political consensus 
offers hope for sustained economic de­
velopment in the coming years. 
For government, the challenge is a 
familiar one, faced today by governments 
all over the world: how to continue 
fostering an enterprise culture while, at 
the same time, maintaining social equilib­
rium. 
For the private sector, the challenge is 
to grasp the new opportunities which 
have been presented to it and become the 
engine of a new prosperity. 
But, in the final analysis, the main 
challenge is for the people as a whole. In 
the quest for human development, it is 
human resources which provide the key. 
It may only be a pointer, but the 
remarkable response of the people last 
year to their currency crisis suggests that 
the Jamaicans are willing and able to rise 
to the challenge.o Simon HORNER 
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P.J. Patterson 
The new man at the helm 
When Michael Manley stood down as Prime Minister in 
March 1992, to be replaced by P.J. Patterson, many Caribbean 
commentators saw it as the end of an era. For more than twenty 
years, the charismatic and sometimes controversial leader of the 
People's National Party (PNP) had occupied a central position 
in the Jamaican political system — as Prime Minister for two 
terms in the 1970s, as the principal opposition figure during the 
government of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in the 1980s and 
then again in the topjob following the PNP's victory in 1989. 
Since the 1940s, when Jamaica elected its first Parliament by 
universal adult suffrage, the country's two political parties have 
vied with each other for power. For much of this time, the 
rivalry has been characterised by sharp ideological differences 
with the PNP favouring socialist policies while the JLP, despite 
its name, argued for a more free-market approach. But it would 
be an over-simplification to portray the political history of the 
country purely in terms of a classic left-right divide. The 
character and personality of the party leaders has also played a 
crucial role, ever since the founding fathers of Jamaica, the 
JLP's Alexander Bustamente (the first post-independence Prime 
Minister) and his PNP rival Norman Manley (Michael's father) 
locked horns in the early political debates. 
Powerful leaders 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the political landscape of Jamaica was 
dominated by the powerful personalities of Michael Manley and 
his arch-rival, Edward Seaga of the JLP, who is currently leader 
of the opposition. These two men offered very different visions 
for their country, and robust debate sometimes spilled over into 
conflict between their supporters, particularly in the polarised 
atmosphere of election campaigns. Despite this it was often 
difficult — at least for outsiders — to think of one without the 
other. The election of P.J. Patterson has changed all that. 
The new Prime Minister, (his first name is Percival, but he is 
more usually referred to by his initials 'PJ'), took office last year 
following a decisive victory over Labour Minister, Portia 
Simpson, in his party's leadership election. He is a lawyer by 
training, having studied at the University of the West Indies and 
the London School of Economics. He has been active in the PNP 
since 1955 and began his Parliamentary career in 1967 when he 
was nominated to serve in the Jamaica Senate. From 1970-1980, 
he was an elected member of the House of Representatives and 
he regained his old seat in the 1989 election which brought the 
PNP back to power. 
P.J. Patterson first entered the Cabinet in 1972 as Minister of 
Industry, Foreign Trade and Tourism. It was in this capacity 
that he led the Jamaican team in the negotiations which led to 
the establishment of CARICOM (Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
1974). He has also been closely involved in Lomé Convention 
discussions. In 1978, he was promoted to the post of Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Trade. Prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1992, Mr Patterson 
was Minister of Finance. 
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New leadership style 
The Prime Minister is regarded by many as representing a new 
and more pragmatic style of politics. He is capable of passionate 
oratory — a necessity for any political aspirant in Jamaica's 
Wstminster-style Parliament — but the emphasis in his publicity 
material, is on his 'ability to work in a 'non-confrontational' 
manner and to guide discussions in a way that 'allows equal 
respect for the opinions of all involved'. According to Minister 
of State, Terence Gillette, the new Prime Minister is 'less 
flambuoyant, less talkative and more serious' than his 
predecessor and recent opinion polls suggest that the voters 
approve of this style. 
During his first nine months at the helm, P.J. Patterson has 
certainly had a stormy passage. Rampant inflation, provoked 
by currency liberalisation, has undermined an already preca­
rious economic situation. The exigencies of IMF-influenced 
structural adjustment measures have brought pain to the public 
sector and provoked widespread industrial action while almost 
half of the country's J$26 billion budget has had to be set aside 
for debt repayment. Unemployment levels remain stubbornly 
high and the alarming crime rate — which must be influenced to 
some extent by the lack of job opportunities — threatens to 
damage the crucial tourist sector as well as business investment 
more generally. 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  15 JAMAICA 
Clearly, the challenges were, and still are formidable but the 
new Prime Minister is determined to steer the ship of state 
through to calmer waters. In fact, the first tentative signs of 
renewed confidence on the economic front appear now to be 
emerging. 
Election forecast 
When The Courier visited Jamaica in January, speculation 
was rife that a General Election would soon be called. Under the 
country's Constitution, it is the Prime Minister who decides on 
the date of polling and P.J. Patterson is doubtless anxious to 
obtain a mandate in his own right. The turbulence of his 
'honeymoon' period appears not to have affected his popularity 
— indeed, he seems to have emerged with his standing 
enchanced, and this is obviously a major consideration in any 
decision to go to the polls. Past Jamaican voting habits — or at 
least those of the crucial 'swing' voters — ought to give the 
Prime Minister cause for optimism. Traditionally, the electors 
have given the governing party two 'bites at the cherry' before 
switching to the opposition and the new incumbent must be 
fervently hoping that Jamaicans do not choose 1993 to break the 
habit ! 
It should be recognised that, in addition to the change in 
leadership style with a new Prime Minister, the policy 
environment in Jamaica has also undergone a radical trans­
formation although, admittedly, this process began somewhat 
earlier. In common with parties of the left in a number of the 
world's 'traditional' democracies, the PNP has felt obliged to 
abandon many of the 'socialist' elements of its programme and 
to turn to policies with a stronger free-market orientation. As a 
result, there is now a broader consensus in Jamaica on the 
economic fundamentals. Although this fact is unlikely to 
diminish the intense rivalry between the parties on the campaign 
trail, it helps contribute to the business confidence which is so 
vital for economic regeneration.o S.H. 
Economic confidence grows 
When Prime Minister Patterson spoke to The Courier in 
January, he was keen to stress the new economic orthodoxy 
which underpinned his government's approach. He began by 
pointing out that Jamaica, like so many other countries in the 
developing world, had been undertaking a programme of 
structural adjustmen in order to improve economic efficiency 
and competitiveness in international markets. The most 
decisive step, he said, was the decision to remove all foreign 
exchange controls and to have a rate for the currency which 
was market-determined. He continued: 'The immediate 
aftermath was a sharp drop in the value of the Jamaican dollar 
and we had to undertake a number of fiscal and monetary 
measures to deal with ¡his. Because so much of our economy is 
influenced by external factors, there was a sharp rise, in 
inflation during this interval. ' 
These measures, combined with the effort made by Jamaican 
foreign exchange-earners and by the people themselves, had 
succeeded in halting the slide of the dollar, and as a result ; 'we 
have enjoyed over the past nine months, a stable exchange rate, 
a marked reduction in inflation, an increase in foreign inflows 
and an unprecedented level of conjidence in the economic 
programmes we are pursuing. ' 
Mr Patterson went on to point out that 'most elements in the 
economy' were forecasting a significant level of growth for 
1993 and a growing belief that this could be sustained in the 
years to come. 
He also spoke of the 'extendedfund facility' recently agreed 
with the IMF which is scheduled to operate for three years. 
'The Government', he said, 'has indicated— with the support 
of the people — that we want this agreement to be our last and 
we are therefore working, not only to fulfil the IMF criteria but 
to reach a level of growth in the economy which would obviate 
the need for any continued dependence on IMF programmes. ' 
Media brief 
The media are an important element in 
Jamaica's vibrant democratic system. 
Despite the relatively small market, the 
country has no fewer than five radio 
stations as well as the JBC television 
channel. There are also two daily news­
papers (the long established 'Gleaner' 
and the 'Herald') and a selection of 
weekly journals. In January, a group of 
local businessmen launched a new title, 
the Observer', which will be published 
using the latest print technologies. Ini­
tially, it will come out weekly, but the aim 
is to turn it into a daily as soon as 
possible. 
Journalistic standards are generally 
regarded as good and reporters do not 
appear to have any qualms about tack­
ling controversial issues. To an outsider 
at least, the amount of radio and TV time 
set aside for political discussion and 
comment may come as something of a 
surprise. There are frequent debates 
about current affairs and all points of 
view can be heard. But then it must be 
remembered that Jamaica has one of the 
most politically aware electorates in the 
world. They probably wouldn't settle for 
anything less ! 
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Keen to deliver 
Senator David Coore, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade, talks about his 
country's external relations policies 
Senator David Coore has hada long and distinguished career spanning politics 
and the legal profession since he began private practice in Jamaica in 1952. He 
was elected to the pre-independence Legislative Council in 1959 and served as a 
member of the special committee that drafted the country's Constitution in 1962. 
Entering the House of Representatives in 1967, he went on to become Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, posts which he held for six years. This 
was followed by a period working for the Inter-American Development Bank 
with postings to the Dominican Republic, Barbados and the United States. 
The election of the People's National Party Government in 1989 saw David 
Coore return to ministerial office. He was appointed a Senator and given the job 
of looking after his country's foreign and trade relations. He is also leader of 
government business in the upper house. 
In this interview, Senator Coore speaks to The Courier about a range of trade 
and foreign policy issues. He also describes, in frank terms, the policy of the 
Jamaican Government regarding the two troubled countries which are its nearest 
neighbours — Haiti and Cuba. 
► Senator Coore. How would you 
characterise the current relationship be-
tween Jamaica and the European Com-
munity ? 
— It is very good. Aside from our links 
under the Lomé Convention, we have 
relations with all of the countries of 
Western Europe and have resident am­
bassadors in Brussels, London, Bonn and 
Geneva. We have a fair amount of trade 
with Europe — for historical reasons, 
mostly with the UK. On the aid side, 
there are substantial programmes, not­
ably with Germany and Italy, but also 
with France and, of course, the UK. And 
we are trying in particular to develop 
European tourism. This is a critical sector 
of our economy and is one of the main 
focuses of our activity in Europe. I should 
say that it has been progressing quite well 
in recent years but we are hoping to see it 
expand still further. To some extent, 
however, growth in this area is dependent 
on us being able to increase the number of 
direct air links. 
In general terms, therefore, we regard 
the EC as a very important area for trade, 
investment and tourism, in addition of 
course, to the programmes that we have 
under the Lomé Convention. 
I should also say that we have tradi­
tionally had good links with the countries 
of Eastern Europe through our embassy 
in Moscow. We had an important trading 
relationship with the former Soviet 
Union involving the exchange of bauxite 
and alumina for cash as well as Lada cars. 
As you can well understand, that arrange­
ment is in suspense at the moment. The 
problem is that the bauxite was going to 
the Ukraine while the cars came from 
Russia. This was obviously workable 
while they were both parts of the Soviet 
Union but things are different now and 
we are still working to find a new 
relationship with these countries. 
► There has been a lot of fairly heated 
discussion recently about bananas, and in 
particular about access to EC markets. 
The Community appears to have arrived at 
a formula which seeks to strike a balance 
between the various producers involved — 
in the EC itself in the so-called 'dollar 
zone' and in the ACP countries including 
Jamaica which have traditionally enjoyed 
preferential access. What is your view of 
the proposal? 
— We are not totally happy with it. We 
think that it has certain deficiencies but 
we recognise that, given the sharp divi­
sions which exist in Europe over the 
banana protocol, it is probably the best 
that could be achieved to protect our 
position under the Lomé Convention. 
Of course, it is all related to the GATT 
and we can't be certain that the new 
tarification proposal will actually achieve 
the same results as the previous regime 
involving specific licensing and quotas. 
We will just have to wait and see how it 
works out in practice. 
We also recognise that it is going to 
take some time for the proposal to be 
implemented. Consequently, we have 
been very keen to ensure that interim 
measures were put in place and this has 
now happened in that the status quo has 
been maintained until July. 
I should say that we preferred the 
original Commission proposal which, we 
thought, met our concerns to a greater 
extent. The current proposal appears to 
meet some of our concerns but, as I say, a 
lot will depend on how it actually 
operates in practice. 
► What about the trading position of 
sugar, which is also an important export 
product for Jamaica ? 
— Sugar is in a different position. The 
quota is not really affected by the single 
market. What it is affected by is the 
modification that is taking place in the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Community. Under the CAP, 
beet sugar enjoys a fairly healthy subsidy 
and since the price of beet sugar is used as 
a reference price for our own cane sugar, 
the position has been reasonably satisfac-
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tory for us. But the beet sugar price is 
under continuous siege — because of the 
pressure to modify the CAP, reduce 
subsidies and so on. We have to antici­
pate that the reference price will be 
eroded. So while there is no immediate 
problem we can see that there may be 
difficulties in the longer term. 
► I was interested to hear your expla-
nation of the problems in the trading 
relationship with the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. Are you exploring 
other export avenues for the bauxite/ 
alumina industry? 
— Yes we are, although we don't have 
any real problem in selling our bauxite. 
We could find other markets. The real 
problem at the moment is that the world 
price is depressed and, therefore, the 
returns on it are not as good as they were 
a couple of years ago. But this is a 
function of the world economy and there 
is very little we can do about it. We hope 
that we will be able to reactivate the trade 
with Eastern Europe because they were 
taking over 5 million tonnes of bauxite 
but our industry was not dependent on 
that — it was the icing on the cake. I can 
say that the Ukrainians are very keen on 
maintaining the relationship and con­
tinuing to receive our bauxite. So I am 
hopeful that, as soon as they can get their 
act together, we will be able to resume the 
trade with them. 
► History seems to be littered with 
failed — or at least only partially success-
ful — attempts to achieve regional integ-
ration in the Caribbean. Indeed, a com-
mentator on local Jamaican television 
suggested recently that integration may 
not necessarily be a good thing and that 
small countries could survive quite happily 
without such arrangements. What do you 
think? 
— That is complete nonsense. All of us 
who are members of Caricom need the 
organisation. It is of value to us. Admit­
tedly, internal Caricom trade is not as 
great as it could be but it is still import­
ant; for example, here in Jamaica it 
provides a good market for our light 
manufacturing industries. But more sig­
nificantly, the existence of a single market 
in the Caricom region, which is what we 
are working towards, will increase its 
attraction to outside investors. You start 
with a larger market base and, with 
different islands having different com­
parative advantages, everyone is in a 
position to benefit from investments 
coming from outside. 
It also gives us a forum for negotiating 
on a more realistic basis, for example with 
the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) or with the countries of Latin 
America. 
Caricom is important to us in Jamaica 
and we believe that it needs to be 
strengthened. We also see it as a base 
from which the English-speaking Carib­
bean can integrate more closely with the 
Latin American region of which we are. 
geographically, a part. It is being recog­
nised more and more that our economic 
future is bound up with the extent to 
which we can integrate ourselves into the 
Latin American region — the wider 
Caribbean if you like — which embraces 
the countries of Central America and 
those of South America that border the 
Caribbean Sea. 
Although progress towards the some­
what grand objectives of the 
Chaguaramas Treaty ' has been slow, 
and marked by some disappointments, 
we have nevertheless moved forward. At 
the most recent meeting, decisions were 
taken on the basis of a report presented 
by the West Indian Commission which is 
chaired by Sonny Ramphal
2. These 
allow us to progress at a pace which 
everybody is comfortable with. There is 
no point in trying to move too quickly 
and not carrying everyone with you. 
So the future of Caricom is assured. It 
is just a question of how fast it is wise to 
go and the extent to which we can make 
use of the real benefits that accrue from 
being able to act as a coherent and 
cohesive body. 
Let me give you a practical example. 
One of the problems that we all face is the 
cost of diplomatic representation abroad. 
As we open up and develop trade and 
because we need technical and, in some 
cases, financial assistance from donor 
countries, it is essential for us to have a 
diplomatic presence in the outside world 
but it is an expensive business for small 
countries to do by themselves. One of the 
planks in the Commission's proposal is 
that we should begin to share the costs of 
diplomatic representation and I think 
1 The Treaty of Chaguaramas (Trinidad) of 1973 
established CARICOM. 
2 Former Secretary-General of the Common­
wealth. 
Bauxite mining 
Hoping to reactivate the trade with 
Eastern Europe 
that this will enable us — individually and 
collectively — to have a much wider 
outreach at lower cost. 
In fact, we have already been very 
successful in operating as a coherent 
group in fora such as the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), the United 
Nations, in our dealings with the USA 
and Canada and of course, in the ACP 
Group. We have worked closely together 
and have benefited from this. 
► I believe that the Dominican Re-
public applied to join Caricom ? 
— Yes, we had applications to join 
Caricom from the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and even Venezuela while Puerto 
Rico has expressed interest in some form 
of association. The conclusion we have 
come to is that it would be unwise for us 
to try and extend Caricom to include 
countries like the Dominican Republic 
because you could overburden the struc­
ture. The total population of Caricom is 
five million and the Dominican Republic 
alone has six million people. Haiti has 
another six million. So we have accepted 
the proposal put forward by the Ramphal 
Commission that the integrity of Ca­
ricom should be maintained. We have a 
lot in common, both historically and 
culturally, and we have already gone 
some way towards creating a single 
market. We think that to attempt to bring 
in other countries at this stage would set 
back that process. We aim to continue 
strengthening and deepening Caricom 
while at the same time, seeking to 
establish what is called an 'Association of 
Caribbean States' of which Caricom 
would be a part. That would enable us to 
establish functional linkages with the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, 
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the Dutch and French Islands and the 
Caribbean countries of Central and 
Southern America. So that is the way that 
we see the development of integration in 
this region — not through the enlarge­
ment of Caricom itself. 
► What is the Jamaican Government's 
position on relations with Haiti? 
— Our position is extremely clear. We 
were very active in the run-up to the 
election which brought President Aristide 
to power. We provided them with a lot of 
technical and other monitoring assist­
ance. Working very closely with the 
Carter Centre in Atlanta, the OAS and 
other organisations, we helped them to 
put their electoral machinery in place, to 
prepare voters' rolls and so on. So we 
were happy when the elections took place 
and a democratically elected President 
took office. 
Of course, it is not for us to determine 
who is the right person to be elected, but 
given the result of the election, Aristide is 
constitutionally the President of Haiti 
and he is the only person we recognise as 
such. Since he was ousted, we have played 
an active role in the OAS and elsewhere in 
seeking to mobilise assistance from the 
wider international community. We be­
lieve, firstly, in enforcing the embargo 
and secondly, in trying to achieve a 
political settlement and we will continue 
with that approach. We are quite un­
compromising in our contention that, 
unless and until Aristide is restored as a 
functioning President, we cannot recogn­
ise any regime there. We will continue to 
press for the people who have seized 
control — the junta, or whatever you 
want to call it — to be ostracised by the 
international community. We are also 
committed that once constitutional 
government is restored, we will do what­
ever we can to mobilise international 
assistance to meet Haiti's needs. They 
need a structure, a civil service and a 
security force that is separate from the 
army. They need massive economic ass­
istance to get their economy on the move 
again and all of this is going to require a 
lot of development cooperation from the 
international community as a whole. 
We have been very vocal in insisting 
that the OAS must be concerned not only 
with solving the legal problem, but also in 
making a commitment that once consti­
tutional government is restored, it will 
take on board the larger, long-term 
problem of creating a viable social, 
political and economic environment in 
Haiti. 
► You talk of ostracising those in 
control in Haiti but of course you have 
another close neighbour which has been 
ostracised by the United States for a long 
time. What is the state of relations between 
Jamaica and Cuba? 
— We have good relations with Cuba. 
They have a resident ambassador here 
and we have an ambassador to Cuba 
although he is stationed in Jamaica. 
Indeed, we have a long standing relation­
ship. Many Jamaicans have migrated to 
Cuba and still live there. We recognise, of 
course, that because of the hostility of the 
United States, we can't push this too far, 
otherwise the US becomes very critical 
towards us, but we do not observe the 
unilateral embargo which they have 
imposed on Cuba. 
There isn't a great deal of trade 
between us because our economies are 
similar in many ways but we do cooperate 
and are doing so increasingly in the field 
of tourism. Cuba is trying to rebuild this 
sector and there is no doubt that it could 
be an attractive destination. We recognise 
that we can both benefit from working 
together in this area. Jamaican en­
trepreneurs are operating tourist facilities 
in Cuba and there is a regular interchange 
of visitors between the two countries. 
We don't think that this antagonism 
between Cuba and the United States is 
permanent. One day it will come to an 
end and we think that when it does, it will 
have been very much in our interests to 
have established joint tourism oper­
ations. 
We are also about to sign some 
agreements with Cuba in areas of 
common interest. These involve ex­
changes of technology, the simplification 
of visa procedures and action against 
narcotics trafficking which is certainly a 
problem for both of us. 
Basically, our policy is to do what we 
can to help the reintegration of Cuba into 
the North and Latin American families as 
quickly as possible. We recognise, of 
course, that as long as the US maintains 
its present policy, this can only go so far, 
but nevertheless we feel — and increas­
ingly this is the view throughout Latin 
America — that we have to do everything 
we can to encourage the Cubans to open 
up their economy, to democratise their 
system and so on. We think that the best 
way of doing that is by letting them know 
that we want them on board, as part of 
the regional system. I think that with the 
collapse of their linkages with the Eastern 
bloc, they themselves are increasingly 
recognising that this is the only way 
forward. The one missing element is some 
shift in American policy. I don't expect 
that to happen overnight but I am 
hopeful that such a shift will begin to take 
place -- perhaps even without anyone 
admitting it. 
In short, we think that Cuba has to 
change, in terms of both its political and 
its economic system but it is much better 
if that change takes place in a peaceful 
way, rather than through another bloody 
revolution. 
► One final question concerning the 
future of cooperation with the European 
Community. You have spoken a lot about 
the common interests of the countries in the 
Caribbean basin. Yet the ACP Group 
consists of nations from three very distinct 
regions of the world, and its composition is 
based on historical linkages with EC 
Member States rather than any particular 
geographical or economic logic. What do 
you say to the suggestion that it may be 
time for the Community to look at a new 
configuration in its development cooper-
ation relationships? 
— I haven't really thought about that, 
to be quite frank. But I do think that it is 
in the interests of all three regions to 
continue to work together. Obviously, 
our concerns are not always identical but, 
by and large, we have a sufficient commo­
nality of interests to make it worthwhile 
for us to negotiate with the European 
Community as a group. 
Some people might feel that we in the 
Caribbean, for instance, could do better if 
we dealt with Community on our own. I 
do not hold to that view myself. I think 
that the European Community will in­
creasingly cease to regard their associ­
ation under the Lomé Convention as 
some sort of assuagement for their 
colonial past and more and more as a 
basis for commercial relationships. With 
this in mind, it is obviously better for us to 
operate as a larger grouping. 
In short, the best way for us to 
maintain our links with Europe and to 
maximise the benefits we can get is under 
the ACP umbrella. That - - at the 
moment at any rate — is our policy. O 
Interview by Simon HORNER 
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Hospitality is big business 
Jamaicas tourist sector 
It does not take a mathematical genius to recognise that when an island with 
fewer than two and half million inhabitants welcomes more than 1.3 million 
visitors to its shores in a twelve month period, this means big business. In fact, 
tourism is the single most important sector of the Jamaican economy 
contributing almost a third of total receipts from goods and services. It is also the 
most important source of foreign exchange, and provides employment, directly 
or indirectly, for tens of thousands of Jamaicans. 
In this article, we take a closer look at Jamaica's tourist industry with 
particular emphasis on the factors which have made it the most important 
economic sector in the country and on the challenges which it is facing in an ever-
more competitive global tourist market. 
Above, sun, sea and sand at Negril on the West Coast. 
Below, Navy Island at Port Antonio which used to belong to film star Errol Flynn 
Beach attractions 
There can be little doubt that, from the 
point of view of the natural environment, 
Jamaica has what it takes to attract 
holidaymakers in large numbers. Top of 
the list must be the beaches. Despite 
concerns over the possible health impli­
cations of exposure to the sun, the mainly 
light-skinned tourists from the rich (and 
cold) countries of the North seem to have 
lost none of their appetite for 'sun, sea 
and sand' vacations. Armed with their 
bottles of high-factor sun-cream, they 
migrate south in large numbers as the 
gloom of winter descends on the northern 
hemisphere and many choose to make 
their landfall in Jamaica. And who can 
deny the therapeutic effects of relaxing on 
a pristine beach of the finest white sand, 
with a glass of rum or fruit punch and one 
of the world's most pleasant natural 
swimming pools just a few paces away? 
But Jamaica has a great deal more to offer 
than just beaches. Despite its small size, it 
has a beautiful and rugged interior with 
mountains rising to a peak of more than 
2000 metres. It has river gorges, water­
falls, cave systems, stunning bird life and 
an abundance of colourful flora whose 
lingering scents provide a constant re­
minder of the tropical setting. When the 
late Errol Flynn was forced by a storm to 
seek a haven for his yacht on Jamaica's 
shores, he was so captivated by the beauty 
around him that he chose to spend most 
of the remaining years of his life there. 
Few overseas tourists have that option, 
but the story underlines the country's 
potential for 'capturing' its visitors and 
inducing them to return year after year. 
Good infrastructure 
Of course Jamaica is not unique in its 
tropical beauty and nature alone cannot 
supply the needs of modern mass tour­
ism. Proper accomodation, facilities for 
entertainment, good food and high 
quality service are all essential elements 
for a successful tourist venture and it is 
here that Jamaica seems to be offering a 
winning formula. In the resort areas on 
the north and west coasts, a great deal of 
money has been invested in tourist 
infrastructure from the main point of 
arrival at Sangster International Airport 
to the restaurants, hotels and villas where 
the visitors will wine, dine and (at the end 
of the day) recline. Jamaica is the third 
most popular holiday destination in the 
Caribbean after the Bahamas and the 
Dutch Antilles and this is reflected in the 
extensive infrastructure. It is noteworthy 
that local entrepreneurs have played a 
prominent part in developing the tourist 
product and the local staff who run the 
operations are well-trained and friendly. 
Jamaicans are naturally gregarious and 
this is an important element in the 
equation as it means that visitors are 
made to feel genuinely welcome. The 
country also has a rich and vibrant 
culture. The natural sense of rhythm for 
which the Caribbean islander is re­
nowned finds expression in reggae and 
calypso. The former is Jamaica's own 
unique contribution to contemporary 
music which was made famous by Bob 
Marley, and it provides a lively back­
ground in the bars and streets. The latter, 
which was first popularised by Harry 
Belafonte, belongs, strictly speaking, .to 
Trinidad and even if it is frowned-on by 
some cultural purists, there is no doubt­
ing its popularity with many visitors. 
The negative side 
Of course, perfection is an aspiration 
that can rarely be achieved and there are, 
as always, some negative elements which 
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ought to be mentioned. The first, which is 
beyond the effective control of the au­
thorities, is associated with the climate. It 
is ironic that a country whose principal 
attraction is its idyllic weather should be 
thus afflicted, but Jamaica is in the 
hurricane zone and during the season 
from June to October, there is always the 
risk that it will be battered by a fierce 
storm. To be fair, it is rare for the island 
to experience the full and damaging force 
of a tropical storm — the last bad one was 
Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 — and the 
experience is more likely to be frightening 
than life-threatening. However, the in­
direct effects on tourism, as on other 
sectors of the economy, can be serious 
when the infrastructure sustains damage. 
A second negative factor which, from 
the point of view of the authorities has 
attracted unwelcome attention in recent 
years, is the security situation. In 
common with many other countries, the 
problem of crime in Jamaica seems to be 
growing and there is concern about the 
capacity of the police to deal with it. 
Some tourists have been attacked and. in 
1991, the US State Department issued a 
'travel advisory' which certainly did not 
help Jamaica's image as a tourist desti­
nation. It is important, however, to put 
the problem into perspective. Much of 
the island's crime is associated with 
drugs, poverty and social conditions in 
the poorer areas, and serious criminal 
acts tend to be concentrated in these 
locations. Security — particularly in the 
exclusive beach resorts — is relatively 
good, and the reality is that the average 
tourist is probably more at risk from a 
traffic accident in his home country as he 
drives to the airport for his flight to the 
Caribbean. This, of course, does not 
mean that the visitor should not take 
sensible precautions. 
From the perspective of the tourist 
industry, the island's flourishing drug 
trade appears to present something of a 
dilemma. There is no question of the 
authorities openly sanctioning the ac­
tivity but neither do they appear to be 
'striving too officiously' to stamp it out, 
to paraphrase a well-known legal ex­
pression. As a result, soft and reputedly 
not-so-soft drugs are widely available in 
the tourist areas. (The Courier was 
approached on three separate occasions 
by young people offering to sell ganja 
during its recent 'Country Report' visit). 
It is a sad fact that for some tourists drug 
availability is a selling point when they 
choose their holiday destination. Con­
versely, for some Jamaicans, the trade 
provides a living in an economic environ­
ment where 'legitimate' work is in short 
supply. It should be understood, how­
ever, that offenders (both Jamaicans and 
foreign) are apprehended from time to 
time and the penalties can be severe. 
A view of the north coast 
near Montego Bay. 
The environmental effects of coastal 
tourist developments are increasingly 
being recognised 
Environmental worries 
The growth of tourism over the past 
decade and a half — the number of 
visitors has trebled since 1976 — com­
bined with a more general awareness of 
'green' issues, has also given rise to 
concerns about the environment. Large 
scale tourist developments, concentrated 
in sensitive coastal areas, will inevitably 
have an impact on local communities and 
wildlife habitats. Mr Roy Miller, who is 
Deputy Director of the Jamaica Tourist 
Board acknowledged these concerns 
when he spoke to The Courier and he 
emphasised the importance of developing 
'eco-tourism' as a viable alternative. 
Although in its early stages, the first steps 
have already been taken with the launch 
in 1991 of the National Park System. New 
resort projects, particularly in areas such 
as Ocho Rios and Negril where substan­
tial tourist developments are already in 
place, are also likely to be subject to more 
stringent environmental assessment in 
the future. 
Keeping up with the competition 
Jamaica was a popular destination for 
the well-to-do long before the growth of 
prosperity in Europe and North America 
engendered the phenomenon of mass 
tourism which we see today. But the 
country has had to adapt to meet the 
changing market in order to stay ahead of 
the emerging competition both in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere in an increas­
ingly accessible world. The economic 
difficulties provoked by the slump in 
earnings from bauxite and alumina, the 
structural problems facing traditional 
agricultural exports and the oil shocks of 
the 1970s have at the same time increased 
Jamaica's dependence on tourism while 
reducing the scope of government to 
invest in the basic infrastructure vital to 
maintaining competitiveness. 
Despite these difficulties, the govern­
ment, with considerable help from its 
overseas partners, has maintained a 
capital investment programme which is 
designed to cope with the increase in 
tourist arrivals. Recent projects have 
included major upgrading of water and 
sewerage facilities at Montego Bay and 
Negril, improvements to the Northern 
Coastal Highway and the expansion of 
the terminal at Sangster International 
Airport. (It is generally acknowledged 
that a visitor's first and last impressions 
of a country are particularly important !) 
These investments should help Jamaica 
to maintain its position in the forefront of 
Caribbean tourism. 
Local feelings 
Jamaican warmth and hospitality have 
already been mentioned, but it is worth 
posing the question whether tourism 
provokes any resentment among the 
majority of Jamaicans who live outside 
the resorts. It is certainly true to say that a 
lot of money has gone into the tourist 
areas and the largest population concen­
tration is in the Kingston metropolitan 
area, which sees few holidaymakers. The 
government is aware of the danger that it 
might be seen to favour the tourists at the 
expense of ordinary people and it strives 
to achieve a fair balance in its investment 
programmes. 
There has been some criticism, notably 
from small independent operators such as 
restaurateurs and taxi firms, of the 
increasing trend towards 'all inclusive' 
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Some basic facts about Jamaican tourism' 
Figures in thousands 
Total visitors 
Stopovers 
Cruise passengers 
Armed forces 
1976 
471 
(328) 
(141) 
(2) 
Origin of visitors 
United States 
Canada 
United Kingdom 
Other Europe 
Other 
1990 
1236 
(841) 
(385) 
(10) 
566 
114 
82 
39 
40 
1991 
1340 
(845) 
(490) 
(5) 
544 
94 
89 
71 
46 
1992 
first 10 
months 
1265 
(742) 
(519) 
(4) 
465 
.80 
78 
73 
46 
% change 
199] to 
1992** 
+ 17.5 
+ 7.2 
+ 36.4 
+ 2.4 
+ 7.2 
+ 7.0 
+ 37.0 
+ 23.4 
Montego Bay was the port of arrival for 691 000 stopover visitors. 154 000 arrived via 
Kingston. 
428 cruise ships called in at Jamaican ports (1990- 336). 286 of these came to Ocho Rios 
while 138 docked at Montego Bay. 
The average length of stay for stopover visitors was 10.9 nights. U K visitors stayed longest 
(20.8 nights) while those from the USA averaged 8.7 nights. 
The number of hotel rooms and beds available rose to 9807 and 20 011 respectively ( 1990 -
9070 and 18 433). 
Although the number of stopover visitors increased, percentage occupancy rates fell due to 
the increase in available accommodation. Room occupancy stood at 57.9% (62.1% in 
1990). Bed occupancy was 54.5% (58.9% in 1990). 
22 788 people were employed in the accommodation sector (20 561 in 1990). 
Visitors spent an estimated US$764 million (1990 US$740 million). 
There were 162 000 home visits from Jamaican nationals living abroad. 
* Source : Ministry of Tourism, Annual Travel Figures 1991 and interim Figures covering the 
first ten months of 1992. 
** In calculating the percentage changes, the partial figures for 1992 have been compared with 
the equivalent January-October figures for 1991. The estimate for total arrivals for 1992 
was 1.56 million representing a 16% increase over 1991. 
resort holidays, in which the visitor is 
whisked from the airport to his exclusive 
hotel by the beach, only to emerge two 
weeks later to catch the return flight. 
Cruise passengers, who make up an 
increasing proportion of'visitor arrivals' 
are also sometimes resented for the fact 
that they reputedly contribute little to the 
economy in their very brief visits to the 
island. 
Responding to the first of these criti­
cisms, the major hotel operators insist 
that they must offer what the ho-
lidaymaker wants if they are to attract 
and retain his or her custom. All-inclusive 
resort holidays are undoubtedly gaining 
in popularity. In addition, it is stressed 
that these operations still generate jobs as 
well as significant business for local 
entrepreneurs. In 1991, almost 23000 
people worked in the accomodation 
sector. Many more, employed in areas 
such as food and beverages, and con­
struction, benefited indirectly. Regarding 
cruise ship passengers, who obviously 
spend no money on local accommod­
ation, it is pointed out in their defence 
that they still bring in substantial 
amounts to the country overall. In 1991, 
they spent an average of US$73 each 
during their short stay. These are power­
ful economic arguments which are dif­
ficult to refute and it appears that the 
majority of Jamaicans seem to recognise 
this. 
Performance and prospects 
As ever, the fortunes of the tourist 
sector are dependent on a wide range of 
factors, many of which are beyond the 
control of the industry or the island's 
government. Three quarters of the tour­
ists who come to Jamaica are from the 
United States and Canada. In 1991, there 
was a significant drop in arrivals from 
both of these countries, apparently due to 
a combination of the Gulf War and the 
economic downturn. However, the fi­
gures for the first ten months of 1992 
point to a recovery in this market. 
Tourists at Sangster International 
Airport checking in j'or the return flight 
The bulk of Jamaica's European ho­
lidaymakers come from the United King­
dom and they appear not to have been 
affected, either by Gulf War fears or by 
the deep recession in their own country. 
Indeed, the number of 'stopovers' in­
creased by almost 7000 from 1990 to 1991 
and the trend appears to have continued 
during 1992. 
The big success stories for Jamaican 
tourism, however, are in the mainland 
European and Japanese markets. The 
number of European tourists (excluding 
those from the UK) almost doubled in 
1991 to more than 70 000 and that figure 
had already been surpassed in the first ten 
months of 1992. In proportionate terms, 
the rise in Japanese visitors is even greater 
although the actual numbers are more 
modest (12 662 from January to October 
1992). 
The Jamaican Tourist Board obviously 
keeps a close eye on economic trends in its 
principal markets and, with indications 
of a recovery in North America but 
continuing economic gloom in Europe, 
more attention is likely to be devoted to 
the former, at least in the short term. 
In the longer term, the industry seems 
certain to maintain its pre-eminent po­
sition in the Jamaican economy. New 
competitive challenges — perhaps from 
neighbouring Cuba, if and when it 
emerges from its cold war purdah — seem 
likely, while unforeseen natural disasters, 
or increasing security problems cannot be 
ruled out. But the remarkable success of 
the sector over the past two decades, 
during a period of sustained economic 
difficulties for the country as a whole, 
reveals a resilience and adaptability 
which bodes well for the future.o S.H. 
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The ideological battle is over but 
policy differences remain 
Interview with Bruce Golding 
Chairman of the Jamaica Labour Party 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Jamaican people were presented with a 
clear choice in elections. The People's National Party offeredan interventionist 
and broadly socialist programme while the Jamaica Labour Party supported 
more liberal economic policies. Now that the PN Ρ has embraced the principles of 
the free market, this ideological split has largely disappeared. The current 
ascendancy of economic liberalism ought to be a source of some satisfaction to 
the party in Jamaica which has traditionally espoused it but it also presents them 
with a dilemma: how to project a distinctive agenda which is attractive to the 
crucial floating voters. 
Bruce Golding who is Chairman of the JLP insists that, despite the new 
economic consensus, there are still important differences between his own party's 
approach and that of the governing PNP. In this interview with The Courier, he 
explains these differences and talks about the J LP's electoral prospects. 
Asia and the Pacific. Twenty-two years 
ago, Singapore was just behind us in 
terms of growth and development. 
Today, they are way ahead of us. They 
succeeded because they had a very pro­
active government and we support the 
same approach here in Jamaica. 
► Mr Golding, how does your party's 
approach to solving Jamaica's economic 
problems differ from that of the Govern-
ment? 
— The ideological differences have 
now disappeared to the extent that the 
governing party has abandoned its social­
ist commitments of the 1970s. There are, 
however, some very sharp policy dif­
ferences over the role of government in 
the economy. The present government 
has adopted a 'hands-off approach. 
They seem to be convinced that, on the 
economic front, the best thing to do is 
nothing. They want to leave it to the 
private sector, confining themselves to 
monetary and fiscal management and the 
provision of basic social services. They 
say that this is an effort to create an 
investment-friendly environment. We 
differ on this fundamental point because 
we take the view that a country in our 
position — where there is a lack of 
investment, no real growth in tradeable 
goods and services, bigh unemployment 
and a significant balance of payments 
deficit — cannot leave the solution solely 
to the organic workings of the private 
sector. 
Now I am not for one moment suggest­
ing that government should become 
dominant or that it should start taking 
economic initiatives in a unilateral way. I 
believe that if we are to succeed, there has 
to be a close synergy between government 
and private enterprise with policies and 
strategies being worked out together. 
There is no point trying to drag the 
private sector, kicking and screaming, 
into doing things they don't believe in. 
But we also see the need for an overall 
investment policy framework that seeks 
to identify the principal instruments of 
growth and development and the areas 
where this will take place. Government 
has a clear role here in pulling the whole 
thing together and providing the neces­
sary incentives. 
I would not necessarily rule out the 
possibility that there may be a need for 
government equity participation, because 
very often, when it comes to new invest­
ment initiatives, the private sector is 
somewhat timid. Perhaps they need to 
have their hands held for a little while. We 
have to recognise that in the past, and 
particularly during the 1970s, there was a 
massive migration of capital and skills — 
management and investment skills in 
particular. As a result, we have lost much 
of the investment ethic. The private sector 
is not as bold or courageous as it used to 
be in embarking on risk investment. They 
prefer to play the stock market where 
money is simply moving around within a 
particular pool, or to deposit their money 
at the central bank where they can get a 
substantial and secure rate of return. But 
that does not create a single job; it does 
not put one root of cane in the ground ; it 
does not put one piece of new machinery 
into a factory so that wc can produce and 
export more. 
The government seems to be hoping 
that, having liberalised exchange controls 
and taken various other measures to open 
up the economy, it will all now happen 
gcncrically. Wc disagree with this analy­
sis. 
Look at the experience of other coun­
tries. We can't really compare ourselves 
with the industrialised nations, but I 
think we can look for comparisons in 
► You mentioned last year's currency 
liberalisation which obviously caused a 
major upheaval. It is widely believed that 
the 'Butch Stewart initiative', which was 
taken up by other entrepreneurs and 
actively supported by ordinary Jamaicans, 
stabilised the currency. Is this belief 
correct, in your view? 
- I think that most of the analyses I 
have heard have missed the fundamental 
point. I should stress that we are not 
opposed to liberalisation. It was in the 
medium-term economic programme 
which we produced in 1988 when we were 
in government. We planned a gradual 
move towards currency liberalisation to 
be completed by fiscal year 1993/94. But 
we also warned that if it happened too 
abruptly, we would pay the price in terms 
of movement in the exchange rate and 
that's exactly what happened. By the end 
of fiscal year 1991/92 which ended last 
March, inflation had reached 105%. This 
had an impact on the poor and middle 
classes alike. It affected the cost of our 
debt servicing and the government's 
ability to provide basic services. That ' 
level of inflation also discourages invest­
ment and I think that we will be reaping 
the consequences of that for a long time. 
We were not opposed to liberalisation as 
an objective, but we would have been far 
more gradual in our approach to it. 
Now in terms of what actually hap­
pened, the Butch Stewart initiative clearly 
had an impact. I don't think one could 
argue otherwise. It put pressure on other 
major foreign exchange earners to take 
similar action and the people rallied 
round. But I think it is true to say that 
that effort, commendable as it was, would 
not have succeeded if it had not been 
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supported by very tight monetary policies 
designed essentially to mop up liquidity. 
And policy in that area has not been as 
consistent as it should have been. In June 
1991, for example, the Prime Minister, 
who was then Minister of Finance, was 
announcing with great accomplishment, 
the reduction of interest rates at a time 
when they should not have been reduced. 
That was one of the reasons why the 
measures in the early part of last year had 
to be so severe but there is no doubt that 
they helped to contain demand and 
therefore to ease pressure on the cur­
rency. 
I am not sure that we are home yet, 
however. While we have had a rate of 
JS22.20 to one US dollar for quite a while 
now and people are inclined to think that 
this is a stable rate, there do seem to be 
some problems in obtaining foreign 
exchange. I myself needed US$2000 to 
send my daughter back to school last 
week and I had considerable difficulty in 
getting it. Now I do believe that my 
position does give me a little premium in 
dealing with bank managers. If I could 
have had that level of difficulty, where I 
had to shop around and it took me a 
couple of days, I can imagine that 
somebody who needs $ 100 000 to bring in 
raw materials probably has problems as 
well. 
► One of the most serious issues facing 
the country is the crime and security 
problem. How has this arisen and what 
would you do to tackle it ? 
— This is not a new problem but it has 
become particularly accentuated in 
recent times. Crime is a factor, principally 
of two things. The first is social con­
ditions — poverty and all that goes with it 
as well as a breakdown in traditional 
community and family structures. These 
are things which have to be tackled with 
long-term policies. 
But you can't afford simply to wait for 
the long term treatment to work. It is also 
an immediate problem which threatens 
much of what is vital to us. This involves 
looking at the other factor which is the 
serious deterioration in our law enforce­
ment capabilities. The police force is run 
down — not just as regards equipment 
and resources but also in terms of 
qualification, spirit and morale. It needs 
major reform. We have made some 
proposals, which I don't think have 
attracted widespread popular support, to 
amalgamate the police and the army. We 
really don't feel that a country of our size, 
living in the world that we now live in, 
really needs an army. They are there, in 
effect, to come in and clean up where the 
police have failed and while that has been 
helpful, we don't believe it is the most 
effective way of dealing with crime and 
violence. 
A criminal will always look at the odds. 
If the chances of his being caught are only 
two in ten, he will probably decide it is 
worth the risk. And the more he gets away 
with it, the more he is likely to do it again, 
so that it becomes a pattern. This is 
essentially what has happened here. 
I feel that we need to get the police back 
into the community. They are too busy in 
these great installations that they call 
police stations. The police officer should 
be the person whom the community looks 
to for protection, not someone to be 
feared. 
There have been various reports on this 
problem and I am optimistic that we will 
see progress in the coming year. A special 
task force, which was set up in agreement 
between the government and the oppo­
sition, has been working on the issue. It is 
too early to say, however, whether their 
recommendations will go far enough. 
► What is the J LP's position on the 
issue of Caribbean integration? 
— We think that the efforts in this area 
have been misdirected. There is an undue 
emphasis on political integration which 
we feel is neither necessary nor workable. 
Too much of the effort is being driven by 
some sort of emotional, sentimental idea 
of commonality, history and culture 
rather than by the solid economic benefits 
that can be gained. Because of this, I 
think we keep missing the goal. Instead of 
the present crusade for deeper integration 
within Caricom, we think it should be 
widened. 
Let us consider Caricom. At the 
moment, it has a population of five and a 
half million which is a joke in terms of the 
world economy. That is the size of a 
European city. We feel that we ought to 
be looking beyond the English-speaking 
Caribbean to relationships in the first 
instance with other countries in the Basin 
such as Venezuela, Suriname and the 
French and Dutch Islands. We would 
then be looking at a population of some 
30 million and an economic unit that 
would make more sense in terms of 
viability, market strength, skills, invest­
ment and so on. And we wouldn't 
necessarily want to stop there. In the 
longer term, we should also be looking at 
closer links with all the Andean countries. 
I also believe that we must seek to 
secure some accomodation within 
NAFTA >. Currently, the talk is about 
preferential arrangements and that may 
be necessary because of our small size. 
But the larger you are, the less dependent 
you become on these types of con­
cessionary arrangement and, even if we 
have to seek concessions, they should be 
for a limited duration. Part of the 
problem of developing countries such as 
Jamaica is that we never allow ourselves 
to be weaned from the nipple bottle. We 
must accept that eventually, we shall have 
to stand on our own two feet. 
► What about the current political 
situation? There is a lot of election 
speculation, now that the PNP has taken 
the lead in the polls. How confident are you 
of being able to claw that back? 
- We have a very difficult task to win 
the election. I think that much of what is 
carrying the PNP along is clever and 
sophisticated management of public per­
ception. A lot has been said about the 
Prime Minister's style and about the 
supposed social tranquility and economic 
stability. The raw experience of the 
majority of the population is very dif­
ferent, but they are caught up in a kind of 
lull having been through a long period 
when prices were going up almost every 
week. So there is a general feeling of relief. 
The Labour Party of course has its own 
internal problems that have not entirely 
been resolved and that has also affected 
us because it tends to diminish our 
attractiveness as an alternative govern­
ment. We are not ready and we do have 
that problem. But politics in Jamaica are 
very dynamic and it is difficult to say 
what the situation will be like in two 
months from now
 2. 
We are mounting a campaign which 
seeks to point out that the country is just 
marking time — that it is going nowhere 
fast — and that a lot of this is due to the 
fact that the government has abandoned 
its role and the country is basically being 
run on autopilot. Deliberate decisions 
and initiatives are needed and we intend 
to outline the policies that we want to see 
implemented. Whether we have enough 
time to get the message across is another 
matter. 
► One final question. Mr Seaga ob-
viously isn't going to be around for ever. 
Are you likely to put you name forward for 
the JLP leadership ? 
- You know that we are avid cric­
keters here. Well, in cricketing terms, I 
don't lift my bat until the bowler has 
released the ball.o 
Interview by Simon HORNER 
1 The North American Free Trade Area which 
encompasses Canada, the United States and Mexico. 
2 This interview was conducted on 18 January 
1993. 
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Dancing to a Jamaican tune 
A profile of Professor Rex Nettleford 
Rex Nettleford is, to use an old-
fashioned expression, a 'man of parts' — 
one of those people whose diverse inter-
ests and activities and whose boundless 
energy prompt admiration and amaze-
ment in equal measure. 
On reflection, 'boundless' is an un-
suitable adjective. For Rex Nettleford is a 
dancer — as well as being a university 
professor, historian, trade union activist, 
choreographer, director, author and all-
round cultural oracle. 
The Courier met this remarkable man 
in his office at the Mona Campus of the 
University of the West Indies, where he is 
Professor of Continuing Studies and Pro-
Vice-Chancellor with responsibility for 
outreach and institutional relations. A 
historian by training, his studies included 
a period as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford 
University and his current teaching time-
table embraces history, politics and 
culture, but the achievement for which he 
is particularly renowned is his central role 
— over thirty years — in the famous 
Jamaica National Dance Theatre Com-
pany. 
The NDTC came into being in 1962 
and the young Rex Nettleford was one of 
the leading lights in the group which 
helped to set it up. The inspiration behind 
the company is perhaps best summed up 
by the professor's own words, taken from 
the brochure which was published to 
celebrate its thirtieth anniversary. 
'In setting ourselves the task of finding 
our own voices (or should I say feet ?) in 
the art of dance, we have from the 
beginning pledged ourselves to forging a 
vocabulary, technique and style rooted in 
the realities of Jamaican and wider Carib-
bean life. This has in no way ruled out the 
fertilising energy of discoveries from other 
civilisations. But we have been very aware 
that none but ourselves can... find oursel-
ves. ' 
Over three decades, the company has 
certainly succeeded in forging a uniquely 
Jamaican vocabulary, technique and 
style — which has been critically ac-
claimed throughout the world. Indeed, 
one measure of the success of this still 
essentially amateur group, is to be found 
in the 'roll-call' of international venues 
where it has performed while on tour. 
The dance forms evolved at the NDTC 
do not, however, necessarily fit a single 
mould or concept. The cultural currents 
and eddies which have swirled in and out 
of the Caribbean Sea for centuries have 
created a kaleidescope where elements of 
the different original influences mingle, 
but can still be identified. 
Nor are the dances always comfortable 
to the eye. As Nettleford, who has himself 
danced in many productions as well as 
choreographing and directing various 
works, points out; 'where being 'enter-
taining' demands little more than what is 
expected of traditional minstrelsy we 
recoil from such an easy and demeaning 
route'. High standards indeed, and ones 
which do not always equate with com-
mercial success. But the NDTC refuses to 
'compromise its vision' and it is worth 
noting that it has succeeded over the years 
without direct government subsidy. 
The success of the NDTC would have 
made an interesting subject on its own for 
an interview, but when Professor Net-
tleford spoke to The Courier, he chose to 
tackle a broader canvass, revealing in the 
process the eclectic nature of his interests. 
He spoke of Jamaica's economic prob-
lems, concerns about social justice and 
equality but above all about 'an intense 
engagement in the exercise of creative 
imagination' which has arguably made 
Jamaica the cultural capital of the Carib-
bean. He stressed the impact of his own 
small island on the popular music of the 
wider world, referring in particular to 
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Bob Marley as a 'global force'. But even 
this, he argued, was only 'the tip of the 
iceberg' with a great deal more happening 
on the ground in Jamaica. 
He went on to refer to the 'excellent 
partnership which exists between the 
government and the people' in the field of 
cultural endeavour, not forgetting the 
private sector which had always played a 
role in helping the arts. The collective 
experience of the Jamaican people had 
been a 'tremendous source of energy' and 
the result was a strong sense of cohesion 
in civil society. 
The Professor also spoke about anoth-
er of Jamaica's unique cultural events — 
the Pantomime — which had not 'missed 
a day since 194Γ. This event, which bears 
a certain resemblance to the fairy-tale 
performances familiar to English-
speakers in Europe, is a highly popular 
musical comedy which satirises local 
situations and people. Jamaican folklore 
supplies many of the characters and 
Jamaican music features prominently. 
One of the reasons for abundance of 
cultural activity in Jamaica, Nettleford 
believes, is the fact that the people have 
traditionally 'sought to honour achievers 
in the area of creative intellect and 
imagination'. 
Finally, when asked about the (perni-
cious?) influence of American culture, 
the professor was surprisingly sanguine. 
He spoke of the challenge to develop 
organic alternatives but also was keen to 
point out that Jamaican reggae had gone 
out into the world. In short, he saw no 
objection to cross-cultural pollination. 
Or as he put it ; 'by all means, put fertiliser 
to the soil. All we have to do is to make 
sure that the fertiliser does not become 
the soil'.O S.H. 
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Profüe 
Area: 11 424km
2 (4411 square miles) 
Population: 2 435800(1991) 
Growth rate: 0.9% (over 1990) 
Density: 213 per km
2 
Capital: Kingston 
Government: Bicameral parliamentary democracy 
Head of State : Queen Elizabeth, represented in Jamaica by a 
Governor-General. (Discussions are currently under way with a 
view to moving towards a republican system) 
Prime Minister: P.J. Patterson (People's National Party) 
Leader of the Opposition: Edward Seaga (Jamaica Labour 
Party) 
Party Representation in the House of Assembly (February 1993) : 
PNP 46 seats, JLP 14 seats (election due shortly) 
Currency: Jamaican Dollar (US$ 1 = J$ 22.20 - January 1993) 
Inflation: 1990 - 29.8%, 1991 - 80.2%. The year-on-year rate 
topped 100% in early 1992 but dropped sharply thereafter. For 
the first nine months of 1992, the rate was 37%. In September 
1992, prices rose by only 1 % pointing to further steep falls in the 
annual rate as the one-off effects of the currency devaluation 
worked through the system. 
1990  1991 
Gross Domestic Product: (in 
JSbn) 
at current prices 
at constant price 
(1986 base year) 
Real GDP growth rate 
Balance of payments (in 
US$m) 
Goods 
Services 
Principal exports (in US$m) 
Alumina 
Bauxite 
Sugar 
Bananas 
Rum 
29.82 
16.92 
4.8% 
- 604.7 
-784.9 
+ 180.2 
625.3 
103.0 
85.8 
37.7 
17.2 
42.37 
16.95 
0.2% 
-404.3 
-654.3 
+ 250.0 
543.0 
112.9 
87.4 
45.1 
15.4 
Source: Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1991 prepared by the Planning 
Institute of Jamaica. JAMAICA 
Cooperation with the European 
Community 
by Jean-Claude HEYRAUD * 
Since 1976, many of the privileged relations between Jamaica and the United 
Kingdom have been taken over by the European Community, through the Lomé 
Convention, and are now based on reciprocal interests in a new spirit of equal 
partnership. They and the EC's relations with the other countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific have been institutionalised in various ways and one of the 
institutions, the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, which takes place at least once a year, 
met in Kingston, the capital of Jamaica, in May of last year. 
The main thing which the Lomé Convention provides is a stable, long-term 
framework, both for the development of trade relations with Europe and for the 
country's economic and social development in general, while there is also shorter-term 
support for the stabilisation and structural adjustment of the economy. 
Jamaican bananas, sugar and 
rum — Community alcohol. 
Trade with Europe remains dominated 
by two Jamaican exports, sugar and 
bananas, once the bulwark of relations 
with the United Kingdom. Two Lomé 
protocols guarantee continuing access for 
these two products, which are vital to 
Jamaica in terms not just of economic 
advantage and export earnings (12.6% of 
the total in 1991, and 78% of agricultural 
export earnings), but of employment and 
a safe income to small peasants and rural 
workers. 
As with other ACPs in the region. 
Jamaican bananas have so far had com-
pletely free access to their only export 
market, that of the United Kingdom. But 
with the coming of Europe's single 
market this year and the disappearance of 
national markets inside the Community 
there is to be a new system though, as 
agreed in the Convention, it attempts not 
to place traditional ACP suppliers in a 
less favourable situation on the Com-
munity market than they were before. 
Like other countries in the region. 
Jamaica has remained alert and still keeps 
a very close eye on Community decisions 
in this field — on which the ACPs are 
always consulted first. 
Although Jamaica's banana output 
was hit hard by Hurricane Gilbert in 
1988, it recovered fast and exports rose to 
75 290 t in 1991, with even better figures 
expected for 1992. 
Bananas and 15 of the island's other 
agricultural products are covered by the 
Lomé Convention's export revenue sta-
bilisation system, Stabex, which cushions 
drastic fluctuations in earnings. Jamaica 
has used it once for bananas in 1981. 
ACP producers have to compete with 
the cheaper Latin American bananas by 
ensuring high quality and low costs. One 
of the reasons for spending ECU 1.5 mil-
lion of EDF money on the rebuilding and 
extension of Boundbrook Wharf at Port 
Antonio — due to be the point of export 
for about 75% of Jamaica's bananas after 
completion in March 1993 - is to cut 
losses and costs at the port and during 
transport. 
For sugar, the protocol provides an 
annual quota of almost 119 000 t of white 
sugar (the ACPs fourth largest) at a price 
related to the price paid for Community 
sugar, which is far higher than the world 
market price. This amount is slightly 
more than half the island's output, which 
thus supplies domestic needs and the 
privileged external markets in the Com-
munity and the United States (quota of 
roughly 22 000 t in 1991). There are also 
special access arrangements for a sugar 
product, rum, which are gradually being 
liberalised, with larger Community entry 
quotas as from this year. The Community 
will be laying down the arrangements for 
stopping the quota (planned as from 
1996) in advance, in the light of ACP 
exports and the situation and outlook on 
the Community rum market. 
Under provisions which are not part of 
the Lomé Convention, Jamaica is also 
able to purchase European wine alcohol 
on favourable terms, turning it into 
ethanol and re-exporting it, also on 
favourable market access terms, to the 
USA. This is almost the only example of a 
commodity imported by an ACP country 
and re-exported in processed form to the 
North. 
Other trade 
Jamaica exports 31.1% (by value) of its 
products to the Community, but goods 
* MrHeyraud is the Head of the EC Delegation in 
Jamaica. 
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New loading shed for bananas at Boundbrook Wharf, Port Antonio 
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Table 1 : Summary of EC assistance to Jamaica since 1975* 
National Indicative Programmes, Lomé I to III 
National Indicative Programme, Lomé IV 
Structural Adjustment Resources, Lomé IV 
European Investment Bank, own resources 
European Investment Bank, risk capital 
STABEX 
Emergency Aid 
Programme against drug abuse 
EC contribution to NGO projects 
Total 
ECU millions 
86.6 
46.0 
2.5 
50.2 
9.1 
4.3 
1.7 
1.3 
1.9 
203.6 
* Not including regional aid 
from the Community only account for 
13.8% of its total imports (1991 figures). 
It has managed to boost its foreign 
exchange earnings and reduce its de­
pendency on sugar and rum over the past 
decade by increasing its output of non-
traditional products (fruit and vegetab­
les, spices, flowers, cigars, textiles etc.), 
thereby bringing about a substantial and 
steady increase in its exports to the 
Community, which levies no import duty 
on them. Indirectly, this improvement 
should also go some way towards helping 
both sides alter the balance of trade. 
The Commission wanted to make an 
effective contribution to this and so, in 
January of this year, it approved the 
Target Europe Programme to provide 
support for the recent, joint initiatives of 
JAMPRO, Jamaica's public trade and 
production promotion board, and priv­
ate exporters in the Jamaica Europe 
Business Club. The ECU 3 million for 
this are to come from the first Lomé IV 
national indicative programme (1990-
1995). 
Structural adjustment 
Jamaica has been negotiating econ­
omic stabilisation and structural adjust­
ment programmes with the international 
financial institutions since 1978. The 
special structural adjustment support 
provided under Lomé IV is timely, be­
cause, over the past two years, Jamaica 
has taken the most stringent economic 
stabilisation and liberalisation measures, 
giving it access to the IMF's Extended 
Financial Facility (EFF) for the three 
coming years. 
The Community's structural adjust­
ment support includes Lomé IV finan­
cing for an ECU 8.4 million general 
import programme (ECU 2.5 million 
special support and the balance from the 
Lomé IV and ex-Lomé I national indicat­
ive programmes) to support the balance 
of payments. The counterpart funds 
accruing from this provide social sector 
budget assistance and in some cases 
supplement Community activity in other 
areas — rural development for example. 
These funds are targeted at a meeting of 
the Finance Minister, the Planning In­
stitute and the Delegation. 
Other EDF projects are also designed 
to support the Government's programme 
of reform. For example, plans are being 
made for an ECU 7 million credit line 
programme using the balance of the 
Lomé II and III NIP special loans and 
grants to promote employment and 
production, two vital factors for the 
policy's success. This programme, in 
which a good percentage of the loans to 
final users will be managed by Jamaican 
NGOs, should not just help small firms. 
Enterprising individuals who want to 
open workshops will also benefit. The 
various organisations will have technical 
assistance to optimise their distribution 
and loan recovery. The prospects of 
success are particularly sound in this 
developing country, where private enter­
prise is expanding and industrial produc­
tion outside the mining sector already 
accounts for 16% of GDP. 
The European Investment Bank, which 
was involved in the sector before the 
EDF, has laid on ECU 30 million in the 
shape of three credit line programmes, via 
the National Development Bank, and has 
financed two ECU 1 million company 
share operations via the appropriate 
organisations. 
Economic restructuring has also in­
volved the Government in a World Bank-
supported civil service reform, of which 
one of the main features so far is a hefty 
20% staff cut. It goes hand in hand with a 
come-home policy to encourage ex­
patriate Jamaicans to return and use their 
skills and experience in the national 
administration to help development. An 
ECU 1 million programme (Lomé IV) is 
currently being set up under the respons­
ibility of the International Organisation 
of Migration in Geneva to get more than 
40 of these qualified Jamaican expatriates 
home and settled. 
Budget restrictions have hit education 
hard, but the University of the West 
Indies has benefited from all the success­
ive Lomé regional funds for wide-ranging 
development of its four campuses in 
Jamaica (Mona), Barbados (Cave Hill) 
and Trinidad & Tobago (Saint Augustine 
and Mount Hope). It has also received 
ECU 16 million from Lomé II and III to 
rebuild the university hostels on the four 
campuses as well as at CAST (College of 
Art, Science and Technology) and the 
CTC (an arts and culture training centre), 
which are two Jamaican institutions 
serving the whole of the Caribbean. 
Lastly, the Community and various 
NGOs cofinance a number (more than 32 
since 1977) of small projects, mainly in 
the social field, to help cushion the social 
repercussions of the adjustment policy. 
Focal sectors of Community aid 
Jamaica has stuck to the approach of 
previous Conventions, Lomé III espe­
cially. The first national indicative pro­
gramme (1990-1995) of Lomé IV focuses 
funds on economic infrastructure and 
agriculture, two sectors affected by the 
adjustment measures. 
The rural road repairs begun under 
Lomé III (almost ECU 7.3 million) are 
continuing under Lomé IV (ECU 
13.5 million), as are the rural and semi-
rural water supplies (ECU 6.7 million 
under Lomé III and perhaps as much as 
ECU 18 million under Lomé IV). These 
sums include the institutional improve­
ments vital to the development and better 
management of the organisations in 
charge of this work (the Ministry of 
Public Works and the National Water 
Commission). There are particularly 
good reasons for Community involve­
ment in this area given that, with the 
Negril and Ocho Rios purification 
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Table 2: Lomé I - Il - III - IV 
(a) PRIMARY COMMITMENTS 
l=l 
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-
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS 
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-
* Estimates 
facilities (see below), almost ECU 50 mil­
lion from the past three EDFs have been 
invested in the water sector. The linkage 
which is envisaged in this area is in the 
hands of the United Towns Development 
Agency, which proposes to extend the 
Ciudagua programme (already deve­
loped with Latin America) to the Carib­
bean with financial help from the Com­
munity. All this financing is of indirect 
benefit to agriculture and transport 
(shifting farm produce) and helps raise 
the standard of living in rural areas by 
discouraging people from moving to the 
towns. 
The EIB has also helped with economic 
infrastructure, using capital from own 
resources to finance a jetty for cruisers in 
Montego Bay (ECU 5.25 million) and to 
build a container terminal in Kingston 
(ECU 16 million). 
Agriculture contributes barely 8% of 
GDP, but it has considerable potential 
and, above all, is an essential aspect of 
any balanced development (employment 
for 27% of the working population, 
development of rural areas, food import-
substitution and containment of the 
move to the towns). The aim of financing 
previous programmes was primarily to 
back up all the small growers, par­
ticularly in the coffee industry, where 
ECU 3.5 million was provided, mainly in 
the form of small loans, although cocoa 
and citrus fruit farmers were also helped, 
as were goat breeders (the meat features 
in curry goat, one of the national dishes). 
This last scheme is in fact being run on a 
regional scale by CARDI, with Lomé III 
financing. The technical cooperation 
with bee-keeping also developed under 
Lomé III is being pursued under 
Lomé IV (ECU 1.7 million) with similar 
aims. Preparation of a programme of 
support for extension services and small 
farmers is due to start in March 1993, 
using the balance of several million ECU 
still available in the Lomé IV national 
indicative programme. 
Lastly, a recent evaluation shows that 
the support for small peasant farmers in 
the Saint Anne province, who have 
switched from ganja-growing to legal 
crops, has achieved what it set out to do. 
This is one of the four Jamaican projects 
financed to the tune of ECU 1.3 million 
from the Commission budget as part of 
the North-South drug control cooper­
ation programme. The others focus on 
prevention and rehabilitation. 
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Table 3 : Allocation of National Indicative Programme resources 
by sector* 
Sector 
Rural infrastructure/development 
Agriculture 
Environment/infrastructure/tour-
ism, including Lomé III Sysmin 
funds 
Support to private enterprise (trade 
promotion, lines of credit, hard 
currency facility) 
Human Resources Development 
(training, return and integration of 
qualified nationals, administrative 
studies) 
Support to structural adjustment 
Public Health Laboratory 
TOTAL 
Lomé II 
ECU m 
including 
Sysmin 
2.5 
5.9 
25.4 
3.2** 
9.7 
4.9 
51.6 
Lomé III 
ECU m 
+ ex-Lomé I 
23.3 + 1.2 
0.2 + 0.3 
7.9 
7.9 + 0.3** 
0.9 + 0.2 
+ 1.3 
40.2 + 3.3 
Lomé IV 
ECU m 
including 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Resources 
13.5 + 18** 
1.7 + 4.2** 
3.0 
1.0 
4.6 + 2.5*** 
46.0 + 2.5 
Total 
since 
1976 
58.5 
12.3 
33.3 
14.4 
11.8 
8.4 
4.9 
143.6 
* Not including regional aid. 
** Not yet entirely committed. 
*** Structural adjustment resources. 
makers. The bulk of the investments in 
this sector have been made by dynamic, 
enterprising Jamaican businessmen. 
The Community provides substantial 
support for this still fragile sector, which 
is now such an important one for the 
country. Montego Bay airport, the main 
tourist point of entry, has been expanded 
(ECU 7.1 million from Lomé III) and is 
already able to cater more efficiently for 
the ever-increasing numbers this season. 
Lastly, Negril and Ocho Rios, the two 
tourist centres, are getting new sewage 
collection and treatment systems to make 
them more hygienic, prevent pollution of 
the sea and the beaches and protect the 
coral reef. The financing for this, ECU 
25 million (approval in the first quarter of 
1993) comes from the Lomé II Sysmin 
funds, which are being redirected from 
the bauxite industry to help diversify the 
Jamaican economy and protect the en-
vironment. 
Τ  τ 
□ l' '' — " o 
The terminal at Sangster International Airport, Montego Bay has been upgraded 
with Community assistance. This is the entry point for the majority of tourists 
who visit Jamaica 
Biggest foreign-exchange earner 
— the tourist trade 
The tourist trade, expanding const-
antly and only slightly dented by the Gulf 
crisis, has been Jamaica's biggest foreign 
exchange earner ($750 million) for three 
years now, with a big interest in visitors 
from Europe making up for the declining 
interest on the part of American holiday-
Community aid : more closely 
targeted and better absorbed 
Not much Community aid was ab-
sorbed in the 1980s. Only an average of 
ECU 3.5 million was paid over each year 
of the decade and there was a con-
siderable build-up (ECU 72 million in 
1990) as a result, but the rate of disburse-
ment has speeded up a lot over the past 
few years to reach an average of more 
than ECU 6 million p.a. But, far more 
than the increase in payments, it is the 
present rate of primary (financing deci-
sions) and secondary (contracts) commit-
ments which, combined with the 
Jamaican authorities' greater attention to 
projects, justifies the level of Community 
aid, most of which is in the form of grants. 
Primary commitments have already been 
made for 52% of the Lomé IV national 
indicative programme. The Government 
knows what is wrong and is trying to cut 
through more red tape. The needs are still 
there, urgent and far from being met. 
So the technical and financial cooper-
ation schemes between Jamaica and the 
European Community are many and 
varied and they are run in many fields, all 
of them essential, to provide support at 
the most critical points in the economy of 
an island which, thanks to its beauty, its 
culture and the drive shown by its people, 
is unique.O J.-C. Η 
30 Zambia 
The score so far: Democracy 2, Economic Recovery 1 
Readers should be aware that just as 
this Country Report went to press the 
President of Zambia declared a state 
of emergency amid reports of a plot by 
the opposition to overthrow his govern-
ment. In a broadcast, the President 
said that democracy in Zambia had 
been poisoned and political stability 
was threatened. Several people were 
arrested, but freedom of expression 
and association remained guaranteed. 
To begin with a little geography, 
Zambia is a landlocked country in 
southern central Africa. The predomin­
ant landscape is one of high plateau 
covered with wide expanses of bush, some 
of it developed for agriculture but most of 
it still virgin land. Population density is 
one of the lowest in Africa at ten per 
square kilometre, yet Zambia is the third 
most highly urbanised country on the 
African continent, with half its popu­
lation living in towns and cities, a 
proportion which is steadily rising. The 
major focus of settlement and economic 
activity is the line traced by the railway 
which runs south from the Copperbelt, 
where Zambia borders on Zaire, through 
Lusaka, the capital, to Victoria Falls on 
the border with Zimbabwe. Lusaka is a 
planned city built where this north-south 
route crosses the east-west route from 
Malawi through to Angola. 
Copper, the mainspring of 
Zambian history 
Zambia's recorded history is com­
paratively recent and is bound up with 
what is still the country's main source of 
foreign earnings, its rich mineral deposits, 
particularly of copper. In the last century, 
in order to secure these for itself, and to 
prevent influence over the land north of 
the Cape being gained by its empire-
building European rivals, the British 
government in 1889 gave a company 
formed by the South African mining 
entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes a charter to 
administer the territories which became 
Southern and Northern Rhodesia, now 
Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively. In 
the 1920s administrative responsibility 
was taken over by the British colonial 
office, and intensive exploitation of the 
copper mines began, to satisfy a 
worldwide demand created by the rise of 
the electrical and motor vehicle indus­
tries. A legislative council represented 
settler interests but excluded Africans, 
who were treated purely as a labour 
reserve. Overall control of Northern 
Rhodesia was, however, retained by 
London, and Europeans resented the fact 
that Britain took millions of pounds out 
in taxes on the mining companies but put 
almost nothing back in for development. 
Africans, for their part, were not keen to 
see settlers taking control, as they feared a 
mass alienation of land such as that which 
had occurred in Southern Rhodesia. 
Despite their concerns, the two Rhode­
sias and Nyasaland (now Malawi) were 
federated under settler control in 1953. 
Independence 
The African population took no share 
in the economic and political advantages 
of the new arrangement, and organised 
opposition to white interests crystallised 
in the late 1950s under a young radical, 
Kenneth Kaunda. He led the newly 
formed United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) in a campaign of civil 
disobedience which forced the colonial 
authorities to promulgate a new Consti­
tution giving Africans a majority in the 
legislature. In 1963, the Federation was 
dissolved and, in the following year, 
Northern Rhodesia achieved indepen­
dence as the Republic of Zambia, with 
Kaunda as its president. 
The government of the new republic 
took over the mineral rights still held by 
the company originally formed by 
Rhodes, but the country's great mineral 
wealth had made little contribution to 
internal development, and the edu­
cational structure and social services were 
woefully inadequate. It was particularly 
vital to the economy that mineworkers 
should be contented, and peaceful indus­
trial relations were bought at the price of 
a large wage rise in 1966, followed by 
increases for other urban workers. Sub­
sistence farmers and the unemployed, 
although far greater in number, were 
neglected, and many migrated to the 
towns in search of work or a better living. 
Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia 
following its unilateral declaration of 
independence, and the struggle to throw 
off colonial rule in Mozambique, which 
Free to speak their minds at last, but how long will they keep their jobs ? 
Mineworkers on the Copperbelt, like other employees in Zambia's huge public 
sector, risk retrenchment in today's dry economic climate 
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Zambia covertly supported, left the 
country economically blockaded and a 
prey to subversion from the south, and as 
the resulting political tension rose in 1972 
President Kaunda declared one-party 
rule by UNIP. Soon after, the civil war in 
neighbouring Angola closed the route to 
the Atlantic hitherto used for carrying 
half of Zambia's copper exports, and at 
the same time the world copper price fell 
sharply. In 1975, for the first time, the 
UNIP leader urged the country to look 
for economic security in farming rather 
than mining, as food prices rose and 
unemployment and popular discontent 
grew. The closure of the export route 
through Rhodesia, and the open hostility 
of the Ian Smith regime in that country to 
the Zambian government, were invoked 
as the main reasons for Zambia's econ­
omic difficulties. Yet when both these 
factors had been removed, by 1980, the 
economy continued to decline and living 
standards to fall, and political opposition 
from both business interests and workers 
mounted. 
Repression 
A failed coup attempt in 1980 was 
followed by reshuffles of cabinet minis­
ters and UNIP officials, and by strikes 
and rioting in protest at food shortages. 
In July 1981 among the workers' leaders 
arrested and imprisoned was the chair­
man of the Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions, Frederick Chiluba, who ten 
years later was to become President. 
Consolidating his power, Dr Kaunda 
won a fifth election in 1983 and turned 
increasing attention to the repression of 
internal dissent and alleged external 
conspiracy. Meanwhile the economic 
crisis continued unabated and, at the 
behest of the IMF, which was called in in 
1983 to help with economic reforms, the 
Government adopted further austerity 
measures, such as removal of the subsidy 
on refined maize meal, the staple food, in 
1986 and a steep increase in the price of 
fuel in 1987. The popular outcry was 
such, however, that these attempts at 
introducing realistic pricing were re­
scinded and the government announced it 
was breaking with the IMF but would 
continue with its own restructuring pro­
gramme. IMF-style policies nevertheless 
reappeared in the Fourth National De­
velopment Plan 1989-93, only to be 
reneged on once again as elections ap­
proached in 1991. 
A new era 
This brief overview brings Zambian 
history up to the point where years of 
political and economic stagnation sud­
denly gave way to a new era. With such a 
legacy as this, the picture now is a very 
mixed one, but to start with the good 
news, after 27 years during which power 
was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of one man, and 19 years of one-
party rule, Zambia has become a de­
mocracy. This is largely the doing of a 
wide grouping of different interests which 
came together in 1991 as the Movement 
for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). The 
announcement of large increases in the 
price of maize meal in that year provoked 
an unprecedentedly violent outbreak of 
hostility not just to UNIP's economic 
policies but to the ruling party as a whole, 
and its President in particular. An earlier 
promise of a referendum on whether to 
change over to multi-party rule was 
abruptly shelved when President Kaunda 
saw that he had lost the political initia­
tive, and the constitutional changes 
required for the holding of multi-party 
elections were quickly set in motion. 
Many UNIP members, including MPs, 
defected to the MMD, and nine other 
new parties also came into being. After 
lively campaigning on all sides, with the 
opposition challenging UNIP's control 
of the media and uncovering evidence of 
preparations for ballot rigging, freely 
contested presidential and general elec­
tions were held on 31 October 1991. The 
MMD swept to victory, taking 125 of the 
150 seats in the single-chamber National 
Assembly, and its leader, the veteran 
trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, took 
76% of the presidential vote and went in 
triumph to State House as Zambia's 
second President. Kenneth Kaunda had 
no seat in parliament but stayed on as 
UNIP leader; last year, however, he was 
replaced in an internal party leadership 
contest and has now retired to private life. 
The new government came to power on 
a surprisingly low turnout of 45.4%, 
owing in part to shortcomings in voter 
registration and provision of polling 
booths, but foreign observers pronoun­
ced the campaign and the polling free and 
fair. The new Cabinet contained rep­
resentatives of all the various interests 
backing the MMD — except that women 
are hardly represented at any level of 
government — and was welcomed inter­
nationally as a credible and competent 
team. There were some misgivings that 
the size of the MMD's parliamentary 
majority might mean continued domi­
nation by a single party, but a free and 
critical press has not been reluctant to 
perform the role of an extraparliamen-
tary watchdog. Some of the reporting of 
alleged corruption and malpractice in 
official circles, particularly in a news­
paper recently set up by private business 
interests. The Weekly Post, is harder-
hitting than would be possible under the 
libel laws of certain longer-established 
democracies in the industrialised world. 
The MMD itself, as can be seen from the 
interview with President Chiluba in this 
Report, actively encourages democratic 
debate, even though it often makes life 
difficult for the Government. Of the 14 or 
so minor political parties, only the Social 
Democratic Party seems to stand any 
chance of emerging as a third force in 
Zambian politics. 
Bankruptcy 
We said the picture is a mixed one. The 
bad news is that by the time President 
Kaunda and UNIP fell, after a final 
attempt to buy votes by extravagant 
spending, they had reduced the Zambian 
economy to a state of total bankruptcy. 
Under the policy described as 'human­
ism', whose stated aim was to loosen the 
grip of'exploitative international capital' 
on the economy, the UNIP government 
had acquired a stake in almost every 
branch of economic activity, from copper 
mining to (literally) hairdressing, and the 
resulting parastatal conglomerates were 
run and staffed by large numbers of 
people on the State payroll. This over­
grown civil service, however, was under­
paid, unmotivated and inefficient. In any 
case, most of the population were still 
employed in the informal sector and the 
tax base was consequently very small. 
Extravagant domestic expenditure was 
financed largely from exports of a single 
commodity, copper, the price of which 
rose and fell in line with world demand, 
so that economic planning became im­
possible except in the very short term. 
Deficits were paid for with the help of 
government borrowing from the central 
bank, in other words the government 
printed money to pay its bills. An 
overvalued currency, the kwacha, helped 
to make exports unattractive; when it 
was devalued, imports of manufactured 
goods, including spare parts for mining 
and other industries, in their turn became 
prohibitively expensive. Infrastructure 
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Workers filling potholes in a Lusaka road— a small symbol of the Government's 
problems. Strapped for cash, it can do little more than patch up the country's 
infrastructure 
became more and more dilapidated, and 
inflation soared out of control. Little help 
could be looked for from the country's 
foreign donors and creditors, as the 
abandonment of economic reforms in the 
last period of UNIP rule had ruined 
Zambia's reputation as a responsible 
partner in development cooperation. 
Economic reform 
Putting the economy back on its feet 
has clearly been the Government's main 
priority since it came to power. The 
economic reform plans it announced 
soon after taking office were firmly in line 
with World Bank and IMF prescriptions 
and feature a well-known mix: price 
liberalisation, involving the removal of 
price subsidies; the privatisation and 
restructuring of the many parastatals; 
promotion of the private sector and 
individual initiative, and encouragement 
for local and foreign private investment; 
more open trade; financial discipline, 
with tight fiscal and monetary policies, 
and tax reform. The Government embar­
ked on these ambitious reforms with a 
speed and aggressiveness that took many 
by surprise and raised fears of worse 
economic hardship to come, and the 
President and Ministers were soon on the 
road appealing to Zambians throughout 
the country to bear the pain in the 
interests of future prosperity. 
Although sacrifices are being asked 
for, the reform programme includes a 
social component, as the path to growth 
is seen as lying through the alleviation of 
poverty. A social welfare programme 
channelled through nongovernmental 
organisations operates; 80% of its ex­
penditure in 1992 was in the provinces, 
and went to projects in the education, 
health and water supply sectors, as well as 
to canal construction as part of a labour-
intensive public works programme. The 
very poor are being offered food for 
work; several programmes are already 
under way, including building projects in 
Lusaka, Ndola and Livingstone and 
farming schemes in rural areas. However, 
an unforeseeable complicating factor 
which came into the equation in the very 
first months of the new Government's 
term of office both curtailed the intended 
spending on social welfare and increased 
the day-to-day difficulties faced by the 
ordinary people. 
Drought 
At the beginning of 1992 Southern 
Africa experienced its worst drought in 
living memory. In Zambia there were 
heavy crop losses in six of the nine 
provinces, and the government appealed 
to international donors to help it feed the 
population until the next harvest. Maize, 
the staple food, was particularly urgently 
needed, as 70% of agriculture is maize 
production (as a result of this, of course, 
there was very little by way of other crops 
which could be eaten instead). Vegetable 
oil, pulses and milk powder were also 
requested, and the outside world, includ­
ing the European Community, responded 
rapidly with shipments over and above 
their normal food aid deliveries. As an 
emergency step, the Government bought 
maize at market prices for distribution to 
the needy, acquiring some 245 000 t out 
of its own resources by May 1992. The 
international aid community provided 
some US$ 200m in drought assistance, 
plus balance of payments support to help 
bear the high cost of moving the maize to 
Zambia. The EC's aid, for example, was 
transported by sea to Dar es Salaam and 
Port Elizabeth and thence by rail. The 
distribution effort put Zambia's trans­
port sector under heavy strain but has 
proceeded smoothly up to the present 
time. A small amount of food aid was 
reported lost through alleged theft, but 
the total was only 0.2% of all shipments. 
Some 30 000 t of maize were given away 
free to very poor population groups, 
sometimes in return for work, but the 
bulk was sold in order to generate 
counterpart funds which were used to buy 
further quantities from the commercial 
market. To protect farmers with crops of 
their own to sell, the Government under­
took not to undercut the commercial 
price for maize. 
As well as losing their crop and a year's 
income, many small farmers had to 
consume their seed corn and had dif­
ficulty affording fresh seed or fertiliser for 
the next season. Adequate quantities for 
the growing season, which began in 
November, were imported either through 
a donor-assisted programme or by priv­
ate companies under open general licence 
for sale on the open market. 
Hardship 
This huge drought-relief effort was all 
conducted against the background of the 
IMF-approved economic reforms, which 
of course included liberalising the mar­
kets for fertilisers, as for other goods. The 
effect of this on the ground can be gauged 
by a small example, the experience of an 
agricultural supply depot funded by the 
EC in Machisompola, a rural area in 
Central Province. The manager of this 
reported that last year he had sold 
8000 bags of fertiliser to local farmers, 
but this year, over the same period, only a 
little above 1500 bags. This must in large 
part be due to the fact that the fertiliser 
price had quadrupled in that time. The 
same depot had bought only 6000 bags of 
maize from local farmers in 1992, 
whereas in 1989, a year when there was no 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  33 ZAMBIA 
drought, it had bought 16 000 bags. The 
effects on farming families' purchasing 
power of price deregulation and loss of 
income were serious enough already ; but 
at the same time the Government went 
ahead with the removal of subsidies on 
food agreed with the IMF as part of the 
structural adjustment programme — and 
at a faster rate than the IMF had 
required. As these had traditionally eaten 
up from 20 to 25% of the total budget, the 
effect on the fiscal deficit will be gratify­
ing to Government and the donors, but 
the hardship it has caused in rural areas 
— and in the towns and cities — can be 
easily imagined. Critics of the speed of 
structural adjustment say this part of the 
programme should have been postponed 
until the economy as a whole had been 
made more stable. The opposing theory is 
that the Government decided it had 
better act fast on this issue while it was 
still popular. The Government itself 
argues that economic instability is over­
whelmingly due to inflation, and that as 
food subsidies contribute to that inflation 
they have to be removed. 
Farming the land 
The rural land on which half Zambia's 
population lives is one resource whose 
huge potential has hardly been tapped. In 
normal years, the country feeds itself and 
has a healthy surplus for export to its 
neighbours. Zaire takes vegetable crops 
and beef, Rwanda and Burundi sugar and 
maize; output in Zimbabwe is limited by 
land availability, and the South African 
decision to stop subsidising maize grow­
ing opens a large possible market in a 
country which is also more prone to 
drought. Cotton, horticultural produce 
and tobacco find international markets, 
and there is scope for producing and 
selling more coffee. According to the 
Minister of Agriculture, who in his time 
has been a successful exporter of straw­
berries, all that the commercial farmers 
need to be able to expand is the removal 
of government controls: 'Getting that 
sector to take off is fairly straightforward. 
It's a matter of what you don't do rather 
than what you do.' For peasant farmers 
the picture is more complicated. 'The 
previous government basically ran smali­
ziasi expanses of unused or underused land could produce a healthy agricultural 
surplus for export if investment finance could be found 
The position now in relation to the 
drought and food supply is that rainfall 
this year has been satisfactory and a 
decent harvest is expected — where 
farmers have been able to afford to plant 
a crop in the first place, that is. The 
Minister of Agriculture, Dr Guy Scott, 
says there is enough food in reserve, even 
before the harvest is brought in, to feed 
the population till August. But to play 
safe, the Government has once again 
asked the donors, including the EC, to be 
prepared to send substantial amounts in 
food aid. 
holder agriculture as a very expensive 
form of social welfare, as a way of giving 
everybody an income,' the Minister says, 
and the focus was almost entirely on 
maize. Inputs, marketing, transport, 
milling and distribution were all sub­
sidised. To rationalise, diversify and 
expand now requires finance, and, away 
from the main consumer centres and 
transport routes, especially in tribal 
reserves where disputes could arise as to 
title and succession, smallholders' land 
has no value as collateral for loans. The 
crop itself has some value as security, and 
the Government is working on schemes 
to encourage contract growing by small 
farmers for the financial institutions 
which lend them the start-up money. But 
Dr Scott wants to see traders, bankers, 
farmers or anyone but the State identify­
ing and exploiting the opportunities. 'If 
the system is not constantly interfered 
with,' he says, 'I think it will tend to 
happen.' 
As for commercial farmland, a recent 
study estimates that 400 000 hectares of 
cleared, good-quality land, accessible by 
road and with power lines, is already 
suitable for use -- this is mostly pre­
viously productive farmland which was 
sold off cheap by settlers who left on 
independence and is now occupied by 
people without the resources or know-
how to utilise it fully. All it needs is to be 
ploughed and it could be brought back 
into production, before there would be 
any need to clear huge new farms in the 
virgin bush. The Government itself in­
herited large amounts of such land from 
its predecessor and is quite prepared to let 
anyone acquire it, including white far­
mers from Zimbabwe and South Africa 
who have already expressed interest. 
Privatisation 
An important aspect of Zambia's 
economic recovery programme is the 
reform of the parastatals. Under Pre­
sident Kaunda some of these largely 
state-owned conglomerates had become 
enormous. Two of them, the Industrial 
Development Corporation of Zambia 
(INDECO) and the Zambia Industrial 
and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), the 
holding company which partly owns 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, 
together accounted for 80% of all pro­
duction in the country. ZIMCO has some 
135 subsidiaries and associated com­
panies and interests not just in mining 
and industry but in commercial transport 
and energy supplies, hotels and land, 
finance companies, communications and 
farming. Its chairman during the UNIP 
period was none other than the Head of 
State himself. Even before the MMD 
took office, it had become apparent that 
the State had neither the capacity nor the 
money to run, still less to modernise, the 
enormous and run-down bureaucratic 
structure which the parastatals created. A 
technical committee on privatisation 
used to report to ZIMCO; in a mem­
orable phrase, President Chiluba said 
asking ZIMCO to privatise the economy 
was like asking a fish to drain its own 
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pond, and responsibility was transferred 
to the Ministry of Commerce and Indus­
try. 
The Zambia Privatisation Agency was 
set up by Act of Parliament in July last 
year, with a board consisting of leading 
private-sector operators and three 
government officials. According to an 
economist on the Agency's secretariat, 
many of the 150 or so parastatals were 
basically not badly run and showed a 
profit or at least broke even, so there is a 
lot of potential which should interest 
private shareholders, especially as there 
will be no political interference in the 
companies' operations from now on. A 
first tranche of small companies with 
between 30 and 150 employees has been 
offered for sale, and 180 competing 
tenders, mostly local but including some 
from Botswana and South Africa, were 
being evaluated at the time of writing. 
The policy is to encourage wide share 
ownership, so parts of the larger para­
statals are being publicly floated and a 
stock exchange may be set up in 1993 — 
meanwhile commercial banks are author­
ised to trade in shares. As for the 
timescale, some 30 companies are due to 
be privatised in 1993, followed by 20 or so 
per year thereafter, leading to a situation, 
when MMD's present term ofoffice ends, 
where the State's interest in the product­
ive economy is reduced from 80% to 
20%. After seven or eight years every­
thing should have been sold off. except 
for a few utilities which the agency 
describes as 'natural monopolies'. 
White elephants 
As in other countries, of course, there 
are no buyers for nationalised assets 
which do not perform, and in Zambia one 
of the most conspicuous white elephants 
which the Government cannot hope to 
get rid of till it becomes a great deal fitter 
is the national airline. Last year Zambia 
Airways' operating deficit required 
Government transfers which came to 
some one per cent of GDP. The airline at 
one time had unrealistic ambitions to be a 
major regional carrier, and is heavily 
overstaffed. Pay strikes by its employees 
this year and last have severely tested the 
Government's resolve to hold inflation 
down by wage restraint. 
Another encumbrance on the Govern­
ment's hands is Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM). This parastatal, 
which mines cobalt, zinc and lead as well 
as copper, is the second largest copper 
company in the world in terms of produc­
tion and employment (after Chile's COD-
ELCO), but output has dwindled steadily 
for several years as world demand for 
copper has fallen (fibre optics are more 
suitable for many applications) and the 
grade of recoverable ore has deteriorated. 
For years the company has been unable 
to reinvest, and its mines are overmanned 
and run down. According to the Deputy 
Minister of Mines, Dr Matthias Mpanbe, 
a large injection of capital will be required 
over the short and medium terms to keep 
ZCCM viable. But where is it to come 
from? Dr Mpanbe himself wondered last 
year what foreign investor could possibly 
be interested in, to use his expression, 
'such a monstrosity'. The only solution, 
he now says, is to divest it of all activities 
not related to mining, so its management 
time and capital can be put to more 
profitable use. At the time of writing, it 
was reported that the Anglo American 
Corporation, already a minority share­
holder, was tipped to buy a majority 
holding this year, but at a fraction of the 
several billion dollars the Government 
had hoped for. As there are no other 
contenders, Anglo American can dictate 
terms, and they are also likely to include 
heavy job reductions. Although that will 
dent the Government's popularity still 
further, it has little choice but to accept. 
The high cost of rationalisation 
Recent events in another area of the 
economy illustrate the difficulty the 
Government faces in trying to reduce the 
public-sector wage bill without alienating 
the trade unions which played a large part 
in bringing it to power. In October 1992 
the government withdrew its annual 
grant of 600 million kwacha to Zambia 
Airways, which had up till then been the 
only company to escape the decision to 
stop subsidising the parastatals. The 
airline said it would have to cut 800 jobs, 
but it was reported to have no funds to 
pay for retrenchment packages for those 
made redundant or cover wage increases 
for the 1200 employees left. In January 
the pilots announced that inflation had so 
eroded their salaries that they could no 
longer afford to house and feed their 
families, so they called a strike. Manage­
ment dismissed 31 of the pilots, a move 
which looked very like pre-sell-off asset 
Zambia Airways flew away with one per cent of GDP 
in operating subsidies last year 
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Mining, traditional mainstay of the economy, is slowly running down as reserves are 
depleted and underinvestment takes its toll 
stripping, as the pilots selected for sack­
ing were precisely those not involved in 
flying the airline's one DC-10, which 
operates the more lucrative long-haul 
routes. The other pilots came out in 
sympathy and refused to fly any of the 
aircraft, so the company had to charter 
'planes from foreign companies to move 
stranded passengers and goods. This 
exercise cost millions of kwacha — far 
more, according to critics of the dis­
missals, than it would have cost to meet 
the pilots' original demands. After a few 
days' of the ruinously expensive stop­
page, the board had no alternative but to 
reinstate the pilots unconditionally and 
announce a pay review, whereupon 
normal service was resumed. Social peace 
was restored, but the underlying problem 
of overmanning remained unresolved. 
Part of the problem is the high cost of 
the retrenchment packages for those who 
lose their jobs in the public sector. The 
figure for 1993 was put in December at 
2.5 billion kwacha, with lump sum 
pension payments to retired civil servants 
at 13.4 billion — a heavy charge on the 
budget. 
Union backing 
The attitude of the trade unions to the 
economic reforms will be crucial. The 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) represents about 75% of work­
ers in formal employment, mainly in the 
public service and parastatals. It was 
instrumental in setting up the MMD, 
though it is not formally linked to it or 
any other political party. It differs, for 
example, with the MMD on privatis­
ation: while supporting the policy in 
general, it thinks that certain strategic 
industries, such as mining, should remain 
under state control as long as they are so 
important to the economy. ZCTU's 
leaders are as enthusiastic for democracy 
as the Government is, which is no doubt 
why its Secretary-General, Alec Chirwa, 
says ZCTU is aggrieved that Government 
did not consult it properly over the 
content or implementation of the econ­
omic recovery programme. Its members 
are suffering from the job cuts, and it 
suggests that a way of taking the pressure 
off them would be to widen the tax base 
— at present fewer than half a million 
workers are in the formal sector — so that 
personal taxation and sales tax could be 
cut. Mr Chirwa also says unions, em­
ployers and government should sit down 
together and set up the social security 
scheme which Zambia lacks, and believes 
that the Government avoids acting on 
ZCTU's suggestion that a poverty datum 
line be established out of a fear that if it 
were, most of the population would be 
found to be below it and would have to be 
helped. The social safety net is already 
minimal; the country simply cannot 
afford to pay for anything more extens­
ive. 
Make or break 
1993, people inside and outside the 
country say, will be make-or-break year 
for Zambia. Thousands more will lose 
their jobs, inflation will eat into already 
meagre pay packets, a debt service 
requirement of US $1.2 billion a year 
cripples the treasury. The Government 
gets full marks from the IMF and the 
donors for its courage in the face of 
daunting difficulties - - praise for im­
plementation of the necessary solutions is 
more muted. The Government still enjoys 
some respect at home for its honesty 
about the hardships still to come, even if 
the lamentable 13% turnout in the local 
elections last November suggests that 
voters are growing disillusioned. If or­
ganised labour withdrew its support, or at 
least its understanding, life for the 
Government could become very hard 
indeed. 
But is this likely to happen? As Alec 
Chirwa puts it on behalf of the trade 
unions, 'If we tore each other apart, we 
would only sink deeper into our problems 
with the economy,' and, as far as the 
Government's credibility is concerned, 
'The eyes of the world are on the 
performance of this government, so we 
should try as much as possible to support 
it, so that, if it succeeds, it could be used 
as a model for other parts of the world, 
particularly Africa. If this government 
fails, then you can be sure that in future 
nobody will pay attention to any govern­
ment which comes out of the support of 
labour.'o Robert ROWE 
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'Democracy is not the preserve of developed countries 
— it is a fundamental human right' 
An interview with President Frederick Chiluba 
In October 1991, in Zambia's first 
multi-party elections for over 20 years, 
the Movement for Multi-party Democ­
racy won both a parliamentary majority 
and the presidency of the country. The 
MMD's leader, Frederick Chiluba, had 
been a prominent trade unionist, and as 
chairman of the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions under President Kaunda 
had been detained for opposition to the 
previous regime. In 1990, Mr Chiluba 
had emerged as one of the leaders, and 
then chairman, of the alliance of trade 
unionists, church leaders, businessmen, 
students and former politicians who 
overthrew the one-party system on a 
promise of democracy and a free market 
economy. 
Zambia's first year and a half of this 
programme has seen general elation 
followed by some disillusionment at the 
government's record. While the daily 
struggle to make a living is made harder 
by high inflation and interest rates and 
rising unemployment, crime figures are 
soaring, there have been allegations of 
police brutality towards suspects in 
custody, and some civil servants, local 
councillors and members of parliament 
and Cabinet have been accused of incom­
petence or corruption. 
Speaking at the opening of the 
National Assembly's 1993 session, Pre­
sident Chiluba took a tough line. In the 
transition to democracy, he said, some 
leading figures in the country had taken 
advantage of his style of democratic rule, 
but this would be a year of discipline. He 
had a mandate from the Zambian people 
and would formalise and implement their 
will, he said; he was not interested in 
winning popularity contests — there was 
too much to be done. On the attitude of 
the media, he said that they had changed 
from an attitude of extreme subservience 
to one of 'free-wheeling and rumour­
mongering beyond all boundaries of 
ethics and reason.' 
The Courier talked to President 
Chiluba just after his return from the 
parliamentary opening ceremony. 
► Mr President, since The Courier last 
came to Zambia three years ago, under 
rather different circumstances, the process 
of démocratisation has come into place. 
What have been your priorities in setting 
up democracy in this country? 
— Well, first of all, one has to ask the 
question: what is democracy? And the 
answer is that it is very difficult to define. 
A lot of countries of the world have 
different models, and we have learned 
that it may mean different things to 
different people, but I think I would like 
to ask the question, what ends does 
democracy serve? And when we define 
what ends our democracy is to serve, we 
have to put in place institutions to make 
sure that democracy works. So we begin 
by saying that we want to ensure particip­
ation of the people in decision-making. 
We want to ensure that with democracy 
the human rights of people, which ob­
viously emanate from the term humanity, 
are observed in the place, and that calls 
for a constitution which will embody the 
rights of the individual person, the right 
to own property, the right to life and the 
right to dispose of whatever property one 
has, freedom of speech, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the individual 
person in many spheres of life. This is also 
interrelated to the liberalisation policy we 
have set in place in the economy. 
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We are instituting the rule of law to 
ensure that there is peaceful resolution of 
conflict. Multiethnic, multitribal Africa 
has been famous for many civil wars and 
we do believe that in the approach to that 
we have to be extremely careful, perhaps, 
to preach a politics of a consociational 
nature, so that we take account of the 
various demands which are in place in 
society. To this end, we have also realised 
that if democracy is to work, the govern­
ment must deliberately allow for the 
existence of dissent, and therefore there 
are many pressure groups : the churches, 
the trade unions, you name them, they are 
deliberately, together with the help of the 
press, almost making it impossible for 
government to sit down, it has to keep on 
its feet — and it's all deliberate. But we do 
realise that, if democracy is to work, that 
deliberate policy must be fully enforced 
and it must be supported deliberately by 
government as well. 
That is why from the very inception we 
realised that we had won such a landslide 
that the opposition did not actually 
qualify, according to convention, to be 
called the loyal opposition. They had not 
reached the stage, in terms of facts and 
figures, to be recognised, but I de­
liberately asked Parliament to recognise 
them and Parliament did so. Under 
normal circumstances, unless they had 
about 30%) of the seats in the House, they 
would not qualify. They had between 
about 18 and 20% of the seats, but in 
spite of that we went ahead. We want to 
encourage this. It is very difficult in 
Africa, with the tradition of the one-party 
system, to leave things to the ideas of 
other people, but we wanted to ensure 
that we deliberately bring in opposition, 
so that it plays its role — and, in order to 
really get policy which is fully accepted in 
all areas of our activities, the opposition 
had to play a very, very important role. 
And they have been playing an important 
role, small as they are, they are very vocal 
and, with the help of the press, they have 
meant that we have had to seek a lot of 
consensus on many matters, so that they 
are not seen to be party matters, they are 
national affairs. 
► The press is extremely lively in 
Zambia and has given you a rough ride in 
two areas that lean think of: the behaviour 
of the police and the calibre of public 
officials. Are these areas where you think 
there is still some ground to be made up ? 
— Well, in more areas than those two. 
The police, I think, with the background 
of their training and the difficulty of the 
legacy we have come from have been a 
little slow in adjusting. But our general 
policy is that the police force in a 
democratic society is not one of re­
pression, and generally the whole area of 
policy in there has totally changed. But 
you see, we have taken over a police force 
that is logistically almost completely 
unable to perform. Transport, the radio 
network and things like that are almost 
nonexistent, they are totally or terribly 
dilapidated. So, they have tremendous 
difficulties. And, with opening our bor­
ders with this democratic climate now in 
the country, we have received a lot of 
people from outside who have added to 
our worries and it is a real problem. So 
the police are not deliberately doing what 
they are doing, I think it is the lack of 
ability to adjust in time, but the general 
policy has changed. They are slow to cope 
because of some of these difficulties. You 
mentioned the calibre of public officials? 
► Yes, I am thinking of a charge that I 
saw somewhere that some officials, even 
government ministers, are putting personal 
economic recovery before the economic 
recovery of the country. 
— No, no, I think again it is just a 
matter of perception. I think that in our 
policy framework and even in our im­
plementation, we have said that while we 
address the full structural adjustment 
programme, there are social aspects and 
the impact of the adjustment itself falls 
squarely on our people. They are the ones 
really who are paying for this and, as a 
result, we have created the Ministry of 
Community Development, which is 
aimed at taking care of these groups of 
the most vulnerable people. We also pay 
attention to things like medical care and 
schools, which were all broken down. The 
problem has been the scarcity of re­
sources, and therefore it is what you call 
the process of making a choice between 
one or the other and you can't have them 
both at the same time. So it is really a 
matter of perception, rather than a 
general policy or the bad calibre of the 
civil servant. Our Ministers, our civil 
servants understand this and they try 
extremely hard to fulfil this. The Ministry 
of Community Development is precisely 
aimed at ensuring that the blind, the 
handicapped, the needy people in various 
areas are cared for and cared for very 
well, so I don't think that it's the calibre 
or any discrimination or any such. The 
calibre is right, the policy is right, it is just 
the scarcity of resources. 
► Your country, Mr President, has 
embarked on a very tough structural 
adjustment programme. In some areas, 
like the removal of the subsidy on maize, 
your government is going faster than the 
IMF stipulates but in other areas there has 
been some slippage. Are you happy with 
the speed of progress? 
— In fact I think we have moved faster 
than could have been the normal case, 
and I have sometimes been afraid that, if 
we move a little faster than our people 
could cope with, we may endanger the 
whole programme. I believe sincerely that 
the help we get from the international 
community, we have to utilise, but, at the 
same time, we have to act in a very 
politically mature manner to enlist the 
fullest support of our people. So far, in all 
the elections, after the main parliamen­
tary and presidential elections, we have 
won a number of by-elections and a 
convincing victory in the local govern­
ment elections; that gives us hope, but at 
the same time I look at that as a challenge 
from the people. They are saying : We still 
appreciate what you are doing but do not 
create problems for us because you 
cannot move. That indication of the 
mandate given to us, the legitimacy and 
authority we obtained from the people, 
must be interpreted into carrying out 
such projects and programmes as will 
ensure their fullest participation and 
support and that the people become the 
beneficiaries of the same programmes, so 
we have moved a little faster sometimes 
than I thought, and I think we are 
realising that the faster we move the 
greater the distance may be between us 
and the people, and that way we may 
endanger the very process. So, 1 think we 
are trying to be systematic and not 
slowing down but just stabilising our 
pace. 
► It is certainly true that in the local 
elections, which you referred to, the MMD 
was very strongly endorsed but, at the same 
time, the turnout was extremely low. 
— It was indicative of the conditions of 
life, the standards of living which have 
dropped remarkably. Staple food prices 
have risen so high that people have felt 
sometimes that we do not care with these 
free market policies, we just ask them to 
fend for themselves. But really it is a bit of 
a difficult situation, we are not asking the 
people to fend for themselves, we are 
asking the people to continue to put in an 
effort: they have sacrificed too much to 
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abandon the programme. We just have to 
go ahead. We are paying for the sins of 
the past 27 years and there is no way we 
can rectify or remedy the situation of 27 
years of mismanagement in a year or two, 
we just have to continue to pay the price. 
In any case we have paid too much of a 
price to ever go back, we just have to go 
forward and that was in fact my message 
in parliament today. 
► Since your government took power, 
you have built up an enormous fund of 
goodwill internationally, and during last 
year's very severe drought the bilateral 
donors and international organisations 
helped your country very extensively, 
including the EEC. What are you looking 
for from the international donors in the 
future ? 
— Well, I must generally say that I am 
very grateful on behalf of my government 
and the people of this country for that 
kind of goodwill from the international 
community. Really, without them the 
drought would, I think, have wreaked 
havoc in our country. But, because ofthat 
goodwill, we managed to pull through 
with their resources, their helping us put 
back the infrastructure, the roads and 
everything — and especially in the area of 
balance of payment support, they have 
been tremendously wonderful and good. 
We still are stuck with huge amounts of 
external debt which we find it very 
difficult a) to service and b) even to pay, 
and I continue to say the reason for this 
accumulation of debts was that there was 
a lack of accountability. There was a lack 
of participation by people, there was a 
lack of openness and transparency. All 
these things we have now put in place; 
surely the international community could 
extend their goodwill to this area since 
now democracy has come and since now 
no debt will be swept under the carpet 
unseen, with so much freedom of the 
press at work. I believe the international 
community would be promoting trans­
parency and accountability in Zambia. 
The international community would be 
helping the continent of Africa in its 
generality to see that democracy is the key 
to development. Democracy with very 
weak economic institutions cannot work, 
its fragility would I think turn into frailty 
and collapse, and I believe the inter­
national community could consider, even 
going beyond the agreed terms, trying to 
help write off the amounts that are 
outstanding. I know that most of them 
are on commercial terms, but if there is 
any way the international community, 
the governments I mean, could be kind 
enough to do it one way or another and 
seek to assist us in this area, they will be 
giving us a lot of relief and we can start all 
over again. We will have so much 
breathing space, we will have nothing 
hanging over our shoulders and we will be 
able to push forward and develop some 
strong basis on which we can build. 
► Next week ', Mr President, the 
Preferential Trade Area is holding a big 
meeting here, and your country is also 
active in the SADC. Is greater regional 
integration a possible way of solving some 
of your country's problems, particularly 
the economic problem ? 
— Yes, indeed, in fact part of the 
reason why African economies are still in 
this kind of shambles is the fact that there 
is a lot of nationalism even in the 
economies. Now, in a small country and a 
relatively small market like this, some of 
the stuff which we produce and which 
may require to be sold outside requires 
bigger markets — and bigger markets 
come by cooperating with countries 
within regions. I mean we should learn 
from America, Canada and Mexico and, 
even bigger still, learn from the EC, where 
a lot of barriers which existed are gone. 
Businessmen and women and citizens all 
over Europe today feel they have a 
broader area within which to operate, 
within which to make the forces of 
demand and supply work and, the bigger 
the market, the larger the scope for 
trading and the larger the possibility of 
the economies growing. This is why in 
Zambia we always say: 'It is important 
that we do not restrict ourselves either 
domestically to the home front or even to 
three or four countries, to a thing called 
the SADC, or the PTA. Why not pool 
together, open up these whole areas and 
broaden the scope of trade by offering 
your goods to larger markets, and that 
might turn into specialisation of produc­
tion and division of labour? It could 
mean a lot of improvement in the quan­
tity and quality of the goods produced. I 
am sure that would make for job creation, 
because production would be on a large 
scale.' The possibilities of advancement 
really would be in place. 
► You obviously have an enormous 
task on your hands guiding the destinies of 
1 18 Jan. - 22 Jan. 1993. 
this country. What is it that keeps you 
going? 
— I have a resolve. You know, when I 
stepped into this thing, long before when 
I was just a trade unionist, I was hooked 
up into trusting and believing in the 
freedom of man here, especially in a 
country that is a member of the United 
Nations and a believer in its charter of 
human rights. I did believe there was 
something missing and I believed the 
dignity of the Zambian could easily be 
better than it was. It was talked about, 
but in practice people were really slaves 
and I felt that the time would come when 
true dignity, the integrity of the people, 
could be seen — and their freedom did 
not have to come from political leaders. 
People were born free. Even if the 
constitution may either confirm or confer 
that, people must be allowed to feel that 
they are free and use that freedom to 
develop themselves. 
Further, I believe strongly that people 
must not feel that without government 
they could not live, in other words 
government must not be on their shoul­
ders, it must not be a big policeman over 
them. Rather, it must be a respecter and 
protector of their rights. And I felt very 
strongly, I still feel and this is my life 
investment in this, that this country and 
the people of this country must be truly 
and honestly free to practise freedom and 
rights without interference from the 
government. Now, I know there is some­
times a thin line between liberal de­
mocracy and anarchy, because of the 
insistence on individual rights. But I am 
talking about rights within the law, where 
one observes that there is a boundary 
between his freedom and his neighbour's. 
Overstepping it would be to injure the 
neighbour's freedom. So, one has to 
recognise that. The rule of law will ensure 
that that does not happen. 
I have a strong desire, a strong am­
bition, a strong dream to build a de­
mocratic state in the country, to free the 
people from unnecessary controls and let 
them take their own personal initiative to 
develop their talents, to decide their own 
lives. I have a strong feeling that we are 
not any different from people in Europe. 
We are not any different from people in 
America. I am sure the hour has come for 
my country and the hour has come for 
Africa to democratise. Democracy is not 
the preserve of developed countries, it is a 
basic, fundamental human right, it is a 
necessity, o 
Inverview by Robert ROWE 
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Freedom from fear 
An interview with 
Rodger Chongwe, 
Minister of Legal Affairs 
Since October 1991 Zambia has been committed to 
démocratisation. Democracy depends for its survival on 
transparency and the rule of law. The Courier asked the 
Minister responsible for establishing that legal framework 
what démocratisation had meant to Zambia. 
— I think for Zambians démocratis­
ation has meant that they are able to 
express themselves without fear, that they 
are able within the limits of the law to do 
whatever they want to do without any 
consideration that there might be some 
intelligence officers to stop them. Our 
journalists, members of the various poli­
tical parties, NGOs, and pressure groups 
are in a position to express themselves 
without hindrance. One thing that has 
satisfied Zambians is the fact that even 
the smallest man, if he says something to 
the press, what he says is given promi­
nence and is reported in the press, and 
this is something we never had before. 
Within the political arena itself, we 
have 125-plus Members of Parliament 
who belong to my own political party, 
they are free in the House even to differ 
with the Government, a thing which was 
never heard ofin the past. The opposition 
is free to say whatever they want to say. 
There is freedom in the issuing of permits, 
where permits are required to hold public 
meetings. There is no pressure from the 
politicians who are in power or otherwise 
to restrict or to refuse permission for 
people to hold meetings. At least I 
haven't received any reports at all. 
So, broadly, I think there are positive 
signs that Zambia has opened up, but we 
do feel that perhaps we should be doing 
more in the area of human rights, and this 
is why we have a task force which has 
been formed in this Ministry to look 
again at the Constitution to see what 
provisions can be amended — and the 
decision to do so is going to be left to the 
people of this country. So, we are opening 
up and we are very happy with what has 
happened here in the past 14 months. 
► What parts of the Constitution need 
amendment in the area of human rights? 
— Well, we would like Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution which sets out the liberties 
of the person to be looked at by the 
Constitution task force. There are two 
main reasons for this. First, the 1964 
Constitution, which we got from Britain, 
had in it a Bill of Rights, and when that 
Constitution was changed in 1973 the 
provisions on human rights which were in 
the 1964 Constitution were repeated in 
the 1973 Constitution. These are the ones 
that are, by and large, reflected in the 
1991 Constitution. 
But the human rights scenario has 
changed very much since 1964. The two 
Covenants of the United Nations, the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the other one dealing 
with economic, social and cultural rights, 
were written in 1966 and they came into 
force ten years later in 1976, so that at the 
time the first Constitution of Zambia was 
written all we had were the provisions on 
human rights as set out in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. We were 
denied the chance to include the new 
perception and conception of human 
rights set out in the two Covenants. 
Also, since 1985 we have been talking 
about the right to development, and on 
the African continent we have a regional 
human rights charter, the African Char­
ter of Human and Peoples' Rights, which 
was adopted in June 1981 and which 
came into force in 1986. 
We would like the task force to include 
these new concepts of human rights in our 
future Constitution. I'll give you an 
example. Article 23 of our Constitution 
bars discrimination, but nonetheless it 
allows Parliament to pass legislation 
which discriminates if the Act of Parlia­
ment concerned deals with private law. In 
other words, in questions of marriage, of 
custody of children, of inheritance which 
affects women, Parliament would be 
perfectly entitled under Article 23 of our 
Constitution to pass a piece of legislation 
which has a discriminatory effect on the 
people of Zambia. We would like that not 
to appear. 
Also the journalists in this country 
want us to specifically spell out within the 
constitutional framework what the rights 
of journalists are, and the trade unionists 
have also asked us to include workers' 
rights specifically in the Constitution. 
And more recently we have been told that 
in the Constitution we should set out the 
directing principles of State policy, to say 
that the State is bound to provide certain 
economic, social and cultural rights in 
accordance with the resources available 
to it. 
► You inherited from the previous 
government a situation where violations of 
human rights, particularly against the 
person, took place. Are you satisfied that 
that has been entirely expunged? 
— No, we are not, but what we are 
satisfied about is that where the violation 
is detected some remedial measures are 
being taken by the current Government. 
One of the problems that we face in this 
country is that the people who are 
supposed to enforce these laws are the 
people who actually worked for the 
previous Government, and they have 
with them a culture which is perhaps 
completely different from the way the 
new Government looks at things. But we 
hope that with the passage of time this is 
going to change. It will take time, because 
we are dealing with the police who have 
been working for the Government over a 
long period of time. It's the same with the 
prison officers, the bureaucrats, the civil 
servants, so it will take time for them to 
react to certain situations differently and 
in conformity with our new conception of 
respect for the rights of the people. 
► Zambia held local elections j'airly 
recently and the turnout was disappoint-
ingly low. Is there a need for civic 
education in the country? With a very 
young population, most or many of the 
people called upon to vole will perhaps not 
have been familiar with what was expected 
of them in a democracy: 
— I think there are two reasons for the 
low turnout. First, since 1980 adult 
Zambians who are registered voters have 
been barred from participating in local 
government elections, because the Local 
Government Registration Act of 1980 
gave the franchise solely to the officials of 
the then political party. Then when the 
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law changed, even educated people were 
seen asking whether they had the right to 
vote, and you had to say to them : Look, 
under our new laws you also have the 
right to participate. 
Secondly, in this country, people are 
more interested in the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Maybe the solution 
lies in timing the local government 
elections together with the parliamentary 
and presidential elections. But it appears 
to me that that is impossible under our 
present setup, because the councillors 
serve for three years and the Members of 
Parliament for five years, so we never 
have local government and parliamen­
tary elections taking place at the same 
time. 
Yes, I agree with you that we should 
have more civic education, because it is 
important that people participate fully at 
the local government elections in electing 
their representatives. I think they are 
much more important than, perhaps, our 
parliamentary elections, because the peo­
ple in my constituency are much more 
affected by what happens locally — for 
example, they would like to have good 
roads in the area, they would like to have 
good schools to which their children 
could go, they would like to have clinics, 
they would like to have hospitals. These 
are the demands of the people at the local 
level. 
► One has the impression from abroad 
that politicians under the old regime were 
suspected and indeed proved to have been 
corrupt, but that something of the same 
suspicion has hung over the present govern-
ment. I wonder if the culture of good 
governance still has to be fully established 
in Zambia? 
— I think you are right. Under the old 
regime, the only person who was trusted 
in this country as the person who could 
take decisions, who could meet foreign 
representatives without being bribed, was 
the President of the State. Anybody else 
was suspect. The new government took 
over under that background. 
Now, we have said that a Minister can 
negotiate and sign contracts, a Minister 
can make statements on policy issues 
affecting his Ministry instead of the 
President doing so. This is something new 
in Zambia and there is always a question 
asked : 'Is that statement which has been 
made by a Minister not being made to 
satisfy the people his statement affects — 
or has he been paid?' The reason is the 
suspicion that was the mainstay in this 
country for years under the one-party 
system of government. But with time I'm 
quite sure that the situation is going to 
change, that the people of Zambia will 
realise that not all Ministers, politicians 
and, particularly, civil servants are cor­
rupt, that civil servants and Ministers can 
make decisions affecting the people of 
this country without receiving any bribes 
from other people. 
Meanwhile I'm quite sure you read in 
the newspapers that there is corruption in 
the Chiluba Government. If a Minister 
signs a contract — it might be a freight 
contract to bring maize from South 
Africa to this country — and he signs 
another contract to bring maize from the 
port of Dar es Salaam, if there is a 
difference between the tariffs of, say, one 
dollar, somenone will say : 'You see, there 
is this difference... I think the one dollar is 
for the Minister.' But they are two 
different contractors altogether. It's be­
cause people can't picture that one 
company could charge a little bit more 
than another company. And in any case 
we are talking about the operations of 
companies in two different countries. But 
because of where we have come from, we 
are always suspicious that someone 
somewhere must be getting a cut. 
► Is that partly because many members 
of Government have private business 
interests ? 
— I don't know. I think that even if we 
didn't have any private business interests 
the very fact that we are in a position to 
freely negotiate and sign these contracts 
on behalf of Government would still give 
rise to suspicion. Anyway these business 
interests are different in most cases from 
what a Minister is called upon to deal 
with in Cabinet. Some ministers or 
deputy ministers were accountants before 
they came into government, others were 
traders, and others were members of the 
clergy or lawyers. Our Vice-President was 
a lawyer, with his own firm on the 
Copperbelt. It is very difficult to corrupt 
or bribe a person who was a lawyer and 
who signs contracts on behalf of the 
Government. 
Maybe if you had your own transport 
company before you came into govern­
ment, when you are negotiating a trans­
port agreement for the transportation of 
goods which have been ordered by the 
State you have a tendency to try to make 
sure your company gets the contract, but 
under our rules you have to declare your 
interests to Cabinet — in fact you have to 
write to the President to inform him in 
which companies you have an interest, so 
that if a situation like that arises every­
body knows exactly where you stand. 
► You are trying to steer these legal 
reforms through a very difficult economic 
situation. Do you think the economic 
recovery programme is making démocrati-
sation difficult in any way? 
— The structural adjustment pro­
gramme is not making the process of 
démocratisation difficult. Far from it. 
What it is actually doing is that it is 
making the process of promotion and 
protection of human rights much more 
difficult, because of the growing poverty 
amongst the people, because of under­
development. Underdevelopment is the 
major cause of the violation of rights. 
And there is also ignorance. Those, 
really, are my own fears, and those are the 
things that we have to watch. 
Now, people who are poor will become 
poorer under the structural adjustment 
programme, and so they may commit 
crimes. And we as a government will be 
forced to use methods to curb those 
crimes which will not be consonant with 
accepted human rights norms. You might 
want to introduce very draconian meas­
ures in order to cut down on crimes, or 
you might even get dangerous statements 
from the man in charge of the police, 
saying: 'There are so many bandits 
around here — you shoot on sight' — 
something of that nature. 
► That has been heard, in fact. 
- Yes. Now, obviously it's not really 
the democratic process which is at stake, 
it is the rights of the people which are at 
stake, because in the process innocent 
people are likely to be shot dead, and you 
might be forced to erect barriers, what we 
call in this country roadblocks, and 
thereby deny the people their privacy 
because they are going to have to be 
searched. So, because of the rise in the 
crime rate, the Government is forced to 
take desperate measures to contain the 
situation, and those measures will not be 
consonant with accepted human rights 
norms. 
► This must be a matter of some 
concern to yourself, in view of what you 
said in your first answer. 
— It is of concern to us, because we 
realise that it might come, and it is a result 
of the economic measures that the 
Government is taking. 
► Is this something that the country's 
donors and creditors, then, should take into 
cognisance ? 
— I think that the donor countries 
should be much more humane in regard 
to the manner in which the structural 
adjustment programme is being applied. 
They should try by all possible means to 
ensure that those poor who are very badly 
affected by the programmes are given 
some welfare assistance, so that they are 
not adversely affected — and I think that 
if we can do that, then it will reduce 
malnutrition in the poor community and 
will reduce the instances of petty crime — 
and even major crimes of armed robbery 
and murder. O Interview by R.R. 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  41 ZAMBIA 
Biting the bullet: the challenge of 
beating inflation 
One of the unwanted legacies of the 
Second Republic which the new Chiluba 
Government is having to cope with as it 
struggles to carry through its economic 
recovery programme is severe inflation. 
Over the 27 years of UNIP rule, inflation 
became deeply embedded in the Zambian 
economy. At independence it stood at 
between 7 and 8%, then in the mid-1970s 
it started to accelerate and for the last five 
years has been going at a rate described as 
very high by economists or even as hyper-
inflation in some of the economic and 
political circles where it bites hardest. A 
paper on inflation produced by the 
Ministry of Information at the end of 
1992 says that from 1964 to 1991 the 
inflation rate as measured by the con-
sumer price index for the low-income 
group increased by an average of 27%> a 
year. The rate now is something like 
200%. 
The Ministry of Information paper 
puts the blame fairly and squarely on 
excessive government spending. 'Except 
for the 1960s and early 1970s' it says, 'the 
government has all along spent more on 
goods and services than its revenues 
allow.' The chronic budget deficits this 
created have averaged 12% of GNP since 
1975. Furthermore, for the last several 
years — and even now under the IMF-
backed structural adjustment prog-
ramme — the deficit has been calculated 
without including debt interest payments 
as current expenditure or grants as 
current revenue; since payments exceed 
grants, the deficit is actually worse than it 
looks on paper. 
In his first budget speech after the 
handover of power, the Minister of 
Finance, Emmanuel Kasonde, pledged 
that the government would from now on 
The eagle on Zambia's banknotes is not the only thing that is soaring. These notes 
represented roughly the annual GDP per capita for one Zambian at the end of 1989. 
Today, they will buy a single farmer less than half a bag of fertiliser. Ex-President 
Kaunda's smiling face still appears, a reminder of where the blame lies for Zambia's 
rampant inflation 
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aim to balance its budget without bor-
rowing from the banking system. The 
practice of not including the interest 
payments, however, already unbalanced 
the budget, on top of which there were 
other payments 'below the line', such as 
large wage increases wrested from the 
State by the civil service, the military and 
the staff of the state-owned Zambia 
Airways. Last year, too, parts of Zambia 
suffered severe crop losses from the 
drought which hit southern Africa, a 
national emergency was declared and the 
IMF created a separate drought budget, 
which was to be financed by the proceeds 
of selling the maize sent in as food aid by 
foreign donors. But in a context of high 
inflation, drought relief bills had to be 
paid before any revenue came in, and that 
simply added to the inflationary pressure. 
Overspending 
The budget consequently unravelled. 
At the start of 1992 the projected expendi-
ture was 90 billion kwacha, consisting of 
roughly 80 billion in revenue plus grants 
to make up the remaining 10 billion, so 
that there would be no need to borrow 
from the banking system. This arrange-
ment, however, made no provision for 
covering the large payments which had to 
be made on existing government borrow-
ing from the public in the form of treasury 
bills; and the extra drought-related ex-
penditure was not covered by any revenue 
either. By October, the Government had 
to enter a supplementary appropriation 
of 60 billion kwacha to finance over-
spending. In the event, at the end of the 
year spending stood at about 120 to 
130 billion kwacha. How was this paid 
for? In effect, the Bank of Zambia was 
asked to write a cheque. 
Part of the blame for this sorry state of 
affairs has been laid at the door of a 
government whose members had no 
experience of the realities of running a 
country, and which consequently took a 
number of ill-advised spending decisions. 
But revenue collection is a problem too. 
Consultants have been called in to com-
puterise the tax administration system 
and the Minister of Finance has ap-
pointed a task force to make the system 
perform properly. One consultant who 
formerly worked for the US revenue 
service estimates that by making the 
system more efficient and improving 
compliance it should be possible to 
increase tax revenue by up to 50%. The 
very large parastatal system, for instance, ZAMBIA 
only reluctantly pays tax, as many of the 
industries concerned run at a loss (and of 
course their heavy borrowing from banks 
to cover those losses also steps up the 
inflationary pressure). 
Exchange and interest rates have also 
played their part. The developments 
outlined above took place against the 
background of a plunging exchange rate: 
in January 1992 there were about 90 
kwacha to the US dollar — by December 
the rate was 360 to the dollar, and this of 
course pushed up the cost of imports 
which had to be paid for in foreign 
exchange. As the currency has dep­
reciated against the dollar, there has been 
no incentive for anyone to hold on to the 
kwacha or kwacha-denominated assets. 
The resulting flight into foreign exchange 
itself adds to inflation. 
Negative interest 
Bank interest rates in Zambia have 
been negative, in other words lower than 
the rate of inflation. This obviously 
discourages investment in the country, 
since money can be invested at positive 
rates elsewhere, especially when there are 
no exchange controls. The exchange 
controls in place for years have not 
worked properly since the early 1980s. 
This has skewed income distribution, 
leaving the few who could export their 
money much richer in kwacha terms, 
while most people became much poorer. 
International financial statistics show 
that people giving Zambia as their place 
of residence hold something like US 
$450 million outside the economy, which 
at current exchange rates is more than the 
entire local money supply. With declining 
or stagnant real incomes, there has been 
massive excess kwacha demand for all 
kinds of resources, including foreign 
exchange: 'too much money chasing too 
few-goods', in the classic phrase. 
Some commentators put further blame 
for inflation on excessive wage demands 
by workers in the State monopolies. 
However, the trade unions, although they 
form the main power base of the 
governing Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy, and despite large pay rises in 
the parastatals last year, have not man­
aged to maintain their members' real 
purchasing power. And although the 
much-needed cuts in the civil service 
payroll have been delayed for political 
reasons, real wages for those still on the 
payroll have fallen too. If they cannot 
even cushion their own earnings against 
the effects of inflation, it is difficult to see 
where or how the alleged pressure from 
the monopolies is being applied. 
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As this press advertisement shows, 
would-be borrowers face punishing 
interest rates — which keep on rising. 
But with returns to lenders less than half 
the 200% inflation rate, no one wants to 
deposit money in the banks either. So 
investment stagnates 
Nor can imported inflation be blamed 
for the present situation. In the 1970s the 
oil price shock was transmitted directly 
into higher domestic consumer prices in 
Zambia, but for some time now, relative 
to Zambia, the rest of the world has been 
deflating — so where would Zambia be 
importing inflation from ? There is, how­
ever, some argument for saying that 
disruptions to Zambia's import and 
export routes through neighbouring 
countries have raised the corresponding 
costs and thus fuelled inflation. 
Drought 
As far as the role of the drought is 
concerned, droughts are known to occur 
in Africa from time to time, so plans can 
be laid for dealing with their results. But 
Zambia when last year's drought struck 
had no foreign exchange reserves to buy 
food, there was no real carryover of maize 
from previous seasons and there was no 
dynamism left in the agricultural sector, 
as farmers had for years been taxed 
through exchange rate pressures on 
purchases of inputs and discouraged 
from efficient production by the system 
whereby the State buying agency paid the 
same price for maize in every part of the 
country and whatever the season. An 
indication of the seriousness of the 
situation came from President Chiluba in 
December, when he told a meeting of 
Zambia's donors in Lusaka that his 
Government expected the economy to 
show a decline of 10% in 1992 as a result 
of the problems faced by agriculture in 
the drought year. 
So what are the consequences of 
inflation? In January this year the 
Government organised a conference to 
discuss this very issue and possible ways 
forward. It was attended by Ministers, 
opposition politicians, bankers, em­
ployers, trade unionists, academics, dip­
lomats and guest speakers from the 
World Bank and the IMF. The Minister 
of Finance, Mr Kasonde, singled out the 
impact inflation had on investment in the 
economy as its most damaging effect. As 
businesses could only guess what ex­
change rates, wages and prices would be 
in six months or a year, they could not 
engage in medium- or long-term plan­
ning, so investment became too risky. 
Uncertainty about government policy 
also destroyed investment incentives. 
Secondly, negative real interest rates 
made unproductive investment in physi­
cal inventory (buildings, land, equipment 
and supplies) more profitable than saving 
money, so there was a shortage of funds 
available for investment. High nominal 
interest rates, even if negative in real 
terms, could cause serious cash flow 
problems for companies which did want 
to invest and could get loans. 
A tax on capital 
All these points were echoed by the 
Chairman of the Zambia Association of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 
David Frost, who pointed out in an 
interview for The Courier that it was 
manufacturers rather than traders who 
were suffering. In practical terms, be­
cause of the high cost of replacing inputs 
industrialists were struggling to produce 
their goods with old, inefficient ma­
chinery, kwacha loans were available 
only on short, overdraft terms and in an 
inflationary situation it was too risky to 
borrow in foreign exchange ; the resulting 
costs of inflation had to be passed on to 
consumers — and they were increasingly 
unable to buy as their own purchasing 
power dwindled. Mr Frost called inf­
lation a tax on capital, and said that if it 
were not brought down to below 10%) 
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Zambia's manufacturers would simply 
turn into traders servicing local needs and 
would be replaced by manufacturers 
from the country's competitors, par­
ticularly South Africa. 
Minister Kasonde also warned that the 
increasing tendency to conduct transac­
tions in foreign exchange rather than in 
the local currency, whether legally or not, 
merely aggravated inflation, since it left 
even more spare kwacha in the system 
chasing too few goods and services, 
resulting in even higher prices — and, 
indeed, immunising those parts of the 
economy operating in foreign exchange 
against any Bank of Zambia monetary 
policies. 
On this subject, The Courier was told 
by a specialist on a macroeconomie 
technical assistance project being run for 
the Zambian Government by Harvard 
University that, at least from the point of 
view of industry, dollarisation is not 
necessarily a bad solution. When Brazil, 
for example, was in a similar situation 
some years ago, price stability was 
achieved by turning the whole economy 
over to dollar transactions, so that 
inflation in the local currency, although it 
remained a nuisance, did not affect the 
activities of manufacturing industry. The 
Brazilian economy, however, was and is 
more outwardly oriented than that of 
Zambia. And in Zambia most of the 
population cannot acquire dollars (or 
pounds or rand) in the first place. 
The hardest hit are, indeed, the 
genuinely poor. Each increase in price 
directly and immediately reduces their 
purchasing power. As the President has 
put it, 'There is nothing that will help the 
most vulnerable groups more than the 
bringing down of the rate of inflation.' 
How, is the question. 
Budget pledges 
The basic cure is acknowledged to be 
making sure that the Government does 
not spend more than its revenues allow. 
This entails either increasing revenue or 
reducing spending, or both. There is no 
proposal to increase taxation, but the 
Government has given several undertak­
ings on expenditure in the 1993 budget. 
Firstly, it says that all expenditure will 
be financed by domestic revenues. 
Second, there will be no new borrowing, 
even on a temporary basis, from the Bank 
of Zambia ; the Bank will not process any 
Government transaction unless the re­
venue to pay for it has already been 
deposited. Treasury bills, too, have been 
floated, so money financing is over. The 
intention is apparently to borrow short-
term from the non-bank public, for 
example Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines, which has large foreign exchange 
inflows available for deployment, 
through Government borrowing, else­
where in the economy. Third, any sup­
plementary spending in 1993 will have to 
be paid for — in advance — by increased 
revenues or lower spending elsewhere. 
And perhaps the hardest promise to keep 
will be the fourth one, an undertaking, if 
revenues rise owing to inflation, not to 
adjust spending upwards as well. 
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David Frost, Chairman of the Zambia 
Association of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry, says inflation is a tax on 
capital which may drive manufacturers 
out of business 
Low money growth is also promised. 
Here there is certainly room for improved 
performance, as last year the targeted 
reduction from 130% to 25% was not 
achieved. According to the Bank of 
Zambia, this was because increased 
copper production during the year had 
led to greater export earnings than 
expected. The Finance Ministeraiso told 
the inflation conference that positive real 
interest rates (as a stimulus to saving and 
productive investment) would be brought 
about, ideally by a reduction in inflation 
but, if necessary, by an increase in 
nominal rates. 
This constitutes a very dry recipe for 
economic stabilisation, yet the Harvard 
project goes even further and advocates 
actually running a sharp budget surplus, 
so as to free resources for paying off 
Zambia's huge external debt. Even balan­
cing the books, let alone producing a 
surplus from a cash budget while inf­
lation runs at 200%, is a tall order, since 
by the end of the year the initial appropri­
ations are likely to have fallen to between 
a third and a quarter of their value, but 
the macroeconomists say it has been done 
in other countries: in Bolivia, for ex­
ample, in 1985, inflation of 20 000% was 
reduced virtually to nothing in a year by a 
government which simply did not spend 
money it did not have. 
Social costs 
As to the social costs of this course of 
action, observers agree they can hardly be 
worse than the social costs of continuing 
with the ruinous economic policies of the 
last 20 years. The Finance Minister said 
he recognised that many workers faced 
serious difficulties and that promises of 
future improvements in real wages might 
seem hollow today. There would there­
fore be measures to increase workers' 
take-home pay, to be financed through 
spending restraint throughout the 
budget, not by borrowing as before, and 
the Government called on workers to 
show wage restraint in return. To offset 
this sacrifice by the labour force, the 
Government also called for voluntary 
price restraint in the markets, urging 
producers who faced no effective compe­
tition not to exploit their market power. 
So the priorities for this year's budget, 
which was presented to Parliament on 
29 January, are to attack inflation and 
stimulate new local and foreign private 
investment. Dramatic cuts were made in 
taxes and duties, and government depart­
ments were warned that they would not 
be bailed out if they overspent their 
allocations. President Chiluba made a 
personal commitment to fighting inf­
lation by voluntarily taking a cut of 
100 000 kwacha (about US $270) in his 
monthly salary of 300 000 kwacha, and 
calling on all Zambians to enlist in the 
battle. It seems unlikely that many 
workers, particularly those at risk of 
redundancy from cost-cutting and priv­
atisation, will be able to follow his lead in 
surrendering income, but he reminded his 
countrymen that the medicine applied 
during the past year, although it had 
already yielded results, was still in­
adequate. 'Painful as the therapy is, 'the 
President said' 'we have taken too much 
pain to give up now.' It is too early to say 
how successful the cure will ultimately be, 
but one encouraging sign is that although 
inflation stands at 200% now, when the 
MMD took power at the end of 1991 it 
was at a peak of 400%. Movement may 
be slow, but it is in the right direction. O 
R.R. 
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Poverty for many, 
wealth for some 
by Clifford SILWIMBA 
An attractive feature of Zambian life under the new 
government is the freedom of the press. Opinions of all kinds 
are expressed in a range of newspapers and magazines, 
which make a speciality of publishing contributions from 
their readers commenting on government policies and 
performance. Many of these writers describe the economic 
hardships ordinary members of the public are having to go 
through and wonder if things could not be differently 
ordered. As a bow to this very distinctive tradition, and to 
air a dissenting political view, The Courier here publishes an 
abridged commentary by a freelance journalist based in the 
Zambian capital, Lusaka. 
On the surface, Zambia is supposed to be doing well 
economically. The country is rich in minerals and other natural 
resources. Mining statistics for 1990, for instance, are quite 
impressive '. Turnover by the mining corporation stood at 
K60.54 million, representing a growth of 103% over the 
previous year's turnover of K29.79 million. Although lead and 
zinc production declined by 8684 tonnes to a total of 16 004 t, 
finished copper production for the year was 448 468 t which was 
32 823 t more than in the previous year. The annual average 
price for copper, which is the country's main foreign exchange 
earner, was £1639 (K45 810) per tonne. 
Although these figures look impressive, the majority of both 
urban and rural dwellers in Zambia remain pathetically poor. 
The new Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) 
government, which has been in power since October 1991, is 
unable to deliver the promised goods to the people because 
allegedly, it inherited an empty state treasury. In short, the 
economy had been plundered. 
Consequently, feeder roads in the rural areas remain 
impassable because no repair work or maintenance has been 
done for years. 
Most bridges have long been washed away—as a result, relief 
food meant for the starving millions is stuck in urban and peri-
urban areas, unable to reach the intended beneficiaries. This 
state of affairs, coupled with the devastating effects of the 1992 
drought, has reduced most families in rural Zambia to mere 
beggars. 
The new government claims to have brought 'democracy and 
a new culture' to Zambia in contrast to Kaunda's socialist 
dictatorship. To ordinary Zambians, however, such talk is little 
more than political rhetoric. 
They want food, shelter, clean water and sufficient supplies of 
medicine in hospitals and rural health centres. At the moment, 
diseases such as malaria, dysentery and cholera are big killers. In 
November 1992, almost 400 people died of cholera in Kitwe, a 
city in the Copperbelt. Most victims die quietly in rural Zambia 
where half of the people still live. 
Whereas the fallen Kaunda government tried to resettle 
people back in the rural areas at public expense, the MMD 
government has stated openly that there is no money in the state 
1 Statistics taken from the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Ltd. 
(ZIMCO) Annual Report - 1990. 
treasury for such ventures. Whereas the Kaunda administration 
tried to distribute 'free' milite meal to low income groups in both 
rural and urban areas, using the coupon system, the present 
government has put a stop to 'free' food, and has more than 
quadrupled the price of the staple food itself— from K225 per 
25 kg bag to well over K1000. 
Most Zambians have also come to realise that life is harsh in 
the urban areas, where jobs are scarce and food prices 
prohibitively high. In an effort to please the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank — two of the major 
donors — the government has instituted measures aimed at 
reducing the size of the workforce in the civil service and the 
para-statal companies. This is called retrenchment. In the 
process, thousands of workers have lost their jobs. The only 
alternative for many is to go back to their villages empty-
handed. They have nothing with which to start a new life in the 
village. It is poverty at its starkest. 
Despite raging inflation, the salaries for ordinary workers still 
in employment are very low. House servants, hospital cleaners 
and farm labourers earn between K3000 and K7000 a month 
and most civil servants earn less than K15 000 a month. In sharp 
contrast, the new government, apparently closing its ears to 
public criticism, has raised the salaries of cabinet ministers from 
the K15 000 set by the ousted Kaunda administration to 
K320 000 a month. Members of Parliament receive not less than 
K250 000 a month in salary and tax-free allowances. To 
ordinary citizens, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians have 
formed a new 'leisure class'. They have and enjoy the best that 
Zambia offers while the majority are living in abject poverty. 
This apparent selfishness on the part of the leaders has surprised 
and annoyed a lot of observers — especially members of the 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, university students, church 
leaders and the workers who are being retrenched in accordance 
with the dictates of the structural adjustment programme 
tailored by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The country's President, Mr Frederick Chiluba, had a tough 
task at a recent press conference, when he tried to justify the high 
salaries awarded by his administration to ministers and 
parliamentarians. He said this was done to avoid corruption — 
but many people saw no logic in this answer. The question is — 
just how much money is enough to prevent corruption? And 
which category of worker is not prone to corruption? Time 
alone will telilo CS. 
Life is harsh for most Zambians 
Above, people waiting for medicine at a rural health centre. 
Below, a classroom in need of repair ZAMBIA 
Small farmers: planting the seeds 
of prosperity 
Small farmers play a vital part in 
Zambia's domestic economy, as they 
account for 70% of the country's food 
production. In its May-June 1990 issue, 
The Courier reported on a development 
project for small and medium-scale far­
mers being run jointly by the Govern­
ment of Zambia and the EC Commission 
in Central Province. This project, centred 
on the mining town of Kabwe, was set up 
in 1988, at a time when farming resources 
throughout the country were concen­
trated on maize production in the inter­
ests of what the government of the 
Second Republic imagined would be a 
cheap way of ensuring food security. 
Since then, last year's drought showed 
how little economic security there was in 
relying so heavily on a single crop. At the 
same time, in the political arena, a new 
spirit is at work and new policies are 
being applied in agriculture as in many 
other areas of national life. A return visit 
to the smallholder development project 
this year gave an opportunity for an 
interesting comparison between the old 
approach and the different attitudes now 
prevailing in the management of the 
Zambian economy. 
At the hand-over of power from the old 
regime in 1991, smallholder farming in 
Zambia was in an unsustainable con­
dition. Farmers would take loans for the 
purchase of necessary inputs such as seed 
and fertilisers ; such loans were in theory 
repayable when the harvest came in, but 
control was lax and when, as frequently 
happened, the loans were not paid back, 
the cooperatives providing the supplies 
were simply indemnified by the govern­
ment. This was, to put it mildly, not a 
prescription for efficient management, 
and at the transfer of power the system 
had virtually collapsed. The cooperative 
delivering to smallholders in Kabwe, for 
example, was in a state described by 
project coordinator Karl-Heinz Voigt as 
'chaos' with the supply depots completely 
empty. To make matters worse, once the 
cooperatives stopped being compensated 
by government for bad debts, they went 
into other businesses, such as transport, 
where the returns on outlay are more 
immediate. Many farmers were in a state 
of apathy, their morale sapped by lack of 
incentive — and by low, fixed prices. A 
change of direction was clearly needed. 
The smallholder development project 
covers approximately 34 000 sq. km. of 
land around the town of Kabwe, which 
lies north of Lusaka on the road to the 
Copperbelt. In the immediate vicinity of 
the town there are large commercial 
farms, many of them run by expatriates, 
but further out are large expanses of less 
intensively developed land on which an 
estimated 35 000 small farmer house­
holds live. The project's targets are to 
increase food production by these far­
mers, raise their income and make them 
economically stable, increase the value of 
their marketable products and help rural 
ment's assumed right to dictate agricul­
tural policy. Since the advent of the 
MMD, however, a group approach to 
development has been chosen as it is 
effective, practicable and stimulates com­
petition between farmers in a grouping of 
shared interests. Whereas under the old 
maize development project, farmer 
groups in each village consisted only of 
the headman, his deputy and four others 
nominated by the headman, farmers now 
organise themselves into groups and 
associations known as cattle clubs on any 
basis they choose, be it ties of family, 
language, religion, political viewpoint or 
any other consideration; the only essen­
tial criterion is, of course, that they 
should trust each other. Thirty per cent of 
farmers in the project area are organised 
in such groups and clubs, and the project 
aims to encourage more. 
Voluntary grouping has the advantage 
that the groups are self-policing and 
exclude anyone known locally to be 
unreliable or dishonest. It also en-
Ox carts are cheap and easy to run. Over-sophisticated 
tractors stand idle in the background 
entrepreneurs integrate small and 
medium-scale farmers into a liberalised 
market system. On the macroeconomic 
level, there is also assistance for the 
Government in defining a minimum 
government support strategy in agricul­
tural and veterinary extension. 
Only two years ago any approach 
involving participation by farmers them­
selves in decision-making would have 
been seen as a challenge to the Govern-
courages loan repayment. No outright 
grants are made, only loans, and the 
lowest credit cell is the farmer group, 
whose members are therefore jointly 
liable for repayment of the debt. If any 
individual defaults, no further loans are 
made to anyone in the group. The groups 
themselves decide which of their members 
is most in need of a loan, and the loan 
itself, which has to be approved by the 
district agricultural adviser attached to 
the project, Traugott Hartmann, is in the 
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form of a piece of equipment, the cost of 
which is recovered from the farmer 
concerned over a period of three years. 
Cash loans are not made under the 
programme. 
A good example of the group approach 
at work can be seen in the Kabwe South 
Rural District area, where Ivy Mainza 
heads a group farming land in the village 
of Kafunda. The traditional crop there 
had been maize grown from hybrid seed ; 
but with this variety fresh seed had to be 
procured each year and was too expens­
ive, so the project introduced perennial, 
open pollinating varieties requiring no 
replacement, and the farmers maintain a 
maize seed garden from which they can 
now meet their own needs without ex­
ternal inputs. As a move towards diversi­
fication, the group leader also set up a 
soya seed garden, using two varieties (one 
of them developed by a local research 
station, Magoye) which produce pods 
without the inoculum needed to stimulate 
growth in earlier types. Although it is not 
traditional to the area, soya grown in the 
district with seed from the garden is 
popular with farming households be­
cause it crops well and is a rich source of 
protein. 
The garden is laid out on land which 
the group members cleared themselves. 
For this and other work on their farms 
the group obtained an ox cart with a 
credit from the project. At first sight this 
looks like a low-technology solution, but 
there are good reasons. Under the old 
system, grants were given for the pur­
chase of oxen but were not repayable, and 
suspicious numbers of grant-aided oxen 
would die of neglect or disappear. Trac­
tors bought with credit were not a success 
either, as a stock of fuel had to be kept 
and farmers did not generally have the 
skills, tools, parts or incentive needed to 
keep the machines in repair, so that many 
tractors now lied unused and rusting. An 
ox cart can also be used for transpor­
tation purposes, such as taking farmers' 
children to hospital or their surplus 
produce to market, where a tractor would 
not be so cheap or practical. 
The project has therefore gone back to 
promoting animal traction, but loans arc 
given only for the purchase of equipment 
(ploughs, ridgers, reapers and so on), not 
animals. And only a farmer whose group 
certifies that he owns or can get the use of 
draught animals (from a relative, for 
example) is eligible for an equipment 
loan. The project supplies a very practical 
four-in-one piece of equipment which 
ploughs, ridges, reaps and weeds, and is 
made by a small company in Zambia 
using local materials, so that there is a 
spin-off benefit for Zambian light indus­
try too. 
Animals, of course, require veterinary 
care, and this is where the 160 cattle clubs 
come into their own. Each club has a 
crush pen or spraying race where cattle 
are treated against tick-borne and other 
diseases. Again, a low-technology ap­
proach is adopted. These enclosures can 
be built using poles cut from the abund­
ant trees growing wild in the bush, 
whereas to build a cattle dip would cost 
ECU 12 500. Technical information 
about spraying, as with all training and 
knowhow, is disseminated through clubs 
and the larger extension groups into 
which they and farmer groups are or­
ganised. 
Most of the farmers concerned by the 
smallholder development project operate 
only at subsistence level, but there is some 
cash crop cultivation. As well as maize 
and soya, farmers in Kafunda village, for 
example, grow cotton, sunflowers, 
groundnuts, tomatoes, okra, cabbages, 
kale, rape, onions and Chinese leaf for 
sale. EC microproject assistance has gone 
towards vegetable-growing projects spe­
cifically for women. Members of a 
Chibombo women display dishes made 
from their own soya crop 
women's group near Chibombo have 
received help with inputs for half a 
hectare of fund-raising garden each, and 
one of them grows 20 boxes of tomatoes a 
year on her patch. These ladies have also 
worked with an EC-funded domestic 
science adviser who has taught them ways 
of incorporating soya beans into their 
diet, the methods of preparation being 
quite different from those for maize. 
At a nearby farm there is an example of 
EC assistance towards onward proces­
sing of farm produce, albeit at a basic 
level. There a farmer, Mr Kayeka, has 
obtained a credit from the project to buy 
and set up a diesel-engined hammer mill, 
where he grinds maize into mealie meal 
for his own use and for other farmers in 
his area. His customers pay in kind or in 
cash, and the mill has to run for six hours 
a day to cover maintenance and loan 
repayment costs. A 5-kg bag of maize 
which would take two days to mill by 
hand now takes three minutes, an ad­
vance which is especially welcomed by 
women, as hand pounding is traditionally 
a female task. Outside harvest time, Mr 
Kayeka can store three tonnes of maize in 
a granary also funded by a loan from the 
project. 
Before making credits available for the 
20 hammer mills so far installed, the 
project coordinator and his team carried 
out a survey to determine where it would 
be most effective to locate them, so that 
farmers would have one within a re­
asonable distance but there would not be 
so many that they ceased to be commer­
cially viable. There are plans for 40 more 
mills. Maintenance services are not well 
developed, but the project coordinator 
hopes that some entrepreneur will realise 
that there is a living to be made out of 
keeping the mills in working order. 
It would be unrealistic to pretend that 
since the change of government all the 
problems of small-scale farming in 
Zambia were on the way to being solved 
by schemes of this type. Project leaders 
have to urge members of farmer groups 
constantly to press their representatives 
for information and action, as 27 years of 
spoon-feeding by the previous regime 
have made many farmers slow to identify 
and fight for their own interests. They 
also have no experience of marketing 
except at an informal level, and govern­
ment policy is now to liberalise the 
agricultural marketing system completely 
so that traders, cooperatives, processors, 
transporters, wholesalers and retailers 
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Tourism - room for expansion 
Zambia has many natural attractions. 
Wildlife is the major draw, and the 
country's wide open spaces and un­
spoiled countryside feature internation­
ally known nature reserves with well-
equipped game lodges. It shares with 
Zimbabwe the natural beauties of the 
Victoria Falls and the Zambezi river. 
Even so, Zambia is not well developed as 
a destination for foreign visitors. The 
Zambian National Tourist Board, 
ZNTB, puts the number at between 
30 000 and 40 000 a year. The bulk of 
these tend to be South Africans — 
relations with that country have recently 
improved and the ZNTB has opened an 
office in Johannesburg — but they are 
mostly backpacking or in their own 
four-wheel-drive vehicles and the contri­
bution they make to the local economy is 
small. 
According to the chairman of the 
Tourist Board, Andy Anderson, when 
the Movement for Multiparty Democ­
racy took over in 1991 the new Govern­
ment had no coherent policy for tour­
ism. Last year, however, the ZNTB 
launched an aggressive policy to develop 
and promote the sector, more or less 
from scratch; but it has virtually no 
funds of its own for the purpose and 
there has been no interest from foreign 
investors as yet. 
There are unfortunately a number of 
disincentives. In material terms, the high 
cost of long-haul air travel into Africa 
discourages visitors from the affluent 
countries of the North. The much 
criticised Zambia Airways puts up a 
performance, both internationally and 
domestically, which Mr Anderson de­
scribes as disastrous. Direct flights to 
New York which were popular with 
package tour groups have been dis­
continued, losing much of the well-
heeled North American clientele. 
Inside the country the low standard of 
roads, transport and telephones makes 
both organising and taking part in 
tourism an uphill struggle. Tour oper­
ators complain that the cost of doing 
business in Zambia is prohibitive, not to 
mention the inordinate amounts of time 
taken up in bureaucratic procedures. 
Potential visitors are also put off by the 
high inflation and reports of insecurity 
and disease. On the credit side, Mr 
Anderson pointed out that almost no 
petty crime had been recorded against 
foreign visitors and Zambian hotels 
offered high levels of comfort and 
service, giving tourists and executives 
good value for money by international 
standards. 
As far as local tourism is concerned, 
commercially organised white-water 
rafting and walking safaris on wilder­
ness trails attract about equal numbers 
of Zambian and foreign tourists. These 
activities have the disadvantage of being 
seasonal. 
The ZNTB has approached the Euro­
pean Community for US $175 000 in 
support for a tourism strategy project 
designed to identify what scope there is 
for the industry and to increase the 
number of visitors. Management plans 
for the lower Zambezi and Livingstone 
(next to the Falls, and once the capital 
city under British rule) are being drawn 
up. South Luangwa National Park is 
already well established, and North 
Luangwa is ripe for exploitation. To give 
an idea of the regional potential, Zim­
babwe attracts 500 000 and South 
Africa one million tourists a year. 
The Zambia National Tourist Board 
is entirely funded by Government 
through the Ministry of Tourism and is 
very short of money. As well as Johan­
nesburg, it has maintained offices in 
London, New York, Sydney, Bonn, 
Rome and Milan which are a tremend­
ous drain on the Board's foreign ex­
change allocation, and closures are 
having to be made. This year's planned 
budget is less than in 1992, even before 
any allowance is made for inflation. 
However, where there's a will there's a 
way : Mr Anderson says the 'product' he 
is pushing at the moment is wildlife-
viewing for the adventurous, and his 
posters speak of Zambia as 'The real 
Africa". 
A hammer mill funded with EC credit 
grinds corn for farmers near Kabwe 
can operate without government inter­
ference. The price of maize, the main 
staple, has been deregulated, but in the 
new pricing environment it is the large 
farmers who are expected to capture a 
larger share of the maize market, as they 
have better access to storage facilities, 
transport and credit and are nearer the 
main consuming centres than smallhol­
ders. 
To help the latter, therefore, the 
Kabwe project has recently recruited a 
marketing adviser, whose job will be to 
help set up a market information service, 
so that small farmers can make better-
informed judgments as to when and 
where to sell their crops and buy inputs, 
and traders will know where marketable 
surpluses are available for purchase. This 
is a radical departure from the old 
marketing arrangement, under which 
crops were bought at guaranteed prices 
by the State-funded cooperatives. The 
challenge of operating in a free-market 
system is one which some small farmers 
will be better able to face than others. 
Recognising, in fact, that entrepreneurs 
eventually have to stand on their own 
feet, the Kabwe Smallholder Develop­
ment Project plans to pull out after three 
years and leave the local farmers to apply 
what they have learned as they see fit. It 
will be up to them to show whether 
Zambia has the grassroots human re­
sources to match its huge agricultural 
potential.O R.R. 
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AIDS — a shadow hanging over 
Zambia's future 
Hardly a day passes but Zambia's 
newspapers report the death of yet 
another person who had been making a 
useful contribution to the public life of 
the country. It may be a businessman, a 
banker, a member of the armed forces, a 
mining engineer, a politician, a lawyer; 
many of them have died relatively young, 
and death is often said to have occured 
'after a long illness'. It is an open secret 
that most of the people who die of this 
unspecified disease are victims of AIDS 
(acquired immune-deficiency syndrome) 
or AIDS-related conditions. 
Those who figure in newspaper ob­
ituaries, of course, are only the comparat­
ively prominent members of society. But 
there is disturbing evidence that AIDS is 
a threat to all classes and social groups in 
the Zambian population, and on a scale 
that is only now becoming clear. A recent 
report by the Zambian Ministry of 
Health and the World Health Organis­
ation said that there had been a steady 
increase in the number of new cases of 
infection by HIV (the human immuno­
deficiency virus, which is responsible for 
AIDS) over the past seven years, and 
quoted several alarming figures. In the 
urban population — and Zambia is a 
highly urbanised country — the highest 
recorded HIV-positive figures were 
among patients who already had another 
sexually transmissible disease: 54% of 
new attenders at STD clinics proved to 
have the virus. Of women attending 
antenatal clinics, the proportion found to 
be HIV-positive rose from 12% in 1988 to 
24% in 1990 (the current figure from the 
Ministry of Health is 40%). Medical 
workers estimate that 50% of the children 
of infected women also have HIV; their 
sexual partners are, of course, also likely 
to be infected. Ten per cent of would-be 
blood donors tested HIV-positive in 
1987, rising to 18% in 1990. The figures 
for semi-urban and rural areas are also 
rising, but are generally lower, owing to 
more traditional morality and lower 
mobility outside towns and cities. 
The figures for AIDS-related fatalities 
have, however, to be regarded as erring 
on the side of caution, as reporting 
mechanisms are faulty, and many deaths 
are ascribed to opportunistic diseases 
rather than to the underlying AIDS 
condition. This is particularly true of 
tuberculosis, the incidence of which has 
risen sharply over the past year. Sec­
ondly, many sufferers, when they realise 
that conventional medicine has no cure 
for AIDS, turn to traditional healers in 
rural areas, and their eventual deaths 
from AIDS are not recorded as such. 
According to Elizabeth Mataka of the 
Family Health Trust, a voluntary, non­
governmental organisation working on 
AIDS prevention and care, the situation 
is critical, and every Zambian has lost a 
relation, a neighbour, a friend or a 
colleague to the disease. Nor has the full 
seriousness of the situation yet become 
apparent. As AIDS has a long incubation 
period, and prevention campaigns did 
not start until the late 1980s, cases 
appearing now are manifestations of 
infections which occurred as far back as 
the 1970s. Most cases contracted before 
the late 1980s have yet to show. Mrs 
Mataka says health workers' worst fear is 
that up to 25% of the population could be 
infected, most of them without knowing 
it. 
In fact AIDS is increasingly regarded 
as not just a medical but also a socioecon­
omic problem. The social impact of the 
epidemic is to be seen, for example, in the 
rising infant mortality rate among child­
ren of infected women. Most of the 
children affected die by the age of one, 
their condition exacerbated by poor 
nutrition, difficult living conditions and 
the inadequacy of healthcare services. All 
HIV carriers in the country, in fact, tend 
to develop full AIDS symptoms earlier 
than their counterparts in developed 
countries, as the general state of public 
health is poor. 
As adults die, more children are being 
orphaned, so that the burden of caring for 
them falls on grandparents or other 
family members who may not have the 
resources to cope. A study carried out by 
the Family Health Trust in the Matero 
East district of Lusaka found that 10.2% 
of children questioned had lost one or 
both parents, the usual figure in 
peacetime being two to three per cent; 
further questions showed that the dif­
ference was accounted for by AIDS. The 
survey also uncovered resulting problems 
of lack of education, crime and vagrancy 
among orphaned children. As far as care 
for AIDS sufferers and unattached child­
ren is concerned, family culture in 
Zambia is very supportive of sick or 
needy relatives, but caregivers themselves 
may be, or later become, infected, and 
when they in their turn fall ill both they 
and those they were looking after become 
a burden on a dwindling family base or 
the underdeveloped social services. 
In the economic sphere, not only is 
health spending having to rise; the labour 
force is being weakened and reduced, a 
fact which trade and industry are now 
becoming alive to as productivity and 
profits fall through absenteeism and loss 
of skilled workers. The cost of training 
staff who may soon after fall ill and 
ultimately die is one which fewer and 
fewer companies can afford to pay. 
AIDS prevention efforts in any 
country must, of course, address the 
reasons for the spread of the disease. In 
Zambia these are similar to those found 
elsewhere, though for cultural reasons, it 
is claimed, sexual transmission is pre­
dominantly through heterosexual, not 
homosexual, contact. A further expla­
nation is said to lie in sociocultural 
practices such as the ritual cleansing of a 
recent widow through sexual intercourse 
with her dead husband's brother, and the 
belief among some older people that sex 
with young partners, whom they pay, 
carries less risk of infection (here it is 
precisely the younger partner who is 
usually put at risk). 
Zambia has a National AIDS Preven­
tion and Control Programme, and recog­
nises the need for a multisectoral, grass­
roots approach by several Ministries at 
once. The Government, however, is 
unable to bear the full cost of the 
programme, which for 1992 was expected 
to reach ZMK 80 million (some ECU 
200 000 at current exchange rates), and 
international donors such as the Euro­
pean Community have become involved. 
Several years ago the EC provided HIV 
test kits and financed a seminar for health 
workers on identification and treatment, 
but the main contribution has been the 
allocation of just over ECU 1 million for 
a three-year project to establish an 
organised national blood transfusion 
system, which has so far not existed. It is 
hoped that an additional ECU 1.5m will 
be available under Lomé IV. 
The NAPCP, and public health bodies 
organised into an Anti-AIDS Project, 
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77ic wise old rabbit of Zambiun folklore has been enlisted into the fight against AIDS 
in this leaflet distributed free to primary schools. Health workers say it is vital to get 
the message through to the very young, so as to protect the rising generation 
have produced AIDS information 
messages, some in local languages, for 
public display, as well as printed material 
and educational plays. The slant of the 
messages is positive : while warning of the 
dangers, they seek to promote hope, 
encourage safe life styles and teach 
compassion for sufferers. AIDS preven­
tion has been incorporated into the 
school curriculum, and to protect the 
rising generation the emphasis is being 
placed on getting the message through to 
children before the age of 16. Other target 
groups for information and education 
work have included 'street-kids' (home­
less children living on their wits in urban 
centres) and employees in the workplace. 
A pioneering example of this last type 
of approach is the policy of Barclays 
Bank in Zambia, which used to make 
HIV testing a condition of employment. 
The Bank soon realised that this served 
no purpose, as antibodies to HIV do not 
appear until some three months after 
infection, so a negative result does not 
necessarily prove that the subject is free of 
the virus, and in any case staff could 
become infected at any time after the test. 
The emphasis therefore shifted to pre­
ventive education and supportive coun­
selling, and the Bank now employs its 
own health adviser, as well as contribut­
ing generously to the nongovernmental 
organisations which, incidentally, handle 
90% of AIDS-related care work in the 
country. 
The challenge is enormous, but meas­
urable progress is being made. The 
Ministry of Health/WHO report said 
that, thanks to public information cam­
paigns, 99% of women throughout the 
country were now aware of HIV, 89% of 
them knew it could be transmitted 
through sexual intercourse and 62% 
believed it was preventable. Condoms are 
consequently in higher demand and in 
1992, for the first time, funds were 
allocated from the national budget for 
procurement of supplies of condoms, 
which are tested for safety and distributed 
all over Zambia using the existing drugs 
distribution system. The number of 
pregnancies among schoolgirls is falling, 
as is the incidence of STD. This suggests 
(though it does not prove) that HIV 
infection too may now be retreating; but 
if so, the resulting fall in the number of 
AIDS cases will not occur for some years 
yet, owing, as explained above, to the 
long incubation period of the disease. 
Programmes of counselling, home-
based care and orphan care are now in 
place. Elizabeth Mataka of the Family 
Health Trust reports that a home-based 
healthcare programme for AIDS suf­
ferers in Lusaka which started in 1987 
had cared for 5030 patients at home by 
August 1992. The purpose of such pro­
grammes is not only to teach proper care 
and nutrition in the home but also to 
relieve pressure on Zambia's hard-
pressed hospitals. This is the way forward 
as far as care is concerned, according to 
the NGOs: even if no extra money is 
available, they want the Government to 
second personnel to help them in their 
vital work. The NGOs also want industry 
to give them more financial support, 
stressing that the future of the country's 
expanding private sector depends not just 
on the success of the structural adjust­
ment programme but on companies 
having healthy employees.o R.R. 
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Profile 
Land area: 752 614 km
2 
Languages: English (officiai language 
of government and business), Nyanja, 
Bemba, Tonga, Lozi and other local 
Population : 
-number: 8.21 million (mid-1991 es­
timate) 
-spread: 50% urban, 50% rural (1990) 
-density: 114 per 1000 ha 
-growth rate: 3.63% per annum 
Main towns (1990 census): Lusaka 
(the capital, 982 362); Kitwe (439 201); 
Ndola (376 311); Chingóla (186 769); 
Mufulira (175 025); Kabwe (166 619); 
Luanshya (147 747); Livingstone 
(84 116) 
Infant mortality: 76/1000 live births 
(1990) 
Life expectancy at birth: 54.4 years 
Doctors per inhabitant : 1/7150 (1984) 
Access to safe water: 76% of urban, 
43 % of rural population 
Adult literacy: total 73% - men 81%, 
women 65% (1990) 
School enrolment rate: primary 80%, 
secondary 20%, higher 2% (1989) 
GNP per capita: US $420 per annum 
(1990) 
Real GDP per capita: US$767 per 
annum (1989) 
Official development assistance per 
inhabitant: US $54 per annum (1990) 
Main exports: Copper (85% of total 
exports in 1991), zinc, lead, cobalt, 
tobacco 
Main imports: Machinery and trans­
port, fuels, lubricants, energy, manu­
factured goods, chemicals, food 
Main trading partners (estimates, 
1990): 
Exports to : Japan, France, Italy, India 
Imports from: UK, Japan, West Ger­
many, USA, Saudi Arabia, South Africa 
External debt: US $7 billion ( in mid-
1991 external debt was twice GNP) 
Debt service ratio: 13.5% of exports of 
goods and services (1991) 
Currency: Kwacha (378 kwacha = 
US $1 in February 1993, with inflation 
estimated at approx. 200% per annum) 
Sources: World Bank, UNDP. 
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EC - Zambia cooperation 
by Dr Nikolaos ALEXANDRAKIS * 
Zambia acceded to independence from 
Britain in 1964, contradictorily inheriting 
both the highest per capita income of any 
black African state and only about 100 
university graduates. Copper accounted 
for almost all of the country's foreign 
exchange earnings and most of Zambia's 
manufacturing industry is oriented to­
wards supplying the mining industry. 
The paternalistic and inefficient poli­
tical and economic pattern of the first 27 
years after independence obviously led to 
too much state regulation as well as 
providing too little or wrongly directed 
investment. This, compounded by the 
very high costs of transport and a soaring 
defence budget, (a consequence of the 
country's landlocked situation and com­
mitment to being in the forefront of 
Southern African emancipation), and the 
continued plummeting of copper prices, 
turned Zambia into one of the world's 
most indebted nations— 8 million people 
owing external creditors more than US-
$7 billion. 
Such was the inheritance of the newly 
elected democratic government, which 
came into power in 1991 after a peaceful 
electoral process. The new regime — a 
coalition of prominent businessmen, a 
new generation of politicians, techno­
crats and labour leaders — was therefore 
confronted with the need to undertake a 
very radical programme of reforms. This 
they are doing at a remarkable pace. 
In a framework of a distressing ex­
ternal debt burden, enhanced donor aid is 
crucial to support the current ambitious 
economic restructuring process, aimed at 
diversifying away from the fortunes of 
copper, hence building up a sustainable 
and diversified new economic found­
ation. 
EC assistance to Zambia 
1. Programmed Aid 
Lomé I 
Having become a signatory to the 1st 
Lomé Convention in 1975, Zambia was 
the beneficiary of ECU 47m under 
Lomé I, allocated to : 
— Agricultural sector: projects in the 
field of livestock development, feeder 
roads directly geared to agricultural 
* Head of Delegation of the EC Commission, 
Zambia. 
development objectives and needs and 
training requirements in the dairy and 
livestock sector. 
— Economic and social infrastructure: 
site and service schemes in rural town­
ships and rural health clinics. 
All activities under Lomé I have been 
completed. 
Lomé II 
The National Indicative Programme 
was designed to be consistent with Zam­
bia's 'Third National Development Plan 
(1979-83)', the objectives of which placed 
particular emphasis on rural develop­
ment, employment creation, food pro­
duction and import substitution: 
— Rural development: to achieve self-
sufficiency in food production, to im­
prove the quality of life in rural areas and 
to stimulate production of industrial 
crops for national manufacturing and 
processing; 
— Economic and social infrastructure : 
to reduce external dependency in the 
energy sector, to develop a transport 
strategy by improving existing roads and 
developing new links and by upgrading 
rural landing strips. Also included was 
the development of water supply 
schemes, medical facilities, sites and 
services for housing and small-scale 
industries in rural and smaller urban 
areas ; 
— Geological surveys and research : to 
assist in the preparation, drawing and 
printing of geological maps ; 
— Microprojects : to assist local com­
munities in self-development, thereby 
strengthening grassroots participation in 
development activities ; 
— Training and technical assistance: 
staff development, technical assistance 
and equipment, special attention being 
given to in-country programmes in vo­
cational and technical training, science 
education, management, communi­
cations and in-service training; 
— Supporting activities : to cover the 
undertaking of necessary supporting 
studies, trade promotion and credit to 
small and medium-sized industries. 
Under Lomé II, ECU 58m were allo­
cated. Generally the projects have 
reached their completion, the total 
closure of the Convention being expected 
shortly. 
Lomé III 
The integration of the EC's assistance 
into national development strategies and 
programmes was the objective under 
Lomé III. Emphasis was laid on the 
notion of a focal sector, where EC 
support could be more appropriately 
integrated. Implementation requirements 
were reinforced by the establishment of a 
timetable of commitments mutually bin­
ding for Zambia and the EC. Agriculture 
and integrated rural development was 
again the sector concentrated on as far as 
the NIP was concerned, 90% of the total 
resources having been initially devoted to 
it. In 1990 the Lomé III NIP was augmen­
ted by ECU 12m from a Special Debt 
Programme, bringing the final figure to 
ECU 92m. 
Among the activities that should be 
outlined are the Smallholder Develop­
ment Projects in the Copperbelt and 
Central Provinces, which aim at increas­
ing yields and total production of small­
holders through the introduction of 
improved technical packages for rain-fed 
agriculture. To better support the pro­
duction aspects, the projects also include 
the improvement of infrastructure, 
inputs, credit, marketing and social 
facilities. 
Import support programmes consti­
tuted the major bulk of the EC's assist­
ance under Lomé III : 
— Supply of inputs to Nitrogen Chemi­
cals of Zambia (NCZ): import of chemi­
cals, catalysts and spare parts for the 
rehabilitation of the factory at Kafue; 
— Foreign Exchange Facility I : sectoral 
import programme in agriculture; 
— Foreign Exchange Facility II : essen­
tial inputs for the agricultural sector. 
The residual funds from these pro­
grammes were later used as additional 
resources for a General Import Pro­
gramme (GIP) undertaken under an 
Import Support & Special Debt Pro­
gramme aimed at, among other things, 
assisting Zambia in clearing her arrears to 
the IMF, hence creating the conditions 
for re-starting structural adjustment dis­
bursements from the World Bank and the 
IMF. 
The projects on education and training 
are also worthy of mention : 
— Zambia mathematics & science teach­
er education : aimed at upgrading lower 
secondary Science and Mathematics tea­
chers, enabling them to teach at senior 
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secondary level, hence improving the 
standard of science education in Zambia ; 
— Zambia Centre for Accountancy 
Studies : aimed at developing an indigen­
ous Zambian accountancy profession in a 
cost-effective manner. 
Implementation of Lomé III projects is 
still on course, secondary commitments 
reaching 86% and disbursements 67%. 
Lomé IV 
The NIP for Lomé IV was signed in 
February 1991, the EC having made 
available to Zambia the total sum of 
ECU 11 lm, comprising: 
— National Programmable Resources: 
ECU 95m; 
— First instalment from Structural Ad­
justment Facility: ECU 16m. 
In recognition of Zambia's démocratis­
ation process, her strong commitment to 
adjustment and the consequent need for 
donors to increase and speed-up their 
financial support, it was possible to 
double the first instalment of the Struc­
tural Adjustment Facility to ECU 41.5m 
(including 10% of the programmed re­
sources) and fix disbursement targets for 
the second instalment at ECU 27m in 
1993 and ECU 14m in 1994. 
As focal areas for Lomé IV cooper­
ation, two priorities have been identified : 
— Assistance to the productive sector, 
with special emphasis on rehabilitation 
and maintenance of the road system, the 
promotion of non-copper exports and the 
improvement of the livestock sector; 
— Improvement of the social infrastruc­
ture and services, taking special account 
of the impact of the adjustment process 
on the living conditions of the poor and 
vulnerable groups of the population. 
These priorities are being addressed 
through the development of the following 
activities : 
— Rehabilitation of the roads sector : 
contribution to the national programme 
for the rehabilitation of trunk roads and 
rehabilitation and maintenance of feeder 
roads in areas of high agricultural pro­
duction; 
— Export development : improvement of 
non-traditional export performance by 
alleviating supply and market constraints 
which are faced by the high-potential 
agricultural, and relatively well-based 
industrial sectors; 
— Improvement of animal health: re­
inforcement of the planning and monitor­
ing capabilities of the national veterinary 
department and supporting the private 
sector's efforts; 
— Microprojects: continuation of the 
microprojects support programmes 
which were implemented in Lomé II and 
III; 
— Social sector support : improvement of 
district health care, improvement of 
blood safety at provincial level and 
improvements in the quality of primary 
education, hence contributing to mitigat­
ing the effects of structural adjustment on 
the most vulnerable groups of society. 
Outside the focal areas, the following 
activities are being designed and/or 
implemented : 
— Natural resources conservation : the 
preservation of wildlife, including the 
reorganisation and restructuring of the 
Department of National Parks and Wild­
life Service; 
— Training of accountants : continuation 
of assistance to the Zambia Centre for 
Accountancy Studies (ZCAS), started 
under Lomé III, within an overall pro­
gramme to indigenise accountancy train­
ing and the profession; 
— Support services : technical assistance 
and consultancy services to help the 
Government of Zambia in developing 
specific policy changes in the areas 
affected by structural adjustment, and to 
facilitate the acquisition of new skills and 
technologies for the productive sector; 
— NIP's contribution to structural ad­
justment: 10% of the NIP was utilised to 
reinforce the first instalment of the 
Structural Adjustment Facility. 
The urgent need to reorganise the 
economy naturally makes structural ad­
justment assistance one of the main 
priorities in EC/Zambia cooperation. 
With this in view, the following pro­
gramme has been agreed upon between 
the Government of Zambia and the EC: 
-Framework: to support Zambia's 
efforts to diversify the economy away 
from copper, improving economic ef­
ficiency and establishing a more stable 
macro-economic environment. These po­
licies will aim at improving the mobilis­
ation and utilisation of domestic re­
sources and restoring internal and ex­
ternal balances by pursuing appropriate 
fiscal, monetary and trade policies; 
— Objectives: provision of foreign ex­
change for imports to support the adjust­
ment programme and to reinforce the 
measures laid down in the NIP. The 
resulting counterpart funds are to be 
allocated to the central budget mainly in 
order to allow increases in the agreed 
budgeted expenditure, particularly for 
education and health; 
— Strategy: The volume and the nature 
of the EC's support to the Zambian 
Structural Adjustment Programme re­
sults in a critical mass which requires a 
concomitant effort to ensure efficient 
utilisation. Hence, the EC's inherent 
strategy is being developed along the 
following lines: improvement of the 
analysis of the short-term evolution of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP); 
improvement of the influence of medium/ 
long-term adjustment objectives on 
short-term policies ; monitoring the social 
impact of adjustment; improving public 
finances management; supporting mo­
netary sector reform and monitoring. 
2. Unprogrammed Aid 
SYSMIN 
A Sysmin loan amounting to 
ECU 55m was awarded to Zambia in 
1982 and another amounting to 
ECU 28m was awarded in 1986. These 
were aimed at rehabilitating the produc­
tion facilities owned by Zambia Con­
solidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 
order to improve costs of production. 
The resulting counterpart funds (CFs) 
have been integrated into a Social Fund 
aimed at improving living conditions of 
the population in the mining areas. 
In view of Zambia's eligibility for 
Sysmin III funds, a grant of ECU 60m 
was awarded in 1992. The purpose of the 
inherent programme is to support the 
current structural adjustment prog­
ramme, by assisting in the diversification 
away from dependency on copper, hence 
reinforcing the Lomé IV balance-of-
payments support. The consequent GIP 
will come in support of trade liberalis­
ation and of the development of the non-
traditional productive sector. The result­
ing CFs are intended to be used for 
covering expenditure in the social sectors, 
for budget lines directly linked to the 
privatisation process now under way, or 
for paying off public debt vis-à-vis the 
banking sector, thereby allowing an 
easing of credit availability to the private 
sector. 
Emergency aid and aid for refugees 
Under Articles 203 and 204 of 
Lomé III, Zambia was granted the fund­
ing of a major Solid Refuse Disposal 
Programme in Lusaka, included in the 
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overall national programme aimed at 
controlling a cholera epidemic in the 
capital and with funding for the upgrad­
ing of the Petauke-Ukwimi Road. 
Food aid 
At the end of 1990, Zambia was 
deemed to be ineligible to receive more 
food aid from the EC, because of non­
payment for deliveries to parastatals 
during previous operations. Neverthe­
less, considering the severe drought that 
devastated the country at the beginning 
of 1992 (probably the worst to afflict the 
region this century) and the démocratis­
ation process being undertaken, the EC 
decided to come to the support of 
Zambia, making the following available: 
Food Aid 
Programme 
(tons) 
Normal 
1992 
Special 
1992 
Maize 
5,000 
100.000 
Oil 
2,000 
1,750 
Pulses 
_ 
712 
Milk 
powder 
78 
Total  105,000  3,750  712  78 
The total value of the current food aid 
operation amounts to ECU 39m, a part 
of which has been "donated to Zambian 
NGOs and the World Food Programme 
for free distribution. 
3. Regional cooperation 
As one of the 19 members of the 
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and 
Southern African States (PTA), Zambia 
is a co-beneficiary of the framework of 
cooperation agreed between the EC and 
the PTA. This cooperation is focused on 
activities leading to economic integration 
in the sub-region, in particular addressing 
the issues of obstacles to trade, transport 
and cross-border investment, with em­
phasis on trade facilitation. 
Zambia is also a co-beneficiary of EC 
cooperation with the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), 
which acts on behalf of its member states 
as regional coordinator in the program­
ming of EC cooperation. In this frame­
work, the areas of concentration are 
transport and communications, food 
security, agriculture and natural re­
sources. 
4. European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Under the Lomé I. II and III Conven­
tions, the EIB accorded to Zambia and 
Zambian companies a total of 12 loans at 
concessional rates amounting to 
ECU 71.6m of which ECU 42m was out 
of the EIB's own resources with a 
significant interest subsidy financed by 
the EDF. Risk capital operations utilis­
ing EDF risk capital funds under EIB 
management, amounted to ECU 29.6m. 
Under Lomé IV, the EIB earmarked 
an amount of ECU 35m for the possible 
financing of projects and programmes in 
the sectors of industry, agro-industry, 
tourism, mining, energy, transport and 
communications.O N.A. 
Areas of cooperation 
Mining 
Agriculture and forestry 
Infrastructure 
Training and education 
Livestock 
Decentralised cooperation (micro-
projects) 
Social services and health 
Productive investment, including 
related banking support* 
Trade promotion 
Environment 
Technical assistance and support 
services 
Tourism 
Energy 
Reintegration of qualified nationals 
Structural adjustment/BOP sup­
port (including related supporting 
activities) 
Emergency aid/Exceptional aid 
Food aid 
EC Delegation running coasts 
Total European 
Development Fund (EDF) 
Lomé I 
ECU m 
1.165 
21.916 
4.271 
4.354 
5.567 
0.265 
5.290 
4.502 
0.563 
0 
0 
0.119 
0.048 
0 
0 
16.384 
4.780 
1.974 
71.198 
% 
1.6 
30.8 
6.0 
6.1 
7.8 
0.4 
7.5 
6.3 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
23.0 
6.7 
2.8 
100.0 
Financial table 
Lomé II 
ECU m 
90.236 
10.785 
0 
3.710 
9.300 
2.120 
7.706 
4.225 
0.823 
0 
0.008 
0 
0.323 
0 
21.800 
1.293 
21.690 
0 
174.019 
% 
51.9 
6.2 
0.0 
2.1 
5.3 
1.2 
4.5 
2.4 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.2 
0.0 
12.5 
0.7 
12.5 
0.0 
100.0 
Lomé III 
ECU m 
0 
25.479 
9.975 
8.280 
3.068 
5.750 
0.761 
11.217 
0.041 
0 
0.988 
0.150 
0 
0.300 
38.698 
1.162 
5.199 
0 
111.068 
% 
0.0 
22.9 
9.0 
7.5 
2.8 
5.2 
0.7 
10.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
0.1 
0.0 
0.3 
34.8 
1.0 
4.7 
0.0 
100.0 
Lomé IV (1st protocol) 
ECU m 
0.440 
0 
33.680 
5.500 
5.280 
11.000 
12.000 
35.000 
10.500 
5.000 
1.100 
0.500 
0 
0.500 
142.500 
0 
39.000 
0 
302.000 
% 
0.1 
0.0 
11.2 
1.7 
1.8 
3.6 
4.0 
11.6 
3.5 
1.7 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
47.2 
0.0 
12.9 
0.0 
100.0 
Total 
ECU m 
91.841 
58.180 
47.926 
21.844 
23.215 
19.135 
25.757 
54.944 
11.927 
5.000 
2.096 
0.769 
0.371 
0.800 
202.998 
18.839 
70.669 
1.974 
658.285 
% 
14.0 
8.8 
7.3 
3.3 
3.5 
2.9 
3.9 
8.4 
1.8 
0.8 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
30.8 
2.9 
10.8 
0.3 
100.0 
European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Own Resources** 
* Includes EIB Risk Capital, projects in 
** Mining, agro-industry, bank credit lim 
10.500 
industry, agro-i 
:s. 
ndustry 
31.500 
tourism, minin  g, energ 
0 
y, transport ane commi 
0 
inications. 
42.000 
54 Making a success of life in the village 
For the vast majority of Africans from a rural 
background, a return to the village after a spell in the city 
means failure. People from the country tend to think that 
they are born peasants and doomed to a hard life and often a 
poor one, with none of the modern comforts of the town. All 
youngsters in villages dream of going to the town, but when 
they do, the living conditions and problems of finding work 
dispel their illusions fast: It is a disappointment and it soon 
becomes clear that living decently means going back to the 
village. But does that really spell failure ? 
Issue n° 78 of Agripromo, published by INADES-
Formation, which promotes the rural world in Africa, is 
about making a success of life in the village '. 
It contains plenty of village success stories, underlines the 
importance of village economic activity and suggests that 
peasants do not need to go to the big city to earn a decent 
living, fulfil themselves and be happy. 
Here is a résumé of this issue full of ideas, successes and 
suggestions. 
COME ON BOYS! 
IF WE PUT OUR HEADS TOGETHER, 
WE'LL FIND A SOLUTION. 
m 
'
 
ΛττνΓ J 
Αλλ'fffr-
Ψ& 
*#^ 
The carpenter 
The first article says that village living 
is indeed hard, but that, in Michel 
1 Agripromo. INADES-Formation, 08 BP.8 
Abidjan 08. Côte d'Ivoire. 
Bahon's experience, 'you can have a 
better life there than in town'. Michel 
Bahon is a carpenter who was properly 
trained and saw his dream of setting up in 
the capital come true. But look how much 
it cost ! He had to lease a workshop, rent 
accommodation, pay for transport, pay 
for gas, pay for water and more — not to 
mention look after all his 'brothers' from 
the village, who came to try their luck in 
the big city, and who he was honour 
bound to support. In the end, he had to 
spend everything he earned, was unable 
to save and was in no position to go and 
help his ageing mother back home. 
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So Mr Bahon decided to wind up his 
carpentry business in the city and go back 
and settle in the village. Being a good 
carpenter with modest prices, he soon 
had a decent clientele. The only problem 
was that close relatives who ordered 
work, took delivery but never paid the 
bills. So Mr Bahon asked for a down-
payment before he started a job and only 
delivered when he had been paid in full. 
There were storage problems as a result, 
but he solved them. 
He is now comfortably off. He earns a 
lot less than he did in the city, but his 
expenses are far lower in the village. 
There is always money in the bank, he is 
near enough to look after his old mother, 
he is married and he is happy. 
Youngsters get organised 
Villages are usually full of young 
people and they often get together and 
take initiatives of their own. Most of 
them have already tried their luck in the 
city and have come home disappointed 
and bitter, but they are still pleased to be 
back in the family, with a roof over their 
heads and plenty to eat every day. But 
what sort of a life is it without money or 
entertainment? Above all, what sort of 
life is it without work? 
There were 22 young people like this in 
K's village. They helped their parents in 
the fields, of course, but they were very 
bored and wanted to earn money of their 
own so as not to depend on their families 
for everything. 
'We decided to form an association to 
help our parents harvest their crops. We 
knew that outside labour was expensive 
at harvest time and had to be paid in cash, 
furthermore, which made our parents feel 
that they were being robbed. So we offer 
to harvest complete fields and the owner 
feeds us while we get the job done and we 
get a tub of rice for every hectare 
harvested at the end of it. We are in great 
demand, because we are very enthusiastic 
about the work. We even have a team 
which comes with us to provide back-up 
and entertainment.' 
The group, which takes all its decisions 
at regular meetings, stocks the rice it 
earns and sells it at a profit between 
seasons and it also has a husker and sells 
paddy rice for seed. 
'We are pleased and our parents are 
proud of us. In record time, the group has 
managed to buy sports equipment and we 
have F 800 000 in the bank. We put into 
practice what we have learned in our 
individual fields and our output is going 
up. Socially, we do a lot too. We clean the 
village and the water point regularly, for 
example, and we make financial and 
physical contributions to village cere­
monies and association members' house 
construction. What we want to do now is 
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set up a village pharmacy fund, which we 
hope will be both profitable for us and of 
service to the community.' 
The coxers of Guéhibly 
The coxers - are another example of 
young people forming an association. 
Guéhibly is a village on the Man-Abidjan 
highway in western Côte d'Ivoire. One 
day, three young people with nothing to 
do were standing at the roadside watch­
ing the cars, and buses go by. Right next 
to them were five people, travellers, 
waiting in the hope that a bus driver 
would be kind enough to stop for them. 
But this was to no avail, since passengers 
are supposed to be picked up only at 
official stops where there is a man from 
the bus company to sell tickets. So the 
youngsters, who were keen to help, went 
and stood in the middle of the road and 
flagged down a minibus. The people got 
on and — what a surprise — the driver 
gave the boys CFAF 500 for each new 
passenger! This gave them an idea, but... 
let them tell the story themselves. 
'We were pleasantly surprised. We 
weren't expecting money. We only wan­
ted to help. But we said to ourselves that 
there was money to be made here under 
our very noses and we ought to get 
organised and make the most of it. So we 
built a papo shed by the side of the road 
opposite the market and fitted it out with 
four benches, a chair and a small table 
and now anyone waiting can sit down in 
comfort, out of the sun and rain. They 
can even have a drink or a snack, because 
girls who sell cakes and sweets and water 
come right up by our shelter. What we 
charge depends on where people are 
going. For Abidjan, for example, it's 
CFAF 500.' 
The coxers offer other services for 
travellers, organising group trips and 
locating lost baggage, but the big thing is 
that they have branched out into other 
village services. 
'We decided that we would mend the 
village pump and pay for it ourselves and, 
in return, the village let us look after the 
management of it. We sell the water so 
there is enough money to keep the pump 
operating properly and to give ourselves a 
bit of income... 
We organise dances to liven up the village 
— we rent a music machine from a school 
teacher — and adults pay CFAF 100 and 
young people CFAF 50 to come. Once we 
have paid our overheads, there is often 
2 A coxer is a canvasser who brings in clients. 
CFAF 2500-3000 left over for our funds. 
Then we clean the market and the main 
streets in the village. When we do the 
market, we are paid CFAF 20 or 25 for 
every trader, but the street cleaning is 
voluntary work and we do it because we 
are fond of our village. It earns us the 
esteem of the villagers and the elders too. 
Lastly, we work a field of rice and maize 
for our own needs.' 
A mine of information 
This issue of Agripromo is a mine of 
information. 
There are detailed figures of one man's 
own project; the experience of a tailor 
who left the town and went back to his 
village, continued tailoring and grew rice, 
yams and maize and raised small animals 
too. The article lists and gives figures for 
the many things which this man had to 
do. 
There is a dossier giving a range of 
possible village activities. People can 
farm, of course, but they can also be 
tractor mechanics, sellers of seed and 
fertiliser, repairers of pumps and mills 
and so on. 
And then there is an article entitled: 
'Can a peasant earn more than a civil 
servant?' The article proves that he can. 
Whoever would have thought it? 
'Genius put off by 
the smell of rice' 
This is the playful title of an article 
which points out that village traditions 
have to be taken into account in any 
return to the land. 'New peasants', 
encouraged and assisted by the state or 
NGOs, often try to run projects which 
have been designed by politicians or 
technicians who are anxious to help the 
Africans out of poverty, but know no­
thing about village life. The following 
quotation makes a fitting conclusion. 
'The villages are poor, but they are at 
one with nature. Traditional society has 
its rules and its laws; it has its customs 
and taboos and failure to take them into 
account may well destroy projects with 
undeniable socio-economic advantages. 
So when ways of developing villages are 
being investigated, the villagers themsel­
ves have to be involved in the process 
from the outset.Ό 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  57 EUROPE 
The enlargement of the European 
Community 
by David SPENCE * 
Enlargement of the European Community is firmly on the agenda. Several 
countries have made formal applications and negotiations officially began 
with Sweden, Austria and Finland at a meeting of foreign ministers on 
1 February 1993. Many other European states have also announced their 
intention to apply for Community membership. So the questions 'Why 
enlargement? And why now ?' are justified. The answers are complex and they 
point to a major shift in world affairs. 
Europe is at a turning point brought about in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell 
and the fate of the former Soviet bloc was sealed. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union brought the end of the bipolar system and of division in Europe. It has 
meant a new era in international relations. As a result, two groups of states feel 
free to apply for Community membership; those formerly under Soviet 
influence and those with traditions of political neutrality. 
German unification was one immediate manifestation of this new era in 
international relations. Freed from the constraints of Soviet hegemony, the 
two states came together after decades of artificial separation. The new 
Germany rapidly became a symbol for the potential unification of the whole 
of Europe and a catalyst for further Community enlargement. Indeed, 
through German unification, one enlargement of the Community has already 
taken place. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was integrated 
into the German Federal Republic in October 1990, thereby becoming an 
integral part of the European Community. There was not, of course, a formal 
accession of the GDR, but the Community was enlarged by the nearly 17 
million citizens of the five new German Lander. 
The other countries of East and Cen­
tral Europe are now envisaging Com­
munity membership. And with neutrality 
in question, some members of the Euro­
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
have reviewed their position on limiting 
cooperation in Europe to strictly trade 
matters. 
To this widening to the North and East 
comes scope for a Southern and Eastern 
enlargement, in the shape of the Mediter­
ranean countries of Turkey, Cyprus and 
Malta. So, while entry in the short-term is 
foreseen only for the EFTA states, there 
are many countries waiting in the wings. 
Their reasoning is simple. The end of 
European division has reawakened a 
sense of cultural solidarity throughout 
Europe and there is a strong political and 
economic attraction in being part of the 
Community. 
But there is a political problem about 
enlargement. The Community has to 
reach a view on those countries where 
membership is politically desirable and 
there is a clear sense of European identity, 
but where problems exist with regard to 
implementation of all the achievements 
of European integration. The risk lies in 
* Principal administrator in the European Com­
mission's Directorate-General for Information, 
Communication and Culture. The views expressed in 
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the potential for a multi-speed Europe. In 
short, the advantages of enlargement risk 
being counter-balanced by economic 
costs and the creation of hurdles to 
further integration. 
Defining potential candidates for 
membership 
The European Community is un­
deniably known as 'Europe'. But Prague 
and Vienna are clearly as much part of 
Europe as Berlin, Paris and London. 
Interestingly, if you look at the map of 
Europe in the 16th century, the fault line 
distinguishing Western Christendom 
from Orthodox Christianity has great 
relevance for the borders of today. Add to 
that the frontier of Islam and the Slav 
areas and the map gains even more 
current relevance — especially in Yugo­
slavia. 
Where does Europe end? How many 
states will the Community of 2006 compr­
ise? The maps of the European Com­
munity and the European Economic 
Area are certainly not the whole story. 
The treaties are very clear on the legal 
pre-requisites for membership. Ar­
ticle 237 of the Treaty of Rome and 
Article O of the Maastricht Treaty spe­
cify three conditions. Acceptable candi­
dates must be European, have a clean 
record on human rights and be de­
mocratic states. 
Entrance requirements are not only 
legal. Negotiations will take place on the 
basis of the Treaty of European Union 
(Maastricht), including the vital pillar of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). Next, accepting the acquis com-
munautaire — the body of primary and 
secondary legislation making up the 
Community legal and policy framework 
— is the basic economic pre-condition for 
membership, but making the acquis work 
relies on a market economy and a 
properly functioning civil service capable 
of implementing and supervising Com­
munity legislation. Community decision­
making is a complex process. Running 
the presidency, for example, makes high 
demands on the civil service of the 
country holding it. 
Having fulfilled these criteria and 
successfully negotiated membership, the 
next hurdle for applicants is ratification. 
The European Parliament must give its 
assent to membership, thus giving par­
liamentarians a right of close scrutiny of 
representatives of the Council, the Com­
mission and the applicant country. Since 
enlargement involves amendments to the 
Treaty, primary legislation will be 
needed. The parliaments of the Member 
States must also ratify the new member­
ship, as must the parliaments of the 
applicants. From the perspective of the 
Community it is sensible for new applic­
ants to be accepted as a group rather than 
at different points of time. Otherwise, a 
series of separate ratifications would be 
necessary. 
Why EFTA first? 
The EFTA states have a head start in 
the enlargement process, since much of 
the important economic integration has 
been achieved in the complex negoti­
ations to set up the European Economic 
Area (EEA). The origins of the Com­
munity's opening towards EFTA lie in 
the mid-1980s when discussions began on 
how the benefits of the Community's 
internal market could be shared. In the 
beginning, the idea was to set up a 
European Economic Area incorporating 
EFTA and the EC and creating one 
market for the whole of Western Europe. 
The EFTA states were not to be required 
to accept the supranational aspects of full 
integration into the Community. For the 
EFTA countries, participation in the 
EEA rapidly came to be seen as the ante­
chamber to full membership, that history 
had previously denied. 
Membership of the Community would 
have been conceivable for Norway and 
Iceland. As NATO members, they had 
never resisted international alliances, as 
had the other EFTA states. But Norway's 
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bid in 1972 to become a member of the 
Community failed when a referendum 
pronounced against entry and Iceland 
has always considered membership to be 
against its interests. The neutrality of 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzer­
land led to their refusal to be part of the 
European Community. They could not 
reconcile neutrality with the long term 
political implications of European integ­
ration and the perception of the Com­
munity as part of the Western side in the 
bipolar world. Their concept of neutrality 
is now being redefined. 
And there is another important reason 
for the EFTA countries to envisage 
membership. The Community is the 
largest trading bloc in the world and the 
EFTA economies are dependent on it as a 
market and a source of imports. The 
Community's role in setting production 
standards means there is an economic 
and political cost in not participating in 
the decision-making process by which 
those standards are set. As the Nor­
wegian Prime Minister put it in a state­
ment to the Norwegian parliament, the 
Storting, on 16 December 1992, 'In order 
to regain control of many of the forces 
that shape our daily lives, we must be able 
to make democratic decisions that truly 
enable us to meet our challenges. It is no 
longer possible... to tell Norwegian voters 
that we can carry out all our tasks by 
means of decisions in Norway alone. If 
we cut ourselves off from the fora where 
important decisions are made, we are in 
reality restricting our own freedom of 
action... Unless we ourselves decide 
otherwise, the EC may in a few years' 
time comprise all of Europe except for 
Norway, Iceland, certain countries in the 
Balkans and Russia.' 
Negotiations with the EFTA 
states 
In practice, the process of enlargement 
involves the European Council request­
ing an opinion on individual applications 
from the Commission. Negotiations with 
the applicant country are then conducted 
by the presidency in office of the Council, 
with the Commission providing technical 
support through preparatory and ex­
ploratory talks to identify contentious 
points. 
The EFTA countries can be integrated 
more easily into the Community than the 
East and Central Europeans. Much of the 
acquis communautaire, which new mem­
bers must accept, will be incorporated 
into national law by Sweden, Finland. 
Norway and Austria when the European 
Economic Area (EEA) comes into force 
later this year. The EEA was due to begin 
on 1 January 1993. It is clearly intended 
to be a preparatory stage to membership 
of the Community for some EFTA states. 
Iceland and Liechtenstein have not ex­
pressed their intention to become full 
members and on 6 December 1992, just as 
the Commission was preparing its 
opinion on the Swiss application for 
membership, Switzerland's population 
voted against ratification of the Euro­
pean Economic Area. The result has been 
the postponement of full membership as 
well. There is currently a pause for 
reflection. 
The EFTA states present major ad­
vantages for the Community. They would 
boost Community GDP considerably, 
provide an important contribution to 
Community finances and a logical integ­
ration of the West European aid effort in 
Eastern Europe and in the developing 
world. Moreover, the EFTA countries 
easily meet the legal, political and econ­
omic criteria for membership. 
There are some problematic areas, 
however. Neutrality was always seen as 
the main stumbling block. Sweden, Fin­
land, Austria and Switzerland have long 
traditions of neutrality and many com­
mentators have seen an incompatibility 
between neutrality and the Treaty of 
Union's move to a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, leading possibly to more 
structured concertation on defence 
issues. 
However, various declarations by the 
EFTA governments seem to clear this 
potential problem away. For example, in 
his letter of 25 November to John Major 
as President of the European Council, 
Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt de­
clared : 
'Sweden shares the political objectives of 
the European Community, as laid down 
in the Maastricht Treaty (les finalités 
politiques). This implies, of course, that 
we are prepared to conduct membership 
negotiations on the basis of the Treaty on 
European Union.' 
The implication is that the Union's 
common foreign and security policy is 
not seen as a hindrance to Swedish 
membership. The Austrian government's 
aides memoire before the Lisbon and 
Edinburgh Councils similarly confirm 
"unconditional commitment to the Treaty 
on European Union'. 
Thus, any remaining problem areas 
concern parts of the acquis, which the 
applicants may not wish to apply im­
mediately. Derogations are not auto­
matic and the discussions on such points 
are likely to be complex. The Com­
munity's view is that membership must be 
on the basis of acceptance of the whole 
acquis of the Union — the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome, the Single European Act 
and the Treaty of Union, with all the legal 
acts of secondary legislation and Euro­
pean Court decisions in existence. 
The economic problems posed by 
enlargement include the budgetary effects 
of membership and negotiations on 
derogations where the applicant state is 
unable to fulfil immediately the criteria of 
the acquis communautaire. For states in 
the early stages of a market economy and 
for poor states, the demands of member­
ship could prove hard to meet. This is 
part of the reasoning behind taking 
enlargement as a series of phases, with 
states entering the Community only once 
the criteria are met. Hence the start with 
the EFTA countries, which, through the 
EEA, are able to meet most of the criteria 
for membership in the short term. 
Deepening before widening 
'Deepening' the Community means 
expanding Community competence to 
areas hitherto the exclusive domain of the 
individual Member States and improving 
the decision-making process by redefin­
ing the rights and duties of the European 
institutions. There have been two pre­
vious enlargement waves. The UK, 
Ireland and Denmark entered in 1973 
after the Hague Summit had confirmed 
the acceptance by Member States of the 
principle of the Community's own re­
sources. The Community had also just 
introduced European Political Cooper­
ation based on the Davignon report. 
Before Spain and Portugal entered in 
1986, Member States agreed on the Single 
European Act. This introduced far-
reaching changes to the Community's 
decision making process and added a 
string of new competences to Community 
business. In addition, political cooper­
ation now became part of the new Treaty. 
The Single European Act also anchored 
the aim of the completion of the single 
market by 1992 and ensured that the 
Community institutions had the adminis­
trative means to match their aim. In 
addition, it provided the majority deci­
sion-making mechanisms needed to 
break the deadlock on so many of the 
Commission's existing policy proposals. 
Changing geopolitics and the drive for 
enlargement have, in turn, led to the need 
to review the Community's internal 
workings. The Treaty of European Union 
signed in Maastricht resulted from the 
resetting of the European agenda 
brought about by German unification. It 
has added more far-reaching changes. 
The most significant is often thought to 
be economic and monetary union by 
1999, but the importance of the inter­
governmental arrangements for legal co­
operation and common foreign and 
security policy should not be under­
estimated. 
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The opening of the negotiations for the ace  'Austria, Finland and Sweden to 
the European Community took place in Brussels in February 1993 
Many saw a reinforced Community as 
a way of ensuring shared power over 
international economic forces, avoidance 
of German economic predominance after 
unification and a 'roof for the integ­
ration of the whole continent. Maastricht 
represents the institutional adaptation 
this implies. By summer 1993, the Euro­
pean Community should have become 
the European Union. 
The new Union will clearly exercise a 
considerable power of attraction for non-
Member States. But for the Member 
States of the European Union the issue 
remains how to bring about the enlarge­
ment of the Community all feel is de­
sirable while conserving the advantages 
of European integration. Preventing the 
potential costs of widening from out­
weighing the benefits brought by new 
members will probably mean more dis­
cussions about deepening. 
Thus, as with previous enlargements, 
the Community has embarked on a 
process of strengthening the integration 
process before it takes on new members. 
The Treaty on European Union rep­
resents a first deepening of the Com­
munity. The next intergovernmental con­
ference in 1996 will continue the process. 
There are, however, those who believe 
that widening should not take place 
before the 1996 conference has settled 
more operational guidelines for the Euro­
pean Union. The role of the applicant 
countries in that conference could be 
crucial to the shaping of the political 
identity of the new Europe. Some believe 
that the wisdom of the mature de­
mocracies of the EFTA group will con­
tribute to the achievement of a sound 
system for an enlarged Europe. Federal­
ists argue that danger lies in diluting the 
supranational aspects of the Community 
by taking on demanding new members, 
who may wish, in the name of national 
traditions, to preserve their indepen­
dence. 
The changes in Europe and the pro­
spect of enlargement have led to a new 
assessment of the purpose of integration 
and posed some of the fundamental 
questions raised as long ago as the 1940s 
when federalists debated with national­
ists about the kind of Europe that should 
be created. Federalism, subsidiarity, 
transparency, democratic legitimacy and 
the limits of the integration process are all 
back on the agenda for debate at the same 
time as the Community prepares for 
enlargement. 
Membership or association? 
There is an expansive logic to the 
European Community; a logic sym­
bolised by the various forms of pre-
membership relations other states in 
Europe now maintain with the Com­
munity. There are three categories — the 
inside track of the EEA, the Euro-
agreements with Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics and, 
finally, the association agreements with 
the other countries of Eastern Europe 
and with the Mediterranean applicant 
states of Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. 
In the short term, the shape of the 
enlarged Community is easily discernible. 
If the current negotiations go well, and 
providing the final agreements are rati­
fied, the EFTA states will enter by 1995. 
By then, or soon thereafter, the question 
of Malta and Cyprus will arise. Both have 
formally applied for membership. There 
is little dissent about the "European-ness' 
of Malta and Cyprus. But there are 
fundamental questions posed with regard 
to their size and the implications for the 
management of Community business. 
In the case of Cyprus, there are clear 
political difficulties arising from the 
division of the island. The vital question 
is the respect of the acquis communautaire 
— hardly feasible in a country where 
freedom of movement of goods and 
persons is restricted. 
Turkey is also a candidate, but Turkish 
membership is a more complex issue. The 
differences Turkey, as an Islamic culture, 
would bring into the Community are 
vast. Many would welcome the diversity. 
But there is no doubt that the process of 
adaptation would not be simple. Add to 
this the Turkish level of economic de­
velopment, difficulties associated with 
the application of the acquis com-
munautaire and the political differences 
with Greece, and it becomes clear that 
early Turkish membership, however de­
sirable, might be fraught with difficulties. 
Successive European Councils have, of 
course, stressed the desirability of 
strengthened economic and political re­
lations with Turkey. To quote the Lisbon 
European Council conclusions again 
'With regard to Turkey the European 
Council underlines that the Turkish role 
in the present European political situ­
ation is of the greatest importance and 
that there is every reason to intensify 
cooperation and develop relations in line 
with the prospect laid down in the 
Association Agreement of 1964 including 
a political dialogue at the highest level'. 
The opening of the Community to the 
East was formalised by the 'Europe 
Agreements' with the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Hungary and Poland. Other 
East European countries have benefited 
from association agreements establishing 
new trade arrangements. As the Lisbon 
European Council concluded in June 
1992, cooperation through these agree­
ments is the first stage in a process 
intended to lead to Community enlarge­
ment 'Cooperation will be focused sys­
tematically on assisting their efforts to 
prepare the accession to the Union which 
they seek'. 
After EFTA, the next enlargement 
wave is therefore likely to include the 
states of Central Europe — the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary 
— the so-called Visegrad states. And 
thereafter the European Community will 
have to consider the Baltic states and 
many of the component parts of the 
former Soviet Union. With the defining 
line of 'Europe' likely to run along the 
Ural mountain range, the size of a 
resulting European Community would be 
vast. The question is whether it would be 
unwieldy too. 
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Some implications for the future 
The problem about enlargement is the 
timescale within which it is to occur. The 
applicant countries (and those who have 
indicated that they will be applicants in 
the near future) have no time to lose. 
Given the criteria for membership I have 
outlined, various alternatives to full 
membership have been canvassed. 
Alternatives include maintaining the 
EEA as an ante-chamber to the Com­
munity. Prospective Member States 
could move into the EEA, having pro­
gressed through an association agree­
ment. The EEA may well prove a sensible 
option for those applicants where full 
acceptance of Community rigours would 
be counter-productive — both for the 
Community and for the country con­
cerned. The Europe agreements are al­
ready intended to be a stepping stone to 
full membership. They may prove an 
acceptable alternative to full membership 
in the medium term. 
But, alternative scenarios such as a 
multi-speed Europe or a Europe of 
concentric circles are seen by federalists 
as potentially dangerous for the integ­
ration process. Member States and ap­
plicants choosing from a menu the dishes 
they can most easily digest would detract 
from the aims of European integration set 
by the original six. It could prove tempt­
ing to take the benefits of integration 
without participating in the costs. This is 
why the debate about enlargement goes 
hand in hand with a debate about the 
future of the Community itself. The 
Community now has the rendezvous of 
1996 set by Maastricht for a further 
review of the need for institutional reform 
in the light of the post-Maastricht ex­
perience. The parameters will also be set 
in 1996 for the future shape of an 
enlarged Community. 
There are clearly many implications of 
enlargement. A major issue is the guaran­
tee of the efficient management of Com­
munity business. A Europe of 17, 21 or 
more members will mean some hard 
thinking about the efficiency of the 
Commission, the Council and the Parlia­
ment. 
Some will argue that there is no 
intrinsic need for each Member State to 
have a Commissioner. After all, the 
Commission represents the European 
interest and not that of the Member 
States. As for the appointment of the 
Commission President, Maastricht pro­
vides for Member States' agreement on 
the proposal of Commission President 
and subsequent endorsement by the 
European Parliament. The Parliament 
may wish to take matters even further and 
consider a system of appointment of the 
whole Commission by itself after consul­
tation with the Council. This would 
require rethinking the question of 
national balance, looking at the impli­
cations of the current political majority in 
Parliament, the removal of states' right to 
a Commissioner and limits on the num­
bers of Commissioners. These would be 
far-reaching measures and are certainly 
not on the cards at present. Indeed, some 
argue that the number of Commissioners 
will have to be reduced if managerial 
efficiency is to be increased. 
As for the Council of Ministers, with 12 
members, the Presidency and the Com­
mission, a tour de table with 10 minutes 
each already takes 2 hours 20 minutes and 
the question of working languages and 
interpreting costs also raises many thorny 
issues. The implications of an enlarged 
Community need thorough consider­
ation. 
The enlargement chronology 
1958 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1967 
1969 
1972 
1973 
1975 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1992 
The first wave 
Treaty of Rome in force 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK apply 
Norway applies 
French veto UK entry 
New applications from Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway and the UK 
Hague Summit agrees on principle of 
enlargement 
Norway referendum 'No ' 
British, Danish and Irish accession 
The second wave 
Greece applies 
Portugal and Spain apply 
Greek accession 
Withdrawal of Greenland 
Portuguese and Spanish accession 
The third wave 
Turkey applies 
Austria applies 
German unification 
Cyprus and Malta apply 
Sweden applies 
Finland, Norway and Switzerland 
apply 
This is also true for the operation of the 
Presidency of the Council. This is cur­
rently held by each Member State for six 
months every six years. Four additional 
members would lower the frequency to 
once every eight years. Should Member 
States share presidencies? What are the 
implications for the European civil ser­
vices — the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission. Would their roles need 
redefining? 
The European Parliament will also be 
affected. The Edinburgh Council has 
already decided to change the balance of 
membership starting with the next Euro­
pean elections in 1994. The enlarged 
Germany, for example, will receive a 
further 18 members, thus converting the 
present 18 East German observer seats 
into full parliamentary seats. More 
Member States means more seats. Some 
have estimated at more than 650 the 
number of seats required to do justice, 
proportionally, to an enlarged Com­
munity incorporating the EFTA candi­
dates. This poses the question of how to 
maintain efficiency in such a dramatically 
enlarged parliament. 
The Community has to start soon to 
consider the implications of a Com­
munity of sixteen and potentially of far 
more. One danger lies in discussion 
appearing to the outside world as a list of 
empty long-term promises. Open debate, 
as welcome as we must all find it, can 
easily create expectations which political 
reality may have to dispel. Certainly, the 
EFTA countries role in the 1996 inter­
governmental conference needs careful 
consideration. The options need to be 
widely discussed. 
We need to distinguish political rheto­
ric from technical reality. While ex­
pressing our readiness to help countries 
prepare for future membership, we must 
avoid the danger of dilution of the goals 
and effectiveness of the Community. This 
means a hard-nosed calculation of the 
current benefits of integration and the 
generation of potential new benefits. The 
benefits may well generate destructive 
conflict at the same time. 
Above all, decision-makers will need to 
avoid increased tensions within the Com­
munity. There are many possible inter­
national disputes present in the countries 
on the potential applicant list. But the 
risks are not only in the international 
field. There are a series of implications for 
the internal policies of the Community. 
We shall need to reflect on the policy 
implications of the next round of enlarge­
ment. Finance, social policy, the common 
agricultural policy and the common 
foreign and security policy are obvious 
potential sources of stress. Even the 
definition of subsidiarity is not without 
problems. 
If accession by stages or affiliate status 
forms part of the answer, as Com­
missioner Andriessen has urged, new 
thinking about alternatives to full mem­
bership may be needed. In the long term, 
Member States and the Community 
institutions will clearly have to consider 
how much diversity they can tolerate and 
which policies they can leave to other 
international organisations or see re­
maining at the national or sub-national 
level in the framework of 'subsidiarity'. 
The dangers for the Community are 
many. It would be sad if the process of 
integration and the construction of a 
supranational Europe risked dilution 
because of governmental overload and 
the impossibility of reconciling the ideal 
of closer union with the practicality of a 
wider yet more efficient Europe.O D.S. 
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Africa's new democracies 
Democracy, according to Winston Churchill, is the 
worst form of government — except for all the others! 
The African people, who against their will, have had 
plenty of experience of all kinds of dictatorship and who, 
it must be said, have paid the price for this, are now 
increasingly following in the footsteps of others who have 
experienced the wisdom of Churchill's maxim. It has 
become commonplace to say that the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of that other modern form of 
organising states — communism — has contributed to 
this democratic surge. The influence of events such as 
François Mitterand's famous La Baule speech in 1990 is 
also stressed. In retrospect, one can but regret that these 
'liberating' remarks were not made much earlier. 
While one African country after another embarks on 
the road to democracy, with varying degrees of en­
thusiasm and in the face of varying degrees of resistance, 
questions are increasingly being asked about the validity 
of Western-style democracy for the continent at the 
present juncture. As, here and there, the democracy 
movement suffers reverses, these questions become 
increasingly pointed. 
Some suggest that Africa should work out a model for 
itself by marrying democratic principles to its own 
cultural heritage. This is a view which is put forward in 
several of the articles in this Dossier although the 
practicalities are deliberately left vague and those 
elements of African civilisation (if it is possible to talk of 
this in the singular) which ought to be incorporated in the 
model are not specified. 
Others take a contrary view, believing that democracy 
is a set of universal principles which apply everywhere in 
the same way. They reject any idea of a specifically 
African dimension, fearing that this can only lead to a 
situation which the international community, having 
acknowledged the right to be 'different', will be much less 
able to condemn. Those who take this view find it difficult 
to understand why the former communist states, facing 
similar ethnic conflicts and economic crises, do not 
receive the same advice as that proferred to the African 
countries. The former, according to this logic, should be 
inventing a democratic system which also takes account 
of their particular history and culture. 
An objection of a different kind is to be found in the 
thesis that Africa does not meet the optimum conditions 
for the establishment and development of democratic 
systems. African countries are indeed very poor, and none 
of the new democracies has been able to pay for the 
organisation of its elections. Even Senegal, which has a 
longer democratic tradition than most, had to have 
recourse to outside help for the financing of its recent 
presidential poll. 
Without development, therefore, the future of the 
democratic process is, to say the least, compromised. 
What would happen if this providential support were 
lacking? And the situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
African states, unlike countries elsewhere which have 
moved to democracy in recent decades, have not been able 
to meet the other important requirement for a successful 
democracy, namely, having a population the majority of 
whom are educated. Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad/ 
Tobago, to take just a few ACP examples, are countries 
where democratic alternation has been the rule since the 
1960s. They are also countries where literacy rates are 
very high (90% in Barbados). It is a very different 
situation in Africa. 
For people who are poor and illiterate, the temptation 
is consequently very great to regard democracy purely in 
terms of utility. If the new system delivers a noticeable 
improvement in living standards, they will support and 
defend it. If it does not, can we really be surprised if they 
view it as something which is alien to them? And it is this 
risk of rejection which underpins the arguments of those 
who support adapting democracy to African realities -
so as to give it sure foundations. 
Using the same line of reasoning, there must be the fear 
that the people will be prepared to accept limits on their 
freedom if their material needs are satisfied. This is one of 
the lessons that one can draw from the past experience of 
Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Malawi. For much of the 
period from the 1960s to the 1990s, these countries 
experienced steady growth. This was reflected in social 
stability which only began to crumble — albeit rapidly — 
when the government coffers emptied because of the 
economic crisis. Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon were in fact, the 
first countries in the period after the La Baule speech to 
face upheavals and to hold multi-party elections. 
Democratic aspirations may not entirely merge with 
economic ones, but they clearly intermingle to some 
extent. 
It is interesting to speculate whether the experience of 
Lithuania may not hold some lessons for Africa. The 
people of this Baltic state recently elected the ex-
communists — under whose earlier management, they 
had faced fewer hardships — in place of the 'champions' 
of democracy. 
In this issue of The Courier, we seek the clues, if not the 
answers, to some of the main issues arising from the 
flowering of democracy in Africa. Two case studies are 
presented. In the Country Report on Zambia which 
precedes this Dossier, we look at an English-speaking 
state where power was transferred peacefully following 
elections — although since this Report was prepared, a 
state of emergency has been proclaimed which illustrates 
only too clearly the vulnerability of the democratic 
process. And at the end of the Dossier, we consider the 
case of M ali, a French-speaking country where blood had 
to be spilt before democracy could put down roots and 
where major difficulties have still to be overcome.o 
Amadou TRAORE 
62 DOSSIER 
The patterns of transition to 
democracy 
by Tesfatsion MEDHANIE 
There is no uniformity in the way 
political change is occurring in Africa. 
The goal in all cases is democracy. But the 
mode or the process of the démocratis­
ation varies. 
There is a marked difference between 
the Francophone and the Anglophone 
states as regards the mode of launching 
the process. As will be discussed later, the 
National Conference is the 'norm of re-
democratisation' in the former, while in 
the latter constitutional revision and 
direct elections is the form. 
Each African state — whether it is in 
the Francophone or the Anglophone 
zone — has its specific political history 
and 'unique internal dynamics'. These 
certainly affect the mode of launching, 
the transition and the outcome, thus 
distinguishing them to some extent from 
each other. 
The intensity of the struggle for de­
mocracy is not the same in all the African 
states. This means, among other things, 
that in some states authoritarian regimes 
are able to preempt situations and en­
trench themselves, at least for some time. 
Within every African state concerned 
the movement is not evenly spread. It 
does not encompass all communities and 
social groups to the same degree. For one 
thing, it is still concentrated in urban 
areas; rural communities are not yet 
significantly involved. 
Patterns of transition 
National Conferences: 
This mode of transition, which has 
been termed 'the Jacobin model', is in the 
style of France's 18th century Estates 
General. Its theoretical elaboration is 
founded on a credo echoing the ideas of 
the French philosopher, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, that 'all power emanates from 
the general will of the people'. 
The National Conference is a forum in 
which not only the political parties and 
elites but all of 'the country's social, 
* Post-Graduate Programme on Third World 
Studies — University of Bremen, Germany. This 
abridged article is part of the report presented in 
November 1992 during the 16th annual meeting of 
the ACP-EEC Social Partners in Brussels. 
ethnic, economic, regional, religious and 
occupational groups' are represented. 
The aim is to launch a process that would 
subject the authoritarian leadership (if it 
is not removed) to the will of the people, 
and eventually to revise the constitution 
and hold 'fully fledged multi-party elec­
tions'. 
It was Benin that set the example of 
transition through National Conferen­
ces. President Mathieu Kerekou was 
stripped of his powers but was granted 
full and irreversible amnesty. 
As developed on the basis of the 
Béninois experience there are internal 
and external prerequisites for the success 
of National Conferences. In the case of 
Benin (i) internally, the financial and 
economic situation had collapsed. The 
elites and the components of civil society 
had not only defied the regime, but also 
demanded that a meeting be held which 
was sovereign and in which all the social 
and economic groups were represented; 
and (ii) externally, the regime was denied 
financial and other help until the so­
vereign meeting was held. 
The conjunction of such internal and 
external factors enabled the consum­
mation of National Conferences, which, 
as in the case of Benin, led to multi-party 
elections following a transitional govern­
ment. In Benin, by the time elections were 
held, the old ruling party was dissolved. 
In several Francophone countries, 
including Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and 
Togo, the National Conferences did not 
succeed fully. To some,, these cases only 
show that the internal and external 
prerequisites were not fully met. But to 
others they only confirm that National 
Conferences are not as effective as they 
were initially thought to be. It is not easy 
to mobilise forces from the various social 
groups and hold National Conferences. 
Entrenched authoritarian regimes easily 
find time and space to frustrate the 
planned meeting and derail the process. 
Constitutional revision and multi-party 
elections: 
This is the model of transition in the 
Anglophone African states. It was first 
applied in Zambia, which became the 
pace-setter in Anglophone Africa in the 
same way that Benin was in the Franco­
phone states. 
In this model a loose coalition of 
parties emerges, becoming the dominant 
- but not the sole — opposition force. 
Examples of such coalitions are the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD) in Zambia, and the Forum for 
Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in 
Kenya. 
In Zambia such a coalition, the MMD, 
defeated the incumbent regime, which 
was constrained by internal and external 
pressures similar to those that had be­
leaguered Kerekou's government in 
Benin. The MMD made several demands 
including the holding of free elections 
attended by international observers. 
After some resistance Kaunda's regime 
agreed. The elections were held and won 
by the MMD. 
In such a model the incumbent regime 
cooperates in the process risking its own 
ouster. But it cooperates more because of 
lack of choice than genuine conversion to 
the principles of democracy. Unlike in 
National Conferences, in such cases the 
old ruling party is not dissolved. Rather it 
continues to exist as an opposition, as 
Kaunda's party does in Zambia. 
Peaceful transfer of power in elections : 
This is one situation where a ruling 
party in a one-party state freely and 
willingly cooperates in holding elections 
risking its own defeat. The incumbent 
regime is not as authoritarian, unpopular 
and isolated as Kerekou's was in Benin 
and Kaunda's in Zambia. Such a smooth 
transfer occurred in Cape Verde, where 
the situation was different in some 
important ways from those in Benin and 
Zambia. 
Cape Verde's socio-economic situation 
was better than most others in Africa 
even though the country lacks 'virtually 
any natural resources' and is a victim of 
'continuous drought'. There were signi­
ficant achievements in this small island 
state, whose population is more or less 
homogeneous. The economy was relat­
ively sound with income per capita 
increasing. Quality of life had improved, 
life expectancy had increased and infant 
mortality had dropped. The country had 
even embarked on a reafforestation 
programme to rehabilitate the ecology. 
There was much less corruption than in 
the rest of Africa. Furthermore, the 
society had a tradition of rule of law and 
functioning parliamentary and judicial 
systems. 
In Cape Verde too, the situation, 
though not bad, was ripe for change. The 
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people were eager to carry out a political 
transformation and 'reduce external de­
pendency'. There was also international 
support for a transition to multi-party 
democracy. Hence, in a fairly conducted 
election, the ruling party was defeated 
and handed over power to the opposition. 
UN-assisted transition: 
In this model, elections are held under 
the auspices of the United Nations. The 
sole example in the current process is 
Namibia, which attained its indepen­
dence in 1990 following a multi-party 
election supervised by the United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG). 
Namibia has proclaimed probably the 
most advanced constitution — and thus 
the most competent constitutional frame­
work for multi-party democracy — in 
Africa. The constitution, which has been 
hailed as a 'model', is an epitome of 
conflict resolution, an outcome of a 
process of compromise — both internal 
and external. The Constituent Assembly 
which was set up following the elections 
comprised representatives of seven poli­
tical parties. On the basis of the principle 
of Proportional Representation (PR) the 
parties were represented in the Assembly 
in proportion to the votes they received in 
the elections. As determined previously in 
the 1982 UN Security Council Document 
S/15287 (commonly known as the 1982 
principles), motions on the drafting of the 
constitution could pass if supported by 
two-thirds of all the members of the 
Assembly. Each of the parties, including 
SWAPO (which had fewer than two-
thirds of the seats) realised 'there was a 
need for a broad compromise". After a 
'wonderful give and take' the parties 
agreed on the contents of the consti­
tution. 
It is significant that each of the political 
parties involved, from the reformist or 
'left-wing' SWAPO to the 'ultra-right' 
Action Christian National (ACN), had 
expressed reservations about the consti­
tution; but still, in the spirit of comprom­
ise and national reconciliation, the As­
sembly adopted the constitution by ac­
clamation. 
The Namibian case benefited from the 
international situation which prevailed at 
the end of the 1980s. The thaw in the 
East/West confrontation had made 
possible a compromise between the US, 
the USSR, South Africa and Cuba 
concerning the implementation of Resol­
ution 435 on Namibian independence. 
Political poster of former President Aristides Pereira. Cape Verde was the first 
African country to organise a peaceful transfer of power after free elections 
Transition following overthrow of a 
regime: 
There are a few cases in which pro­
cesses of démocratisation are launched 
following the ouster of a regime by force. 
Mali and Ethiopia are two examples. 
In Mali, popular discontent and 
demand for change erupted in early 1991. 
By order of the President, Moussa 
Traoré, measures were taken to crush the 
popular movement. But soon after this 
event some military officers staged a coup 
and arrested the president. Uniquely, the 
officers immediately started a process of 
effective transition to civilian rule. Multi­
party elections were held in early 1992. 
resulting in the victory of the Alliance for 
Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), which 
now rules the country. 
The case of Ethiopia is slightly dif­
ferent. A Transitional Council was es­
tablished following the military defeat of 
the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariani. 
The Council, which comprises represen­
tatives of several organisations, is domi­
nated by the Ethiopian People's Re­
volutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), the armed movement that 
defeated the regime. 
A National Conference held in Addis 
Ababa issued a Charter which is the 
supreme law for the transitional period. 
The Charter guarantees fundamental 
human, civil and political rights and has 
all the cardinal elements of a liberal 
democratic constitution. Freedom of 
expression and association are now re­
alities in Ethiopia. The Charter also 
enunciated the principle of self-determi­
nation, recognising the right of any 
nationality or ethnic group to determine 
its status, including the option to sep­
arate. 
Ethiopia is making progress in political 
democracy, but it is also encountering 
severe problems as a result of power 
struggles and a politicisation of ethnicity 
— problems that sometimes appear to 
threaten its territorial integrity. 
Cease-fire, multi-party elections and com­
promise : 
This was a new pattern seen first in 
Angola. The Angola process was distinct 
in a few important ways: (i) A genuine 
multi-party election in which the party in 
power participated following a cease-fire ; 
(ii) the parliamentary election, judged 
'free and fair', was won by the incumbent 
(MPLA), which had been socialist-ori­
ented for a long time, (iii) if there are 
going to be obstacles to the démocratis­
ation process they are more likely to come 
from the opposition than from the 
MPLA which, by almost all accounts has 
been cooperative in the process; (iv) 
efforts are being made to bring about 
compromise and understanding between 
the main protagonists in the Angola 
process. The MPLA declared its willing­
ness to establish a coalition government 
even if it won the elections. The fact that 
there would be a run-off of the presiden­
tial election just because the MPLA 
received 49.5% and not 50% of the votes 
is itself a mark of compromise. (UNITA 
got only 40%.) 
Limited and controlled démocratisation 
from the top: 
This is a process in which a regime in 
power presides over an election among 
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political parties of its own choice or even 
of its own creation. This approach to 
démocratisation is being applied in Ni­
geria, where the regime has seen to it that 
only two parties are established — the 
Social Democratic Party and the 
National Republican Party. The former 
is described as 'a little to the left' and the 
latter 'a little to the right' of centre. 
There is controversy about the process 
in Nigeria. Some describe it as a 'pro­
gramming' of democracy from the top, 
suggesting that it is a genuine and realistic 
process of change. Others view it in effect 
as a pre-emptive device by the ruling elite. 
A few even focus on the control of the 
process by the regime and call it 'author­
itarian democracy'. This characterisation 
sounds increasingly appropriate, espe­
cially in the light of the fact that the 
regime itself dissolved the leaderships of 
the two parties in late October 1992. 
Nigeria's may be described as a situ­
ation which is half-way between dé­
mocratisation and authoritarian reten­
tion of power. Other cases which can be 
categorised as such are those in Ghana 
and Uganda. But there are also other 
states — like Botswana and Senegal — 
which are usually referred to as multi­
party democracies, but which are more of 
a blend of democracy and authoritarian­
ism. 
One-party-dominated multi-partyism : 
This is the situation which obtains in 
Botswana and Senegal; it may also be 
what Tanzania is heading towards. 
Botswana has important features of 
parliamentary democracy. For example 
there is some degree of freedom of 
association and of the press. And elec­
tions are held every five years. The 
problem seems to be that the opposition 
parties are 'not free to compete on equal 
terms with the ruling party' which has the 
monopoly of access to the media and 
other infrastructure necessary for poli­
tical competition. In Senegal, the situ­
ation is similar. There are a few political 
parties, but the ruling party is by far the 
dominant one. Following the events in 
Benin, Senegal's ruling party has sought 
'to build bridges' with the opposition and 
has taken steps towards a 'government of 
national union'. 
Indemnity clause and multi-party elec­
tions: 
This is the situation of Ghana, where 
for a long time, the government resisted 
the demand for démocratisation. Given 
the démocratisation in several African 
countries and the pressure exerted by the 
economic and financial institutions, the 
government agreed to effect a transition 
to democracy. Political parties have now 
been legalised under the new consti­
tution, which has been overwhelmingly 
approved in a referendum. A crucial 
provision in the constitution is the 
'indemnity clause' which gives the in­
cumbent regime, which has ruled Ghana 
for 11 years, amnesty for whatever crimes 
and abuses it may have committed. 
Besides, the constitution also makes it 
possible for the present leader, Jerry 
Rawlings, to run for the presidency as a 
In Togo, where the democratic process 
came to a halt, this statue of President 
Eyadema stood for a long time in the 
centre of the capital, Lomé 
Blend of authoritarianism and 'partici­
patory democracy': 
This refers to the political system the 
government in Uganda is experimenting 
with. The government has not banned 
political parties. The parties still exist but 
they can 'function' only 'under restricted 
circumstances'. However, there are also 
structures for 'political participation'. 
These structures exist within the frame­
work of the ruling National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which actually con­
trols them. They extend from the village 
level all the way to the highest body, the 
National Resistance Council. The ele­
ments of democracy in the Ugandan 
system comprise the 'preservation of 
personal freedoms' and 'popular par­
ticipation'. Related to these are the 
government's efforts to realise 'national 
reconciliation and political stability'. The 
element of authoritarianism lies in the 
government's control of the structure and 
its limitation of the extent to which the 
political parties can function. In this 
respect the regime is said to be similar to 
the government of Zimbabwe even 
though it does not claim or seek a 
'complete political monopoly'. 
The situations and patterns in Nigeria, 
Botswana (Senegal and Tanzania), 
Ghana and Uganda are half-way between 
authoritarianism and démocratisation. 
But characterising them as such is not to 
underrate the significance of the positive 
in them. New political space is being 
opened up in these situations also, which 
is helpful. 
Modes of resistance. 
Thus far, incumbent regimes have been 
resisting démocratisation to varying de­
grees. A variety of modes or tactics can be 
identified : 
Repression by force or intimidation: 
In the initial phase of the démocratis­
ation wave, some African regimes, like 
Moussa Traoré's in Mali, resorted to 
open measures of military repression. A 
few regimes continue to use brute force 
against democratic opposition. Among 
them are the fundamentalist military 
regime in Khartoum, and to some extent, 
the regime in Malawi, which is still 
harassing and detaining leaders of the 
pro-democracy movement. 
The fall of Moussa Traoré as well as the 
observed consequences of military resist­
ance to change — as shown in Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and the Sudan — was a lesson to 
other regimes in Africa. Several have thus 
avoided the use of brute force, resorting 
instead to more subtle and calculated 
means of undermining or blunting the 
process of démocratisation. And in order 
to accomplish this, they needed to appear 
supportive of democracy. 
Pre-emptive elections or national con­
ferences : 
Some regimes have survived by exploit­
ing the ill-preparedness and lack of 
organisation on the part of the oppo­
sition. Two such regimes are those in 
Côte d'Ivoire and in Gabon. The former 
hurriedly called for presidential and 
legislative elections before the opposition 
could organise itself and develop stra­
tegies. It won the election and hence, gave 
itself new legitimacy, at least in the formal 
sense. Likewise the Gabonese regime 
called for a National Conference when 
the opposition was still 'embryonic'. The 
Conference, which was not quite so-
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vereign, decided on a multi-party system, 
but the President's powers were not 
'affected ... in any way'. Elections were 
held subsequently and were won by the 
incumbent regime, whose status was even 
'enhanced'. 
Reversal of the démocratisation process 
A few regimes survived by reversing or 
halting the démocratisation process. Ex­
amples are those of Togo and Algeria. 
In Togo, the regime was on the verge of 
being ousted following a National Con­
ference in which the president was de­
prived of some of his powers and elec­
tions were scheduled. But the president 
promptly acted through his supporters in 
the army and restored some of his powers 
and his party's legal status. He even 
brought pressure to bear on the interim 
legislature. Having blunted the process, 
the regime continues to stay in power. 
In Algeria, démocratisation was laun­
ched following the economic liberalis­
ation of late 1988. A new constitution was 
adopted providing for multi-partyism 
and other political freedoms. Local elec­
tions and the first round of general 
elections were held in mid-1990 and late 
1991 respectively. Both were won by the 
fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS). Alarmed, the regime declared the 
second round of the general elections 
cancelled. It then proceeded to suppress 
the FIS, thus reversing the process of 
démocratisation. This is not to suggest 
that Algeria would have been on the road 
to genuine democracy had the FIS 
become the government. The point here is 
only that the démocratisation that was 
going on was halted and reversed. 
Threat of election rigging 
It is not difficult for ruling parties in 
Africa to rig elections. After all, the 
election officers are close to and ap­
pointed by the party in power. In a few 
cases the incumbent regimes appeared so 
determined to rig the election that oppo­
sition parties became discouraged. Se­
veral opposition parties have given up 
and withdrawn from the contest, which 
means the incumbents continue to stay in 
power. This was said to have happened, 
for example, in Cameroon. Surprisingly, 
the ruling party had already lost an 
election ; it managed to stay in power only 
by establishing 'an alliance with an 
opposition group' in a nominally re­
constituted government. Later, in Oc­
tober 1992 new national elections were 
held and won by the incumbent regime. 
But opposition groups as well as inter­
national observers have insisted that the 
regime rigged the election ; the former has 
asked for the cancellation of the election 
results. 
Temporising 
Some regimes hold on to power by 
temporising — i.e. procrastinating and 
delaying the process using one or other 
pretext. Their hope is that as time goes by, 
the pro-democracy challenge will 'dis­
sipate'. An example of such a regime is 
that of Zaire. The President delays 
matters by concentrating on issues of 
preliminaries and 'dragging out the ques­
tion of form'. In the meantime, he has 
worked hard to co-opt or neutralise some 
members of the opposition. 
Situations of ethnic violence 
Ethnic violence is rife in a number of 
African countries today. One of these 
countries is Kenya. The regime there had 
for a long time opposed multi-partyism, 
arguing that such a system is dangerous in 
a multi-ethnic society. Due to external 
pressure and increasing internal chal­
lenge, it finally agreed to allow political 
parties and hold elections eventually. But 
soon after the regime gave in, ethnic 
violence erupted in parts of the country 
where the opposition has some of its 
strongholds. As a result, people fled their 
homes, their usual places of residence, 
which means that they cannot be regist­
ered for voting. Many, especially those in 
the Kenyan opposition, suspect that the 
regime itself instigated the violence. 
Whatever the truth in this regard, the 
important point to note is that such 
situations are used in various ways to 
prolong the span of an incumbent regime. 
Two of the ways are : (i) the regime may 
declare a state of emergency to rationalise 
postponing the elections, thereby pro­
longing its stay in power; or (ii) it can 
hold elections when, in those regions it is 
not confident of winning, the people are 
still dispersed and cannot vote because 
they have not registered. 
Manipulation of electoral law 
The regimes in power easily man­
ipulate electoral law to suit their aims. 
For example, they fix constituency boun-
deries and determine the laws on party 
organisation in ways favourable to them. 
Fixing constituency boundaries is done 
in such a way as to give an advantage to 
the ruling party. For example, the section 
of the country where the ruling party is 
strong will be divided into several con­
stituencies, sometimes with each con­
stituency having a very small population. 
Conversely, the parts of the country 
where the opposition is strong would be 
divided into a few constituencies (or just 
one constituency) even if it is heavily 
populated. In this way the ruling party 
gains more seats in parliament. 
Definition of a party 
One method is to leave the meaning of 
political party not clearly defined in the 
law. Any group of people, even a few 
friends or family members, could be 
organised and called a 'political party'. 
This means there can be a number of 
small entities that are in no sense viable 
and cannot really function as political 
parties. They are no threat to the regime 
in power, which uses them as 'evidence' 
multipartyism, in the country. Some 
opposition groups in Botswana allege this 
is one of the methods the party in power 
uses. 
Requirements the opposition cannot meet 
According to journalists and the oppo­
sition movement in Kenya, this pattern of 
resistance is now being attempted by the 
regime there in a refined way. The regime 
has lately introduced a constitutional 
amendment bill. This bill requires that in 
order to be declared a winner in the 
presidential elections the candidate who 
receives the highest number of valid votes 
should also get 'a minimum' 25% of the 
votes in 'at least' five of the country's 
eight provinces. Critics argue this amend­
ment is unfair to the opposition groups, 
who do not yet have the necessary 
infrastructure in various parts of the 
country. But the amendment would give 
the regime a clear advantage. Over the 
years the ruling party had established 
extensive machinery and networks for 
running its elections. 
Opposition threatens civil war 
This is a new pattern coming from 
Angola. One thing that makes it new is 
that it is the opposition (UNITA) and not 
the incumbent that seems poised to 
hamper démocratisation. The UNITA 
leader threatened to go back to the bush 
and resume fighting, alleging fraud in the 
election, which, according to UN and 
other international observers, was largely 
free and fair. The fighting which has since 
erupted has brought the démocratisation 
process to a halt.O T.M. 
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Africa in search of 
institutional revival· 
by François VAN HOEK 
From the independence period in the 
early 1960s until the mid-1970s, the 
practicians and theorists of development 
swore by the theories, models and con-
cepts of central planning and strong, 
centralised systems of government. Afri-
ca is still feeling the disastrous conse-
quences of this blind application of ideas 
borrowed wholesale from other parts of 
the world with no concern for the specific 
realities of the continent itself. 
Then, in the late 1970s, came the 
invasion of structural adjustment, with 
particular emphasis on reducing State 
involvement, political and economic 
liberation reigning supreme and the 
sacrosanct market economy set up, in the 
light of the principle of its comparative 
advantages. And with this movement, 
which was inspired by external forces in 
many cases, African politicians and 
theoreticians woke up to the fact that 
developing the continent meant comple-
tely changing domestic policies and 
structures to place the emphasis on 
democracy, good governance and partici-
patory development. 
So, internal and external factors set the 
scene for the sudden awakening of 
pressure for democracy in Africa today, 
with a mainly urban population anxious 
for a new political order. There has been a 
severe attack on the authoritarian regi-
mes which took over most of the African 
countries with their single party systems 
and always attracted strong support at 
home and abroad by appearing as the 
means of overcoming ethnic and religious 
divisions and building up the nation. The 
present call for a complete overhaul of the 
organisation of the State and its relations 
with society can only be applauded by all 
those concerned with development. No 
country can achieve lasting development 
unless it has law and order, responsible, 
accountable leaders, room for the people 
to capitalise on their skills and express 
themselves freely and the right institu-
tions, and strong ones too. 
The importance of this last condition, 
one often lost sight of in the past, was 
brought home by Jacques Attali, Head of 
* This article owes a great deal to a similarly titled 
special study by the European Development Policy 
Management Centre in Maastricht (Netherlands) of 
which the author was the first Director-General. The 
special study is due to be published in French and 
English in March 1993. 
the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, recently, when he said 
that 'a democracy without institutions is 
anarchy and a market economy without 
institutions is a Mafia'. He was probably 
talking about the situation in Eastern 
Europe, of course, but, all things being 
equal, the golden rule applies to Africa 
today too. It is now clear that Africa has 
to have a new political, economic, social 
and institutional framework to manage 
its development process, but how should 
it go about obtaining it? Practical indica-
tions as to how to create a new institutio-
nal framework that will be efficient in the 
context of Africa are seriously wanting, 
although the pitfall of transplanting the 
principles and institutions of western 
democracy has always to be avoided. The 
past provides ample proof that grafts of 
this sort are not terribly efficient and 
more likely to be actively rejected as 
foreign bodies. But it is frightening to see 
just how little resistance the Africans put 
up to the idea of importing western 
models of democracy, constitutions and 
electoral procedures. So the present 
process of démocratisation must be put 
back into the context of everything the 
African heritage has to offer with an 
attempt to strike a proper balance of 
tradition and modernity and native cultu-
re and foreign experience to shape genui-
nely African systems in which the people 
can influence the political life of the 
nation and the region. 
It is as well to beware of the current 
tendency to assimilate multi-party 
systems and democracy found among 
many of Africa's opposition parties and 
in the foreign agencies which are pressing 
the countries for reforms. Multiparty 
systems and competitive elections are 
neither a democratic panacea nor ade-
quate guarantee of public affairs being 
run properly. An instrument as limited as 
the multiparty system is not enough to 
ensure a healthy political and democratic 
life. It is worth remembering that 'the 
single party system is not dead. It has 
merely multiplied', as one African com-
mentator said recently. Rivalry and even 
violence between the members of diffe-
rent parties are already a feature of the 
new African 'democracies'. It is difficult 
to see how this can contribute to the vital 
development of the majority of a popula-
tion which is now more concerned with 
having less repression, less arbitrariness 
and better basic services such as educa-
tion, health and access to credit than with 
knowing that party Χ, Y or Ζ is in power 
in the capital. 
Rearguard fighting is common, as are 
attempts by the elite (and their potential 
successors, who are not necessarily a new 
generation of politicians) to impose the 
whole process of démocratisation and 
reform or at least control it from above. 
This of course does nothing to help 
arouse or increase the interest of a large 
part of the population in public affairs 
and there is a risk of seeing democracy 
operate under a flag of convenience, with 
the African governments going through 
the motions of bowing to pro-democratic 
'Multiparty systems and competitive elections (here in Mali) are not, 
a democratic panacea ' 
Le Courrier n° 138 — Mars-Avril 1993  67 DOSSIER 
Niger's National Assembly building 
There can be no development without the appropriate — and strong — institutions 
pressure at home and abroad, but failing 
to make the fundamental change to the 
rules of the game which is vital if they are 
to achieve a démocratisation of convic­
tion. 
This, given the complications of mana­
ging the process of transition, will take 
time to achieve. Three decades of authori­
tarian regimes have created a gulf bet­
ween State and society and there is no 
point in thinking that a great national 
conference or the legalisation of opposi­
tion parties will close it overnight. Deve­
loping what Olusegun Obasanjo calls a 
culture of democracy means, first and 
foremost, changing the outlook of both 
governments and governed and ensuring 
that everyone fully accepts the new rules 
of the game. 
So when an author such as Etounga-
Manguelle defends the idea that what 
Africa needs most for lasting démocrati­
sation is cultural adjustment, he is se­
rious. The proof that the new institutio­
nal structures are efficient will only come 
when the people involved — and that 
includes women, young people, the rural 
population and the armed forces — 
manage to agree on the new roles of State 
and society and each is in a position to 
perform the new functions to the full, 
which means putting priority on literacy 
schemes and education at all levels. It 
means teaching the new political leaders 
to perceive the State's and their own jobs 
differently. It means teaching civil ser­
vants to relearn the basic principles of 
State management and having a civil 
service that actually serves the people. 
And it means teaching the non-govern­
mental operators to organise themselves 
better, to stop looking upon the State as 
an enemy and to see it as a partner in the 
common war on want and the common 
campaign for fair and lasting develop­
ment. What Samir Amin calls today's 
canonisation of non-governmental orga­
nisations, as the only worthwhile agents 
of development, will not bring the part­
ners in the development process any 
closer together. It is foolhardy to imagine 
that a host of NGOs operating outside a 
national political framework would be in 
a better position to solve Africa's present 
development problems. 
That leaves two basic questions rarely 
raised in discussions of démocratisation 
of Africa : 
1) How viable a form of governance is 
democracy in a situation of economic and 
social decline with scant prospects of 
improvement in the short term? How 
conceivable is it to promote both structu­
ral adjustment with a high social cost and 
greater involvement of civil society in the 
formulation and implementation of deve­
lopment policies? The situation in some 
European countries suggests that a return 
to autarky can never be ruled out in 
conditions of this sort and that it does not 
take long for a population to stop 
believing in democracy. It can only be 
hoped that the poor African peasant, who 
used to wonder: 'when will all this 
independence come to an end?' does not 
soon start asking: 'what is all this 
démocratisation for?' 
2) What part should the international 
community, never a neutral partner in the 
African development process, play? The 
international community facilitated, pro­
moted even, the import of foreign struc­
tures and institutions for all the world as 
if precolonial Africa had no political, 
economic and social structures of its own. 
It propped up authoritarian regimes, 
considered to be strategic allies, for years, 
and then suddenly swerved to the defence 
of the democratic cause. If this is what it 
really wants, it must also set about 
creating the conditions that are vital if 
Africa is to develop in an ever more 
interdependent world. This does not just 
mean adapting and increasing aid. It also 
means taking a hard look at its relations 
with Africa in terms of trade, debt and the 
transfer of knowledge and technolgy. It is 
of course up to the Africans, above all, to 
define and set up their own democratic 
systems and structures, as indeed it is to 
get the process of development off the 
ground again. 
But the international community can 
no longer be content to be the onlooker it 
was, well-intentioned of course, but also 
ready to impose conditions which rode 
roughshod over the realities of Africa and 
ignored all the time and money involved 
in this structural change to the conti­
nente) F.V.H. 
68 The future for the new 
democratic regimes 
by Peter GAKUNU * 
Today, in most African countries, 
there is increasing interest in the es­
tablishment of democratic regimes. There 
is a growing consensus that political 
leaders should be made accountable to 
the electorate. There is growing pressure 
to introduce democracy and restore 
human rights. In most African countries, 
autocratic governments have been forced 
to accept the idea that they should be seen 
to be safeguarding basic human rights 
and they are, therefore, releasing political 
prisoners, liberalising controls on the 
media, allowing for the establishment of 
opposition parties, organising and hold­
ing elections, tackling corruption and so 
on. 
This rapid shift from autocratic to 
democratic thinking in the continent 
raises a number of questions. For ex­
ample, what future is there for the new 
democratic regimes in Africa? Are the 
changes real and sustainable or are they 
simply another way of ensuring that 
desperate political leaders continue to 
cling to power? 
The democratic banner in Africa is 
being raised by the common man, who is 
protesting and demanding political 
change, as well as by the press and other 
groups, including foreign governments, j 
who are advocating good governance and 
improved government accountability in 
managing the resources of the country. I 
The African people have shown their 
willingness to fight for democratic ! 
change; many have been tortured and | 
even killed in the process. African rulers 
are converting to multi-party democracy 
and fair elections because they are under 
pressure from their own populations and 
face the threat that external interest 
groups and foreign governments will 
deny them financial and other assistance. 
After independence, many African 
governments continued the autocratic 
rule which they had inherited from their 
colonial masters. This was necessary to 
preserve the nation. Independence and 
* Head of the Trade and Customs Cooperation 
Division, ACP General Secretariat. The views 
expressed here are personal and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the ACP General Secretariat. 
self-determination had, in most cases, to 
be fought for and won. The new govern­
ments, composed in large part of persons 
incarcerated during the colonial period 
and, therefore, with no experience in 
government, were left to fend for themsel­
ves as best they could. The new leaders 
had to concoct ways to hold their states 
together and thereby remain in power: 
they declared their party the sole legal 
political party in the country and either 
co-opted or banned opposition groups. 
They arrested and detained their oppon­
ents without trial for protracted periods. 
The new governments took over or 
disbanded associations that had operated 
independently. The parliament was re­
legated to rubber-stamping presidential 
decrees and cabinet decisions. Cabinet 
appointments were based on an in­
dividual's obsequiousness to the ruling 
party and its president. The independence 
of the judiciary was often compromised. 
The government nationalised the media 
as a means of enhancing its propaganda 
and controlling information that was 
disseminated to the public. Once political 
power was centralised, economic power 
became concentrated in the hands of a 
few ministers, friends and relatives of the 
president. Africa's autocrats exercised 
absolute power and ruled by patronage 
and repression. The concentration of 
political and economic power provided 
them with resources (government ap­
pointments, lucrative contracts, import 
and export licenses, detention, imprison­
ment, forced exile, assassination, harass­
ment, etc.) either to buy supporters or to 
silence opponents. The armed forces, the 
police and the rest of the law enforcement 
apparatus were blended into the ruling 
party's machinery and were used ruth­
lessly to crush any dissent. 
Government bureaucracies grew 
incompetent and spawned massive cor­
ruption and inefficiency. The productive 
sector was sacrificed, the education 
system undermined and the emerging 
middle class forced into exile in search of 
better opportunities elsewhere. Foreign 
governments and investors, realising that 
the only way they could participate in the 
economic activity of the country was by 
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having access to those associated with 
people in power, encouraged and courted 
the autocrats. 
Because political and economic power 
was concentrated in the hands of a few, 
foreign governments shied away from 
their responsibility of ensuring that 
resources given or lent to these countries 
were properly utilised. Foreign firms, 
concerned with protecting their business 
interests, offered bribes and other kick­
backs to the ruling elite. Consequently, 
these autocratic regimes, realising that 
they wielded absolute power, legitimised 
their corrupt practices. 
Economic activity either ceased or 
reverted to the parallel market for quick 
returns. Economic stagnation at home 
and a collapse in export prices led to an 
acute shortage of foreign exchange. 
Foreign governments and interested 
groups, realising the depressing effects 
that the policies pursued by these regimes 
were having on the people, began to 
demand minimum safeguards on the 
utilisation of the financial assistance 
given. The Bretton Woods institutions 
(the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank) imposed stabilisation 
and structural adjustment conditions on 
most African governments, requiring 
them to dismantle state-owned enter­
prises and rationalise government ex­
penditure, forcing them in the process to 
acknowledge their past mistakes. 
As the economic situation of these 
countries worsened, public discontent 
mounted. A shortage of government 
revenue undermined the ability of the 
regimes to buy support through pat­
ronage. Problems of governance and 
political instability came to the fore. The 
legitimacy of the 'African dictator' was 
profoundly undermined. 
Perhaps the most dramatic influence 
for the wind of change now blowing 
across the African continent has been the 
realisation that it was 'people pressure' 
which brought about political change, 
even in the face of repressive author­
itarian regimes, in Eastern and Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Also, the realisation that rulers who had 
used the army or internal security ap­
paratus violently to repress pressures for 
political reform had spurred more de­
termined opposition, which had led to 
their own downfall, may have influenced 
African autocrats to agree to change. 
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Entrenched autocrats are struggling to 
maintain their untenable positions in the 
face of very stiff domestic and external 
pressure for change. Opposition groups, 
even though extremely divided, have 
considerable support. Popular demand 
for change has been fuelled by continued 
economic stagnation and decline, by the 
failure of government to reverse the 
situation, and by its failure to accede to 
the demands of the people for greater 
accountability. 
Like most of their predecessors, the 
new political parties have formed around 
an individual, often a former leader who 
might have fallen from grace with the 
ruling party. Most of these parties have 
emerged along ethnic lines and are united 
only by their determined opposition to 
the poor record of the ruling party. They 
are, in most cases, weak because they 
have no access to the existing media, 
which are controlled by the ruling party. 
They are poor because they have no 
access to government funding and, there­
fore, depend solely on unpaid volunteers. 
They are inexperienced in politics, lack­
ing grassroots organisation and leader­
ship — a reflection of the fact that they 
were banned until very recently. 
Interest groups are quite new, without 
experience or influence. A free and 
experienced press is also lacking since it 
had either been nationalised or banned 
altogether, or because the investment, 
both human and financial, necessary for 
setting up viable media organisations can 
only be undertaken with assistance from 
the government. An independent ju­
diciary and an effective legislature and 
civil service will also need to be developed 
and strengthened. Under autocratic rule, 
these institutions only served the ruling 
party. One of the difficulties that has to be 
resolved now that the democratic process 
has been established is to define a role for 
the opposition in parliament and for the 
existing administration and civil service. 
A further difficulty is the absence of a 
political culture tolerant of an effective 
democracy. 
Many of the preconditions necessary 
for an effective democracy, including 
widespread literacy, a high level of per 
capita income, a sizable middle class, a 
vibrant and organised civil society, strong 
independent public institutions, nation­
ally-based political parties with viable 
programmes and a political culture of 
tolerance, debate and compromise, are 
The rapid shift from autocratic to democratic thinking raises a number of questions: 
are the changes real and sustainable or are they simply another way of ensuring that 
desperate political leaders continue to cling to power? 
lacking in Africa today. Since these 
conditions are not in place, what is the 
future for the new democratic regimes? 
In cases where fair elections have been 
allowed to take place, with one of the 
parties winning a respectable majority 
and a viable, albeit inexperienced, oppo­
sition, it can be reasonably argued that 
the necessary conditions for stabilising 
democracy exist. Political institutions 
should grow in experience and strength. 
In the African context, a number of 
countries have just one ethnic grouping 
but a large number of others comprise a 
multitude of ethnic groups with different 
languages and traditions. In a situation 
where the opposition wins, the sustain-
ability of democracy depends on the 
quality of political leadership and on the 
relationship forged with the main group­
ing that volunteered their support. In this 
case, political institutions should grow in 
strength and experience as the new parties 
are allowed to expand their grassroots 
membership and the media are allowed to 
play a more neutral role. The success of 
the regimes in these scenarios, however, 
will depend on their ability to develop 
and present economic programmes ac­
ceptable to the electorate and to external 
financial donors. 
Where governments continue to resist 
reform, domestic and external pressure 
for change is likely to persist and remain 
strong. 
New democracies in Africa, arising 
either from old alliances or from newer 
ones, should avoid confrontation with 
their supporters. Failure to do so could 
undermine the foundation on which their 
coalition is based and thereby result in an 
entrenchment of old dictators or in their 
replacement with new autocrats. In other 
cases, a confrontational approach could 
result in a proliferation of political parties 
and render the government totally inef­
fective. 
In recent years, governments of de­
veloped countries have decided that aid 
should be given only in cases where the 
local regimes have demonstrated good 
governance, a good record in upholding 
the protection of basic human rights, 
improved accountability in managing 
national resources and greater tolerance 
of the opposition as well as having 
embarked upon democratic reforms. The 
emergence of opposition political parties 
in Africa and the change towards more 
tolerant and democratic regimes have 
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mntries undergoing democratic change, foreign earnings are at their lowest 
ever levels as commodity prices plummet and remain depressed 
come about because western govern­
ments have given the impression that 
once African governments had success­
fully embarked upon such reforms, re­
storing basic human rights and undertak­
ing structural reforms, financial and 
technical assistance previously withheld 
would start to flow again. Most African 
governments have, therefore, either been 
forced, or have willingly agreed, to 
embark upon the path of democratic 
change because they expected that they 
would be generously rewarded or at least 
compensated for their efforts towards 
sustained democratic reforms. 
Western governments and aid donors 
in general, including even non-govern­
mental organisations, have tended to use 
aid as a sword of Damocles, to coerce 
recalcitrant African governments into 
introducing political, social and econ­
omic change. The impression was created 
that once democracy and human rights 
were seen to have been established, there 
would immediately follow a greater flow 
of financial resources and an alleviation 
of the debt burden. It was also supposed 
that, with democratic reforms, African 
countries would be transformed over­
night. Corruption would be eliminated, 
and these countries would immediately 
become magnets, attracting foreign as­
sistance and investment. 
Regrettably, the advent of democratic 
regimes in Africa, while ushering in 
greater accountability by government, 
has not been accompanied by increased 
government revenues, either from in­
creased foreign assistance or from im­
proved domestic savings. The African 
peoples, having fought for democratic 
change, are now called upon again to pay, 
at times with their lives, as many of them 
are now faced with natural calamities and 
human suffering at unprecedented levels. 
Faced with growing unpopularity 
during the transitional period leading to 
democratic rule, governments have failed 
to maintain the rule of law. Indeed, in 
some cases, they fomented social and 
political unrest, either to avoid further 
unpopularity or because they felt that this 
would be one of the ways in which to 
undermine the credibility and popularity 
of the opposition. Most African govern­
ments, in their zeal to buy political 
support, overprinted money without the 
authorisation of the central banks, con­
trary to defined monetary and fiscal 
policies and in direct contradiction with 
existing structural adjustment program­
mes agreed to with donor institutions and 
governments. Available resources were 
diverted away from genuine needs such as 
health care and education, export sup­
port and promotion and from other 
productive activities of the economy to 
buying political patronage and blackmai­
ling opposition groups. 
During this period of uncertainty, 
when African autocrats were not sure of 
their future, a lot of damage was done to 
the economic and social structures in 
most countries undergoing democratic 
change and this has been inherited by the 
new democratic regimes. In cases where 
the process of democratic reform took a 
long time, the damage to the economy 
and, therefore, to the welfare of the 
people, has been considerable. In short, 
the economic and social development of 
these countries has been set back by 
several decades. In the meantime, foreign 
investment, both from governments and 
from other institutions, including private 
investment, has dried up or remains 
frozen. Thus, it is now at levels well below 
those that prevailed during autocratic 
rule and during the transitional period, 
and it shows no signs of improving in the 
foreseeable future. Earnings from com­
modities, the major source of foreign 
exchange for most African countries, are 
at their lowest ever levels as commodity 
prices plummet and remain depressed. 
Efforts to renegotiate commodity agree­
ments to boost prices have been frust­
rated by the reluctance of the govern­
ments of developed countries to accept 
agreements with economic clauses. The 
problems of indebtedness continue to 
haunt the new regimes. More conditions 
are being attached to aid, while stringent 
and unpopular structural adjustment 
programmes remain fully in force. Econ­
omic and social ruin arising from mis­
management by autocratic regimes 
thrown out by 'people power' through the 
ballot box has now become the respons­
ibility of the newly elected democratic 
regimes. 
The new governments, faced with this 
cruel dilemma and constrained by the 
inadequacy of resources at their disposal, 
have now become as unpopular as their 
predecessors. The success of democracy 
in Africa will, therefore, depend in large 
measure on international developments 
and on the ability of the new democracies 
to keep the promises that they have made 
to their electorates. Advocates of de­
mocratic reform in Africa (western 
governments, international financial in­
stitutions and pressure groups) must 
ensure that these fledgling democracies 
are successful so that they can be cited as 
examples worthy of emulation for other 
countries intending to embark on de­
mocratic reform. Otherwise, Africa will 
witness a return, either to autocratic, 
repressive and corrupt regimes or to 
military rule. However, to the extent that 
democracy has brought greater aware­
ness about the rights of the individual and 
assuming continued external support for 
change, democratic regimes will surv­
ive, o P.G. 
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Applying the solutions of the 
21st century to 10th century 
problems 
by Josep Enrique PONS-GRAU * 
Over the last few years the world has 
witnessed a series of democratic develop­
ments in developing countries, particul­
arly on the African continent. 
It already seems to have become a 
cliché to refer to the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the consequent end of the Cold War 
when attempting to account for these new 
processes. Realpolitik was an accomplice 
to dictatorships, corruption and the sale 
of weapons of mass destruction ; in short, 
it turned a blind eye to human rights 
violations worldwide. 
Most international forums have seen 
the opening of a political debate on 
democracy, human rights and develop­
ment. In some of those forums, however, 
the traditional rather hypocritical and 
misleading arguments persist. Some 
countries, too, particularly the tradi­
tional donors in the industrialized North, 
have been two-faced in their utterances 
while pretending to harbour only the best 
of intentions. At all events, there is a 
strand of public opinion in the donor 
countries which seeks to justify their 
traditional lack of interest in a genuine 
development cooperation policy by in­
voking the defence of human rights. This 
is a dangerous time for countries receiv­
ing aid, now that the onus has shifted 
from covering up a threadbare cooper­
ation policy to justifying it under the 
much more progressive guise of defend­
ing human rights. 
At the present stage of international 
economic and political relations, the 
capital markets are aware that a higher 
and faster rate of profitability can be 
achieved more easily if trade flows shift to 
countries in the eastern part of Europe, 
which has in fact been transformed into a 
political and economic South. 
On the other hand, many well-in­
tentioned people in northern countries 
are genuinely sick and tired of the fact 
that aid funded from their taxes fails to 
* Euro MP, member of the Development and 
Cooperation Committee of the European Parlia­
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bear fruit in the beneficiary countries and 
that it serves in many to prop up 
dictatorships that are economically os­
tentatious and politically bloody. In the 
worst cases, which are all too common, a 
large percentage of the finance provided 
is paid into bank accounts in the tradi­
tional tax havens, leading to a drain on 
the hard currency which is so necessary in 
the beneficiary countries. 
Moreover, we are now seeing a change 
in attitudes in many of the traditional 
donor countries, where the feeling of guilt 
which used to motivate people to make 
penance for the past is in the process of 
disappearing. Equally, while it is gen­
erally agreed that there is no more fertile 
breeding ground for dictatorships than 
poverty, this cannot be taken as a 
permanent excuse for failure to respect 
human rights. No political leader today 
can continue to see himself as the owner 
of his people's sufferings and exploit 
them to block human development. 
Quite apart from the above reasons 
and opinions, which are justified to 
differing extents, one thing is clear; the 
system of development cooperation and 
all its political and economic offshoots as 
they have developed hitherto have not 
been equal to the task of meeting the 
needs of the poor, and positive results — 
apart from a number of isolated cases — 
are notable by their absence. There needs 
to be a change of direction in commercial, 
cultural and political relations. There is a 
vital need for determined action from 
within the beneficiary countries to avoid 
a situation in which others impose reform 
from outside. This explains why — to 
venture a little optimism — we have 
recently witnessed a number of de­
mocratic changes in developing coun­
tries. Clearly, the right of each country to 
carry out the necessary changes in ac­
cordance with its culture, tradition and 
individual character is a principle which 
must be defended through thick and thin. 
In other words, we must abandon the 
universalising model of democracy and, 
of course, the Eurocentric and ethnocen­
tric variant thereof. We therefore ad­
vocate an anthropological dimension to 
democracy not rooted solely in an econ­
omic model. 
We cannot use talk of good govern­
ance, the rule of law and corruption as an 
excuse for abandoning cooperation with 
needy countries. We cannot speak of 
democracy in African countries while the 
institutions set up under the Bretton 
Woods agreement impose certain meas­
ures on governments as a sine qua non for 
economic recovery. These economic con­
ditions are diametrically opposed to the 
basic needs of the economies of African 
countries. 
The challenge for the 1990s and forth­
coming decades will be to reconcile 
modernity with tradition, but a bridge 
must be created if the solutions of the 
21st century are to be correctly applied to 
10th century problems. 
Deepening the Treaty of 
Maastricht 
The Community institutions (Parlia­
ment, the Commission, the Council and 
the Economic and Social Committee) 
have definite views on the issue of 
democracy and human rights. Admit­
tedly, a number of questions which will 
play an important role when it comes to 
applying corrective measures — 'who, 
how and when' — have yet to be 
considered in detail. At all events, it seems 
to us that Community policy could be 
more coherent and determined than has 
been the case hitherto with some of the 
main bilateral policies in this cooperation 
field. The disparity between bilateral and 
Community policy is evidence of in­
coherence and political short-sighted­
ness, and it does not escape the notice of 
European citizens that their governments 
are motivated by utterly outdated geopol­
itical or strategic interests. 
Maastricht must serve as a point of 
departure for a genuine common foreign 
and security policy including develop­
ment cooperation issues. If fundamental 
divergences between the two policy areas 
persist, not only in the field of develop­
ment cooperation but also in that of 
human rights and democracy, we shall 
continue to fuel contradictions and en­
courage the rise of tyrannical dictator­
ships. 
The principle of subsidiarity cannot be 
interpreted in such a way that Brussels is 
responsible for implementing impossible 
72 DOSSIER 
'The challenge for the 1990s and forthcoming decades will be to reconcile modernity with tradition' 
or unpopular policies (negative or re­
strictive measures in the field of cooper­
ation) while the Twelve pursue the 
policies which best suit their currencies, 
banks, stock markets or enterprises. This 
is the great challenge with which the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference will pre­
sent us. 
We must, furthermore, deepen dia­
logue between the countries of the North 
and the South in order to change many of 
the outdated ideas underlying an anti­
quated system of international law. Cer­
tain components of a new system of 
international law, such as the right to 
peaceful and democratic intervention, 
must be examined in detail to enable the 
democratic concerns of North and South 
alike to circulate freely beyond the 
frontiers of each. 
The new hopes for democracy and 
human rights which have been emerging 
recently must be reflected in political 
agreements and commitments of a new 
type, based on the revision and reformu­
lation of agreements derived from the 
colonial past. Third-generation agree­
ments containing clear specifications on 
human rights cannot co-exist within the 
European Community with first-gener­
ation agreements which take an ambigu­
ous stance on the issue and which date 
back beyond the Berlin Wall era. 
Whilst the European Community 
cannot fight the good fight on its own, it 
can and must make itself heard with a 
single voice in other organisations, par­
ticularly the UN. This represents a new 
challenge to innovate, reform and im­
prove existing structures to enable them 
to adapt to the prodigious economic, 
social and cultural changes which have 
taken place in other continents. Soli­
darity cannot continue to operate in one 
direction only; many other countries 
which have been neglected hitherto are 
knocking at our doors. 
We must lay the foundations for and 
continue to stress the need for genuine 
worldwide economic democracy. Let us 
start by condemning any element of 
obligation in the allocation of the econ­
omic roles hitherto imposed on each 
country or group of countries. We must 
champion the implementation of 
genuinely cohesive regional policies. How 
long will international economic and 
monetary institutions continue to de­
termine the economic policy of sovereign 
countries without taking into account 
either their views or their interests? 
We must continue to stress the need to 
establish a cultural democracy which will 
oppose cultural norms and standards 
foreign to the development of the coun­
tries concerned. Cultural and religious 
extremism cannot be viewed as offering 
hope to betrayed and manipulated peo­
ples. 
We would stress that political de­
mocracy, which must embrace the 
characteristics peculiar to each people or 
region, must be based on scrupulous 
respect for the rule of law. We know that 
while it is difficult to define democracy, it 
is easy to prostitute it. Democracy exists 
when the inhabitants of the country 
concerned experience it day-by-day and 
minute by minute. 
In order to achieve these three forms of 
democracy, in the economic, cultural and 
political spheres, far-reaching reform of 
existing international institutions will be 
required, from the most universal — such 
as the United Nations — to the most 
specific — such as these derived from the 
Lomé Convention. This is the challenge 
facing the European Community. Its 
achievements will determine in no small 
measure the name and role which it 
decides to give itself.o J.E.P.-G. 
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Democracy and structural 
adjustment in Africa 
by Bernard PETIT * 
The African scene is dominated by two 
powerful ideas — the transition to de­
mocracy and the notion that economic 
reforms must be undertaken or pursued. 
Economic reform, which began to be 
put into effect and attract support from 
external funders in the early 1980s, is a 
sine qua non of a return to growth in most 
of the countries concerned. Yet since 
deficits have to be reduced and imbal­
ances righted, reform means bringing in 
measures to shrink demand, which may, 
and usually do, entail high social costs. 
Human rights and démocratisation, 
the vital underpinning of lasting, sus­
tainable development, are changing Af­
rican societies and plunging the continent 
into a new phase in its history. 
These parallel trends are welcome, of 
course, but it must also be realised that 
running economic and political reform 
simultaneously poses difficult problems 
and is one of the major challenges for the 
African States and their external partners 
in the world today. 
Why a challenge? 
Because the opening to democracy has 
of course aroused enthusiasm among 
people who, in many cases, have been 
oppressed by authoritarian regimes, but 
also aroused great economic expec­
tations. The 'forces in society' clearly 
expect a democratic process to make 
visible and rapid changes to their state of 
economic wellbeing. 
But democracy itself does not bring 
growth. That should be the job of the 
structural adjustment process. Unfortu­
nately, however, structural adjustment, 
with its trail of hardship and austerity and 
its slow-acting effects on growth, is ill 
suited to meeting the immediate expec­
tations born in the transition to de­
mocracy, for there may well be a negative 
correlation between démocratisation and 
economic reform programmes, in the 
short term at least. 
Experience seems to suggest that, when 
it comes to enforcing programmes of 
reform, authoritarian regimes have more 
means of coercion available to them than 
democratic ones, which have to engage in 
dialogue with the other forces at work in 
the economy and society and cope with a 
free press, the right to demonstrate, the 
right to strike and so on. 
The best-known example here is of 
course the Chilean 'success story', or the 
unadulterated form of adjustment de­
vised by the economists of the Chicago 
school (who were unencumbered by 
either social claims or pressure groups), 
and which had such impressive results in 
terms of growth under the Pinochet 
regime — although those who were poor 
before Pinochet were still poor after­
wards. 
In fact, the dialogue which starts up 
under a democratic system — and it is 
absolutely vital that that dialogue should 
take place — is the very essence of what is 
usually termed the internalisation of 
programmes of reform. 
But if this dialogue coincides with what 
can easily be a fragile process of dé­
mocratisation, it is bound to mean some 
degree of adaptation (particularly in 
terms of taking reform measures in stages 
and the need to take maximum account of 
their economic and social effects), which 
will take the country out of its adjustment 
process for a time or at least prevent it 
from fully meeting the performance 
criteria agreed on with its external part­
ners. 
In situations of this kind, its partners, 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
especially, tend to suspend or completely 
withdraw their financial support. 
The State in question, now without the 
financing it needs to carry out the agreed 
reforms, sees arrears piling up and 
deficits mounting and ultimately ab­
andons the structural adjustment pro­
gramme, thus opening the way to inex­
orable economic decline, general dis­
content in society when expectations are 
no longer met and a serious threat to the 
stability and democratic viability of the 
State. This is an open door for the return 
of the authoritarian system and the 
countless excesses it brings with it. 
This disaster scenario may be some­
thing of a caricature, but there are signs, 
here and there, of the transition to 
* Head of the Division responsible for support for 
structural adjustment policies and programming. 
Directorate-General for Development, EC Commis­
sion. 
The end of the school day in Cape Verde 
Structural adjustment programmes have often put severe strain on education budgets 
74 DOSSIER 
democracy losing ground or grinding to a 
halt altogether as the economic situation 
in the countries in question declines. In a 
démocratisation process, there is a very 
fine line between the need to run growth-
generating economic reforms and the 
demands which express the legitimate 
aspirations of the people. 
Lomé IV support 
for structural adjustment 
With Lomé IV, the Community began 
providing support for structural adjust-
ment in the ACP States. Specific re-
sources in the form of grants (ECU 
1150 million under the first financial 
protocol of the Convention) are avail-
able for this and they may, where 
appropriate, be added to from the 
national indicative programme of the 
country concerned. 
The Community hopes to use this 
money to give a better differentiated, 
more pragmatic and more human face to 
adjustment. The six main concerns are : 
— the internationalisation of adjustment 
programmes, which have to be designed 
and formulated by the leaders of the 
countries in question — a sine qua non of 
their viability; 
— priority to long-term development 
aims. Stabilisation and adjustment po-
licies must serve to back up the in-
dividual State's development aims and 
drives and not threaten its development 
priorities (development of human re-
sources, food security, environmental 
protection etc.); 
— differentiated programmes, which 
must be geared to local situations and 
the special features and constraints of 
each country; 
— a realistic, modulated rate of im-
plementation that is geared to local 
potential. If necessary, adjustment pro-
grammes covering a longer period can 
be set up, to allow for step-by-step 
adaptation; 
— incorporation of the social dimension 
from the start. The purpose of adjust-
ment must not just be growth. Fairness 
and social justice are also important and 
special attention should be paid to the 
most vulnerable categories, in particular 
by ensuring that government social 
spending can be maintained; 
— full consideration of the regional 
dimension of adjustment, so as to avoid 
measures implemented nationally with-
out the proper coordination causing 
serious disruption and distortion that 
are difficult to overcome at regional 
level. The problem of structural adjust-
ment is closely linked to regional integ-
ration and the interaction between the 
two should be taken into account so that 
adjustment and integration are mutually 
reinforcing processes. 
In 1991, 38 countries were potentially 
eligible for structural adjustment sup-
port and were able to draw on resources 
from the first allocation provided for 
1991-92 (ECU 460 million). By 31 De-
cember 1992, ECU 305 million (66%) of 
this amount were committed and ECU 
198 million (43%) spent. It is mainly 
because many governments find it dif-
ficult to be serious about getting reforms 
going and abiding by the special con-
ditions negotiated for Community sup-
port that this first allocation was not all 
spent. 
A new system was brought in for the 
second allocation (1993-94) with the 
idea of matching available resources to 
the needs and performances of the 
countries. 
At the end of 1992, 14 countries ' — 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, 
Papua-New-Guinea, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe — 
qualified for financial support from the 
second allocation right at the beginning 
of 1993. Manuel Marin has told their 
Heads of State how much they can 
expect the Community to contribute 
towards support for their adjustment 
processes over this period. The full 
amount, ECU 417.5 million, will be 
adapted to reflect actual needs during 
1994. 
All the other countries will be notified 
of the amount of resources necessary 
(provided they press on with their 
structural adjustment) as soon as finan-
cing requirements stop being covered by 
the previous allocation and a new 
financial proposal therefore has to be 
prepared. 
1 Seven of them — Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania and Gambia — are 
moving to democracy. 
Governments must, in fact, constantly 
adapt to the economic logic of structural 
adjustment programmes and the political 
logic of démocratisation processes and 
reconcile the demands of their con-
stituencies at home (the voters) with the 
demands of their constituencies abroad 
(the funders)
2. 
A democratic approach should of 
course not be an excuse for displaying a 
high degree of economic laxity or allow-
ing a government team to 'buy' its 
support or legitimacy with the wholesale 
granting of each and every exaggerated 
corporate or other claim, often from 
urban social groups and leading to 
demagogic policies which reject the re-
forms of substance that would reverse 
economic decline. 
At the same time, however, it would be 
wrong for beneficiary States' external 
partners to ignore this democratic dimen-
sion, a feature of which should be that it 
prompts the international donor com-
munity to be more pragmatic and display 
more political sense, particularly when it 
comes to the rate and progressiveness of 
the projected reforms. 
Above all, the democratic dimension 
should lead the Bretton Wood Insti-
tutions to seek a dialogue and look for 
systematic coordination with the State 
and the donor concerned, in order to see 
whether the mistakes and slippages which 
occur in implementing the reform actu-
ally threaten the economic viability of the 
structural adjustment process; before 
they somewhat mechanically withdraw 
financial support. 
When the time is right, the Community 
will take the necessary steps to ensure that 
the donors involved maintain the con-
tinuity and coherence of the framework 
of support for the reforms under way in 
the States concerned. 
The external partners of countries 
engaged in both a move to democracy 
and structural adjustment must be aware 
of the considerable danger and serious 
political responsibility involved in being 
excessively and sometimes unrealistically 
harsh in their perception of economic 
reform and thereby threatening a fragile 
democratic process and opening the door 
to the return of the previous regimes and 
all their excesses.ο Β.P. 
2 Thandika Mkandawire, Dakar, November 1992. 
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Community support for setting up 
and strengthening democracies 
Development cooperation must promote 
democracy 
The Community's support for the 
démocratisation processes in Africa is a 
practical illustration of its determination 
to make the promotion of human rights 
and democracy one of the linchpins of its 
development cooperation policy. 
This is the logical conclusion of recog­
nising the fact that human rights and 
democratic principles are vital to fair, 
balanced and sustainable development. 
Statements, resolutions and conclusions 
produced by the various Community 
bodies over the past few years have 
highlighted the importance of this recog­
nition and made it clear that the demands 
arising from it are one of the cornerstones 
of cooperation and of the Communtiy's 
relations with the developing countries. 
It is indeed the importance of the link 
between human rights and participatory 
development focused on man himself that 
is behind the principles and objectives of 
the cooperation which the Community 
and the ACP States have agreed on in 
Lomé IV (Article 5). 
The idea that development cooper­
ation policy should put more emphasis on 
human rights and democracy took prac­
tical shape in the Treaty on European 
Union signed in Maastricht, which makes 
one of the aims of Community policy in 
this field to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
Council of Development Ministers' 
recent statement (18 November 1992) on 
aspects of development cooperation for 
the year 2000 brought further confirm­
ation of this in asserting that the develop­
ment programmes of Community and 
Member States alike had to pursue these 
aims. 
Resolution of November 1991 and priority 
for the positive approach 
The 28 November 1991 Resolution on 
human rights, democracy and develop­
ment is of course still the reference text in 
the field, as it lays down specific policies, 
procedures and lines of action. It is also 
important because in it, for the first time. 
by Hans SMIDA * 
the Community and the Member States 
expressly recognise the need for a 
common, consistent approach in this 
area. 
The November 1991 Resolution sug­
gests giving high priority to a positive 
approach which will promote and en­
courage the establishment and 
strengthening of democracy in the de­
veloping nations, although it also makes 
it clear that the Community may react to 
any serious hiatus in the democratic 
process and even suspend cooperation if 
this is appropriate (as in the event of 
serious and persistent violations of 
human rights, obviously). The most 
important thing is therefore to set up and 
maintain an open, constructive dialogue 
with the governments of the developing 
nations. Practical steps should also be 
taken to provide active support for 
countries setting out on the path to 
democracy and, therefore, for their ef­
forts to do such things as hold elections, 
create new, democratic institutions and 
consolidate the rule of law. 
Another very important thing is for 
developing countries which are making 
positive, substantial changes on the 
democracy-human rights front to receive 
extra Community aid. 
When governments and NGOs run 
proper schemes to promote democracy in 
the developing world, they must be given 
the right financial assistance by the 
Community — and that is why the 
November 1991 Resolution stresses the 
need for an increase in the resources 
earmaked for this to be envisaged, in so 
far as the general development budget 
will allow, so that the Community can 
support operations designed to en­
courage the democratic process (and 
promote human rights and good govern­
ance) in the developing countries. 
Positive action — means and priorities 
It is with this in mind that, in addition 
to the series of changes and improve­
ments to the use of existing resources, a 
new heading to cover support for schemes 
to promote human rights and democracy 
in the developing world was included in 
the budget last year. There was ECU 
10 million for this budget heading in 1992 
(most of which, as will emerge below, 
went towards supporting the démocratis­
ation process in Africa) and there will be 
ECU 16 million in commitment ap­
propriations in 1993. 
* Director of development policy, DG VIII, EC 
Commission 
The Community intends to give preference to schemes which will have a lasting effect 
when it comes to development and human rights and democracy 
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Community support for positive 
schemes of this sort in the developing 
nations should also be entitled to draw on 
the general financial and technical 
cooperation funds (EDF, counterpart 
funds etc.) in addition to the resources 
under specific budget headings. 
Combined, complementary use of 
these two types of financial instruments 
seems the proper course to take, par­
ticularly since the amounts available 
under the specific budget headings are 
often fairly limited. 
The promotion of démocratisation 
(and human rights) in the developing 
countries is one of the essential aims of 
our development aid policy, so we must 
go for a constructive and efficient ap­
proach, not just in specific and one-off 
schemes run with the various sources of 
financing available, but in the design and 
implementation of the Community's 
development cooperation projects and 
programmes. 
As part of the positive approach, the 
Community intends to give preference to 
schemes which are basically essential to 
sustainable development. The key is for 
every operation to generate lasting effects 
when it comes to development and 
human rights and democracy. 
In addition to the heavy priority given 
to strengthening the democratic bases of 
society, establishing a state based on the 
rule of law and encouraging good govern­
ance, special attention has also been paid 
to schemes to support the transition to 
democracy which has recently been and 
still is under way in a number of develop­
ing countries, especially in Africa. 
In the short term, and because it 
received specific requests for help, the 
Community had no choice but to give 
support for the preparation and running 
of a whole series of elections, since it saw 
these formal political processes as the 
first practical expression of a desire for 
change and, therefore, as the first essen­
tial step towards more lasting democratic 
change. 
Support for democratic processes 
In 1992, then, the Commission decided 
to commit some ECU 6 million of the 
resources earmarked for support 
(through the provision of material and 
technical assistance and by means of 
prior or flanking measures) for human 
rights and democracy schemes in the 
developing countries, to help with the 
preparation, organisation or conduct of 
elections in a whole series of countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Madagas­
car, Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, 
Lesotho/ Guinea, Ghana, Namibia, 
Kenya, the CAR, Mozambique and 
others). 
In some cases, it was also decided to 
finance this type of support scheme 
through the development cooperation 
funds — using about ECU 6.7 million 
from the EDF national indicative pro­
grammes and about ECU 3.5 million in 
counterpart funds — either in addition to 
the special budget heading already men­
tioned (Angola, Madagascar, Senegal, 
Lesotho etc.) or as the only source of 
financing (Togo, Mali, Gabon and 
Zaire). 
These various election support 
schemes were of course undertaken in 
close coordination with the Member 
States and the main funders. 
Although at this stage it is fairly 
difficult (and in some cases premature) to 
draw final conclusions as to the practical 
effect of each of these schemes, it is 
nonetheless important to realise that the 
Community contribution has had a fairly 
important part to play in most of the 
countries concerned. 
Difficulties and the risk of backsliding 
It is well known that the results of the 
drive to start the move to democracy in 
some African countries have not lived up 
to expectations, despite initial hopes, and 
that there have been serious hold-ups and 
even a risk of backsliding, with oppo­
sition parties questioning the honesty of 
the count, reports of massive irregularity 
and fraud, refusal to accept the outcome 
of the polls, persecution and suppression 
of opposition supporters, the use of force 
and fresh take-overs by leaders represent­
ing the old political and ethnically based 
structures, a return to armed confron­
tation and so on. 
Events that have given cause for 
concern in Angola, Cameroon, Kenya, 
Ghana, Zaire and elsewhere reveal the 
scale of the difficulties which various 
African countries have to tackle if they 
are to make a successful start on a proper 
démocratisation process. 
Generally speaking, the conclusion is 
that there is more to it than voting. The 
count has to be honest, the results have to 
be accepted with a good grace and the 
majority has to respect the rights of the 
minority. 
A look at Angola, Cameroon and all 
other countries in the same situation 
should at least lead us to the conclusion 
that the future of the democratic process 
in Africa has less to do with what happens 
at the elections than with what agree­
ments are put together afterwards and, 
most importantly, with the pre-existing 
balance of power. 
This is a bitter lesson to learn, and an 
old one, but unless people actually learn 
it, it is likely to crop up again in other 
countries (the CAR or Mozambique, for 
example) where general elections are on 
the drawing board. 
The difficulties and dangers of back­
sliding to be seen in various countries 
prove that, although the commitment to 
democracy which has taken hold of the 
continent of Africa over the past two or 
three years is by no means running out of 
steam, the path to democracy will be a far 
more tortuous one than was originally 
thought. 
But there is an encouraging sign. The 
political consensus on the fundamental 
link between multi-party democracy, 
respect for human rights and develop­
ment as a fair and sustainable process 
centred on the individual is gaining 
strength all the time. 
The right conditions for démocratisation 
and the role of the EEC 
The Community knows that the poli­
tical, economic and social structures on 
which democracy has to be based can 
only be set up gradually and sometimes 
fairly slowly, and it will have to look for 
the best way of achieving lasting results as 
quickly as possible while sustaining the 
African countries' drive to achieve this. 
So, as well as maintaining an active 
dialogue on these questions, the Com­
munity has to do its best to mobilise all its 
support, assistance and cooperation pot­
ential in the most consistent and effective 
way possible. 
But it must also be aware of the fact 
that the success of a genuine process of 
démocratisation has, above all, to be the 
result of moves made within the country 
concerned. Democracy cannot be im­
posed from the outside. Nor can it get a 
hold if it has no anchor in each country's 
domestic structures. It is up to the 
Africans, in fact, to shape their own 
history. 
Although it is generally agreed that 
democracy, multi-party politics, respect 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  77 DOSSIER 
President Mobutu (Zaire) and President Ey adema (Togo), the Heads of two States in which the democratic process has broken 
down — which is why the EEC has suspended all assistance other than humanitarian relief 
for human rights, institutions which are 
part of a constitutional system, ac­
countable governments appointed after 
regular, honest elections and an ac­
knowledgement of the legitimate import­
ance of the individual in society are basic 
conditions for sustained economic and 
social development, the African countries 
must still be free to choose the particular 
forms of political democracy which are 
best suited to their social and cultural 
structures. 
When looking at ways of providing the 
proper support for the African countries' 
quest for the most suitable form of 
political democracy, the Community 
should be careful to be politically neutral 
and strictly non-partisan in its assistance, 
and it must take far greater care than it 
has so far to establish whether the 
processes of démocratisation in certain 
countries are genuine ones or merely 
facades. 
Just one of the things this means is that 
it has to beware of political changes 
which are mere window-dressing. It must 
avoid rubber-stamping the sort of situ­
ation which occurs when the leaders of 
some authoritarian regimes try to mislead 
the outside world or to counter inter­
national pressure by setting up pretences 
at parliamentary democracies, capitalis­
ing on the immaturity of the opposition 
and hanging on to the reins of power with 
the help of their former single parties. 
Greater Community commitment 
called for 
The Community should respect the 
principles and policies behind earlier 
developments, take every proper pre­
caution and be even more determined 
than before in its continuing provision of 
every kind of support for the démocratis­
ation of the developing countries on the 
African continent. 
This is the background against which 
the conclusions of the Development 
Council of 18 November 1992 must be 
viewed. These emphasised the need for 
the Community and the Member States 
to follow the guidelines of the November 
1991 Resolution and devise strategies 
which give priority to positive action for 
the establishment of new democratic 
institutions, the strengthening of the rule 
of law and the promotion of greater 
popular involvement. 
The recent Edinburgh Summit (De­
cember 1992) reiterated this determi­
nation in its conclusions on the situation 
in Africa, which made it clear that the 
Community and the Member States 
would continue to support the efforts 
which a number of African States are 
making to apply the principles of de­
mocracy, ensure the proper management 
of public affairs, respect human rights 
and apply sound economic policies. 
One more demonstration of the need 
for the Community to step up its commit­
ment is the European Parliament's major 
resolution (16 December) on the. conclu­
sions of the Edinburgh Summit, which 
calls on the Council to take its common 
policy of support for démocratisation in 
various countries of Africa further and to 
pursue a firm common policy towards 
African countries where the human rights 
situation is cause for major concern.c 
H.S. 
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Mali : The other side of the pattern 
To many Africans, the first thing about the Malian model 
of démocratisation is the determination and heroism shown 
by demonstrators who took their lives in their hands and 
managed to overthrow a dictatorship they could no longer 
stand. 
The next thing they think of is the transition to 
democracy, carried through at the double and culminating 
in a smooth transfer of power to the election victor. 
The Malian model does have that bright side. But it also 
has a darker side to it, one where demands of every kind are 
being made against a backdrop of economic crisis. 
This is the side which The Courier shows in the analyses 
which follow, by two leading observers of Mali's political 
scene — Gaoussou Drabo, head of the Agence Malienne de 
Presse et Publicité, and Souleymane Drabo, Editor of 
Γ Essor, ο A.T. 
Autopsy of a Transition 
by Gaoussou 
As time goes by and what are often ' 
short-lived attempts at democracy come 
and go, Mali's transition to democracy ' 
looks more and more remarkable. At 15 
months, it was the shortest a changing 
Africa has seen and that record seems 
unlikely to be beaten. And it was the least 
stormy of changeovers, with its legi-
timacy virtually unthreatened and its 
sights never reset, leaving a far less 
explosive political legacy than Benin 
before it or Congo afterwards. Lastly, 
notwithstanding the obstacles and pitfalls 
which beset it, it could almost stand as a 
model of its kind. 
Its progress could have been com-
plicated by a National Conference whose 
only point, after the toppling of the 
Moussa Traoré régime, was a far-
reaching catharsis. It could have been 
diverted from its path by the continuing 
Tuareg rebellion heightening misunder-
standing among the people of northern 
Mali. And it could have seen its basic 
ideal, that of a clean change-over to an 
elected government, put at risk by wor-
sening political struggles. But, (it would 
be tempting to say) miraculously, the 
transition in Mali went through without 
tension degenerating into breakdown and 
its internal contradictions were resolved 
with relative ease. 
The relative smoothness of the trans-
ition to democracy may have been helped 
by factors which were specifically 
Malian, starting with the origins of the 
process. 
In contrast with other democratic 
processes, ongoing or complete, on our 
continent, transition in Mali was not the 
outcome of a hard-won compromise 
between antagonistic political forces. It 
DRABO * 
emerged from a revolution which toppled 
the old order. The term 'revolution' here 
means a sudden, radical and largely 
forward-looking change and is well-
suited to the combined action of four 
forces which came together from 22 to 
26 March 1991. These were the de-
mocratic associations which were the first 
to develop alternative political thinking 
through the rallies and marches they held 
to demand the démocratisation of the 
system; the school and university student 
movement whose marches and barricades 
triggered the insurrection of 22 March ; 
the only trade union confederation of the 
time, the National Union of Workers, 
which joined forces with the two first-
named organisations on 23 March and 
bolstered their action by calling an 
indefinite strike ; and the army, which put 
an end to autocratic rule by carrying out a 
coup d'état during the night of 25-26 
March. 
Once under way, the process of poli-
tical renewal in Mali managed to avoid 
the cohabitation between the representat-
ives of the old order and partisans of 
change which always spells conflict, and 
was spared the inevitable quarrels over 
the legitimacy and ranking order of 
institutions (the presidency of the Re-
public, the legislature and the govern-
ment) headed by people with ideologi-
cally divergent viewpoints. 
Another special feature of the trans-
ition was the way the army adapted to the 
ways of a republic. It had been involved in 
the bloody repression unleashed by the 
Moussa Traoré régime, won back some 
respectability by carrying out the coup 
d'état, but failed to neutralise all the 
feeling against it and so had to re-
habilitate itself. It therefore practised 
strict political neutrality (other than for 
Commander Lamine Diabira's putsch on 
16 July 1992), although it was a soldier, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani 
Touré, who guided Mali through the 
whole delicate period of transition. 
A third feature of the transition was 
that it neutralised the political ambitions 
of its leaders, for the basic Act prom-
ulgated on 30 March banned every 
* Head of the Agence Malienne de Presse et de 
Publicité (AMAP). 
One of the main tasks during the transition was to organise 
the first multi-party elections 
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member of the Committee of Transition 
for the Salvation of the People (the law-
making body) and the government from 
running for office in the first Government 
of the Third Republic. 
The advantage of this was that it 
guaranteed that the transition authorities 
kept the same distance between them and 
all the various competing parties and 
prevented State machinery being used for 
electioneering purposes. There were slips 
from grace, of course, but there would 
have been far more of them if the people 
in power during the transition had been 
able to stand in the elections. 
The final great asset of the transition 
was that the different institutions did not 
pull in opposite directions. The March 
revolution did of course remove the 
opportunities for ideological dissent be-
tween decision-making centres, but it 
nonetheless set up a dual system at the 
head of the State, where a legislative body 
(the Committee of Transition for the 
Salvation of the People — CTSP) and a 
conventional executive, the Government, 
worked together, the former as the 
inspiration and moral tutor of the latter, 
which was itself jealous of its indepen-
dence of action. There could well have 
been friction if Amadou Toumani Toure 
had not worn two hats, that of Chairman 
of the Committee of Transition and that 
of Head of the Government, a difficult 
combination which forced him to display 
uncommon tact in handling the two 
institutions and certainly made it possible 
to avoid conflicts of authority. 
So the transition in Mali enjoyed 
considerables advantages over its equi-
valents elsewhere in Africa, and it made 
the most of them along its path to what 
was a generally positive record on poli-
tical, economic and social affairs and the 
thorny question of the rebellion in 
northern Mali. 
Politically speaking, there were two 
major tasks facing the transition process 
— holding the National Conference and 
organising Mali's first multi-party elec-
tions. The national conference was of 
course one of the opposition's main 
demands under Moussa Traoré's regime. 
Political groups saw it as a forum in 
which to make objective preparations for 
the transition which was bound to 
happen, but the single party, the De-
mocratic Union of the Malian People, did 
its best to reserve the question of opening 
up the political arena to its own ordinary 
When Moussa Traoré was overthrown, several of the objectives which the opposition 
had set for the national conference fell into abeyance 
congress, which should have started on 
29 March 1991. 
The toppling of Moussa Traoré should 
rightly have done away with the need to 
hold the National Conference, since the 
basic law promulgated on 30 March 1991 
met all the democratic demands which 
had been made, in particular by setting up 
a full multi-party system. But the new 
authorities preferred to go ahead with the 
Conference. They confined it to adopting 
the draft of the new Constitution, the new 
electoral code and the party charter, but, 
under pressure from public opinion, they 
added to the agenda a discussion of a 
report on the state of the nation briefly 
summarising the management record of 
the former regime. 
But even with this clear signposting to 
lead the Conference away from pointless 
discussions that would go on for ever, 
there was still a risk of matters getting out 
of hand. Many political parties which had 
just been set up, and were unsure who 
their followers were, wanted to use the 
Conference to win some institutional 
legitimacy for themselves and get onto 
the CTSP, which was to become a sort of 
provisional parliament. And the school 
and university students association, 
which had sustained very heavy losses, 
turned some of the sub-committees into 
people's courts in which the army was 
among those put on trial. 
But thanks to the firmness of Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, 
who was elected President of the Con-
ference, they failed to raise the stakes and, 
after looking as though it was spreading 
its net far too wide, the meeting once 
more focused on its main objectives and 
— unusually for this type of gathering — 
got through its agenda within the pre-
scribed time (two weeks). On the last day, 
it recorded the Malian people's army's 
official apologies for its part in putting 
down the demonstrations in March, a 
gesture which did a lot for the reputation 
of a body of men who had come to 
symbolise the 23 years of Moussa 
Traoré's regime. 
Barely was the National Conference 
over than there were the elections to 
prepare — no mean challenge with the 
coffers resoundingly empty and the 
administrative system paralysed by all the 
pretences at consultation set in motion 
under the single party. There was a never-
ending trail of new political parties, most 
of them not conspicuous for their cred-
ibility, although three clearly stood out 
from the rest. Two them had originated in 
1 associations which had come to promi-
■ nence between December 1990 and 
| March 1991 — the ADEMA-PAS (ΑΤ-
Ι rican Party for Solidarity and Justice), 
which emerged from the Alliance for 
Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), and the 
CNID-FYT (Faso Yriwa Ton), which 
emerged from the National Congress 
Democratic Initiative (CNID). 
The third leading party had been seen 
before. It was the Sudanese Union-RDA 
(the single party until the military took 
power), which had reactivated its party 
organisation but was soon faced with a 
leadership struggle which, broadly speak-
ing, revived the old radical-moderate 
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confrontation which had been a feature 
of the party's history in the past. The 
exacerbation of internal dissent eventu­
ally caused the US-RDA to split down 
the middle (and each faction to put up its 
own candidate in the presidential elec­
tions), with Baba Akhib Haidara as 
spokesman of the orthodox group and 
Tiéoulé Konaté running for the liberals. 
Other parties still managed to find a 
niche for themselves around the three big 
contenders, as is clear from the results of 
the local government, parliamentary and 
presidential elections. They were the 
Sudanese Progressive Party (PSP), the 
RDA's main rival in the pre-indepen-
dence era, the Party for Democracy and 
Progress (PDP), set up by Idrissa Traoré, 
the Leader of the Order of Barristers, the 
Assembly for Democracy and Progress 
(RDP), set up by former international 
civil servant Almany Sylla, the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UFD), the party of 
lawyer Demba Diallo, a prominent figure 
in the events of March 1991, the Union 
for the Defence of Democracy (UDD), 
which was handicapped by having among 
its members people tainted by association 
with the old regime, and the Assembly for 
Democracy and Work (RDT), led by 
former top civil servant Amadou Nian-
gado. 
Alongside these parties with a national 
following, there were three parties which 
decided to stake everything on targeting 
regional audiences and were able to get 
themselves voted onto local government 
bodies and win parliamentary seats. Dr 
Sanogo's Malian Development Party 
(PMD) won five seats in Sikasso, for 
example, and the Union of Forces for 
Democracy and Progress (UFDP), set up 
by Colonel Youssouf Traoré, former 
member of the Military Committee of 
National Liberation, targeted San, won 
the parliamentary seat and gained an 
overwhelming majority on the city coun­
cil in the local capital. Finally, the Malian 
Union for Democracy and Development 
(UMADD) concentrated on Menaka (in 
northern Mali) where it got its only 
representative elected. 
The various elections confirmed the 
fact that the sudden appearance of the 
multi-party system and the shortness of 
the transition period meant that the 
political parties had not had time to cover 
the whole country effectively. The relat­
ively meagre funds available did not 
make up for the flimsiness of local 
facilities and the parties had to make do 
with what little there was to get their 
message across. 
ADEMA-PAS did best in the elections, 
winning 214 local government seats out 
of 751, 77 of the 117 seats in the present 
National Assembly and the Presidency of 
the Republic. The Bee Party (as it is called 
after its emblem) began by relying on a 
network of volunteers, mainly teachers, 
and then, to back them up, fielded 
opinion leaders and local personalities 
from the old regime who still had in­
fluence and whose prestige had not 
suffered in the eyes of the native popu­
lations. 
But, dynamic though it was, ADEMA-
PAS only won over a small fringe of the 
rural population and, since its rivals did 
less well, the transition went ahead with 
an election turnout that many people 
found disastrous when measured against 
the challenge of democratising the poli­
tical life of the nation. Such criticism is 
understandable. The elections, in which 
the local government electorates are 
fairly concentrated, attracted only 32.1 % 
of the 800 000 registered voters and the 
turnout for the general election was still 
lower — 22.38% in the first round and 
22.31% in the second. It was hoped that 
the presidential election, where individual 
personalities counted for a lot, would see 
an improvement on these figures, but the 
first round brought out 23.56% of voters 
and the second only 20.87%. 
The figures should probably be revised 
upwards, however, as the census was 
done hastily by young, unemployed 
graduates who were unfamiliar with the 
procedure and, specialists claim, the 
numbers on the electoral registers were 
inflated. Keeping them up to date had 
never been a priority of the single party 
system, of course, when it was standard 
practice to fiddle the votes. 
It had been intended that the transition 
process in Mali should be seen as a model 
for others, and the low turnout tarnished 
that image. With hindsight, this was 
inevitable. Organisationally speaking, 
there were bound to be problems, despite 
all the efforts made, when cumbersome 
administrative machinery, logistically 
under-equipped and not practised in 
meeting the demands of multi-party 
elections, had to be coaxed into top gear 
in only six months. 
The practical difficulties faced by the 
civil service impacted especially harshly 
on newly formed parties with rather 
modest administrative back-up. Voters 
were half-hearted after all the electioneer­
ing charades staged by the single party, 
they were only faintly interested in 
politics and clearly felt that the political 
parties were short on respectability. 
Calling in local opinion leaders to revive 
the flagging interest of the man in the 
street was only a solution in a limited 
geographical area and did nothing to 
solve the problems of identification faced 
by politicians most of whom were un­
known to the public at large. 
Where issues of society were con­
cerned, the extraordinary upheaval which 
took place during the transition failed to 
bring about the standard of results 
anticipated. It would have been re­
asonable to expect organised civil associ­
ations to have emerged to provide cred­
ible front-men and act as a counterweight 
to the power of the State and the influence 
of the parties. But the anarchic way in 
which these associations burgeoned was a 
sign not so much of vitality as of a 
fragmentation of the forces in society, 
and all the special-interest groups (par­
ticularly those set up by jobless recent 
graduates and lawyers) which emerged 
during the closing months of the trans­
ition were signs of a basic corporatism at 
work rather than of a lasting stand being 
taken in the social arena. But despite 
being rudimentary and going too far, 
these forces at least had the merit of 
saying what they thought, in complete 
contrast with the inertia in social matters 
typical of the old regime. 
Economically, the transition started 
with a clear handicap. The country's 
already difficult situation had been fur­
ther worsened by the battering which the 
economic apparatus took in the events of 
January and March 1991, which caused 
damage estimated by the Soumana Sako 
Government at more than CFAF 30 bil­
lion. The Treasury lost 14% of its 
potential revenue, industrial production 
dwindled, GNP declined and budget 
deficits grew. On 29 April 1991, the 
Transitional Government started on a 
plan of action to rehabilitate the count­
ry's productive fabric and rescue the 
administrative and economic apparatus. 
Special tax and customs regulations 
were set up for the private sector, which 
needed support for its self-financed 
recovery drive. The authorities also went 
further in removing controls on prices 
and marketing and with measures to 
improve and simplify the regulatory 
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framework. All price controls (other than 
on hydrocarbons) were removed. 
The adjustment campaign continued 
with an interim programme produced 
with the agreement of the IMF, and 
Mali's development partners commended 
the authorities' determination to press on 
with the economic reform programme 
and redress the basic balance. 
Budget aid in 1991 was CFAF 41 bil­
lion, CFAF 22.9 billion of it in grants and 
CFAF 18.1 billion in loans. The finan­
cing received under investment schemes 
brought external assistance to Mali 
during the transition up to just over 
CFAF 105 billion. 
Prime Minister Soumana Sako had 
every right to be proud when he submit­
ted his Government's resignation on 
5 April. GDP had gone up by 5.6% in 
1991, which, allowing for 1.7% inflation, 
was a real increase of 3.9%. This, Sako 
maintained, was thanks to very good 
recovery in the primary and tertiary 
sectors and to a drive to rebuild in­
capacitated industrial units and get them 
working again. 
On the public finance front, the Prime 
Minister said, the budget deficit had been 
held at 11.1% of GDP, as against the 
13.3% predicted in the programme, and 
the deficit on current transactions, ex­
cluding grants, was 13.3% of GDP, as 
against a predicted 16%. Overall, the 
report by the Head of the Transitional 
Government suggested, there was a large 
balance of payments surplus — CFAF 
38 billion in 1991, as against CFAF 
11.6 billion in the previous year — 
although Soumana Sako did admit that 
the exceptionally large amounts of ex­
ternal aid went a long way to explaining 
this performance. 
The Third Republic authorities have 
never openly contested the picture which 
Soumana Sako painted, but they have 
hinted that it was an unlikely one several 
times since the Treasury affair, as they 
call it in Bamako, came to light. The facts 
emerged in June 1992. when a World 
Bank-IMF mission went to Bamako to 
finalise documents for the signing of an 
augmented structural adjustment facility 
for Mali and a letter of intent from 
Bamako to the IMF. 
What should have been a routine 
procedure turned up two irregularities in 
the statement of the financial position as 
it was presented: unexplained extraordi­
nary expenditure of CFAF 8.5 billion 
The National Assembly of Mali 
The 117 members were elected on a turnout of only about 22% 
and a CFAF 5.5 billion hole in public 
revenue. 
Although an explanation for the extra­
ordinary spending was soon found (it had 
gone on reconstruction operations, elec­
tion organisation and a series of major 
works), the hole remained a problem, but 
investigators traced it to the Treasury 
departments and embezzlement involv­
ing unsupported cheques and misuse of 
public monies. 
In fact, the enquiry into the Treasury 
affair had begun during the transition 
and the investigation had concluded just 
before President Alpha Oumar Konaré 
was sworn in. But saying so did not stop 
political sniping breaking out over the 
affair or prevent a shadow falling over the 
economic record of the transition. 
The Tuareg issue turned out to be far 
more important during the transition 
than was originally suspected. The new 
authorities thought they would get them­
selves well on the way to a negotiated 
solution by including representatives of 
the Azawad Arab Islamic Front (FIAA) 
and the Azawad People's Movement 
(MPA) in the CTSP, but persistent 
attacks forced the transition authorities 
to embark upon a laborious process of 
dialogue with the armed movements, 
with help from Algeria, which was shel­
tering one of the movements on its 
territory. 
It all ended in Bamako on 11 April 
1992, when the Malian Government and 
the Azawad United Fronts and Move­
ments (MEUA) signed the National Pact, 
an agreement featuring a ceasefire, the 
Malian Army's withdrawal from the 
north, the formation of an independent 
commission of enquiry, the return and 
resettlement of displaced Tuareg popu­
lations, the integration of rebel fighters 
into the regular armed forces and the 
establishment of a decentralised system 
of administration in northern Mali. 
The general public were highly un-
enthusiastic about the National Pact as 
originally drafted, as people were con­
vinced that over-generous concessions 
had been made by the authorities. The 
Songhay and Peul majorities in the North 
also received it badly, believing that the 
way the negotiations had been conducted 
had been to their disadvantage. None of 
these reservations was ever expressed in 
public, however, and there was an un­
spoken national consensus that the 
priority should be to re-establish peace. 
But the Pact was put under severe strain 
in July and August 1992, when the army 
withdrew too soon, leading to renewed 
attacks by armed bandits, and a faction 
of the Azawad People's Liberation Front 
led by the dissident Rhissa Ag Mohamed. 
Troops were redeployed and the M FU A 
became more involved in maintaining 
security, so that things were quiet again 
by the end of 1992. 
All in all, the Transition, as regards the 
spirit behind it, was a privileged period in 
the history of modern Mali. It came after 
a period of autocracy during which 
political, social and intellectual life had 
deteriorated, and it released energy in 
what was often a disorganised way. It can 
also claim credit for having laid the 
foundations of a democratic Mali. But 
what gave it strength also led to its 
weaknesses. It started like a bullet from a 
gun, but soon ran up against the con­
straints created by the deliberate choice 
that it should be short, and it did not 
change the underlying situation as pro­
foundly as its roots in revolution had led 
people to hope it would.c G.D. 
82 Society of tensions 
by Souleymane DRABO * 
In Africa, democracy does not have the 
reassuring tick of a Swiss watch. In Mali, 
it is more like a time bomb, with the 
repeat button switched on. Defuse one 
potentially explosive situation and you 
could well set off another, creating an 
even bigger risk of social upheavel else­
where. There are so many fires raging at 
the same time that the Government does 
not know if it should be bomb disposal 
expert or fireman. And it forgets to 
govern. 
New democracy in the tropics catalyses 
all the frustrations built up over the years, 
brings them to the surface and forces 
them, as priorities, on the new author­
ities. How could it be otherwise when 
freedom of speech and freedom of action 
are being thrust upon some of the world's 
poorest countries, where the poverty of 
the vast majority is being aggravated by 
structural adjustment programmes 
which, whatever the reasons for imposing 
them may have been, may well do 
wonders for public finance but have 
predominantly bad effects on the every­
day life of the man in the street ? 
Bamako goes from one march, one 
stoppage and one demonstration to the 
next. School strikes have become part of 
everyday life. The jobless march for bank 
loans and the opposition parties march 
for a fairer allocation of television time. 
Taxi-drivers attack a private radio sta­
tion when they feel they have been 
insulted, cars are set alight by swindled 
members of a share scheme, and trades­
men and other economic operators down 
tools to force the Government to accept 
their demands. Even the army stops work 
to press its pay claims. And there is more. 
There is something for every taste, every 
cause and every class of society. 
Catharsis and all the excesses that go 
with it seem unavoidable after years of 
dictatorship, but a country so badly run 
down cannot afford to let it last. The 
outside observer has the impression of a 
boiler perpetually about to explode. 
There is nothing to reassure or attract 
potential funders and investors, although 
the Government is courting them none­
theless. 
Although Mali has been successful in 
its official transition to a democratic 
state, it is still a fine testing ground for all 
* Editor of L'Essor, Mali's daily newspaper. 
the tensions pulling the fabric of society 
this way and that, for all the currents and 
conflicting interests and for all the fires 
smouldering over an Africa on the road 
to democracy. And it is first-class terrain 
on which to observe the challenges 
awaiting new regimes when they are 
elected, the delicate balancing-act which 
governing entails in a situation of this sort 
and the dangers stalking all these coun­
tries forever on a knife's edge. 
Here, the aftermath of bad manage­
ment and the constraints of structural 
adjustment programmes create tension in 
every sensitive area of society. 
Youngsters, first of all, 3.5 million of 
them (with a working population of 
3.8 million and 45% of the total popu­
lation under 15), find it difficult to get a 
place at school and even more difficult to 
get a job. School attendance is no more 
than 30% and 75% drop out of their 
basic education — a problem area in that 
it caters for 94% of school attenders and 
gets barely 50% of the funding, most of 
which it has to spend on staff. 
The Government of the Third Re­
public and the funders have agreed to 
concentrate on basic education. How­
ever, Mali's Association of Pupils and 
Students (AEEM), the all-powerful or­
ganisation which was decisive in bringing 
down Moussa Traoré in 1991, has a 
different approach altogether, not just in 
theory, but in action too, for only five of 
the points in its 26-point Memorandum 
have any direct bearing on basic edu­
cation. 
Pressure from the Association is such 
that more than a third of the 1993 
education budget (CFÂF 14.6 billion) is 
going into grants for secondary and 
higher study, which means that 6-7% of 
the students are getting nearly 35% of the 
money. This spells danger for the future, 
but the Association does not seem to care. 
If the 1992-93 academic year is still going 
through the upheavals which at one stage 
made it look as if there would be no 
teaching at all, it is because the schools 
have struck regularly in support of 
demands for smaller and smaller groups. 
The strikes in December and January, for 
example, which were strongly supported, 
were aimed at getting study grants for 
only a thousand high school pupils (out 
of a total school population of 400 000). 
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Fortunately for the State, other claim­
ants are not being quite so active in 
putting the 'All now at any price' slogan 
into practice. But pressure is still very 
strong and people sometimes take to the 
streets — notably the Association of 
Volunteer Pensioners and the Associ­
ation of Retrenched Workers '. These 
names speak for themselves. Volunteer 
pensioners are the (virtually always 
consenting) victims of the civil service 
paring-down operations in which 4500 
staff agreed to swap the safe but not very 
nourishing bosom of the State for a 
severance grant of between CFAF 1.7 
and 4 million and go their own way. In 
practice, alas, there has often been no 
crock of gold at the end of the rainbow 
and the whole thing has ended in disaster. 
But failure does not crush these volun­
teer pensioners. They have turned on the 
State with accusations of its failure to 
support them vis-à-vis the banks, for the 
banks' opinion is that most of them are 
not creditworthy enough to qualify for 
loans for their projects (only 33 out of 
800 loan applications have been ap­
proved). So tempers are rising and the 
volunteer pensioners are back on the 
streets, just as they were in December, 
besieging the Council of Ministers al­
though they have been unable to halt the 
retirement programme which, if what the 
Finance Minister said at the 1993 budget 
vote is anything to go by, means 2300 
more job losses. 
The retrenched workers are less voci­
ferous, yet they too have their problems. 
These are the people, more than 3000 of 
them, who were laid off when public firms 
closed down and State companies went 
private and they are now seeking either 
the redundancy benefits (which have been 
divided up 'scientifically' to give them a 
theoretical guarantee of re-assignment) 
or another job. 
This second possibility, another job, is 
a matter of complete chance with the 
public sector on a drastic diet and the 
private sector slow to take over because 
there are no viable markets, businessmen, 
capital or anything else. The pool of 
labour, swollen with the retrenched and 
the pensioned-off and each year's batch 
of school leavers, is impossible to reduce. 
More than half the 12 000 job-seekers 
registered in 1991 were between 20 and 
30 years of age and 37% held at least a 
1 'Retrenched' means made redundant in a staff-
reduction exercise or for economic reasons. 
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school-leaving certificate, baccalaureate. 
At the same time, the job supply was 36% 
down on the previous year and only 8% 
of the applicants were placed. It is true 
that 1991 was a disastrous year for the 
Malian economy, but the Labour Office 
itself, which analyses fluctuations in this 
sector, admits that the imbalance in 
supply and demand on the labour market 
is a persistent phenomenon. 
Things could decline further if the 
private sector does not take off soon. But 
there is an obvious malaise here too. 
Economic operators, hit by the events of 
March 1991 (directly through sacking 
and looting and indirectly through lost 
trade), have also jumped on the band­
wagon of public sector orders. They have 
been tainted by a massive scandal over 
funds misappropriated from the treasury, 
the banks are put off by their unfortunate 
experiences and view them with mistrust, 
and they are awaiting a recovery which is 
slow in coming. 
They too blame the State which, they 
claim, has not taken the proper steps to 
ensure recovery in line with the recom­
mendations made by the nation's busin­
essmen at a so called 'round table' of 
trade and industry. 
Although the two parties seemed to 
diverge widely on some issues (how many 
measures to apply — the Chamber of 
Commerce said 66 and the Government 
45, for example, and how much to pay in 
damages to looted businesses — 21 bil­
lion on one side and 10 billion on the 
other), agreement still seemed to be in 
prospect, because the authorities had 
made a big effort on many other fronts, 
with such things as tax and bank arrears 
and fiscal and tariff reforms. So when the 
economic operators announced a 72-
hour strike for 28 December, it seemed 
not so much a genuine threat as a way of 
extracting more concessions from the 
Government. But the stakes rose and a 
curious 'tradesmen's strike' did in fact 
take place, although only for 24 hours, 
because the organisers carefully'called a 
halt to the action — without getting 
anything from the Government. 
The Third Republic authorities have 
been forced to put up more firebreaks and 
keep a watchful eye on the fever mount­
ing in every class of society. The army, 
now the great unknown quantity in 
Africa's emergent democracies, needs 
particular attention. Organised, equip­
ped and coddled by authoritarian or just 
plain military regimes, it is finding its feet 
in the new social and political context of 
the continent. And not without trouble 
either, as in Zaire and Togo, or tension, as 
in Congo or Niger. Local details vary 
widely, but the basic problem is always 
the same — what to do with an army used 
to privilege and with a habit of heavily 
influencing if not taking a direct hand in 
the management of public affairs. 
The army which arrested Moussa Traoré on 25 March 1991 
had previously fired on the demonstrators 
In Mali, the army is a problem, but 
there is one very unusual thing about it — 
the fall of Moussa Traoré was hastened 
by a military coup but actually brought 
about by a popular uprising. The army 
which arrested Moussa Traoré on 
25 March 1991 had previously fired on 
demonstrators, killing 106 and wounding 
1000, official figures claim. The soldiers 
were feted as heroes for what putsch 
leader and transition head General 
Amadou Toumani Touré called 'finish­
ing off the work of the popular insurrec­
tion but they were also suspected of trying 
to capitalise on the situation, put themsel­
ves in a better light and take over. 
The temptation was undeniably there, 
and, in July 1991, only four months after 
the transition began, there was an 
attempted coup d'état. But in fact it was 
soon realised that the army's claims were 
far from being political. They were 
corporatist and came from the troops 
rather than the officers. In April 1991, 
soldiers from the ranks took to the streets 
to protest against badly equipped bar­
racks and came into conflict with the 
students. From this emerged an influen­
tial group of NCOs and soldiers, which 
took part in the negotiations for better 
living conditions in the garrisons. 
The army, which was aware of its 
disastrous image in the eyes of the public, 
and felt guilty about its part in putting 
down the demonstrations, officially made 
its apologies at the National Conference. 
This followed its open day operation, 
which was designed to woo the people by 
bringing them face to face with a poverty 
felt it bore a fair share. It was aimed at the 
media and backed up by the high author­
ities of the State, which, in the heat of the 
moment, granted a large pay rise to the 
ranks and launched a national barracks 
renovation programme. 
All this helped calm things down, but it 
did not completely extinguish the fire 
kept burning by a never-ending rebellion 
in the north or quell the fear of heads 
rolling when the case of the killings in 
March 1991 got to court — which it did in 
June and again in November 1992. 
On 3 June, the Third Republic, which 
had inherited this problem, went for 
continuity and appeasement. It prepared 
for the court case by setting up legal 
'crash-barriers' to tighten the circle of 
responsibility and put the blame on those 
who gave the orders rather than those 
who pulled the triggers. This put the 
troops and most of the officers out of 
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The mosque at Djenné 
Despite the Tamanrasset agreements (1991) and the National Pact (1992), there is still no peace in northern Mali 
danger and the prosecution could focus 
on the people responsible for the count­
ry's defence at the time. Once the field of 
investigation had been circumscribed in 
this way, it stood up successfully to any 
challenge mounted by the defendants' 
lawyers — who obviously had an interest 
in implicating other people in the de­
monstrators' deaths. 
This relative success was not repeated 
in the handling of the rebellion. There, 
the army was taken by surprise when the 
Tuaregs rose up, since it underestimated 
the weapons and state of preparation of 
the enemy. Under-equipped and ill-
prepared for fighting in the desert, it met 
defeat after defeat and many lives were 
lost. 
The Tamanrasset agreements (January 
1991) and, above all, the National Pact 
(April 1992) were supposed to bring 
peace, but they merely contrived to turn 
direct confrontation into insidious 
guerilla warfare and disguised crime. 
Disconcerted by an elusive enemy which 
clearly had plenty of help from the 
population, the army began reprisals, 
which made feelings run far higher than 
the rebel attacks had done. 
Torn between politicians calling for 
negotiations at all costs and the people 
calling for security, also at all costs, the 
military was in an unenviable situation, 
with prestige dwindling and losses moun­
ting. Some 10 months after the National 
Pact was signed, the cease-fire control 
system is beginning to be set up. The 
army, still champing at the bit, is forced 
by both law and political authority to 
cope with a rebellion which has broken 
up into many sub-movements. These, 
despite the Pact, do not always respect the 
law or political authority. 
This 'more-war-than-peace' situation 
in the north is very much to blame for the 
latent tension in the army. And not 
always latent either. On 26 January. 
NCOs and troops downed tools in the 
barracks in support of a 32-claim memo 
focusing almost entirely on compens­
ation for the families of soldiers who had 
lost their lives in the north and on better 
pay and social conditions. This action, 
intended to last 72 hours, was patchily 
supported and ground to a halt 24 hours 
later, following bargaining led by the 
Defence Ministry. 
An unofficial source then announced 
that the bulk of the troops" claims were 
going to be met. a move which should be 
eased by the fact that the biggest chapter 
in the national budget for 1993. ahead of 
education and health, is defence. The 
defence department's CFAF 13.9 billion 
has risen to CFAF 16.6 billion, with even 
the MPs voting to add a further 200 mil­
lion to the sum proposed by the Govern­
ment. Officially, however, the object of 
the rise is not to better the soldier's lot. It 
is to 'improve the human and material 
resources of the defence and security 
services'. But morale among the troops 
must be kept high, so it is reasonable to 
assume that many of their claims will be 
met. 
This could of course cause discontent 
in other quarters, because the Govern­
ment is also bound by a social pact which 
tics it to the unions and provides for 
various pay rises. However, the structural 
adjustment programme provides for the 
aggregate wage to go down by about 
2.5% of the 1992 figure, with a ceiling of 
CFAF 41 billion. The Government 
thinks that juggling retirements will 
enable it to meet these two conflicting 
demands. 
The daily round of the Government of 
Mali and the governments of many other 
countries of Africa is aptly encapsulated 
in the challenging task of reconciling the 
irreconcilable and making miracles an 
everyday event... and, of course, main­
taining democracy, without which the 
impossible really would be out of the 
question. O S.D. 
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Survival economy 
Malian TV has been showing a little 
educational piece at peak viewing times 
lately, urging all good citizens to pay their 
taxes. There is no question as to the 
actors' talent, but it does seem reasonable 
to wonder about the efficiency of the 
campaign, given that bald exhortation 
pays off very rarely and in any case very 
few homes have TV sets. What people are 
asking now is when this insistent appeal 
to the citizen's civic sense is to be followed 
by more traditional means of coercing the 
recalcitrant tax-payer. For the State has 
no choice. Its coffers are empty. For 
many reasons, including embezzlement in 
the top echelons at the treasury, declining 
customs receipts and tax recovery prob­
lems, it was almost CFAF 8 billion short 
on the revenue side in 1992. 
The Government has to shoulder some 
of the blame for the tax problem, at least, 
because of its rush to keep new President 
Alpha Konaré's election campaign prom­
ises and do away with the basic levy which 
was so unpopular in rural Mali. This tax, 
a legacy of the colonial period, brought 
the State some CFAF 3 billion annually, 
collecting it was always the opportunity 
for abuse and it has indeed been rep­
ealed... as from 1993. But how can the 
rural population, which is unused to such 
gifts but is now cashing the first dividends 
of change, be made to understand it has 
to pay one more time? And how can tax 
officers, who may well have been called to 
account of late, be persuaded to redouble 
their efforts? 
This is particularly difficult for them 
because they know that Malian peasants 
are feeling the pinch in early 1993. The 
cotton harvests, one of the only sources of 
foreign exchange, have been good, but 
the world price has collapsed. For the 
first time in years, CMDT, the Malian 
Textile Company, has been unable to pay 
the growers cash for their cotton fibre and 
has had to give out vouchers — which are 
exchanged, sometimes at half their face 
value, for goods from money-grabbing 
tradesmen. 
The rice harvest was also good, but has 
sold badly and there are thousands of 
tonnes of it in Niger Office silos and rice-
growers' barns awaiting customers who 
become more hypothetical as every day 
goes by. Here are the victims of the 
competition from the huge quantities of 
Asian broken rice which the Transition 
Government unwisely let in to amass 
customs duties to finance its policy. 
So the CFAF 24.7 billion overall 
budget deficit not covered by grants or a 
moratorium on repayments has had to be 
revised upwards, which augurs ill for the 
improvements projected for this year. 
The State is on the brink of bankruptcy 
and everybody knows it except the 
Malians. It is for all the world as if they 
did not want to believe in the financial 
crisis or were convinced that the Govern­
ment could always manage to get the 
money it needed from abroad. Malians 
have never made so many demands for 
material advantages before and there are 
apparently 3000 interest groups, which, 
fortunately for the Government, are not 
all out demonstrating in the streets 
(although they are not all as whimsical as 
the organisation which looks after the 
material and moral interests of... twins !). 
The students and the civil servants, two 
of the prime movers in the collapse of the 
previous regime, got the Transition 
Government to make promises that the 
recently elected powers are finding very 
difficult to keep — and not just because 
money is short either. The new Govern­
ment in fact told the IMF and the World 
Bank that it would keep the aggregate 
wage down to CFAF 42 billion in 1992, 
which it did, and to cut it to CFAF 
41 billion this year, which will be more of 
a problem, particularly if voluntary 
retirements slow down as feared. 
The study grants which are virtually 
wages for students in secondary and 
higher education cost CFAF 5.2 billion 
last year, CFAF 1 billion more than 
provided for in the structural adjustment 
programme, an effort which the students 
clearly find inadequate. 
A shortage of resources also meant that 
last year's scheduled CFAF 1.2 billion 
civil service pay scale realignment on 
1990 figures had to be dropped. But the 
most spectacular demonstration of anger 
in recent months was, perhaps surpris­
ingly, not by the civil servants, but by the 
private sector (see also Souleymane 
Drabo's article). On 28 December, the 
economic operators — as the 23 477 
people, many of them ordinary shop-
holders, covered by the code of commerce 
are rather pompously called — triggered 
a 72-hour walk-out in support of a 66-
point claim for tax and tariff reform, 
postponement or writing off of tax 
A street scene in Bamako 
This mode of transport from an earlier age — still widely used in the Malian capital 
— is a reflection of the country's economy 
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arrears, rescheduling of bank loans and 
economic rescue measures. 
The tussle with the authorities only 
lasted 24 hours in the end, because the 
economic operators decided to stop what 
had in fact been fairly well-supported 
action. Many of their claims had in fact 
been met even before the dispute. On top 
of this, they engineered an end to the 
system of closing down firms which failed 
to pay their taxes and to the tax author-
ites' swoops on businesses. 
Let us now take a look at the com­
plaints of the private sector, which may 
have a decisive contribution to make to 
the success of the democratic process. It is 
generally agreed that it is on the economic 
field that the battle of democracy will be 
won or lost and the creation of a dynamic, 
enterprising private sector is at the heart 
of the economic strategy of every new 
democracy in Africa. State companies 
everywhere have proved to be inefficient 
and their structural adjustment program­
mes inevitably spell State withdrawal and 
economic liberalisation. 
Mali's businesspeople lost a lot of 
money in March 1991, at the time of the 
riots which ultimately toppled the 
Moussa Traoré régime. Factories were 
sacked and burnt down, shops were 
pillaged and stores were robbed — losses 
of an estimated CFAF 30 billion that the 
State does not have the means to pay for 
and the funders are unwilling or unable to 
cover. The deduction of arrears on tax 
penalties and the rescheduling of bank 
loans over 10 years and 1990/91 taxes 
over three years are two attempts at 
making up for the failure to pay compens­
ation. 
But what the economic operators want 
the State to do first is restore a climate of 
security conducive to good business by 
re-establishing its authority. They main­
tain that 'democracy has not been ex­
plained properly and Malians think it 
means freedom to do what they like, so 
they won't pay tax, they fiddle at the 
customs and they go on strike all the 
time'. They are very clear that 'liberty 
doesn't equal shambles' and deplore the 
fact that 'the fraud squad doesn't dare 
control fraud any more, because it would 
be beaten up and nobody would object'. 
The new Government, it is often said, 
does not like the idea of using force and it 
is trying to dissociate itself from the 
muscular approach which led to the 
The manufacturers and tradespeople of Bamako suffered heavy losses during the 
events of March 1991. This confectioners fell victim to one of the most serious 
acts of pillage 
bloody repression of March 1991 under 
the old régime. The forces of order are 
carefully keeping a low profile, their new­
found discretion an attempt to wipe out 
the memory of the part they played in the 
events of two years ago. Now they are 
unwilling to take any initiative for keep­
ing order, as the Mayor of one Bamako 
district regretfully informed me, and they 
want written instructions from the civil 
authorities, if not their actual presence at 
the hot spot. 
Security is nonetheless a genuine prob­
lem in Bamako today, and there have 
never been so many robberies. A large 
number of prisoners took advantage of 
the events of March 1991 to break out of 
prison — which may partly explain the re­
appearance of banditry. But denouncing 
mounting crime is one thing. Considering 
that exercising a basic right such as the 
right to demonstrate or strike helps 
weaken the State is quite another. Al­
though the present leaders cannot safely 
allow the insecurity and anarchy which 
encourage the most uncontrolled be­
haviour to continue (and a day rarely 
breaks without the finding of two or three 
bodies, ostensibly those of thieves caught 
in the act and beaten to death by people 
never called to account for meting out 
this kind of rough justice), they have to be 
congratulated for their scrupulous re­
spect for the freedoms guaranteed by the 
constitution. 
The second big demand from the 
private sector in Mali is for the State to 
put an end to the widespread fraud which 
is throttling the economy, starting with 
the country's 30 or so processing indus­
tries. Over the past year, one of Bamako's 
biggest businessmen has stopped produc­
ing PVC pipes and his output of plastic 
bags and other articles is down to 10 % of 
capacity. Another has had to stop manu­
facturing insecticide because a similar 
product is available on the market at less 
than his cost price. The blame, of course, 
lies with the fraud at the customs when 
goods come in from Nigeria, where 
production costs have defied all competi­
tion since the currency collapsed. But the 
complainants are like the boy who cried 
wolf, because it is the businessmen 
themselves who are behind the fraud they 
are objecting to. The industrialists accuse 
the tradesmen of organising illicit im­
ports to put them out of business and the 
tradesmen complain of unfair competi­
tion with industrialists flooding the 
market with the raw materials they need 
for their products without paying the 
customs duties. 
They all belong to Mali's Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. But instead of 
seeking the answer in that organisation, 
they have once again sent the ball back 
into the State's court and are querying the 
probity of customs and tax officers — as 
if they could hide the fact that there are no 
corrupt people without corrupters. The 
Government is not trying to duck re­
sponsibility for its departments either, for 
it is keenly rooting out the corruption 
which costs the public finances so much. 
But very little practical action has fol­
lowed the verbal condemnation so far 
and the size and difficulty of the task, 
which reflection the extent of the social 
rot to be excised, no doubt have some-
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The rice fields of Dioro in the Ségou region 
Ma// Aas the greatest potential for irrigated land in the Sahel 
thing to do with it, as does the failure of 
previous public moralising and anti-illicit 
wealth campaigns. But can a Govern-
ment which wants to establish its dif-
ference on stringent, transparent man-
agement of public funds afford not to 
make the fight against fraud and corrup-
tion a major feature of its action pro-
gramme? This is a major consideration 
now it has had its first scandal — in the 
Niger Office, a State company, which 
used grossly falsified bank papers in a 
CFAF 300 million rice deal with a 
notoriously shady tradesman. Although 
the ringleaders are in prison, there is no 
trace of the money from the rice, which 
was immediately sold for cash. What is 
worse is that it could happen again, which 
goes to show just what a state the 
administration is in. As the new Govern-
ment team took over, evidence of breat-
htaking embezzlement was already found 
in high places at the treasury, when 
unscrupulous businessmen were paid 
large amounts of money in exchange for 
bouncing cheques or over-valued goods, 
with the connivance of senior officials. It 
cost the State CFAF 6.1 billion, of which 
barely CFAF 1.2 billion of an anticipated 
CFAF 2.7 billion have been recovered. 
The Government is about to bring out a 
report on the state of the country when it 
took over and, of course, it will bring 
other skeletons out of the cupboard. At 
least, that is the theory of the top customs 
official, very involved with the previous 
regime, who says that there were 'levies' 
of 15-20% on public contracts worth tens 
of millions of CFA francs signed with 
individuals under the Transition, al-
though the commission was in fact 5-7%. 
Even if the Government does manage 
to do its share of the vital spring cleaning, 
can the private sector do the same, 
including in its management bodies? It is 
public knowledge that some of its leaders 
have things to reproach themselves for in 
the big financial scandals (the 55 billion 
hole in the Mali Development Bank, the 
2 billion slate at the Postal Cheque Office, 
the recent treasury embezzlement and all 
the damage to State companies) which 
have rocked the country since indepen-
dence. 
But spring cleaning it has to do if it is to 
win back the confidence of the banks and 
be the driving force of a market economy, 
which is its rightful role and one for which 
it is qualified by many assets which it 
holds, particularly a class of rich tradi-
tional traders who are punctilious in their 
business dealings and have the confidence 
of their foreign partners. Many people 
hope to see men of this calibre move out 
of trade and property speculation and go 
into industry, particularly the sector of 
agricultural processing. The fact that 
Mali has the greatest potential for irri-
gated land in the Sahel, where food 
supplies are always precarious, is all too 
often overlooked. 
These, briefly, are the things to bear in 
mind in any analysis of the present 
situation in what is one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Some people say 
that the ongoing democratic movement 
would have a better chance of success if 
Mali was richer and had a higher literacy 
rate. No doubt. But these are the very 
things which make Mali an example. 
Because if the process Mali has embarked 
on works despite all the constraints, then 
democracy can win through all over 
Africa. There is more to the Malian 
model than overturning a dictator.O 
Amadou TRAORE 
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Feeding the world 
by Ellin BESSNER * 
The World Food Programme of the 
United Nations has a formidable task. 
Wars and natural disasters have 
brought many populations close to 
starvation in these turbulent times and 
the WFP are usually to be found in the 
vanguard of those seeking to pick up 
the pieces. In this article, supplied by 
the agency itself, we hear about its 
recent activities across the world, and 
its work — with the European Com-
munity as well as others — to supply 
the nutritional requirements of those 
most in need in the world's famine-
stricken areas. 
For nearly 25 years, the EC's Food Aid 
Service has been working closely with the 
World Food Programme (WFP) to trans-
port and deliver the Commission's do-
nations of food aid to millions of hungry 
people around the world. By the end of 
1992, the EC was WFP's second largest 
multilateral donor after the United 
States, committing $526 million in food 
and cash for the two-year period 1991-
1992. 
WFP — the food aid arm of the United 
Nations — has a dual role : it is a principal 
channel for mobilising and moving relief 
food aid to victims of natural and man-
made disasters, while at the same time it is 
the UN's largest source of grant assist-
ance for development in third world 
countries. 
The Programme now provides one-
third of all food aid moved globally. In 
1992, this amounted to approximately 4.1 
million tonnes of food, the bulk of which 
was donated by developed nations, in-
cluding the EC. 
As a result, WFP has a large and 
efficient transport and logistics oper-
ation, moving relief food by land, sea and 
air. The past year saw WFP commit and 
move a record amount of donated food 
aid to meet emergencies in 46 countries. 
Whether it was Somalia or Yugoslavia. 
Iraq or Pakistan, in 1992 the Programme 
raised and committed 2.8 million tonnes 
of life-sustaining food for emergency 
relief— including 552 596 t provided by 
the European Community — to feed 
27.5m needy refugees and people dis-
* WFP Press Service. 
placed by war, drought, tribal and reli-
gious conflicts, and natural disasters. 
The bulk of WFP's emergency work 
went to help victims of man-made crises. 
In many countries in Africa such as 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique, 
drought combined with war to produce 
humanitarian tragedies. 
Somalia 
Delivering life-saving food to Somalia 
was one of WFP's most difficult and 
frustrating relief operations in the or-
ganisation's 30-year history. In May 
1992, with 2.5 million people at risk of 
starvation in central and southern So-
malia, WFP was the first international 
relief agency to open the port of Mogad-
ishu to cargo ships carrying large quan-
tities of vital food aid. Despite the volatile 
security situation, WFP staff members 
remained in Mogadishu. In late August, 
the UN designated WFP as overall 
logistics coordinator for international 
relief efforts in Somalia. 
At the same time, WFP launched an air 
bridge to shuttle food from Kenya to 
locations inside Somalia. Although 
moving food by air is usually a means of 
last resort, it provided a vital link in this 
case and was the only source of food for 
villages in the Somali interior. The airlift/ 
airdrop operation used both privately 
chartered planes as well as military 
aircraft supplied by Germany, the USA 
and Canada. 
The EC donated 32 500 t of wheat and 
several hundred tonnes of cooking oil and 
enriched, dried, skimmed milk to the 
WFP relief operation in Somalia. The 
Community also contributed $3 million 
for transport and handling of the cargo to 
secondary delivery points — where local 
WFP transports and delivers aid to millions of hungry people throughout the world 
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and international NGOs took over to 
supervise the free distribution. 
Delivering relief food to Somalia was 
an enormous test of WFP's expertise in 
logistics. The challenges faced were for­
midable. For instance, armed looters in 
Mogadishu and Berbera made off with 
more than 15 000 t of relief rations while 
local and international relief staff were 
routinely threatened at gunpoint. Cargo 
ships and aircraft were also fired upon. 
The turning point came in December, 
with 'Operation Restore Hope', the 
military intervention under the UN 
umbrella to secure transport routes for 
WFP's relief convoys. The Programme 
sent a fleet of trucks from Ethiopia to 
Somalia to boost delivery capacity — 
trucks normally assigned to WFP's long­
standing operation in Ethiopia. By the 
end of 1992, WFP had delivered more 
than 103 000 t of food to Somalia and a 
further 113 000 t were scheduled for 
delivery in the first three months of 1993. 
Yugoslavia 
Towards the end of 1992, ongoing 
relief operations in the war-ravaged 
territory of ex-Yugoslavia became so 
complex that bilateral donors asked WFP 
to intervene to help them move the largest 
possible quantities of food into the region 
more quickly. In November, WFP 
launched its own additional relief oper­
ation to provide emergency food aid for 3 
million people who are being assisted by 
the UN High Commission for Refugees. 
The programme committed $ 145m worth 
of humanitarian assistance, and opened 
offices in Zagreb, Split and Belgrade. 
WFP's food shipments are destined for 
six of the former Yugoslav republics, 
including Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part of 
the relief food is meant to help supply 
therapeutic feeding centres for mal­
nourished children, pregnant and nursing 
mothers, the elderly and the sick. 
The EC — which was already operat­
ing in Bosnia — was one of the first 
donors to respond to WFP's appeal and is 
also the largest donor. Through its 
European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO), the EC has already 
pledged ECU 33.5m for the purchase of 
wheatflour, pulses, oil and sugar, as well 
as salt, biscuits, dried milk and canned 
meat, fish and cheese. This timely do­
nation enabled WFP to accelerate distri­
bution of food to Yugoslavia in mid-
December. To date, the EC has commit­
ted, through WFP, a total of 66 800 t of 
relief food for the former Yugoslavia, 
valued at S41m. 
Southern Africa 
In 1992, Southern Africa faced the 
worst drought in living memory. WFP 
was asked by the UN to mobilise relief 
food and to help donors channel it to the 
region. The reason was to ensure a 
continuous flow of food and to avoid 
backlogs or gaps in the food pipeline. 
WFP established a regional Logistics 
Advisory Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
to monitor the flow of all international 
food aid entering the 10 affected coun­
tries in the region. It set up a similar 
monitoring office in Johannesburg and, 
in addition, committed itself to raising 
some 712 000 t of food for free distri­
bution to famine victims. 
WFP logistics crews were deployed 
across the region — directing, loading 
and unloading at the ports of Beira, Dar 
es Salaam, Durban and so on. The 
Programme worked closely with govern­
ment emergency agencies and local and 
international NGOs to move the food 
from the ports into the interior. In 
Mozambique, WFP lodged official pro­
tests against government efforts to place 
special taxes on the entry of relief food. 
The EC was the second largest donor 
to respond to WFP's 'Drought in 
Southern Africa' appeal. In 1992, the EC 
contribution of food and cash amounted 
to over 280 000 t and $4.7m. For Mozam­
bique alone, the EC gave, through WFP, 
nearly 39 000 t of maize to be distributed 
among the 1.3 million drought victims 
and 1.85 million people displaced by 
17 years of civil war. In Malawi, the EC 
committed 46 000 t of maize and several 
thousand tonnes of nuts, beans, sugar 
and salt — to help the 4.7 million drought 
victims and the nearly 1 million refugees 
from Mozambique temporarily living in 
the country. 
Elsewhere 
In northern Iraq, WFP has been 
providing aid to 750 000 Kurds since the 
end of the Gulf War in April 1991. At the 
same time, the Programme is providing 
basic food rations to 450 000 poor and 
displaced people in central and southern 
Iraq. 
The operation in northern Iraq has 
been fraught with danger, as more than a 
dozen trucks carrying WFP food have 
been either blown up or endangered by 
bombs as they made the hazardous trip 
through the mountains across the border 
from southern Turkey. 
WFP also has large emergency oper­
ations under way in other parts of the 
Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Eritrea and Sudan. Indeed, Oper­
ation 'Lifeline Sudan' has been under way 
since the end of the 1980s. 
WFP also participated in the UN's 
major refugee repatriation operations, 
working closely with the UNHCR in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Na­
mibia, Guatemala and Cambodia. 
In nearly all the countries where WFP 
ran emergency operations last year, the 
EC had an input in the form of relief food 
donations. WFP's operations fall into 
two categories: short-term relief needs 
and long-term feeding operations. In 
1992, the EC donated food and cash 
towards WFP's long-term refugee pro­
jects in 15 countries: Mozambique, Li­
beria, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Pakis­
tan, Senegal, Swaziland, Sudan, Algeria, 
Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zaire and 
Rwanda. The food aid supplied benefited 
8.1 million long-term refugees and dis­
placed people. 
Bilateral donations 
Although most of WFP's emergency 
work is for moving multilateral do­
nations, a growing number of individual 
donor countries are calling on the WFP's 
bilateral services branch to complement 
their emergency efforts. Many donors, 
including the EC, recognise WFP's ex­
pertise in monitoring food distribution, 
in shipping and in transport. Last year, 
for instance, the EC requested WFP to 
monitor the considerable donation of 
109 000 t of wheat destined for victims of 
a cyclone in Bangladesh. 
Bilateral donors use WFP for shipping 
and transport because the agency does 
such an enormous volume of business 
each year. International freight com­
panies have designed a special weighbill 
for WFP cargo and the Programme 
enjoys competitive transport and ship­
ping rates. 
The EC is a flexible bilateral donor 
because it encourages WFP to purchase 
relief commodities locally or in the 
region, as well as ensuring that the 
donated rations meet locally accepted 
food-eating habits. It also helps to keep 
down external transport costs. 
In 1992, the WFP handled approxi­
mately 180 000 t of food for the EC 
through bilateral donations and charged 
$21m for its services.o 
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AIDS in the South Pacific 
Getting the message across 
What do theatre companies, comic 
strips, broadcasters, confessional groups, 
videos and male and female imperso-
nators in the islands of Oceania have in 
common? 
They have all been roped in by the 
South Pacific Commission, that veteran 
of Pacific regional organisations, to stop 
the spread of AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases in the region. 
The SPC works mainly for the develop-
ment requirements of its 22 Pacific island 
members from its headquarters in 
Noumea (New Caledonia). Since 1991, 
when the AIDS-STD prevention cam-
paign was launched in Oceania, the 
project organisers have been doing their 
utmost to ensure that information about 
AIDS spreads faster than the implacable 
disease itself. 
'The AIDS project has been able to use 
the vast information network built up 
over the years through the SPC's different 
work programmes in fields as varied as 
fishing, rural development, health, the 
media and women's affairs', Hélène 
Courte, the head of the Commission's 
programmes, explains. 
'We in the Pacific have been lucky 
enough to be able to draw on the 
experience of what have proven to be the 
most efficient AIDS and STD prevention 
policies in other parts of the world and 
one of the conclusions we have come to is 
that any drive to contain these diseases 
must rely heavily on local communities 
and associations', she says. 
So, for instance, the AIDS project has 
supplied technical assistance and made 
grants of up to S5000 to various groups 
and associations, as part of the South 
Pacific Commission's small grants 
scheme for AIDS-STD prevention, to 
enable them to run their own prevention 
programmes. 
The theatre — a good way of 
promoting AIDS education 
More than 20 associations in 12 coun-
tries have had help since the project began 
and 19 applications for small grants are 
currently being processed. Among the 
projects financed with these grants, 
seminars have been set up for women's 
associations, information booklets have 
gone out to male and female imperso-
nators and teaching aids have been 
produced for family planning organis-
ations. Theatre groups in Papua-New 
Guinea have had grants to write scripts 
and put on plays about AIDS and the 
Wan Smolbag Theatre of Vanuatu has 
been able to tour the country to tell 
people about AIDS. 'When you realise 
that Vanuatu has 145 000 people speak-
ing more than 100 different languages 
and Papua-New Guinea has 3.8 million 
people and 742 known languages, you 
begin to realise that the theatre is a good 
way of promoting AIDS education', Mrs 
Courte explains. 
The AIDS project organisers are also 
working closely with other organisations 
on setting up training activities. Broad-
casting specialists and health prof-
essionals, for example, have got together 
to see if they can improve their produc-
tion skills. Messages and radio plays on 
AIDS and STD-related subjects have 
been produced as part of this drive and all 
the region's radio stations now broadcast 
them regularly. Since 1991, the SPC and 
PIBA, the Pacific Islands Broadcasting 
Association, have awarded prizes to the 
stations organising the best AIDS-STD 
news and prevention campaigns on radio. 
Youth organisers and artists had the 
opportunity to get together at a seminar 
run jointly by the Commonwealth Youth 
Programme and the Australian publi-
sher, Streetwize Comics. They saw how 
useful comic strips were for health pro-
motion and produced two of their own on 
AIDS-STD prevention, one in French 
and one in English. Mrs Courte hopes to 
see them translated into some of the 
languages of Oceania too. 
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South Pacific Commission 
This truly international organisation, 
which combines all the peoples of the 
Pacific, has 27 members, all countries 
and territories committed to improving 
socio-economic conditions for all those 
who live in the region. 
Since the allies set it up in 1947 to help 
develop their colonies and territories in 
the Pacific, the Commission has evolved 
in line with the economic situation in 
that part of the world. 
The peoples of Oceania began to have 
their say when the first independent and 
autonomous States of the region joined 
the SPC in the 1960s and 1970s. Eventu-
ally, in 1983, all countries and territories 
in which the Commission ran program-
mes became full members of the organis-
ation regardless of their political status. 
There are 27 members today, five of 
them the founder nations (Australia, 
France, New Zealand, the United King-
dom and the United States), in which no 
programmes are run, and the other 22 
the countries and island territories of 
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, 
which get the benefit of the SPC's 
services. 
More than 98% of the area covered by 
SPC activities consists of the Pacific 
Ocean, which goes a long way to 
explaining the types of programmes the 
Commission runs for development. 
A low percentage of arable land, 
inadequate water resources, the econ-
omic importance of the marine re-
sources (particularly in the 200-mile 
EEZs), transport and communications 
problems, isolation and a population 
shift away from the countryside and into 
the big towns in the region all shape the 
policy and content of the Commission's 
activities. 
The principal fields of Commission 
involvement are marine resources and 
public health followed by agriculture 
and the protection of plant life. In 
addition, the SPC has programmes 
dealing with rural development, rural 
technology, women, young people, stat-
istical information, economic questions, 
population, training in the socio-edu-
cational field and training in the use of 
the media. The SPC's work programme 
is assessed and adopted at the South 
Pacific Conference, where the member 
countries and territories meet once a 
year to ensure that the Commission is 
providing the right sort of assistance in 
the region. O 
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Young villagers ir,  'lew Guinea. Parents are encouraged to be more open in discussing AIDS with their children 
Publications 
The SPC's AIDS project produces a 
number of regular publications, led by 
Alerte au sida — Oceanie, a quarterly 
distributed widely in the region and 
elsewhere, whose success is such that, by 
the fourth edition, the original print-run 
of 2000 had to be increased to 5500. The 
AIDS project also brings out a quarterly 
list of acquisistions giving all documents 
received through the WHO-SPC data 
exchange network. There have been five 
printings of the 200 publications listed 
and sent to various resource centres, 
national AIDS control committees and 
other organisations in the region. 
The AIDS project is also behind a 
number of publications in Oceanic lan­
guages. Friends of workers on the project 
took their cue from the theme of the 
WHO'S World AIDS Day in 1991 -
'Let's join forces' — and agreed, as their 
contribution to the drive to reach as many 
people as possible in the region, to 
translate a children's booklet written 
during a series of WHO-UNESCO 
backed courses aimed at producing AIDS 
teaching aids for the countries of the 
region. By November 1992, the booklet, 
called All about AIDS, had already been 
translated into 17 Oceanic languages and 
more translations are coming out. 
With 'commitment from communities' 
being the theme of the 1992 World AIDS 
Day, SPC AIDS project staff called on all 
their partners to try out or translate the 
All about AIDS booklet. 
Some churches criticise, others 
applaud 
'There were problems, obviously,' Mrs 
Courte says. 'As has happened in other 
countries, we have been criticised by 
people who maintain that talking about 
sex is going against the values of Oceania. 
Some churches even complain that the 
very mention of using condoms is en­
couraging too much sexual freedom. We 
have backing from leaders of other 
denominational groups, very fortunately, 
and they tell those of their colleagues who 
do not support us that, while the Church 
opposes talk of sex in general, it certainly 
does not do so when it is a matter of 
promoting health and saving lives.' The 
SPC AIDS project is now planning to join 
with the Conference of Pacific Churches 
and the Catholic Commission for Justice 
to set up a meeting to help churches in the 
region come up with a joint approach to 
the epidemic. 
To encourage parents to talk to their 
children about these diseases more 
openly, the AIDS Project has made 
Charlotte's Story, a video of a moving 
and thought-provoking interview with 
Charlotte Frankovich, a Samoan, whose 
son died of AIDS. In December, it was 
presented at the 12th International Film 
Festival in Hawaii, where many Oc­
eanians live. Charlotte knew that they 
would be readier to listen to someone 
who had lived through this tragedy and 
react to what she had to say and so she 
agreed to take part in the Festival and 
discuss questions the video raised. 'We 
were very lucky to find an Oceanian who 
was brave enough to talk about these 
things in public so that other people could 
benefit from her experience,' Mrs Courte 
says. 
The SPC AIDS project distributes 
videos on AIDS and sexually transmitted 
diseases widely in support of the edu­
cation and prevention campaign in the 
region. The video of a play, a joint AIDS 
project-Wan Smolbag Theatre of 
Vanuatu production, was to be premiered 
on 1 December 1992, World AIDS 
Day. o 
92 CULTURE AND THE ARTS 
Derek Walcott 
The 1992 winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature 
"He believed the swelling came from the chained ankles 
of this grandfathers. Or else why was there no cure? 
That the cross he carried was not only the anchor's 
but that of his race, for a village black and poor" 
(from 'Omeros' by Nobel laureate, Derek Walcott
 ]) 
Although Derek Walcott — with typical modesty — was 
reported to have been 'shocked and surprised' when he heard 
that he had won the 1992 Nobel Prize for Literature, the news 
was perhaps less of a surprise to his colleagues in the literary 
world. The 63-year old poet and playwright is widely recognised 
as one of the greatest living writers in the English language and 
he already has a number of prestigious awards to his name. But 
the fact that the Nobel success was not entirely unexpected does 
nothing to diminish the widespread sense of pride and pleasure 
felt throughout the English-speaking Caribbean. 
For it is clear that Derek Walcott is a Caribbean whose 
attachment to the region transcends his feelings for any 
particular island state. He was born and raised in St Lucia, went 
to university in Jamaica and has lived much of his life in 
Trinidad where he set up and managed a theatre workshop. But 
above all, it is in his works that the spirit of the Caribbean — 
where African and European cultures have clashed and 
coalesced for centuries — shines through. His manipulation of 
language is masterful, creating images which are so perceptive 
that they catch the reader's breath. 
1 Printed by Faber and Faber, London and Boston, 1990. 
tø 
*&  . WALCOTT 
I FniES^" aureate , 
Derek Walcott's Nobel success has been feted 
in the Caribbean. This is his Theatre Workshop in Port of 
Spain, Trinidad 
Walcott's loyalty to the Caribbean is matched, according to 
the Swedish Academy's citation which accompanied the 
announcement of the prize, by his loyalty 'to the English 
language and to his African origin'. 
Writing has always been a vocation for Derek Walcott. He 
had a literary and artistic family background and published his 
first book, entitled 25 Poems, when he was only 18 years old. He 
went on to achieve international fame with works such as In a 
Green Night (1962), The Gulf (1970) and his highly acclaimed 
Omeros (1990). In this last work, which is an epic poem based 
loosely on Homer's Odyssey, the author recounts the voyage of 
two fisherman back to their African 'roots'. (The above passage 
refers to a shin injury from a rusting anchor sustained by one of 
the fishermen, Philoctete). 
The new Nobel laureate also has had a distinguished 
academic career in the United States, having taught at 
Columbia, Yale and Harvard before taking up a Chair in 
English Literature at Boston University. It was here that The 
Courier caught up with him and discovered that he also has an 
aptitude for teaching — not always an attribute of great thinkers 
and writers. He clearly enjoys the dynamic interaction of 
performance, criticism and analysis' as plays written and 
directed by his students are put through their paces on the 
purpose built theatre set. 
Despite Derek Walcott's academic duties, he manages to 
spend a considerable amount of time in the Caribbean where he 
is also heavily involved in developing theatre ventures. The 
extent to which he is admired and respected in his 'home' patch 
is illustrated by the fact that St Lucia recently held a week of 
celebrations in his honour. 
This is the first time that the Nobel prize has been awarded to 
a West Indian writer and, as the winner himself says, it shows 
that the literature of the region has now been recognised 
internationally. For the new generation of writers from the 
Caribbean, Derek Walcott's success and commitment must 
surely provide the best possible inspiration.o S.H. 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  93 Bulletin 
TECHNICAL CENTRE FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL COOPERATION 
Improving access to technical 
publications in Africa 
Books are an essential part of human 
development. They are one of the essen­
tial tools, not only of cultural develop­
ment, but of development in general and 
they create the catalyst by which the 
technical needs in Africa will be met. This 
was the central theme of a seminar on 
alternative approaches to publishing and 
distributing technical publications in 
Africa, held recently in Arnhem and 
organised by CTA. 
Overall, the literacy rate in Africa 
today is about 50% but this is likely to fall 
as most countries experience rapid popu­
lation growth. Yet 21 % of children are of 
primary school age which demonstrates a 
potential increase in demand for literacy 
teaching and reading materials. The 
escalating cash crisis faced by most 
countries with debt restructuring has, for 
the most part, resulted in cutbacks of as 
much as 50% in education expenditure. 
So, while there is an expanding popu­
lation that needs and even wants to be 
encouraged in the reading habit, financial 
constraints mean less money is available 
publicly and privately for book purchase. 
A statement by the newly formed 
African Publishers Network (APNET) 
summed up the mood of the seminar. 
'The future of publishing in Africa, 
including technical publishing, lies with 
indigenous African publishing com­
panies and institutions. We believe that 
support from donors for technical publi­
shing in Africa must concentrate on using 
the capacity that already exists within 
Africa.' 
In this way African expertise can be 
strengthened and the future of relevant 
technical books for Africa will be as­
sured. 
Obstacles to be overcome 
However, book publishing in Africa 
faces many constraints. These can ad­
versely affect one or more stages in the 
publishing process from the original 
concept by the author or commissioning 
agent, through the printing and publi­
shing process until the finished work is 
distributed for sale. For example, it is not 
sufficient to pursue what is deemed by the 
author to be a 'good idea' for a book if 
that idea is inappropriate for the target 
readership. Furthermore, government 
fiscal policy in Africa can militate against 
a viable indigenous publishing industry : 
in many countries there are import taxes 
of up to 20% on most of the materials 
which are required in the printing process 
from inks to paper and printing plates, all 
of which may have to be obtained from 
overseas. In addition there is often a sales 
tax on books, including educational 
publications. Even computers, a vital 
component in desk-top publishing, are 
seen as a leisure component attracting up 
to 100% import tax and 18-20% sales tax. 
As a result it is a sad fact that books for 
Africa are often published at less cost 
outside Africa and there is an urgent need 
to redress this situation. 
The Florence Agreement of 1950, 
under the auspices of UNESCO and the 
Nairobi Protocol of 1976 stipulate that 
APNET 
The African Publishers Network 
was formed in February 1992 to 
'strengthen indigenous publishing in 
Africa'. Based in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
it has fourteen member countries with 
regional representatives from Anglo­
phone, Francophone and Lusophone 
countries. APNET exists as an or­
ganisation bringing together indigen­
ous African publishers. It works with 
African publishers' associations and 
individual publishers and seeks to 
work as a partner to assist in the 
coordination of efforts to develop 
technical publishing in Africa. At the 
Arnhem seminar, APNET offered to 
act as a clearing house for information 
on implementing the recommend­
ations of the seminar. 
APNET - PO Box 4209 
Harare, Zimbabwe 
Tel. 72 99 04 Fax 72 99 05 
there should be no taxes on books. Most 
African countries are signatories but 
indigenous publishing continues to suffer 
from anomalous taxation which treats 
publishing materials and books as no 
different from imported wheat or tooth­
brushes. 
Fortunately, the adverse implications 
of these taxes have begun to be opposed 
with vigour in some countries and in at 
least two, Kenya and Zimbabwe, intense 
lobbying of government has resulted in 
some tax concessions. This has had an 
immediate impact on reducing costs and 
making books more affordable at the 
grass roots level. 
Another area of contention between 
publishers and governments is where 
Ministries of Education are involved in 
the printing and distribution of school 
books. Educational books form by far the 
greatest market share of technical publi­
cations in Africa and if commercial 
publishers are denied access to this sector, 
there is little incentive for them to become 
involved in commissioning, printing and 
distributing in what remains as a very 
reduced market. Many educators and 
trainers believe that technical inform­
ation is a development resource and that, 
just as roads and trucks are needed to 
deliver goods, and clinics, hospitals and 
medicines are needed to deliver health 
services, publishing and books are an 
essential pre-requisite for the dissemi­
nation of knowledge. Therefore govern­
ments should consider giving books and 
their indigenous publishers the same 
consideration and priority as they do to 
infrastructure development in transport 
and health. 
Appreciating the market 
Even when the book has passed suc­
cessfully and at reasonable cost through 
the production process and has been 
published, a final hurdle still has to be 
overcome: the lack of effective distri­
bution to accessible points of sale. It has 
been observed that while regular supplies 
of soft drinks, beer, cigarettes and even 
highly perishable commodities such as 
fish are readily available for purchase in 
the remotest villages of Africa, there has 
been a failure to develop an effective 
distribution network for books. Ob­
viously suppliers serviced a perceived 
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Mr Amadou Traoré of Librairie Traoré Mali in conversation with Mr Dominique Hounkonnou of CTA at the recent 
International Workshop on 'Promotion of Technical Publishing in Africa' 
demand and either there is not sufficient 
demand for reading materials beyond 
urban centres or the demand has not been 
recognised. 
Price, design and format all influence 
potential book purchasers. In the past, 
Northern donors, publishers and NGOs 
have played an important role in meeting 
some of the shortfall in purchasing power 
by the free distribution of technical 
books. Undoubtedly the availability of 
free books has met a need and en­
couraged the reading habit, but indis­
criminate 'dumping' of inappropriate 
books from the North has led to the 
undermining of local publishing indus­
tries, which are already in a fragile 
economic situation. Struggling publi­
shers and distribution chains may also 
face competition from 'street bookstores' 
and 'book tinkers' which are a growing 
phenomenon in Africa. This informal 
trade in second hand books and donor 
books, which have somehow by-passed 
the normal channels, is a serious chal­
lenge to the viability of the formal sector. 
Finally, books sales can be inhibited by 
there being too few bookshops and by 
staff being poorly trained and therefore 
unable or unwilling to help customers to 
select the books they need. Access to 
publications and the reading habit in 
general may also suffer from the dearth of 
public libraries and the formalities re­
quired to borrow books. This discourages 
those with little formal education. There 
is also a failure to promote books by 
bringing them to the attention of the 
book-buying public. Book fairs, which 
are an excellent means of displaying 
wares and promoting new titles, are 
relatively rare in Africa. 
Realistic target 
All these constraints make the realistic 
pricing of books hard to achieve. The cost 
must be affordable yet provide a rea­
sonable margin to author, publisher and 
distributor. A survey conducted as a 
prelude to a conference on 'The pro­
motion of technical books in Africa' 
suggested that an ideal was a book of 60 
to 120 pages priced at between US$4-
US$8. However delegates at the recent 
Arnhem seminar concluded, after much 
debate, that while readers were naturally 
concerned with getting value for money, 
the appropriateness of the content was 
the over-riding factor influencing pur­
chase. It was felt that many people in 
Africa would be prepared to pay the 
equivalent of US$15 or more for a well 
presented book that encompassed all the 
information they required of it. 
The final recommendations of the 
seminar have yet to be published by CTA 
but in essence they include the need for : 
* a much greater degree of cooperation and 
understanding between publishers and 
distributors North to South, South to 
North and South to South ; 
* a better understanding of the demand and 
the market for books; 
* restructuring book donation program-
mes; 
* lobby of governments, the World Bank, 
donors, NGOs and banks to overcome the 
fiscal, legal, and injrastructural obstacles 
to developing a viable indigenous publish-
ing industry; 
* training in all sectors of the book chain: 
the lack of trained professionals was seen 
as one of the major weaknesses of the 
publishing industry in Africa and was a 
recurrent theme throughout the discus-
sions. 
Looking forward to a more dynamic 
and useful era in the commissioning, 
publishing and distribution of technical 
books in Africa, a delegate from Senegal 
concluded, 'We have been given the 
opportunity to discuss all the issues 
concerned with the promotion of tech­
nical books. The ball is now in our court 
to resolve these issues. And, if we want a 
viable book industry in Africa, we have to 
be worthy of the challenge.Ό 
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in Africa? 
Thank you for sending The Courier regularly. It always 
provides a lot of useful information on agriculture in the 
developing countries — a subject I am studying at a 
faculty of agriculture in the Netherlands — as well as 
about ACP-EC relations and even the situation in my 
own country of Senegal, and I derive pleasure and interest 
from it. 
I am writing to you about two questions which have 
arisen in my mind from reading issue No 136 (November-
December 1992). 
First, on page 31, you say that the idea behind the 
policies pursued by Senegal and other African countries 
was to disprove the generally accepted 'natural process' of 
economic development, namely that industrialisation 
cannot be achieved without first developing a strong 
agricultural sector. 
In the Treaty of Rome, the EC countries pointed to the 
need to ensure the development of overseas countries and 
a lot of European funds have been spent on this since 
then. But it would seem that the African countries always 
use the money to develop areas other than the farm sector 
which should be their first priority. 
Did the European Community countries — who know 
themselves how important it is to start by developing 
agriculture — always give the right advice before the 6th 
EDF in 1990? And if the developing countries were 
properly informed, or if they already knew it themselves 
as I imagine they did, why did they persist for so long in 
turning a blind eye to the basic inadequacy of their 
industrialisation policy? 
My second short point relates to an inconsistency in the 
article on Senegal by that country's Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Finance and Planning. We are told that CFAF 
33 billion has been channelled into the Podor Region but 
the five items subsequently listed do not add up to that 
amount. 
Potin Diémé — Wageningen (Netherlands) 
European integration... and African 
disintegration 
I am a regular reader of your magazine and enjoy the 
dexterity you show in compiling information on Africa 
which is both rich and educational. I have also been 
following with interest the stages through which the 
European Community has passed from the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 up to the present debate on the Maastricht 
Treaty which was due for ratification by January 1, 1993. 
Europe is to become an 'ever closer union' in which 
'decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity'. But what is 
the agenda for the countries of Africa ? Who decides the 
level of involvement of the people and who sets out the 
priorities for development? 
I have calculated, with a sense of dismay, the huge sums 
of money in the form of grants and loans that have been 
transferred to African countries from Europe since 
Lomé I came into force. I seriously wonder whether the 
projects involved were those which the Africans themsel­
ves most needed. 
While European integration is taking place on one side 
of the Mediterranean Sea, African disintegration is being 
encouraged on the other. There may even be a United 
States of Europe by 1999, but by then the African may not 
even be able to trade with his nearest neighbour for lack of 
roads and other infrastructure. 
What Africa needs above all, to facilitate trade and 
prevent this disintegration, is all-season roads, both 
within countries and linking with neighbouring countries. 
F.A. Akum — Yaounde (Cameroun) 
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THE CONVENTION AT WORK 
EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
The Commission has taken decisions 
to finance the following schemes from the 
6th and 7th EDFs. 
— 22 January 1993 
Angola: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
950 000 to improve the services of the 
National Authorising Officer. 
AU ACPs: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
1 380 000 for 'The Courier ACP-EEC'. 
Pacific Region : 7th EDF grant of ECU 
1 300 000 for the ACP-EC Second Pacific 
Unit 
— 25 January 1993 
Jamaica: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
3 000 000 to develop trade and services 
(Target Europe Programme) 
Niger: 7th EDF Grant of ECU 
16 000 000 for small irrigation facilities in 
the Lower Tarka Valley (Phase II). 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal & Chad : (7th EDF grant ECU 
9 997 868 to improve the permanent 
diagnosis instruments for regional food 
security (Phase III) 
Sao Tome & Principe: 7th EDF grant 
of ECU 1 300 000 to repair the S. Joao 
dos Angloares-Ribeira Peixe road. 
— 2 February 1993 
Cameroon: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
22 500 for a road maintenance pro­
gramme 
ACP-OCT: 6th EDF grant of ECU 
35 000 000 as a global commitment au­
thorisation to finance (expedited pro­
cedure) technical promotion operations 
and schemes to develop trade and ser­
vices, including tourism, in the ACPs and 
OCTs. 
— 4 February 1993 
SADC region: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
2 000 000 for a SADC language training 
programme. 
SADC region (Botswana, Lesotho, Na­
mibia & Swaziland): 7th EDF grant of 
ECU 1 900 000 for a SADC regional 
customs training programme. 
Namibia: 7th EDF grant of ECU 
1 300 000 for institutional support for the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development. 
COMMUNITY 
BUDGET 
After a favourable opinion from the 
Mediterranean Communitee, the Com­
mission has taken decisions to finance the 
following schemes from the European 
Communities' budget. 
— 3 February 1993 
Jordan: Grant of ECU 1 315 000 (2% 
interest rate subsidy) — ECU 645 000 for 
the Kafrein dam and ECU 670 000 for the 
King Abdullah canal. 
— 4 February 1993 
Lebanon : Grant of ECU 30 000 000 for 
technical assistance for the Lebanese 
authorities. 
Lebanon: Grant of ECU 1 500 000 to 
access war damage and prepare dossiers 
of invitation to tender. 
EMERGENCY 
AID 
1 January — 5 February 1993 
The Commission took the following 
emergency aid decisions between 
1 January and 5 February 1993. 
Tadjikistan: ECU 500 000 for dis­
placed persons. 
Sierra Leone: ECU 300 000 to finance 
the purchase of relief equipment follow­
ing the recent fighting in the south west. 
Fidji: ECU 1 million-worth of food aid 
for victims of Hurricane Kina. 
Haiti: ECU 1 million-worth of huma­
nitarian aid (purchase and transport of 
immediate relief, medicines, equipment 
etc) for Haitian populations following the 
embargo. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT 
BANK 
The EIB has just made the following 
loans. 
Nigeria: ECU 75 million to develop 
small and medium-sized businesses. 
Uganda: ECU 5.44 million for indus­
trial development. 
Swaziland: ECU 3.5 million towards 
the financing of investments made by 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Tanzania: ECU 11 million to extend 
the container terminal at the port of Dar­
es-Salaam. 
Dominican Republic: ECU 3 million to 
help small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Dominica: ECU 2.5 million towards 
the financing of investments by small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
Mozambique : ECU 3 million for a 
joint venture set up by Mozambican and 
European partners to develop cashew nut 
processing in Nacala in northern Moz­
ambique. 
Zambia: ECU 7 million to extend the 
cotton spinning installations and related 
thread dying facilities in Ndola. 
Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 6.5 million to 
modernise and expand the tuna proces­
sing plant at Abidjan. 
Cap Verde: ECU 5.4million for the 
Nindelo electricity generating station. 
Netherlands Antilles: ECU 3 million to 
lay on airline catering services at Cu­
raçao. 
Guyana: 5 million to reorganise the 
bauxite sector. 
EIB 
President appointed 
The Board of Governors of the EIB has 
appointed Sir Brian Unwin as President 
of the Bank, as from 1 April 1993. Sir 
Brian, who sat on the EIB Board in 1983-
1985 and is President of the Board of HM 
Customs and Excise, takes over from Mr 
Ernst-Günther Broder, the German 
economist and banker who has headed 
the EIB since 1984. 
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ACP-EEC 
Foundation for 
ACP-EEC cultural 
cooperation 
General Assembly 
meets 
The plenary session of the General 
Assembly of the Foundation for ACP-
EEC Cultural Cooperation was held in 
Brussels on 1 February 1993 under the 
chairmanship of Mr Giovanni Bersani, 
President of the Governing Board of the 
Foundation and Honorary President of 
the Joint Assembly. 
Among participants were Mrs Aïssata 
Kane, a former Mauritian Minister, Mrs 
Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerreti and 
Dr Erskine Simmons, Co-Presidents of 
the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, Mr Henri 
Saby, chairman of the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation of the 
European Parliament, Dr Edwin Car-
rington, Secretary-General of CA­
RICOM, and Mr Francis K. Muthaura, 
the Ambassador of Kenya to Brussels. 
There were diplomats, anthropologists, 
sociologists, psychologists, educational 
psychologists, lawyers, distinguished un­
iversity teachers, as well as representat­
ives from the Commission of the Euro­
pean Communities. The press was also in 
attendance. 
The relevance of the cultural issue to 
the development process and in the 
struggle against racism and xenophobia 
was strongly emphasised by various 
speakers who recalled the role played by 
Ambassador Chasle in securing recog­
nition of the cultural dimension in the 
Lomé III and Lomé IV Conventions. 
These members emphasised the Foun­
dation's daring objectives, which were 
sometimes perceived as subversive. Wi­
dening the range of partners, they say, is 
absolutely essential, so as to give more 
weight to the Foundation in the balance 
of power and reduce its financial depen­
dence. 
One of the anthropologists attending 
the meeting expressed the view that the 
Foundation should remain open to cul­
tural nuances and cultural blending and 
that multidisciplinary research should be 
undertaken between the various con­
tinents without having to go through the 
West. 
Addressing the Assembly, the Sec­
retary-General of the Foundation, Am­
bassador Chasle, stressed the European 
Parliament's role in and contribution to 
the recognition of the significance of 
culture and its role in development 
cooperation, and he paid tribute to 
Angolo Narducci who, through his 
report to the Parliament, contributed to 
making his colleagues realise the relev­
ance of cultural dialogue. 
The Secretary-General added that if 
this recognition was now an acquis, the 
visions of culture and of cooperation 
were still radically different and that the 
conflict between these perceptions had 
led to certain tribulations and unsuccess­
ful attempts to destabilise the Found­
ation which unfortunately impeded its 
progress and action. He indicated that, 
beyond the recognition of cultural plura­
lism, it would be proper to promote the 
concept of culture as a capacity for 
reflection, analysis and upliftment, aimed 
at responding to current exigencies. 
The Secretary-General also observed 
that Euro-ACP intercultural dialogue 
would contribue to the reconstitution of 
the vital fabric of European culture and 
to revitalising its profound and genuine 
values, which were essential for the 
construction of Europe. 
The General Assembly was pleased to 
hear that Mr Manuel Marin, Vice-Pre­
sident of the Commission, had informed 
the Secretary-General that the various 
evaluations conducted on the Found­
ation were on the whole positive and that, 
following procedures now under way, the 
Protocol Agreement between the Com­
mission of the European Communities 
and the Foundation provided for under 
Annex XXII to the Lomé IV Convention 
would be signed in the weeks to come — 
giving a clear signal of the Commission's 
determination to support the Found­
ation. The Assembly General moved that 
a letter of thanks and appreciation be sent 
to Commissioner Marin. 
EUROPEAN COMMUNTIY 
EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC 
AREA 
The results of the Swiss referendum on 
6 December were such that the agreement 
on the European Economic Area was not 
able to come into force as planned on 
1 January. Under the terms of the accord, 
if one of the contracting parties fails to 
ratify, the other contracting parties have 
to call a diplomatic conference to look at 
the possibilities of adopting a protocol 
setting out the necessary amendments. 
The Commission, the Council and the 
other EFTA States (Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Sweden) made it clear that they were still 
committed to the EEA, which they 
wanted to see come into being soon. 
If the procedure is to be speeded up and 
any further ratification complication 
avoided, the protocol which the other 
contracting parties sign will have to be 
confined to provisions made absolutely 
essential by the Swiss non-ratification. 
The Commission has therefore sent the 
Council a draft recommendation for a 
decision authorising it to embark on 
negotiations with the EFTA States, other 
than Switzerland, with a view to an 
additional protocol to the EEA accord. 
EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL 
COOPERATION 
The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 
Member States of the European Com­
munity have issued the following state­
ments on the dates indicated: 
8 January: 
Statement on Kenya 
The European Community and its 
member States welcome the holding of 
multi-party elections in Kenya on 29th 
December 1992 as an important step in 
the ongoing democratization process in 
the country. 
The Community and its member States 
have also noted with satisfaction that the 
Kenyan people exercised their demo-
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cratic right to vote in great numbers and 
in a peaceful manner throughout the 
country, thus proving an impressive 
degree of political maturity. They have, 
however, noted with concern reports by 
international observers as well as 
national monitors of irregularities in the 
election process. 
The Community and its member States 
hope that all parties will not turn to 
violence but use legal means to seek 
redress of all grievances related to the 
conduct of the election process. 
The election results seem to represent a 
broad reflection of the choice of the 
Kenyan people, and the Community and 
its member States therefore urge all 
political parties to take up their seats in 
Parliament and find ways and means to 
work together within the constitutional 
framework, for the future peace, pros­
perity and unity of Kenya. 
21 January: 
Statement on Haiti 
The Community and its member States 
have consistently reaffirmed their com­
mitment to the restoration of the de­
mocratic and constitutional government 
in Haiti as well as their will to support all 
efforts conducive to a settlement of the 
Haitian crisis. 
They, therefore, welcome the efforts by 
the organization of American States and 
the United Nations to bring about the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti, and 
they urge all parties concerned to work 
towards this end. 
The elections held on 18 January as 
well as those planned for 25 January do 
not constitute free and fair elections since 
the necessary preconditions, notably 
freedom of expression and assembly and 
the right to an open political dialogue, do 
not exist in Haiti. 
For these reasons, the Community and 
its member States do not consider these 
elections to be a valid expression of the 
democratic will. 
22 January : 
Statement on Angola 
The Community and its member States 
deplore the outbreak of widespread and 
fierce fighting in Angola and the heavy 
losses of human lives incurred. They 
appeal strongly to the government and to 
UNITA to bring an end to the fighting, 
which constitutes a serious set-back for 
the peace process that culminated in the 
free and fair elections of September 1992. 
They also appeal to the countries in the 
region to refrain from any act that could 
contribute to an internationalisation of 
the present conflict in Angola. 
A solution to Angola's problem cannot 
be found on the battleground. A general 
cease-fire is the first and immediate 
requirement. On this basis they regret the 
refusal by UNITA to attend a meeting of 
military leaders due to have taken place in 
Addis Ababa last week thus jeopardizing 
the efforts of the special representative of 
the UN, the Secretary-General and the 
observers to the peace process and they 
urge UNITA to reconsider that decision. 
The Community and its member States 
reiterate their earlier appeals to the 
parties, in particular UNITA, to abide by 
the results of the elections, observe the 
Bicesse Peace Accords and resume the 
demobilisation process. In this context, 
they urge the President of Angola and the 
UNITA leader to respond positively to 
the UN Secretary-General's call for an 
early meeting between them. 
The Community and its member States 
consider that the United Nations should 
continue to play a key role in restoring 
and maintaining peace in Angola. They 
look forward to the report of the United 
Nations Secretary-General on the future 
role of UNAVEM. In the light of this 
report, the United Nations Security 
Council should consider the role and 
mandate of UNAVEM and the possibi­
lities of strengthening the United 
Nations' involvement in the peace pro­
cess. However, it must be underlined that 
cessation of hostilities and genuine willin­
gness to reopen the political dialogue are 
prerequisites for a meaningful UN contri­
bution. 
21 January: 
Statement on Rwanda 
The Community and its member States 
express satisfaction that, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the 
Arusha cease-fire agreement of 
12.7.1992, the Rwandese Government 
and the Rwandese Patriotic Front have 
concluded a protocol agreeing on power-
sharing during the transitional period. 
They feel that this important stage in 
the political negotiations should quickly 
lead, in the interests both of the Rwan­
dese people and the entire subregion and 
of fruitful international co-operation, to 
the restoration of peace and security and 
to the return of persons displaced by the 
war to the land from which they have 
been driven. The progress achieved 
should also pave the way to the reconcili­
ation of the Rwandese people with itself, 
the organization of free elections in the 
near future and the strengthening of 
democracy in Rwanda. 
The Community and its member States 
pay tribute to the work carried out by the 
negotiating parties in their dynamic quest 
for a peaceful and lasting solution to the 
conflict. They urge all Rwandese political 
forces to continue to support the Arusha 
process and the agreements resulting 
from it and to work for pacification in 
unity and tolerance. They particularly 
appreciate the constructive role and 
positive contribution of Tanzania and of 
the other countries and international 
organizations which are observers in the 
Arusha negotiations. 
1 February : 
Statement on Zaire 
The European Community and its 
member States deeply deplore the out­
break of violence which has just occurred 
in Zaire and which has caused numerous 
deaths, including that of the Ambassador 
of France in Kinshasa. 
While expressing their grave anxiety at 
this new trial facing the Zairian people, 
the European Community and its 
member States are also very concerned 
for their nationals and hope that the 
ongoing evacuation can be continued in 
good order. 
The European Community urgently 
appeals to the forces involved to put a 
stop to the fighting. 
Political forces in Zaire must do 
everything in their power to enable the 
democratic process to make a fresh start, 
and the transitional Government must 
exercise its prerogatives in all areas, 
including the maintenance of order in 
compliance with human rights, and the 
economic and monetary control which 
are necessary for the social situation to be 
restored. 
In this respect, the European Com­
munity calls upon the President of Zaire 
to ensure that an end is put to the actions 
to obstruct the process of democratic 
transition. It supports the efforts of the 
President of the High Council of the 
Republic, Monseigneur Mossengwo, to 
promote a political settlement enabling 
this transition to free and democratic 
elections to be properly carried out. 
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1 February : 
Declaration on the follow-up to 
the Warburton Mission 
The Community and its member States 
welcome the report submitted by the 
Warburton Mission on its findings 
during visits conducted on 20-24 De­
cember 1992 and 19-26 January 1993. 
The decision by the European Council 
to establish this investigation is vindi­
cated by the findings. Rape has been 
perpetrated on a wide scale in former 
Yugoslavia, in such a way as to be part of 
a clear pattern. The great majority of the 
many thousands of victims have been 
Muslims. 
The European Community and its 
member States are appalled by these 
crimes and the inhumanity which marks 
the present conflict. They intend to 
implement the recommendations in the 
report on assistance to the Bosnian 
Muslim women victims of rape and other 
atrocities. 
At a political level, the Community and 
its member States will approach the 
parties to the conflict, and in particular 
the political leadership, to impress on 
them the incontrovertible nature of the 
evidence and the imperative need to bring 
these abhorrent practices to an end. In 
this context, the Community and its 
member States will pursue full implemen­
tation of UN Security Council Resol­
ution 798 and will endeavour to inspect 
the locations associated with the practice 
of rape. 
26 January : 
Statement by Manuel Marin 
on Togo 
Following the violent repression of a 
peaceful opposition demonstration in 
Lomé by the Togolese armed forces on 
Monday 25 January, in which at least 
12 people were killed and 25 wounded, 
Manuel Marin, the Commissioner re­
sponsible for development and humani­
tarian aid, has issued the following 
statement: 
'I have learned with great emotion of 
the drama to which the population of 
Lome has again been subjected. I am 
deeply shocked by the upsurge of violence 
and of death in a peaceful demonstration. 
I hope the Togolese people will remain 
calm and find a peaceful way of resolving 
their political problems and resume as 
quickly as possible the democratic pro­
cess. 
In order to facilitate the return to calm, 
I now appeal to President Eyadema to 
declare the army neutral and to take 
measures to ensure that this neutrality is 
effective. I also appeal to the different 
political forces to restart dialogue as 
quickly as possible in view of elections 
which will allow everyone to express and 
determine themselves freely, in order to 
establish stable and lasting democratic 
institutions. 
Once again, I remind that the Commis­
sion is ready to support this process, the 
only guarantor of a balanced and durable 
development. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Commission awards 
Lorenzo Natali Prize 
for Journalism to 
Reporters sans 
Frontières 
The Commission has just awarded the 
Lorenzo Natali Prize for Journalism for 
the first time. 
There were 53 applicants for the 1992 
award, which the judges, chaired by 
Manuel Marin, the Commissioner re­
sponsible for development cooperation, 
gave to the Newsletter of Reporters sans 
Frontières, an organisation which works 
for human rights and democracy in the 
developing world. 
They also decided to make special 
mention of Mr Nicoué Broohm for his 
article on voluntary servitude and human 
rights in Africa, which appeared in the 
first issue of Droits et libertés, the journal 
of the Togolese Human Rights League. 
This was the judges' tribute to an article 
and a journal representing the fight for 
freedom now a feature of so many 
developing nations. 
The Commission organised an official 
ceremony for the award of the prize and 
the special mention in January. 
Background to the Lorenzo 
Natali Prize for Journalism 
The Commission set up the Lorenzo 
Natali award, with an ECU 5000 allo­
cation, in memory of the former Vice-
President of the Commission of the 
European Communities - - he was re­
sponsible for development cooperation 
- in 1992 (Official Journal C182 of 
18 July 1992). 
Articles on development cooperation 
published in one of the official languages 
of the Community in a daily paper or a 
periodical from any country in the world 
are eligible. 
The judges are particularly interested 
in journalistic work which makes an 
outstanding contribution to the defence 
of human rights and democracy as 
essential elements of economic and social 
development and may, on an exceptional 
basis, decide to award the Prize to a 
means of communication which has 
made an outstanding contribution to 
championing human rights and democ­
racy in the developing world. 
The judges, chaired this year by 
Manuel Marin, the member of the Com­
mission responsible for development, are 
from the Commission staff and may 
consult members of other Community 
institutions as well as leading persona­
lities from the world of development 
cooperation in making their decisions. 
COLEACP meets in 
the Caribbean 
For the first time in its 20 years of 
existence COLEACP has held a meeting 
in the Caribbean. From 11-15 January 
1993 over 150 producers and exporters of 
fruit and vegetables (ACP, Caribbean 
and European alike) gathered in Santo 
Domingo to examine ways of improving 
the commercial position of Caribbean 
fresh produce in Europe. 
The Conference identified five main 
areas of concern: market intelligence, 
organisation of the sector, transportation 
and logistics, quality of produce and 
promotion. 
On market intelligence, the Conference 
agreed that there was a general lack of 
information on developments in the 
European market place, which meant 
that exporters often failed to respond to 
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short-term windows of opportunity and 
niche-markets. The DECS Agricultural 
Diversification Coordinating Unit 
(ADCU) had developed scope for repli­
cation of the techniques used to benefit 
the wider region. The Conference recom­
mended considering ways of improving 
the flow ofinformation from its importer 
members, particularly as regards exotic 
and off-season fruit and vegetables with 
potential on the European markets. 
The Conference noted, as regards the 
organisation of the sector, that this was 
undergoing a major upheaval with the 
general trend towards privatisation of 
marketing functions so that marketing 
boards and similar parastatals increas­
ingly retained only quality control and 
certification. The emergence of numerous 
small, unsupported private operators 
entailed other problems. The meeting 
recommended the formation of profes­
sional exporters' associations for which 
successful experiences in the Dominican 
Republic and St Lucia could serve as 
models. 
Transportation and logistics were 
viewed by many participants as the 
principal constraint to expansion of trade 
in non-traditional produce. Given the 
subject's importance, COLEACP had 
sent an expert on a preparatory assign­
ment to the region and the item was thus 
covered in depth. 
Generally, it was found that while 
regional shipping services remained 
geared to traditional exports (bananas), 
the facilities available could, at least in 
theory, be adapted to mixed cargo re­
quirements to include non-traditional 
produce; there was an increasing ten­
dency to switch to air freight where 
possible, but freight capacity was a direct 
by-product of passenger movements and 
the upper limits on fresh produce exports 
therefore coincided with those of the 
region's tourist industry. Moreover, there 
was a lack of containers for non-tradi­
tional produce and the fact that export 
volumes were small did little to encourage 
a greater supply. Intra-regional trade was 
severely hampered by very limited, ex­
pensive and slow transport and badly 
affected by the absence of storage and 
chilling facilities at regional ports/air­
ports in the same way as extra-regional 
trade. 
Recommendations included joint 
action by exporters' associations to 
negotiate standard rate and service spe­
cifications with carriers, action to per­
suade banana companies to review their 
cargo configurations so as to accom­
modate more non-traditionals, expan­
sion of port/airport facilities and better 
demand analysis in mainland Europe. 
The transport session was followed by a 
well-attended workshop on containeris-
ation. 
The Conference found that quality of 
produce needed to be monitored from 
producer to final consumer. Too often 
produce was spoiled by poor handling 
during packaging, transportation and 
distribution, an inadequate perception of 
what is acceptable in the marketplace and 
a failure to recognise the direct corre­
lation between the standard of produce 
offered for sale locally and that of export-
quality fruit and vegetables. A common 
quality strategy and agreed standards 
were recommended for specific produce. 
Last but not least, promotion was 
highlighted because of the need to 
combat the contraction of Caribbean 
market share in Europe relative to other 
sources (among which Europe itself was 
becoming a serious competitor for certain 
'ethnic' produce such as pumpkins and 
yams). There was some disagreement on 
'crossover' thresholds (the point at which 
an 'ethnic' product becomes part of 
general consumption) but there was 
general consensus on the need for point-
of-sale information to the public and 
carefully targeted public relations to 
generate free coverage by the mass media. 
It was agreed that once quality standards 
were in place (and sufficient volume 
guaranteed) a logo could be introduced to 
denote top-grade Caribbean produce. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Development Committee 
encouraged by new Council 
President 
Members of the European Par­
liament's Development Committee were 
pleasantly surprised when the new 
Danish Minister for Development 
Cooperation, Helle Degn, addressed 
them at their meeting in Brussels on 
18 February. Representing the Danish 
Presidency of the Council, Mrs Degn set 
out an ambitious agenda designed to give 
greater impetus to development policy in 
the coming months. She began by outlin­
ing the general priorities of her Govern­
ment in the development field, which 
included fighting hunger and defending 
human rights and democracy. Signific­
antly, she also underlined the importance 
of achieving compliance with the long­
standing commitment by developed 
states to provide 0.7% of their GNP for 
development assistance. In fact, Den­
mark is one of only two EC Member 
States to have met this target (the other is 
The Netherlands). Mrs Degn spoke of 
seeking 'to inspire countries which have 
not yet achieved the target to take their 
full share'. 
Mrs Degn also served notice that 
certain specific issues which 'have been 
played down in recent months' would be 
given greater prominence. She focused 
specifically on the role of women and on 
the environment. As regards the former, 
the Minister said that the Danish Pre­
sidency would 'insist' that the Commis­
sion take steps to increase the role of 
women in development programmes. As 
for the environment, she argued that it 
was essential to build on the agreement 
which had been reached at the Rio de 
Janeiro conference. The Presidency, she 
said, intended to ensure there was a 
concrete follow-up to the commitments 
made by the Community at the Earth 
Summit. 
Another thorny subject which Mrs 
Degn would seek to tackle was the issue 
of tied aid — in other words, assistance 
which is made conditional upon purchase 
of the related goods or services from the 
donor country. The Minister argued that 
this should be 'untied' so that 'the 
developing world can get more out of the 
aid that is available'. 
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Mrs Degn also dealt with a variety of 
other important issues including effective 
coordination between Community and 
national development policies,population 
policy, emergency a/í/and the importance 
of an independent judiciary and police 
forces that are free of corruption in the 
context of human rights and democracy. 
In the subsequent question and answer 
session, the Minister was widely praised 
by MEPs from all sides although one 
member did suggest that she might be 
'pushing her luck' in putting forward 
such a bold programme. Several mem­
bers expressed doubts about whether her 
aspirations for other Member States to 
meet the 0.7% GNP target were realistic 
in the current economic climate. 
Vice-President Marin looks to 
the future 
Later in the day, Commission Vice-
President Manuel Marin had his first 
meeting with the Development Commit­
tee since his reappointment. His develop­
ment portfolio has been expanded to 
include relations with developing coun­
tries outside the Lomé system, that is to 
say economic cooperation with the coun­
tries of Latin America, Asia, the Middle 
East and the southern Mediterranean. He 
has also been appointed Commissioner 
with responsibility for humanitarian aid. 
Mr Marin used the opportunity to 
sketch out the Commission's working 
programme in the development field for 
the coming two years. He began by 
stressing the complexity of development 
processes, pointing out that there was 'no 
miraculous solution'. He affirmed that 
'respect for human rights and democracy 
are built into the very body of Com­
munity development policy' and praised 
the 'decisive work' of the Parliament in 
this area in recent times. 
The Commissioner also sought to 
reassure the Committee that there was no 
question of excluding Parliament from 
the process currently under way leading 
to a reformulation of development 
policy. He said that the Commission 'is 
very attentive to the various criticisms 
and reservations of some MEPs as re­
gards the content of the 'Horizon 2000' 
document whose only purpose was to 
provoke a comprehensive and open 
debate on the future of our development 
cooperation policy'. 
Mr Marin spoke about making aid 
more effective in quality terms and 
emphasised the advantages of having all 
the Commission services dealing with 
cooperation and development policy 
under a single Commissioner. 
Turning to more short-term issues, the 
Commissioner referred to the forthcom­
ing negotiations with the ACPs on the 
second financial protocol to Lomé IV. 
(The Convention is valid for ten years, 
but the financial arrangements are set out 
in a Protocol which must be negotiated 
anew after five years.) He saw the 
negotiations as an opportunity to intro­
duce changes elsewhere in the Conven­
tion, stressing that this would not be 
changed for its own sake, but in order to 
bring it up to date. He pointed out that it 
was impossible to ignore the transform­
ation of the international scene, and the 
changes which had taken place inside the 
Community in recent years. 
Mr Marin also spoke at some length 
about the growing area of humanitarian 
aid. The Community, he said, had helped 
people in the past without discrimination 
and this was something which must 
continue — the sole task in emergency 
situations being to help the victims. In 
this connection, he said that one of his 
immediate tasks was to get the EC 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) working. 
The Office, he said, can act as a coordi­
nating agency between the various Com­
mission departments as well as in its work 
with Member States, third countries, 
international organisations and NGOs 
operating in the same field. 
There then followed a lengthy session 
during which members of the Committee 
posed questions on a variety of issues. 
Several members expressed general con­
cerns about the process leading to the 
reformulation of development policy and 
about the future of the Lomé system. 
Responding to specific criticisms of the 
'Horizon — 2000' document, Mr Marin 
said that the text was a 'starting point and 
not a conclusion' and urged committee 
members, as part of the debate, to come 
up with constructive criticisms. 
As regards the possibility of changes to 
the fourth Lomé Convention, Mr Marin 
sought to reassure MEPs by stressing the 
'open and transparent' way in which he 
was pursuing the initial debate — both 
with the ACP representatives and with 
the European Parliament. He reiterated 
his view that a comprehensive updating 
of the Lomé Convention was needed. 
Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
Two days prior to meeting with the 
Development Committee, Vice-President 
Marin also attended, for the first time 
since the redistribution of portfolios 
within the Commission, the Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee of the 
European Parliament. Both sides enjoyed 
the opportunity of having a first, frank 
exchange of views. Mr Marin highlight­
ed, as he was to do later in the week, the 
guiding principles behind his develop­
ment thinking: good governance, de­
mocracy, respect for human rights, and 
development as a long-term process, the 
ultimate goal being mankind and his well-
being. He also reviewed recent develop­
ment performance and set out the short-
term priorities by respective geographical 
areas of cooperation (ACP, Maghreb, 
Mashrek, Asia and Latin America). 
MEPs took the opportunity to put 
specific questions to Mr Marin. These 
ranged from such issues as humanitarian 
aid and the difficulties of putting it into 
practice ('15 000 tonnes of wheat in­
tended for Armenia were stolen'), the 
problem of defining borders ('Africans 
ask how Europe can teach them a lesson 
when it is in Europe that borders are 
currently being fought over'), East-South 
competition for development funds 
('private firms cannot be dictated to but 
as far as public resources are concerned, 
we will not abandon the South') and the 
renewal of the Lomé Financial Protocol 
('Lomé needs to be modernised and 
brought up-to-date'). 
Commissioner Marin also criticised the 
Bretton Woods Institutions — the IMF 
and the World Bank — for their 'in­
flexible approach', insisting that young 
democracies needed support in order to 
avoid creating conditions that are worse 
than before. He pleaded for complicity 
between the Commission and the Parlia­
ment in order to try and avoid having 
'Member States defending one policy in 
Washington and another in Brussels'. 
One field of cooperation between the two 
institutions which, as revealed in this first 
meeting, is already operational, is in 
respect of democracy and human rights. 
The Commission and Parliament are 
working hand-in-hand to keep these 
issues at the forefront of future EC 
development policy.O 
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Mr.PaulFRK, 
Director of the CDI. 
Editorial 
THE CDI'S PRIORITIES IN 1993 
1993 will be a particularly important year for the GDI. After two years of fundamental rethinking 
and restructuring of the Centre's operational activities, the CDI's ability to respond to the needs of 
the ACP countries has increased substantially, in terms of both quality and quantity, thanks to the 
improvements in its working methods and the strengthening of its human resources. In effect, the 
number of experts and support staff has been increased by over 50%. 
1993 will be a year of greater selectivity in the CDI's activities and reinforcement of its ACP and 
EC networks. 
Selectivity 
Í
n terms of strategy, the CDI intends 
to focus its action on three fields : 
l.ACP countries which, in liaison with the 
CDI, use a significant proportion of their 
national indicative programme within the 
context of the EDF (European Develop-
ment Fund); 
2.Assisting and following up projects over 
a sufficiently long period to ensure that 
they reach viability and the takeoff stage; 
3. Specific industries in which the CDI has 
acquired particular expertise, such as fish-
ing, agro-foodstuffs, textiles and garment 
manufacture, timber, non-metal minerals, 
foundries and building materials. 
Networks 
To consolidate its ACP network, the CDI 
will be giving special attention to strength-
ening or creating service companies and 
consultancies capable of operating as local 
CDIs. Close to firms and entrepreneurs, ef-
ficient, flexible and removed from political 
influences, these local support structures 
are essential to establish more effective co-
ordination on the spot. They will ensure 
greater complementarity in practice 
between sources of international aid 
and/or domestic and foreign financial in-
stitutions concerned with industrial devel-
opment in the ACP countries. 
In Europe, the CDI intends to continue 
with the mobilization and effective utiliza-
tion of additional co-financing resources 
from member countries of the European 
CONTENTS 
Follow-up to Dakar '92 
Healthy crop of projects to be harvested 
Dakar '92 in figures 
Partnership Day 
2nd meeting of the "Okoumé Club" 
Europe in the 90s 
Challenges and opportunities 
for ACP countries 
"Fishing" Industry in Mauritania 
Highly professional meetings 
In brief 
Meeting of the CDI's West African antennae 
♦ Promotion of EC/ACP partnerships in the 
South of France 
Community. With various partners it is 
studying the ways and means of reinforc-
ing the management and follow-up of co-
financing agreements for projects, and 
hopes to develop to this effect a network of 
organizers in each country responsible for 
implementing the main agreements. 
One of the bases of the Centre's strategy re-
mains its openness to other national and 
international bodies and institutions in-
volved in the promotion of industrial de-
velopment, and particularly with Commu-
nity bodies such as the EIB and the Europe-
an Development Fund. But this openness 
also extends, at international level, to coop-
eration with organizations such as the 
World Bank, the African Development 
Bank, UNIDO, the ILO, regional or local 
development banks, etc. 
Anticipation 
The CDI is endeavouring in fact to anticipate 
the changes that are proving necessary in or-
der to take up the unprecedented challenge 
of company creation and industrialization in 
the ACP countries, especially in Africa, a 
continent going through a profound structu-
ral crisis. On this will depend the CDI's abil-
ity to play its role among the various tools of 
renewed cooperation. It is a question of re-
sponding more effectively to the tremen-
dous hopes pinned on it by so many ACP 
countries. This approach has called for and 
will continue to call for constant questioning 
and changes in habits, which by definition 
are not and will never be easy. 
Paul Frix, 
Director of the CDI. Follow-up to Dakar '92 
HEALTHY CROP OF PROJECTS 
TO BE HARVESTED 
Mr. Georges Tatepo, CDI Geo­
graphical Officer for West Africa. 
We are now going to try ¡o 
consonante lhe "fairings" formed 
in Dafair. 
No sooner were 
the doors to the 
EEC-West Africa 
Industrial Forum 
(FORDAK'92) 
closed than the 
follow-up to Dakar 
'92 began, a stage 
just as important 
and intense as the 
meticulous prepara­
tions for this major meeting in the region's busi­
ness life. The CDI, in cooperation with the 
Commission of the EC, will be providing the 
ACP and European companies present at the 
Forum with its support in giving concrete shape 
to the partnership projects initiated at this event. 
: his Xth EC-West Africa Industrial 
JL Forum, held in Dakar at the begin­
ning of December 1992, lived up to what is 
now a well-established tradition of high at­
tendances. The five-day event brought to­
gether some 380 participants(*) from 16 Af­
rican countries (including about 300 pro­
moters and companies and over 50 public 
institutions or private organizations) and 
150 participants from 11 EC countries - see 
Tables I and II opposite. On the menu for 
this enormous "business fair": the partner­
ship possibilities offered by the 432 projects 
presented by the African contingent and 
the 84 cooperation proposals from Europe­
an firms. It should be borne in mind that 
these projects and offers had been com­
piled and selected beforehand by the EC 
and the organizations involved in the prep­
arations for the Forum(**). 
Clear trend towards 
regional integration 
These figures illustrate the interest shown 
by economic operators, African and Euro­
pean alike, in this two-yearly event. There 
was a significantly large attendance from 
English-speaking countries, which provid­
ed 144 industrial and institutional partici­
pants (over half of them from Nigeria). 
"For Dakar '92, prospecting for projects in 
these countries ivas particularly intense", 
observed Mr. Georges Tatepo, the CDI's 
Geographical Officer for West Africa. 
"This positive response from the English-
speaking world is a clear indication of a trend 
towards the economic integration of West Afri-
ca. In addition, a survey conducted at the end of 
the Forum among African participants revealed 
that a third of them were also very interested in 
the "South-South" contacts at the Forum, an-
other sign of this growing awareness of the re-
gional potential of African markets". 
First assessment 
Just how successful was this gathering of 
industrialists ? It is certainly too early at 
the moment to give a full picture of the re­
sults in the short and medium term from 
the 3,200 business meetings officially 
counted during the Forum. 
The consultants appointed by the Commis­
sion of the EC to collect details on projects 
and offers have recorded some fifty letters of 
intent or agreements signed in Dakar itself 
(see Table III). These immediate prospects 
Dakar '92 in figures 
Table I. EC participation 
Number of companies 
and organizations represented 
Type of activity 
Industrial companies 
Design and engineering offices 
Commercial companies 
Promotional bodies 
Consultants 
Banks and financial institutions 
Press 
Total 
150 
% 
55 
13 
9 
8 
7 
4 
4 
100 
concern 10 ACP States and 8 EC countries, 
over half of them in the agro-foodstuffs, 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. 
CDI involvement in the organization of the 
EEC-Africa Forum - a high spot for the 
promotion of ACP projects - was substan­
tial. Apart from actively cooperating in the 
Country 
French-speaking c 
Bénin 
Burkina Faso 
CapeVerde Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Sénégal 
TORO 
Total 
English-speaking 
Gambie 
Ghana 
Libéria 
Nigéria 
Sierra-Leone 
Total 
Total 
Dakar '92 in figures 
Table II. African participation 
Total of which promoters/ of which 
companies public institutions 
and private organizations 
ountries 
8 
16 
13 
29 
16 
18 
30 
40 
6 
55 
4 
235 
countries 
27 
23 
1 
77 
16 
144 
4 2 
13 
6 7 
27 1 
12 
16 2 
23 3 
36 3 
5 
50 
3 
195 18 
18 5 
20 1 
1 
47 27 
12 2 
98 35 Follow-up to Dakar '92 
selection of projects and the financial sup­
port given to numerous African and Euro­
pean industrialists to help them take part 
in the Forum, the Centre also provided lo­
gistical support on the spot in the form of 
technical and financial advice, legal assis­
tance, etc. The CDI also organized the Part­
nership Day and took advantage of the 
presence of numerous representatives of 
development finance corporations to ar­
range a second meeting of the "Okoumé 
Club" (see boxes below) (* * *). 
Strengthening company 
"pairings" 
Post-Dakar activities are already under 
way, following up the contacts generated 
by this event. "Working in close synergy with 
the Commission of the EC, we are now going to 
try to consolidate the "pairings" formed in 
Dakar, especially with regard to seeking out 
sources of financing, through the contacts of 
our dual network of support bodies and devel-
opment finance corporations in Europe and in 
the ACP countries", explains G. Tatepo. 
Two important events held in parallel with the Forum 
The "Okoumé Club" at Dakar ' 
To link up European, African ani international development finance corpi  ori and promotion bodies. 
(*) The term "participant" does not refer to the actual number of 
people present but the industrial, institutional and other entities 
represented at the Forum. All the figures given above were com­
piled by the ASIAFCO consultants commissioned by the EC to coor­
dinate prospecting for projects and evaluation of the results of the 
Forum. These data are still provisional. 
(**) See the article on Dakar '92 in Partnership No. 4. 
(***) It should also be noted that the Forum provided a useful op­
portunity to organize a meeting of CDI antennae in the region : see 
the short report on page 8. 
Future EEC-Africa 
Industrial Forums 
The next Forum will concern Central Africa 
and will take place in Libreville at the end 
of 1993. The exact date will be announced 
later. 
The EC is currently studying the possibil­
ity of organizing the first Forum for East 
Africa around June 1994. 
The EC is planning an industrial and min­
ing Forum in Southern Africa, also in 1994. 
¿nd session of lhe "Okoumé Chili" 
It will be recalled that the aim of this "Club", 
launched in 1991 at the Libreville '91 Forum, is to 
link up European, African and international de­
velopment finance corporations with support and 
promotion bodies wishing to provide financial 
and technical backing to promoters of industrial 
projects in the ACP countries. 
At the Club's second meeting in Dakar, the par­
ticipants analysed in particular the problems 
posed by the insufficient level of capital and 
guarantees provided by promoters and the obsta­
cles connected with the non-convertibility of na­
tional currencies. They also studied ways and 
means of bringing the development finance cor­
porations and the support bodies together to 
meet these challenges by working out new guar­
antee mechanisms and developing joint back-up 
initiatives: 
creation of service and consultancy compa­
nies for local enterprises; 
more rigorous selection process for projects 
presented for financing; 
special support for the private sector and 
companies going through processes of re­
structuring or consolidation; 
co-financing of studies demonstrating the 
viability of projects in terms of markets and 
marketing strategy; 
training of promoters and industrial opera­
tors; 
assistance with technical, commercial and 
administrative management, etc. 
Partnership Day 
Using the same formula as for the Fora in 1990 
and 1991, the CDI organized another "Partner­
ship Day" in Dakar. During this day of talks and 
debates - "designed to compare experiences on both 
sides and to draw lessons from them", explains Pat­
rick Keene, CDI Officer in charge of promotion 
and support for partnerships - four successful 
projects seen as yardsticks were discussed and 
commented on in depth(*) : 
AGRIFA (Senegal) : manufacture of peanut 
paste 
SCS (Cape Verde Islands) : soap production 
* NIGERIAN FOUNDRIES (Nigeria) : foun­
dry extension 
ASTEK (Ghana) : production of fruit juices. 
(*) A short description of these projects was given in Partnership 
No. 4. Follow-up to Dakar '92 
Visit to five 
Senegalese companies 
Extracts from speeches at the F omni s opening session 
The product range of the Senegalese company SAFRISAND. 
& post evaluation d company health after receiving aid from the 
CDI. 
In keeping with the CDI's concern to measure 
the impact of its interventions and to provide 
ongoing support to companies, the team that 
the Centre assigned to Dakar took advantage 
of their stay in Senegal to follow up five firms 
that have received or are currently receiving 
support from the CDI; technical, financial and 
commercial aspects were examined and, in 
some cases, further support from the CDI was 
envisaged. The companies visited were the fol-
lowing : 
SAFRISAND (manufacture of shoes and 
sandals), which has received commercial assis-
tance to step up its exports to Europe; 
NSTS (Nouvelle Société Textile Sénégalaise), 
provided with assistance by the CDI to rehabil-
itate and restart the company; 
COSELEC (electrical engineering), a firm 
helped by the CDI when it was set up as a joint 
venture with a French partner and soon to re-
ceive assistance in improving the technical 
skills of the workforce; 
M'BAO (poultry farming), a French-
Senegalese partnership resulting from the pri-
vatization and modernization of a State-run 
industrial farm; 
AGRIFA (peanut paste production), a com-
pany assisted by the Centre when it recently 
started up. 
Various CDI staff members also made working 
visits to companies or organizations in neigh-
bouring countries : Nigeria, Mali, Ghana, Gam-
bia and Guinea Bissau. 
Mr. Alassane Ndiaye, Senegalese Min-
ister for Industry, Trade and Crafts: 
"With the opening up of world markets, the 
growing competition among countries and 
companies calls for real strategic manage-
ment of industrial development within a per-
manent dialogue between the private sector, 
governments and investors". 
Mr. Francisco Granell, Director at DG 
VIII (Development) of the CEC: "The 
Community wishes to play a leading role in 
encouraging the private sector in ACP 
States. And this policy is not just a passing 
fashion. It reflects a deep European convic-
tion as to the fundamental role that private 
enterprise and civilian society must play in 
order to promote the kind of development 
that will create jobs and fresh opportunities 
for nations and for their populations". 
Mr. Paul Frix, Director of the CDI: "It is 
important to lay new and realistic founda-
tions to consolidate Euro-African cooperation 
in favour of enterprises displaying a spirit of 
innovation. In particular, it is a question of 
promoting the creation of venture-capital in-
vestment companies and support organiza-
tions working together to provide aid to en-
trepreneurs". 
Table III. F 
Dakar'92 
irst assessment 
in figures 
of the industrial meetings 
Number of letters of intent/'agreementssigned between ACP and EC participants : 50 
ACP country concerned 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde Islands 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
4% 
3% 
37, 
10% 
18% 
12% 
10% 
18% 
14% 
8% 
EC country concerned 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
14% 
12% 
14% 
24% 
5'Λ 
5% 
16'/, 
United Kingdom 10% 
Sector concerned 
Agro-foodstuffs 25% 
Agro-industry 5% 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 25% 
Elec./electronic 3% 
Engineering 4% 
Non-metal minerals 16% 
Paper 3% 
Textiles 15% 
Wood 4% Europe in the '90s 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR ACP COUNTRIES 
European union, the GATT world trade 
agreement and Eastern European economic 
reform spell change for ACP countries. Suc­
cess in this new Europe will require a pro­
found understanding of these developments, 
coupled with effective management and 
marketing skills. These topics were ad­
dressed in 'The New Europe', a 3-week 
seminar organised by the Trade and Devel­
opment Institute of Ireland (TDI), to which 
the CDI sponsored 5 delegates from Papua 
New Guinea, The Gambia, Nigeria, Grena­
da and Botswana. 
A Look into the Future 
T
he European Economic Area (EEA) 
will involve 380 million people in an 
area stretching from Central Europe to 
the shores of the Arctic, Mediterranean 
and Atlantic. The EEA and GATT will 
change the face of international trade, 
while the reform process in Eastern Eu­
rope is moving the focus of many devel­
oped countries eastwards. 
"Understanding these challenges is crucial to 
ACP countries," explains Mr. Ceesay, an 
economist from the Gambian 
National Investment Board. 
"The conference covered all these 
developments, as well as strategic 
management, attracting inward 
investment and targeting export 
markets." 
The first of the five sessions, 
held in Germany, examined the 
EC Common Market and EEA, 
the new East-West relationship, 
Lomé IV and the GATT negoti­
ations. 
"One of the most interesting 
things I learnt was the importance 
of standards," commented Mrs. 
Grubbe, the new CDI Antenna 
for Grenada. "We will need to 
ivork harder to meet EC standards, 
but we will be rewarded with access 
to the entire European market." 
A Case Study: Ireland 
The seminar was practical in nature, and 
included an extensive case study of 
Ireland's successes in attracting foreign in­
vestment. 
"Ireland is a very relevant model for Grenada" 
explained Mrs. Grubbe. "We are looking to 
attract offshore data services just as Ireland at-
tracted computer companies. We can also learn 
from their tactics in marketing liqueurs, an-
other domestic industry Grenada is developing 
with CDI's help." 
The Irish case study is also relevant to Bot­
swana. "Like Ireland, we have a powerful 
neighbour," Mr. Mpoloka pointed out. 
"When the dust settles in South Africa, Bot-
swana is going to face strong competition in at-
tracting investors. We will need the sort of 
skills I learnt at this conference." 
"I think we were all worried about 'Fortress 
Europe'" agreed Mr. Mpoloka, from the 
Botswana Ministry of Trade and Com­
merce. "We've learnt, however, that the 
changes will stimulate competition, not bar us 
from the market. We also understand the 
system much better now, learning, for exam-
ple, that you can prosecute a company for un-
fair trading. " 
Strategic Management 
Later sessions, presented in the UK, cov­
ered the application of strategic market­
ing and management techniques to at­
tracting inward investment and targeting 
exports. 
The increasing attention being paid to 
Central and Eastern Europe is focusing 
the ACP countries' attention on new ways 
to attract investment. "Contributions have 
increased to cope with the new demand, but 
the scene is definitely more competitive," not­
ed Mrs. Grubbe. 
Partly as a result, all five agreed, they pre­
fer technology and skill transfers to pure 
investment dollars. Mr. Chikere, of the 
Association of IMO-State Exporters, Nige­
ria, gave an example: "Nigeria is the 
world's largest exporter of yams. However 
much of the produce rots before being eaten or 
sold, so they need food processing technologies 
to improve efficiency. Feasibility studies, in-
volving the CDI, are underway." 
"Papua New Guinea," added Mr. Anuk, re­
sponsible for trade at the Papua New 
Guinean embassy in Brussels, "is experi-
encing a mineral boom, but we must focus on 
industries that will be there after the boom 
ends. We are diversifying from traditional 
agro-based industries into manufacturing, so 
technology transfer is vital." 
"Eastern Europe will also compete 
with us in exporting to the West," 
observed Mr. Mpoloka. "The 
seminar introduced 'niche 
marketing' as an answer. So TDI 
presented new solutions, as well as 
explaining the New Europe." 
(left to right) Mr. Anuk, PNG; Mr. Mpoloka, Botswana; Mr. Stekelee, CDI; Mr. Ceesay, The Gambia; 
Mrs. Grubbe, Grenada; Mr. Chikere, Nigeria. 
In return for CDI's assistance, each is to write a report on what they leaml at the conference and how they plan to 
put this knowledge into action. In this way the CDI gets valuable feedback from its activities, from which it can 
judge ¡hár effectiveness. Fishing Industry in Mauritania 
HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS 
Around the middle of December 1992, three 
days of "Professional Meetings" were orga-
nized by the CDI in collaboration with special-
ist consultants, bringing together around the 
same table a total of twenty Mauritanian com-
panies and twelve European firms in the fish-
ing sector, together with representatives of the 
national authorities and the EC. The purpose 
of this meeting, which focused on small-scale 
fishing in Nouadhibou, was to draw up a list of 
the problems faced in the development of this 
sector of prime importance for the country's 
economy and to identify potential partners like-
ly to increase the value added of local fishing 
companies. 
Priority for 
small-scale activities 
t all began with a request for assistance 
J- made by the Mauritanian authorities 
during the official visit to the country by 
Mr. Paul Frix, the Director of the CDI, in 
April 1992. At the moment, one of 
Mauritania's main priorities is to develop 
the fishing industry and especially small-
scale fishing activities. "This request immedi-
ately aroused the interest of the CDI", ex-
plained Paul Chotard, Technical Resources 
Officer in the Interventions Division. "It 
had all three ingredients upon which the Centre 
intends to focus its support activities: 
> fishing represents an essential but poorly 
controlled resource for the Mauritanian 
economy; 
in spite of many structural 
difficulties, there is an estab-
lished network of local pri-
vate companies which consti-
tutes a real basis for develop-
ment; 
finally, the national au-
thorities clearly have the po-
litical will to make an effort 
to support this sector". 
The approach adopted - that 
of Professional Meetings -
was aimed at acquiring first-
hand knowledge of the prac-
tical problems encountered 
by Mauritanian firms and 
analysing them in the light of the reactions 
from a selection of European companies 
wishing to develop business links with 
Mauritania. To prepare for this meeting, 
the CDI commissioned an in-depth study 
from the French consultancy firm 
Cofrepêche(*) on the current situation in 
this sector (state of resources, types of fish-
ing, means of production, marketing meth-
ods, competitiveness, etc.). The Centre then 
carefully selected the participants, recruit-
ed from all the stages in the process, on the 
basis of their motivations. 
Identifying ¿bottlenecks 
"The first positive result from these few days 
was pinpointing all the bottlenecks hindering 
the exploitation of these resources by Maurita-
nian companies", indicated Eric Rotsaert, a 
fishery expert appointed by the CDL "The 
Mauritanians there described the conditions in 
which the local industry is operating at the mo-
ment and asked numerous questions about out-
lets in Europe, quality and packaging stan-
dards, distribution channels, the problems in-
volved in air-freighting fresh products to mar-
Contactatthe CD I 
Further information on the meeting in Nouad-
hibou (details on the participants, preparatory 
report, etc.) can be obtained from the CDI. 
Contacts : 
Hamed SOW, Geographical Officer respon-
sible for Mauritania, Projects and ACP Network 
Division 
Paul Chotard, Head of the Technical Resourc-
es Department, Interventions and EC Network 
Division. 
A prototype of the "Senegalese pirogue" modified and improved by the Breton firm Hauchard. 
Technology adapted to suit the traditional know-how of local fishermen. 
kets, fishing and preservation techniques and 
boat-building technologies. For their part, the 
representatives of the European companies gave 
the fullest replies that they could, outlining the 
possibilities for developing partnerships, and, in 
turn, questioned the Mauritanian entrepren-
eurs on their capacity for supplying certain 
products". 
"And the presence of officials representing 
Mauritanian fisheries was also extremely use-
ful", adds Paul Chotard, "because this made it 
possible for numerous questions concerning 
weaknesses, contradictions or gaps in govern-
ment policy concerning fishery regulations to be 
openly discussed". 
Practical results 
Another positive aspect of these three days' 
work was the concrete cooperation pros-
pects that emerged. 
♦ Exporting to European markets. The 
first possible type of partnership with 
EC companies is in the marketing of a 
wider range of products at competitive 
prices and meeting European quality 
standards. New sources of supply are 
very much in demand among EC im-
porters. During the Meetings, an agree-
ment was signed between two partici-
pants for the delivery of a stock of fro-
zen products so that the commercial 
possibilities could be tested. "Other busi-
ness contacts are also being pursued and the 
CDI Projects Division has already received 
ten requests for partnership assistance", re-
ported Mr. Hamed Sow, Geographical 
Officer responsible for Mauritania. 
The CDI is also studying ways of 
helping local companies to bring their 
products into line with the standards in 
force in Europe. 
♦ Participation in fairs. 
"The discussions brought to 
light a distinct lack of knowl-
edge about the European mar-
ket among Mauritanian opera-
tors", commented Eric Rot-
saert. A major effort is re-
quired in this field and the 
CDI intends to help Mauri-
tanian operators to take 
part in trade fairs in Eu-
rope. 
♦ Training. In a country 
which has traditionally 
turned towards the desert Fishing Industry in Mauritania 
rather than the sea and its resources, 
training is essential for the development 
of small-scale fishing activities. The tech­
nical know-how of European companies 
can play a very positive role in this con­
nection: for instance, a subject of great 
interest in Nouadhibou was the introduc­
tion of trawl line fishing, a technique un­
known to Mauritanian fishermen. 
* Modernization of on-shore equipment 
and boat-building. The Breton company 
Hauchard, which attended the Meetings, is 
already constructing a factory in Nouad­
hibou to produce light boats of the "Sene­
galese pirogue" type, adapted to suit 
small-scale fishermen (see photo oppo­
site). 
Other contacts between European manufac­
turers and local entrepreneurs have opened 
the way to possible projects for the manu­
facture of single-hull or multi-hull boats of 
aluminium or fibreglass, to replace and ex­
tend the existing fleet, which is very under-
equipped. There are also possibilities of 
modernizing fishing equipment, harbour 
installations, etc. 
At the Nouadhibou "Meetings". 
The main possibilities of potential 
partnerships lie in exports to Europe, 
modernization of the fleet and equipment 
and training. 
A test for «Fishing» Meetings 
in other ACP countries 
"The CDI has already adopted integrated secto-
ral approaches of this kind in a number of coun-
tries for different industries - wood and non-
metal minerals in the Caribbean, tropical fruit 
processing in Africa and textiles in Madagas-
car, Burundi and the Pacific. But these meet-
ings were a «first» in a sector which represents 
an important resource for other ACP coun-
tries", explained Paul Chotard. "Having 
seen the interest aroused by the experiment in 
Mauritania, which the Centre is now actively 
following up, we are studying the possibility of 
repeating the same formula in the near future 
for professionals on the coast of the Indian 
Ocean or in the area of the Great Lakes of Cen-
tral and East Africa". 
(*) Cofrepêche had already made an inventory of fishery resources 
and fishing grounds in Mauritania in 1991, within the context of a 
review of the fishing industry carried out by the World Bank with 
the support of the Commission of the EC. 
Profile of an industry 
The coastal waters of Mauritania are teeming 
with fish, and the fishing industry currently ac­
counts for almost a third of the country's GDP 
and 70% of its exports. Over recent decades, 
this resource has mainly been exploited 
through industrial deep-sea fishing : 
either in boats flying a foreign flag, under 
agreements signed with certain countries (espe­
cially the former USSR, Romania, the former 
GDR and some Community countries within 
the context of the EC/Mauritania Fisheries 
Agreement); 
or under the Mauritanian flag. But most of the 
national fleet is in fact made up of foreign boats 
(East Asian in particular) chartered by Maurita­
nian shipowners with fishing licences. This fleet 
poses some major problems, especially due to 
the decrepit state of the boats, the high ruiming 
costs arising from this, unsatisfactory returns, 
no local workers in crews, etc. In addition, 
Mauritanian operators are almost totally absent 
from the marketing channels, which pass large­
ly through middlemen based in the Canary Is­
lands, thus preventing the country from having 
any control over possible benefits for the local 
economy. 
Consequently, along with the need to restruc­
ture the industrial fishing industry, the Mauri­
tanian authorities are giving special priority to 
the small-scale fishing sector, which is largely 
underdeveloped and accounts for only about 
5% of the total catch. These fishing companies, 
often operating on a very small scale indeed, 
have so far specialized mainly in catching octo­
pus - a very abundant resource - almost all of 
which is sold on the lapanese market. This 
"single-species" fishing activity, centred on the 
port of Nouadhibou, is therefore dependent on 
this sole outlet. 
For the fishing industry to inject more value 
added into the country's economy, the strength­
ening of this existing structure of small local 
fishing companies must begin with moderniza­
tion and diversification of products and mar­
kets, especially in Europe, a close target but one 
under-exploited by the Mauritanian fishing in­
dustry. Local consumption and exports to 
neighbouring countries should also be taken 
into consideration. 
European participants on a visit to 
fishing companies. 
Strenglhening an existing structure of 
small local fishing companies must begin 
with modernization and diversification 
of producís and markets. In brief 
ACP NETWORK  EC NETWORK 
CENTRE POUR LE DE VELOPPEHENT INDUSTRIEL , 
REUNION REGIONALE OES ANTENNES 
DE LAFRiaUE DE L'OUEST 
¿¿KARDU2BÄf 27NCLyE»f^RE 1 3P2 
V  iL 
I 
Promotion of partnerships 
with ACP countries among 
SMEs in the South of France 
The ADECK*), which is an experienced link op-
erating between SMEs in the region of Provence-
Alpes-Côte d'Azur (France) and the CDI (togeth-
er with other cooperation support bodies) orga-
nized an information day in Marseille in Mid-
December 1992 on the theme of "Direci or indirect 
financial support for partnerships with the ACP and 
Mediterranean countries". Many industrialists 
from the region were able to question officials 
from the four organizations sponsoring this 
event, namely : 
The 'family picture' of the meeting of West African antennae. 
The antennae play a very important role as "critical filters" in selecting projects. They represent a key link between financial institutions and local 
organisations. 
1993, the year 
of the networks: 
A boost for West Africa 
Reinforcing the role and the effectiveness of 
the ACP network - one of the CDI's major ob-
jectives for 1993 - was at the centre of discus-
sions between the representatives of the CDI 
antennae in 14 West African countries(*) 
meeting in the wings of the Dakar Forum. The 
Centre has recently increased its Brussels staff 
of geographical officers for this region, which 
now comprises four people : Messrs. CG. Ta-
tepo, A. Ndiaye, S. Ditutala and H. Sow. 
These four officers explained the increased 
role that the antennae (private or public) are 
being called upon to play in project identifica-
tion, preparation of CDI interventions and fol-
lowing up companies receiving support from 
the Centre. 
Three aspects were underlined in particular : 
♦ The CDI has chosen to focus its attention on 
projects with a real chance of success, avoiding 
too many sporadic interventions and favour-
ing those based on the real needs of domestic 
and export markets. With their knowledge of 
local conditions, the antennae must serve as 
"critical filters" so that requests from the most 
efficient entrepreneurs can be selected. 
• Second strategic choice: the Centre will fol-
low the development of projects step by step, 
relying on local service companies or manage-
ment consultancies in countries displaying a 
dynamic policy towards private enterprise. A 
large proportion of contacts with the antennae 
must therefore concern the identification and 
establishment of such structures. 
Φ Third strategic option: the CDI will work in 
close conjunction with local or international 
finance institutions operating in the ACP 
States. Here too, the antennae will continue to 
play a role of prime importance, especially 
through their close contacts with the local rep-
resentatives of these institutions. Further-
more, in some countries the Centre will man-
age a portfolio of several projects, with the an-
tennae being well placed to help the Centre to 
coordinate the activities of all the players in-
volved. 
The meeting of West African antennae also 
analysed the ways and means of stepping up 
regional cooperation in favour of industrial 
projects, particularly by developing exchang-
es of information and know-how between an-
tennae. With this in mind, the CDI's budget 
for 1993 provides for the possibility of financ-
ing assignments among regional consultants 
who are well acquainted with the industrial 
potentials of a particular geographical area(**) 
and would work in close collaboration with 
the local antennae. 
(*) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone. 
(**) Such assignments could be given when they concern several 
countries in the same region. 
<S> Mr. F. Matos-Rosa, Officer in charge of Euro-
pean relations, Interventions and EC Network 
Division, for the CDI; 
> Mr. A. Fiévet, representing Proparco, the fi-
nancial instrument of the CCCI group (Caisse 
centrale de Coopération économique, France), 
who, apart from reporting on the group's inter-
ventions, also gave details to the participants on 
the ECIP (EC Investment Partners) procedures, 
sometimes known as the "Cheysson Facility"; 
♦ Mr. C. Guillemin, Director of UNIDO services 
for France; 
? Mr. C. André, Director of the EC Office in 
Marseille; 
Φ Mr. J.C. Sitbon, Director of the ADECI, and 
Mr. P. Francotte, this association's expert within 
the European institutions. 
These organizations help SMEs in seeking out 
industrial partners, co-financing feasibility stud-
ies or technical assistance, investing their own 
funds or mobilizing equity loans or loans with 
interest subsidies for joint investments. 
(*) Association régionale pour le développement de la coopération 
industrielle internationale. 
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EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EEC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EEC since 1 976 and 1 977 ; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.); 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to : : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
G 12 4-14 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
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Al Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1 G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2Ai Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3E Conservation and extension 
A3F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto­
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B Industrial development banks 
A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
A5D Export promotion 
A5E Trade, commerce and distribution 
A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous­
ing) 
A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog­
raphy 
A5H Other insurance and banking 
A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
A6 Education 
A6A Primary and secondary education 
A6B University and higher technical institutes 
A6Bi Medical 
A6C Teacher training 
A6Ci Agricultural training 
A6D Vocational and technical training 
A6E Educational administration 
A6F Pure or general research 
A6G Scientific documentation 
A6H Research in the field of education or training 
A6I Subsidiary services 
A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
A7 Health 
A7A Hospitals and clinics 
A7B Maternal and child care 
A7C Family planning and population-related 
research 
A7D Other medical and dental services 
A7E Public health administration 
A7F Medical insurance programmes 
A8 Social infrastructure and social wel­
fare 
A8A Housing, urban and rural 
A8B Community development and facilities 
A8C Environmental sanitation 
A8D Labour 
A8E Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
A8F Environmental protection 
A8G Flood control 
A8H Land settlement 
A8I Cultural activities 
A9 Multisector 
A9A River development 
A9B Regional development projects 
A10 Unspecified 
ATTENTION : The PABLI Service is temporarily suspended for technical reasons 
on the production side. 
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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Rehabilitation national roads in the 
South-West region: Namibe-Serra da 
Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabili-
tation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG A2d 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Road Rehabilitation Programme 
Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works 
and Communications. 3.100 mECU. Re-
construction of the road from Golden Grove 
to Urlings (11.75 km). Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF AB 6001 A2d 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
BARBADOS 
Hospitality Studies Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. 
2.75 mECU. Construction of Tourism Train-
ing Centre-cum-Hotel and T.A. Project on 
* appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
March 93. 6th EDF. 
EDF BAR 6006 A5c 
Livestock Development. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. 2.475 mECU. Re-
novation and construction of administrative 
buildings, supply of vehicles, equipment and 
computers. Line of credit and T.A. Project in 
execution. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF BAR 6004 A3a 
National Development Foundation. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. National Devpt. Foundation. 
0.250 mECU. Loans to SME, equipments, 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BAR 7102 A6ci, d 
BELIZE 
Community Development Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social 
Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation 
study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF BEL 6002 A6b 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
Support programme to the health 
policy. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 
11.846 mECU. Rehabilitation of the health 
infrastructure, supply of equipment, medi-
·*■ cines and T.A. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BEN 7002 A7a 
BOTSWANA 
Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Wildlifeand National Parks. (DWNP). 6.800 
mECU. New tracks, construction of adminis-
trative office quarters and accommodation. 
Supply of equipment (earthmoving — trac-
tors — 4x4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i 
Geophysical survey in the Ghanzi-
Chobe fold belt and Chinamba Hills. 
Resp. Auth.: Dept. Geological Survey. 
1.6 mECU. Investigate mineral deposits and 
water potential. Production of geological 
maps. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BT 7001 A1g 
T.A. to the Department of Water 
Affairs. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Water Affairs. 1 mECU. T.A. 
to the Dept. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BT 6023 (7002) A2b 
BURKINA FASO 
Water resources development pro-
gramme in the South-West. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau, Estimated total 
cost 15 mECU. Drillings, water supplies, 
water points, hand pumps, vehicles, various 
equipments, T.A. for works supervision and 
programme implementation. Training. Pro-
ject in execution. 5th and 7th EDF 
EDF BK 6020 (7001) A2b, A3c 
Douna Plain development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de 
l'Elevage. 2.050 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 
0.050 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6005/7002 A3a 
Electrification of 3 secondary urban 
centres. Resp. Auth.: SONABEL — Soc. 
Nat. d'Electr. 7.100 mECU. Power centre 
and distribution network in Diébougou, 
Kongussi, Nouna. Works, supplies and T.A. 
for supervision and control. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7001 A2ai 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modern earthroad. Super-
vision: short-list to be done. Estimated cost 
18.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
BURUNDI 
Structural Adjustment Support. 
General Import Programme. 12 mECU. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC goods. There is a negative list. Evaluation 
after 1st phase. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BU 7200 A1c 
Development of the health sector in 
the Mosso and Imbo regions. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique. Total 
estimated cost 24.877 mECU. EDF 
18 mECU, local 5.41 3 mECU. Counterpart 
Funds for G.I.P. 1.464 mECU. Health cen-
tres staff training, supply of equipments and 
health services rehabilitation. Constructions, 
T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7003 A6bi, A7 
Training for rural development pro-
grammes. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Ag-
riculture et de l'Elevage. 1.910 mECU. Man-
agement, planning, know-how, evaluation, 
maintenance. T.A. 6 months. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7000 A6c, i 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Elimination 
of conf lictual sources between the game and 
population. Make the game accessible to the 
tourism. Works, supplies, T.A., training and 
awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-entrepr-
ises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare tech-
nical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
CAMEROON 
Rural development programme in 
the Logone and Chari. Resp. Auth.: 
Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolid-
ation and extension of existing actions. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6013 A3a 
Rural development poles: Saa-ntui, 
Sang melima, Bafut. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tères de l'Agriculture et du Plan et de 
l'Aménagement du Territoire. Total es-
timated cost 14.625 mECU. EDF 10.300 
mECU, local 4.325 mECU. Strengthening of 
the monitoring structures, improvement and 
extension of basic socio-economic infra-
structures, training, education, populariz-
ation of rural development, health. Works: 
tracks, buildings; supplies for civil works, 
vehicles, crop inputs, rural equipment. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF CM 6012 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods. There is a 
negative list. 29.5 mECU. T.A. for starting 
and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CM 7200 A1c 
Support to the health services. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
8.5 mECU. Works, supplies of medicines by 
• int. tender, T.A. by G.T.Z. Project in 
execution. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6030 (7004) A7e 
Road maintenance programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
22.5 mECU. Maintenance in 3 regions: Tikar 
* plain, Ayos-Bertona, Yaunde. Date finan-
cing February 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6031(7005) A2d 
CAPE VERDE 
Improvement of urban management. 
Resp. Auth.: Muncipalidad de Praia. Direc-
ção Geral Cartografia e Cadastro. EDF 0.800 
mECU, local 0.371 mECU, Sweden and 
Dienste in Übersee (German NGO). 
Strengthening of the land registration and 
cartographical services, creation of a Study 
and Planning Office in the Municipality. 
* Supplies, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF CV 6001 (7001) A8a, b 
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Support for the National Laboratory 
for Buildings and Public Works. 
(LNBTP) Resp. Auth.: Ministère des T.P. 
1.200 mECU. Works, supplies training. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF CA 6011 A1 a 
COMOROS 
Seed, support and market-garden 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. Total estimated cost 5.650 
mECU. EDF 5.5 mECU, local 0.150 mECU. 
Production of improved vegetable material. 
Rural development actions, infrastructures, 
training teams. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 5002(7001 ) A3a 
Line of credit for SMEs. Resp. Auth.: 
Banque de Développement des Comores, 1 
mECU. Small loans for farmers. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7002 A5b 
Micro-projects. Estimated total cost 3.4 
mECU, EDF 2.5 mECU, local 0.4 mECU, 
local communities 0.5 mECU. Warehouses, 
rural hydraulic and electrification, health, 
education, works, supplies, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7102 A3a 
CHAD 
Support programme to revitalize 
primary education. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de l'Education Nationale. 10 mECU. 
Works by ace. tender or direct labour. 
Building materials, equipment, and edu-
cational equipment, by int. tender. Training 
programmes and support infrastructures. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7001 A6a 
Environmental conservation in the 
South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 3,5 mECU. 
Flora and fauna reconstitution in the 
Zakouma region. Integration, growing 
public awareness and participation of popu-
lation for conservation of natural resources. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7002 (4017) A8f 
Support programme to improve 
maintenance and road infrastructure. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des T.P. 15 mECU. 
Works, bridges, Moundou-Touboro road 
study, institutional support to the Ministère 
des T.P. Training. Road study: short-list 
• done. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF CD 6001 (7003) A2d 
CONGO 
Support to the private sector and 
S.M.E.'s promotion. Resp. Auth.: 
National Authorizing officer, Ministère for 
SME, EEC delegation, Associations. 
10 mECU. Lines of credit, development, 
promotion, viability of micro — small and 
medium entreprises. T.A., supplies and line 
-Α-of credit. Project in execution. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF COB 6005/7001 A4, A5 
Works, soil improvement, supplies. T.A. structure, supply of equipment, T.A, and 
studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project * lines of credit. Project in execution. 7th 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009 A3a EDF DO 7006 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EEC goods. There is a 
negative list of items not eligible (military-
luxury products). 15.5 mECU. T.A. for the 
Ministère de l'Économie et Finances and 
T.A. for the Ministère de la Santé. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7200 A1c 
Health sector support programme. 
11.2 mECU. Strengthening basic care, cor-
recting balances between regions and sup-
port to decentralization. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6011 (7001) A7 
Support programme to coastal 
cities. 28.5 mECU. Social and economic 
infrastructure, planning and management of 
municipalities. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7001 A8a, b 
Research — development prog-
ramme for market gardening, agro-
forestry and fruit-trees sectors. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Supér-
ieur et de la Recherche Scientifique and 
IDESSA-IDEFOR/DFO and IDEFOR/DFA. 
Ministère de l'Agriculture. 8.760 mECU. 
Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7003 A6f, A6c, i 
Support to cooperatives. Resp. Auth. : 
G.V.C. Groupement villageois de com-
mercialisation. 1.275mECU. T.A. for3 years, 
evaluation and training, supply of equipment 
and line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 6101/7 A5f 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti, Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Handcraft promotion. Resp. Auth.: 
Office National du Tourisme et de l'Artisanat. 
Estimated total cost 2.371 mECU. EDF 
1.960 mECU, local 0.071 mECU, France 
(Volontaires du Progrès) 0.340 mECU. 
Training, trade and technical advice, en-
couragement for forming professional 
groups, financial assistance. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. for training, monitoring and 
technical support. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF DI 7001 A4d 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Central Region food crops prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agric-
ulture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture 
modernization, young settlements. Food 
crops production marketing improvement. 
DOMINICA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Development — Economic Develop-
ment Unit. 2 mECU. General Import Pro-
+ gramme. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DOM 7200 A1c 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Integrated rural development pro-
ject in the NOROESTE (PROLINO). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 
23.61 mECU. Building of earth-dams, infra-
Integrated programme to develop 
primary education at local level. Resp. 
Auth. : Secretaría de Estado de Educación. 
Bellas Artes y Cultos (SEEBAC). Totalcost8 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 1 mECU. Build-
ings, equipment, T.A. Works by direct labour 
or ace. proc, the equipment will be pur-
chased locally. T.A.; short-list to be done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7007 A6a 
Integrated health programme in the 
south-east. Resp. Auth. : Secretarla de 
Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social 
(SESPAS). Total cost 9.8 mECU. EDF 8.8 
mECU, local 1 mECU. Physical health 
infrastructure by direct labour or ace. proc, 
health materials and equipment by int. 
tender, training, health education, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing March 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7008 A7a,b,c,e 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming. 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
M'Bini — Akalayong road. Rehabili-
tation and improvement of the road. 65 km. 
Int. tender for works (conditional). Es-
timated cost 1.6 mECU. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6006 A2d 
Rural development programme in 
the South-East. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ETHIOPIA 
South Shewa conservation-based 
rural development. Resp. Auth. : Ministry 
of Agriculture. 26.2 mECU. Buildings, roads, 
rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, con-
sumer goods, training, T.A., micro-projects, 
credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6005 A3a 
Coffee improvement programme III. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea 
Development. 38.1 mECU. Construction 
and civil works, supply of equipment, vehic-
les and agrie, inputs, aerial photography, 
training and T.A, Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF 6003 A3a 
Lake fisheries project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries Dept. 
7.5 mECU. Provision of inputs to fishermen, 
development of cooperatives, establishment 
of marketing organisation and infrastructure, 
training, research and fingerling production 
centres. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in 
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EDF ET 6008  A3d 
Foreign trade development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT). 
1.5 mECU. T.A. : two-years marketing 
expert, a team of marketing specialists 
(short-term consultancy services in Et-
hiopia). Market research, training in inter-
national marketing and international trade, 
technical seminars. Equipment and support-
ing services Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ET 6010 A5de 
Sectoral Import Programme IV. Resp. 
Auth.: AISCO and ESC for agricultural 
inputs. Vice Minister of Industry in charge of 
private sector and handcrafts development, 
the National Bank, the Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia, and the EDF Nat. Auth. off. for the 
hard currency line for the private sector. 
Fertilizers, seeds and chemicals by int. 
tender. Procurement Unit for 3-4 years. 
27 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7200 A1c 
Short-term support programme for 
the reconstruction and development 
of Eritrea. 19.800 mECU. Dams for irrig-
ation, rural hydraulics, road rehabilitation. 
Works by direct labour, supplies by int. 
tenders, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7001 A96 
FIJI 
Investment and export development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Com-
merce (MTC) and Fiji Trade and Investment 
Board. 7.2 mECU. Land purchase for the Tax 
Free Zone, works, supply of equipment, T.A 
and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF FU 6007 A5d 
GABON 
Construction of 95 classrooms 
(primary schools) in Libreville. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. 6.5 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, work super-
s-vision and coordination. Project in exe-
cution. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF GA 5017 A6a 
GAMBIA 
Rural Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
water schemes, supply of road equipment 
and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF GM 6004 A3a 
Training programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Office of the President. 0.800 mECU, Insti-
tutional linkage of the Management Devpt. 
Institute with a European institution for 
training in financial and economic manage-
ment and administration. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF GM 7001 A6b 
GHANA 
Accra Plains Livestock Development 
Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 
4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. 
Provision of veterinary and animal hus-
bandry extension services, including con-
struction of cattle treatment centres, water 
points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6006 A3a 
Twifo oil palm development. Main-
tenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(M.F E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU 
EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment and T.A Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF G H 6007 A3a 
Second microprojects programme. 
(Lomé III). Total cost 9 mECU, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning 2 mECU. 
District assemblies - communities 1 mECU. 
Construction of schools, clinics, wells, 
sanitation facilities, markets. Local T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF GH 6102 A6, A7, A8 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
General Import Programme. Hard cur-
rency allowance to import ACP and EEC 
goods. There is a negative list of items not 
eligible (military-luxury and environmentally 
hazardous products). 20 mECU. T.A. for 
procurement agent possible. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7200 A1 c 
GRENADA 
Farm and feeder roads project. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Agriculture. 1.580 mECU. 
Construction or rehabilitation. Works by 
direct labour. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7002 A3a 
Microprojects programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to purchase EEC or A C Ρ 
goods with negative list. 2 mECU. Provision 
of T.A. in the fields of legislative andlor fiscal 
expertise. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing March 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7200 A1c 
GUINEA 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods. There is a negative list of items not 
eligible (military, luxury and environmentally 
hazardous product). 14 mECU T.A. for 
implementation and follow-up. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6009/7001 A1c 
Improvement of living conditions in 
backward areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministères 
de Santé de l'Enseignement et de l'Agricul-
ture. 20 mECU. Building, rehabilitation and 
equipping of health infrastructures (regional 
hospitals and health centres) education 
(teachers national schools, primary 
schools). Water points. Work, supervision. 
+ Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing March 93. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6022 (7002) A6, A7, A8 
Road Infrastructure Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports. Min-
istère des T.P. Building, reconstruction of 
national and secondary roads 50 mECU. 
*■ Works, supervision, several T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF GUI 6021 (7003) A2d 
Rural Development Programme — 
Western Upper Guinea. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources 
Animales. 15 mECU. Cotton, crop, stock-
farming, rice-growing, bee-keeping, 
draught farming, market-garden, rural credit, 
processing, feederroads, Works, supplies, 
• line of credit. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF GUI 6002 (7004) A3a 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Rural development programme. 
23.8 mECU. Improvement of food and fish-
eries production, line of credit, micro-
projects, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6001 A3a 
Project for the rehabilitation of 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 11 
mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health 
centres, urban roads, markets, water and 
sanitation. Construction of secondary brid-
ges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, 
• supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6013 (PRI) A7, A8 
Support to Guinea Bissau students 
abroad. Resp. Auth.: Office International 
pour les Migrations (executive organiza-
tion), EEC Delegation in Bissau and Minis-
tère de l'Education et de la Culture. 1.450 
mECU. To repatriate or for payment of 
scholarships supplements, evaluation. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7003 A6b 
GUYANA 
Sea defence programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Hydraulic Division. 12 mECU. Rehabili-
tation of 11 km of sea defences, procurement 
of materials and equipment. T.A. and train-
ing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 6003 (7001 ) A8g 
Immediate action programme forthe 
Demerara Harbour Bridge. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 3 mECU. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 6011 (7002) A2d 
New Amsterdam water supply. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 4 mECU. Con-
struction of the ring main system, reservoir, 
supplies T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 601 2 (7003) A2b 
Credit development to S.M.E.'s. 
0.250 m ECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal 7th EDF 
EDF GUA 7001 A4, A5 
JAMAICA 
Negril and Ocho Rios sewerage 
schemes. Resp. Auth.: National Water 
Commission. 25 mECU. Negril: 17 km of 
trunk sewers, 13 pump stations and 2 treat-
ment plants. Ocho Rios: 5 km of sewers, 6 
pump stations, 1 treatment plant and deep 
sea outfall. T.A. for supervision. Works by int. 
tender Project in execution. 5th EDF. 
EDFJM A8bc 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods. 8.4 mECU. T.A. 
for follow-up, evaluation and procurement 
Agent. Project in execution. 6th and 7th 
EDF. 
EDFJM 7001 A1c 
Road rehabilitation and Institutional 
Strengthening Project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Construction — Works (MOC-
W) 1 3.5 mECU. Rehabilitation and mainten-
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Ministry. Works by ace. tender and direct 
labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: short-
list done. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDFJM 6001 (7001) A2d 
Return and reinstatement of quali-
fied nationals. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDFJM 7002 A1c 
All-island beekeeping development. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture. EDF 1.700 mECU, local 0.230 mECU. 
Supply of equipment, vehicles, specialized 
T.A. research, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDFJM 7003 A3a 
Target Europe Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: 'Jamaican Promotion Corporation' 
(JAMPRO). 3 m ECU. Trade and invest-
ments promotion. Marketing, T.A., training. 
ir Date financing January 93. 7th EDF 
EDF JM 5021 /7004 A5c,d,e, 
KENYA 
Conservation and Management of 
indigenous forests. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Environment and Natural Resources. 
Estimated total cost 67.5 mECU. EDF 4.4 
mECU, ODA (UK) 11 mECU, World Bank16 
mECU, SDC (Switzerland), FINNIDA 17.7 
mECU, local 18.4 mECU. EDF part: T.A., 
supplies and materials to the Kenya Forests 
Dept. (KFD). Works, supplies, T.A., training 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF KE 6025 (7001) A3c 
Assistance for the 1992 Electoral 
Process. Resp. Auth.: Parliamentary Elec-
toral Com. Total cost estimates 27.8 mECU. 
EDF 1.96 mECU, EEC Budget 0.5 mECU, 
ODA (UK) 0.4 mECU, Kenya — Austria — 
EEC Member States 24.94 mECU. Pro-
motion of human rights and démocratisation 
through support to the preparation and 
execution of general legislative, presidential 
and local elections. EDF part: provision of 
security printed ballot papers and technical 
expertise. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7001 A1c 
Elephant and Community Wildlife 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS). EDF part 4 mECU. Erection 
of wildlife proof barriers to protect neigh-
bouring communities. Supplies, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 6024(7002) A3a, A5i, A8f 
LESOTHO 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. 2.5 mECU. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF LSO 7200 A1c 
MADAGASCAR 
Rice and fish-breeding promotion 
and popularization. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de la Production Animale, des Eaux et 
Forêts (MPAEF). 2.300 mECU. Fish-breed-
ing and research centres, excavation, re-
habilitation, swamp reclamation, access 
roads, supply of equipment and T.A. T.A. : 
short-lists done. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MAG 6023 A3a 
Livestock development in the South-
West. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Produc-
tion Animale. Estimated total cost 6.850 
mECU. EDF 5.700 mECU, local 1.150 
mECU. Buildings and feeder roads. Supply 
of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 
6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6013 A3a 
Slaughter-house equipment prog-
ramme for secondary towns. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère de l'Elevage. 2.250 mECU. 
Construction of 7 slaughter-houses by ace. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. for 
• follow-up and coordination. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 5024(6024) A3a 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7001  A2d 
MALAWI 
Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: 
Office of the President and Cabinet. Con-
tingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU, Con-
struction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. 
Associated infrastructure and equipment. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF MAI 5020 A2a 
Programme for industrial products 
imports. 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial 
equipment, raw materials and spare parts. 
Project in execution 6th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6019 A1c 
Aid for refugees. Resp. Auth. : Food Aid 
Coordination Unit in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet (OPC). 5.224 mECU. 
The programme concerns basic needs for 
refugees from Mozambique. Roads, wells, 
drinking water, health, education. Manage-
ment by UNHCR, Red Cross, MSF, Concern 
Universal. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7255 A6, 7, 8 
AIDS prevention programme Phase 
II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.200 m 
ECU. Supply of information material, labo-
ratory equipment, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF MAI 7001 A7 
MALI 
Support programme for S.M.E. cre-
ation. Lines of credit, T.A. and follow up. 
13 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001 (7001) A4,A5 
Health programme and population. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
Estimated total cost 51.7 mECU. EDF 
12 mECU, F.R. Germany and France 6.4, 
World Bank 21.6 mECU, local 3.5 mECU, 
USAID 8.2 mECU. Rehabilitation of health 
centres. T.A. for pharmaceutical sector, 
supply of medicines (with anticonceptionals 
and condoms). Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 7022 A7 
MAURITANIA 
Support programme for the develop-
ment of the Gorgol region (PDRG). 35 
mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, 
support for traditional crops, regeneration of 
natural habitats, rural infrastructure, sani-
tation of Kaedi. Project in execution. 6th 
EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007 A3a 
First road programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Equipement et des Transports, 
17.5 mECU. Strengthening works, training 
works supervision. Works by int. tender. 
Rehabilitation of Nouakchott and 
Aioun Hospitals. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Equipement et Transports. 7.350 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, staff training. 
Supervision and audit. Project on appraisal. 
• Date foreseen for financing March 93. 
5th, 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6009 A7a 
Gold-field prospection programme. 
Resp. Auth. : OMRG 2.5 mECU. Site identifi-
cation in the Tasiast and South-Maurit-
anides regions. Equipment, T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MAU 7002 A4a 
Rehabilitation of the Nouakchott 
Wharf. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Equipe-
ment et des Transports. 4.5 mECU. Works, 
supervision, follow-up and evaluation. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 5002(7003) A2d 
Support for the structural adjust-
ment programmes. General Import 
Programme. Hard currencies allowance to 
purchase EEC and ACP goods with negative 
list. 18 mECU. T.A. foreseen for implemen-
tation of the G.I. P. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing March 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7200 A1c 
Istitutional support to the Ministry 
of Planning. Resp. Auth. : Ministère du 
Plan. 1.562 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAU 6015 A1b 
MAURITIUS 
Pamplemousse— Grand Baie Road. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Road construction. 11.8 km. Works and 
supervision. Works by int. tender (con-
ditional). Supervision: short-list done. Total 
cost 7.4 mECU. EDF 5.7 mECU, local 
1.7 mECU. Project in execution. 5th and 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAS 5014 (7001) A2d 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Moamba region food self-suf-
ficiency. Rehabilitation of infrastructures, 
supply of agricultural inputs. T.A. for 18 
months. 2 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF MOZ 6034 (7001 ) A3a 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministères du Commerce et des 
Finances. 54.7 mECU. hard currency allow-
ance to import ACP and EEC goods. There is 
a negative list of items not eligible (military-
luxury and environmentally hazardous pro-
ducts). T.A. for management, follow up and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7200 A1c 
Training for railway staff. Phase II. 
T.A. for the regional School at Inhambane 
and the provincial centres of railway training. 
20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d 
Support for the electoral process. 
Resp. Auth.: Commission Nationale Elec-
torale. 9 m ECU. T.A. supply of security 
* printed ballot papers. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7004 A1c 
Support for the rural health sector. 
15.390 m ECU. Assistance to populations. 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY assistance for mutilated and disabled war 
victimes. Management by existing N.G.O.'s. 
• Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7255 A7 
Support for road rehabilitation and 
water supply. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la 
Construction et de l'Eau. Direction Nationale 
des Routes et des Ponts (DNEP) and 
Direction Nationale de l'Eau (DNA). 10m 
• ECU. Works and supplies. T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7005 A2d 
Reinstatement of displaced, refugee 
and demobilized people. 11 m ECU. For 
about 108,000 families. Supply of T.A., 
workshops, tools, building materials and 
equipments, 'Kits' for S.M.E's, agricultural 
• tools, seeds. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF MOZ 7006 A3a 
NAMIBIA 
In-Service Training and Assistance 
for Namibian Teachers (INSTANT). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and 
Culture. National Institute for Educational 
Development. 4.500 mECU. T.A. training, 
works and supply of pedagogical equip-
ment. T.A. : short-list done. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF NAM 7001 A6b, d 
Support programme for the mining 
sector. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. Day-to-day administration by the 
Industrial Development Corporation. 40 
mECU. Mine development, expansion, dril-
lings, tiling plant, recuperations, small scale 
mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. 
T.A. and training. Date financing March 93. 
7th EDF. 
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 
1.3mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and 
marketing and production economics. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7003 A1c 
environment, supply of equipment and T.A. 
* Date financing January 93. 7th EDF 
EDF 6002/7001 A3a 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 7200  A1c 
NIGER 
Support for the development of the 
private sector (S.M.E.). Resp. Auth.: 
AFELEN (Agence pour le Financement et 
l'Encouragement de la Libre Entreprise au 
Niger) - Niamey. 12 mECU. T.A. for the 
AFELEN and line of credit. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6023 (7003) A5b 
Re-arrangement of the health ser-
vices on the site of the old 'Maternité 
Centrale' in Niamey. Resp. auth.: Minis-
tère de la Santé Publique. Estimated total 
cost 9.650 mECU. EDF 3.1 50 mECU, Spain 
6.500 mECU. Works by ace. tender (EDF 
part), supply of equipments and T.A. by 
Spain. Project in execution. 5th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6027 A7a 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
medical supplies and inputs for the 
productive system. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de Finances et du Plan. 23 m ECU. Hard 
currency allowance to finance imports. T.A. 
* Date financing February 93. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7002 A1c 
Small-scale Irrigation in the Tarka 
Lower Valley (Phase II). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 
16 m ECU. Irrigation works, infrastructure. 
NIGERIA 
Export Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion 
Council. 37 mECU. To transfer export know 
how to ±250 Nigerian firms. Components: 
sectors, market, human resources and insti-
tutional development. Others: T.A. for man-
agement and supervision. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 6011 A5d 
General Import Programme. 
55 mECU, Hard currency facility to import 
goods and equipment not specifically ex-
cluded via a negative list. T.A. foreseen. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7200 A1c 
Oban Hills Programme. EDF 
16.5mECU, Germany (KFW) 11 mECU. 
Park management and conservation, sup-
port zone development, park research and 
monitoring. To give the local people an 
incentive to protect - support the park. 
Buildings-peripheral facilities, supply of 
equipment and véhicules, T.A. and research 
studies. Villages Development Funds and 
recurrent costs. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UNI 7001 A3c, e-A8f 
Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria 
(RRIN). Resp. Auth.: R.R.I.N. 8 mECU. 
Works, infrastructures, rehabilitation of buil-
ding, repair of roads, water supply. Supply of 
vehicles, tractors, laboratory and comp, 
equipment. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF UNI 6012 (7002) A3a 
University Libraries Project. Resp. 
Auth.: National Universities Commission. 
11.500 mECU. Small repair work, supply of 
book, and scientific journals, equipment, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF UNI 7004 A6b 
Katsina Arid Zone Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Governor of Katsina State. 25 mECU. 
Soils and forests protection, livestock, in-
crease agricultural productivity, irrigation, 
rural and social infrastructure, management 
and coordination, training. T.A. : restr. tender 
after prequalification. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF UNI 7005 A3a 
Urgent assistance for the News 
Agency of Nigeria (N.A.N.) Resp. Auth.: 
N.A.N. 1.300 mECU. Repair-reconstruction 
of N.A.N, communication building, procure-
ment — installation of new telecommuni-
cation equipments. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7007 A5g 
NITEL Maintenance training pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Telecom-
munications. 10.5 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipment, T.A. and train-
• ing. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing April 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7008 A2c 
Third Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
8.5 m ECU. Same as 2nd programme. Pro-
* ject on appraisal. Date financing Feb-
ruary 93. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7201 A1c 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Second Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme. General Import Programme. 
11 mECU. Foreign currency facility to the 
Bank of PNG. There isa negative list of items 
not eligible (military-luxury items). Project 
RWANDA 
Institutional Support. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Plan. 3.5 mECU. T.A. by 4 ex-
perts for 4 years to strengthen administration 
capacities to implement Lomé IV. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 7001 A1f 
Drinking water supply in the Bu-
gesera East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
Travaux Publics. 9 mECU. Pumps, treat-
ment, tanks, renovation existing network. 
Works, supplies and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
Development of Social Infrastruc-
ture - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Works, Com-
munications and Public Utilities. 
0.872 mECU. Construction and supply of 
furnitures for primary schools, supply of 
equipments, T.A. for supervision of works. 
Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF SCN 6001 A6a 
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENA-
DINES 
Mount Wynne— Peter's Hope Land 
Resettlement Project. Resp. Auth.: 
A.R.D.P. — Agricultural Rehabilitation — 
Diversification Programme. Total estimated 
cost 3.329 mECU, EDF 3.2 mECU, local 
0.129 mECU. Road realignement, cadastral 
surveys, allocation of small holdings on 
leasehold bases, works, supplies and T.A. for 
• supervision. Date financing February93. 
7th EDF. 
EDF SVG 7001 A36, A84 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 
Sectoral Import Programme for 
Structural Adjustment Support. Resp. 
auth. : Secrétariat d'Etat à la Coopération — 
Délégation de la Commission à Libreville et 
Antenne de la Commission à Sao Tomé. 
1.5 mECU. Medical supplies, school equip-
ment, foods and T.A. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF STP 7200 A1 c 
SENEGAL 
Consolidation of the livestock de-
velopment programme. Resp. Auth.: 
SODESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study 
under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on 
appraisal. 5th EDF. 
EDF SE A3a 
Support for the Sectoral Adjustment 
Programme for Transport. Resp. auth.: 
Ministèrede l'Equipement, des Transports et 
de la Mer. M.E.T.M. 70 mECU. Works by int. 
tender for 4 roads. Supervision: short-lists to 
be done. Training. General Import Pro-
gramme (10 mECU). Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF SE 5046 (7001) A2d 
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Tuna quay rehabilitation. Resp. auth.: 
S.F.A. 1.200 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and works. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SEY 6008 A2d 
SIERRA LEONE 
North Western artisanal fisheries 
and community development prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources (Fisheries Divi-
sion). 6 mECU. Infrastructure, supply of 
equipment, line of credit. T.A. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF SL 6004 A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Telecommuni-
cations network. Phase 2. 7.5 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. T.A.: BRITISH TELCON-
SULT (UK) 
EDF SL 6006 A2c 
Tourism development programme. 
Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the 
Ministry of Tourism and supply of equip-
ment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF SL 5026 A5c 
Agricultural Sector Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 14.3 mECU. Construction of stores, 
rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, 
agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project 
• management, training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7001 A3a 
SURINAME 
Rehabilitation Road Section Jenny-
Ingikondre. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Public 
Works. 4.5 mECU. New asphaltsurfacing on 
37 km and ancillary works. T.A. for super-
vision and tender dossier preparation. 
Works: ace. tender (conditional) launched. 
• Opening 27.1.93. Date foreseen for 
financing February 93. 5th EDF. 
EDF SUR 5011 A2d 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
(N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU.T.A. 12 person-years 
to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SW 7001 A1f 
Support to Smallholder Agricultural 
Production. Resp. Auth.: Central Cooper-
ative Union (C.C.U.) Total cost 1.315 
mECU. EDF 0.950 mECU, local 0.365 
mECU. Completion — renovation of 18 
forming inputs — crop marketing depots. 
Supply of equipment, supervision and train-
ing. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF SW 5005 (7002) A3a 
Institutional Strengthening of 
Government's Central Agencies. 5 
mECU. To achieve an appropriate level of 
institutional planning and management ca-
pacity in the central ministeries. Three T.A. 
for 4 years under 'link' arrangement with a 
European Public Administration training 
institution. Fellowships. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SW 5019/7003 A6c 
TANZANIA 
Management Assistance for Mo-
rogoro Canvas Mill. 1.950 mECU. Con-
tinuation of T.A. for the management. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6002  A4 b 
Port development, Zanzibar and 
Pemba ports, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Zanzibar. Estimated total 
cost 13.4 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, Italy 
3.4 mECU. Procurement and rehabilitation 
of cargo handling equipment. Rehabilitation 
of transit sheds, construction of passenger 
terminal with RO-RO facilities. Study: 
design of passenger terminal with RO-RO 
facilities for Zanzibar port. Short-list done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6009 A2d 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme- General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Tanzania. 
30 mECU. Import of goods in the context of 
Tanzania's open general licence system, 
subject to a negative list. T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200 A1c 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
3 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Serengeti Conservation and Devel-
opment project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism, Nat. Resouces and Envir. 9 mECU. 
Road and water supply rehabilitation, supply 
of equipments, studies and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7002 A3a 
TOGO 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and E.C. 
goods. T.A. for management and implemen-
tation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TO 7200 A1c 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
Vava'u development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Vava'u Committee. 5 mECU. 
Construction of new market, road improve-
ment and maintenance, education and 
health facilities, training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 6002 A8b 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Sectoral import programme: indus-
try. 12 mECU Allocation of currencies to 
import raw materials and intermediate pro-
ducts. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDFTR 6002 A4b 
Support to Structural Adjustment 
Programme. General Import Prog-
ramme. Hard currency allowance to pur-
chase EEC and ACP goods with negative list. 
T.A. for six months for GIP implementation 
and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing March 93. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDFTR 7200 A1c 
TUVALU 
Electrification development prog-
ramme. Upgrade existing diesel power 
station - extend provision of electricity for 
home lighting to households on the outer 
islands. Supply of photovoltaic systems. 
1.020 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF TV 6004 A2a. i 
Tuvalu fuel import programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Tuvalu Electricity Authority Corpor-
ation (TEAC) 0.900 mECU. Diesel fuel 
programme purchase. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF TV 7001 A1c 
UGANDA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme General Import Programme. 
35 mECU. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods. There is negative 
list of items not eligible (military-luxury 
items). T.A. procurement agent. Project in 
execution. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 7200 A1 c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Department. 12.8 mECU. 
Infrastructural rehabilitation, equipments, 
• T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF UG 7001 A6b, c, d 
ZAMBIA 
Smallholder development in copper 
belt region. Resp. Auth : Ministry of Agric-
ulture and water development. 12 mECU. 
Basic infrastructure by ace. tender Supply of 
vehicles and materials by int. tender T.A. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF ZA 6004 A3a 
Smallholder development in central 
province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture and water development. 12.35 mECU. 
Basic infrastructure and social facilities. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6005 A3a 
General Import Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 41.5 mECU. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EC 
good. T.A. already financed on previous 
funds still on the spot. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7200 A1 c 
SYSMIN III - General import. Resp. 
• Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 60 mECU. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 999 -SYS A1c 
Zambian Centre for accountancy 
studies. Phase II. Estimated total cost 
5.200 m ECU. EDF 4.400 m ECU, local 
0.500 m ECU, Centre itself 0.300 m ECU. 
T.A., supplies and Works Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6001/7001 A6a 
ZIMBABWE 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp Auth.: Ministry of National 
Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholar-
ships, awards, seminars. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6020 A6 
OMAY land use and health pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 
6.031 mECU. Raising the standard of living 
of Omay rural population. Conservation and 
improved utilisation of the Wild Life re-
source, support to agriculture and improve-
ment of social infrastructure. Road network, 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY water, sanitation, building of a district 
hospital, equipment and supplies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development. 28 mECU. 
• General Import Programme and T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 7200 A1 c 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
ANGUILLA 
Water Development Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Communications, Works 
and Public Utilities. Total cost 2.905 mECU. 
EDF 1.710 mECU. UK 0.968 mECU, local 
0.227 mECU. EDF Pert: works by direct 
labour, supplies by int. tender. T.A. by U.K. 
• Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF AG 7001 A2b 
ARUBA 
Airport extension. Extension of airport 
facilities. Apron, taxiway, new arrival build-
ing, car park, access roads, platform buses, 
fencing, security, peripheral road, technical 
studies. Estimated cost 14.5 mECU. EDF 6.3 
mECU, The Netherlands ± 8,2 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. (final design, 
tender dossier, supervision). Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6003 A2d 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Improvement of Magenta airport. 
Construction of Crash, Fire and 
Rescue Services (SSIS) building. Resp. 
Auth.: Civil Aviation Department. 0.700 
mECU. Special loan. Building, parking area 
and slip roads, furnishing and technical 
equipment. Works by ace. proc. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 
93. 5th EDF. 
EDF NC 6006 A2d 
Educational buildings in the Loyauté 
Islands. 2.375 mECU. Works by ace. proc. 
(conditional). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC A6d 
ST. HELENA 
Sea defences. Resp. Auth.: Public 
Works and Services Dept. 3 mECU. 2,5 
mECU EDF, 0.500 mECU UK. To protect 
shore facilities at James and Rupert's Bay. 
Rehabilitation and reinforcement of existing 
sea walls. Project in execution. 5th and 6th 
EDF. 
EDF S H 5001 A8g 
Regional Projects 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three 
management units and 10 bridges and 20 
observation posts with their equipment. 
Building and rehabilitation of administrative, 
technical and social buildings, tracks and 
bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on 
appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
TANZANIA — BURUNDI — 
RWANDA — UGANDA — ZAIRE 
Tanzania Railways Corporation. 
Railway Restructuring Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Communication and 
Transport. T.R.C. 33 mECU. Flood preven-
tion works, quarry development, procure-
ment of track maintenance and accident 
relief equipment, fuel tank wagons and 
trolleys. T.A. for supervision of works, tender 
dossier and training. T.A. short-list done. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7003 A2d 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth. : 
Secretariat of the centre. 2.0. mECU, Widen-
ing of capacity. Construction of class-
rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: 
identification. 5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 A6b 
Institutional support to Eastern and 
Southern Africa Management In-
stitute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, 
Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Exten-
sion of ESAMI installations plus provision of 
library, audio visual and printing equipment 
and improvement of kitchen and laundry 
facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6311 A6b 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Support to improve educational sys-
tems. 5 mECU. Trainers training, produc-
tion of pedagogical equipment, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-001 A6b 
Regional training for Middle Staff 
Statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 
middle staff statisticians in the five countries. 
Building-up a modular training system, 
training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901 -002 A6b,j 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF C.O.I.-
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF EIER-
ETSHER 
EIER-ETSHER — Housing and ac-
comodation for teachers. 20 teacher's 
houses for EIER and 9 for ETSHER and 1 
common for ETSHER. Works, by ace. tender. 
Studies and supervision. 2.8 mECU. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7103 A8a 
MALAWI - MOZAMBIQUE -
ZAMBIA - ZIMBABWE 
Regional Tsetse and Trypano-
somiasis Control Programme: exten-
sion of preparatory phase. Resp. Auth.: 
Deparments of Veterinary Services. 
22.700 mECU. Research and development, 
training, environmental monitoring and as-
sessments of the economic and land-use 
implications of tsetse control, T.A. and 
supply of vehicles, field, scientific and 
camping equipment. Project in execution. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5420 A3a 
MEMBER 
ECOWAS 
COUNTRIES OF 
Improvement of postharvest utilis-
ation of artisanal fish catches. Resp. 
Auth.: Sierra Leone National Authorizing 
Officer as Regional Auth. Off. Technical 
Secretariat in Abidjan. 8 mECU. Interven-
tions in 16 countries. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6126 (001) A3a 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Human resources development in 
energy sector. 4.400 mECU. T.A. to 
improve management, technical perform-
ance and regulation of conventional power 
supplies and petroleum import. Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5705/001 A2a,i 
Support for environmental program-
mes in C.D.I, countries. Resp. Auth.: 
Mauritius Regional Authorising Officer. 11 
mECU. T.A. for the regional coordinating 
unit - for national coordinating units - for 
surveys on the coastal area and on the 
protection of plant biodiversity. Supply of . „ - · execut¡on 7th E  equipment by int. tender, training. Date * ^
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EDF REG 6511/7 A8f 
ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE 
Training in the port and maritime 
fields. Training by experts and consultants. 
T.A., training and equipment. 0.950 m ECU. 
A6b 
Regional programme to develop 
tourism in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth. : 
C.O.I. - Comité Permanent du Tourisme -
CP. T. 6.239 mECU. T.A. for setting-up the 
training programmes, sale, promotion and 
marketing, back-up operations to assist 
management, transfer of know-how and 
intra-regional solidarity, specific studies. 
Supplies and training. Date financing Feb-
ruary 93. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6944/7 A5c 
SADCC 
International Baccalaureate Studies. 
Resp. Auth.: SADCC Regional Training 
Council. 1.695 mECU. Supply of scholar-
ship programme for selected secondary 
school graduates from Angola and Mozam-
bique to study for the International Bac-
calaureate Diploma in Swaziland. T.A. and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6440 (7016) A6a 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993  IX Senior Managers' Training in Road 
Traffic and Transport. Resp. Auth.: 
SATCC. 1.900 mECU. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. evaluation. Fellowships. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6426 A6d 
Collaborative effort for a maize and 
wheat improvement network. Resp. 
Auth.:SACCAR — CIMMYT. 3.837 m ECU. 
T.A., training, supply of equipment. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7402 A3a 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5412/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6 
SADCC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works : 2 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
• training. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing March 93. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU—TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
OECS — TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
BARBADOS — GUYANA 
Regional fruit and vegetable market-
ing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean 
Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and 
supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6620 A5de 
ACP COUNTRIES 
Programme for fighting AIDS. Fund-
ing of regional actions. 20 mECU. Support 
for regional structures, improvement of 
information, funding of research and training 
actions. Supplies, T.A. and training. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 8000 A7 
ACP AND OCT COUNTRIES 
OCTs and ACPs participation in 
trade and services development ac-
tions. 6.650 mECU for ACPs and 
0.950 mECU for OCTs. Participation in fairs, 
seminars, trade missions, documentation, 
T.A. and follow-up-evaluation. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 70001/002 A5c, d, e 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Financing of artisanal enterprises 
from 'Société Nationale de l'Elec-
tricité et du Gaz (SONELGAZ)'. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Arti-
sanat and SONELGAZ. 9.060mECU. Supply 
of line of credit for artisanal enterprises, 
supply of pedagogical equipment, T A. for 
bank-office in charge of credits. Project in 
execution. 
SEM AL A4d 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materials to finish 100,000 
social houses. 70 mECU. hard currency 
allowance to cover CIF imports. Manage-
ment by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). 
Special accounts in the Central Bank. 
Banque d'Algérie (Β.Α.). Purchase by a 
positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
parts). Project in execution. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
EGYPT 
Ras Mohammed National Park 
Sector Development Project. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth. : Egyptian Environmental Affairs 
Agency (EEAA). 2.5 mECU. Supply of 
equipment, transport, T.A. and training. 
Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 692/91 A8f 
Oil pollution combating emergency 
centre at the entrance of the Gulf of 
Aqaba. 4.300 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 771/91 A8f 
Channel Maintenance Project 
(CMP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works and Water Resources (MPWR). 40 
mECU. Integrated weed control, irrigation, 
biological control, institutional support, 
training, T.A. for general management, pro-
curement and contracting, planning, moni-
toring and supervision, works, supplies and 
• training. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 881/92 A3c 
JORDAN 
Ground water investigation in the 
Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 
Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, 
drilling exploration, surveys and analysis. 
Project on appraisal. 
SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a 
Cooperation project in science and 
technology. Resp. Auth.: Higher Council 
for Science and Technology (HCST). 
3.5 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, 
staff exchanges, T.A. training, evaluation. 
Project on appraisal. 
SEM JO A6f 
Structural adjustment. Support pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 50 mECU. T.A. for follow-up 
and evaluation. Project in execution. 
SEM JO 440/92 A1e 
LEBANON 
T.A. to prepare reconstruction 
works. 2nd phase. Resp. Auth.: Conseil 
pour le Développement et la Reconstruction 
(CDR). EEC contribution 3.4 mECU. War 
damages evaluation, preparation tender 
documents, T.A. to establish execution 
programme. Project in execution. 
SEM LEB 702.92 A8a 
T.A. to the Administration. Resp. 
Auth.: Conseil pour le Développement et la 
Reconstruction. C.D.R. EEC contribution 
30 m ECU. Establishment of consultant 
teams for CDR and various Ministries and 
Public Offices. Management Units and 
Implementation Units. Sectors: Water, elec-
tricity, sanitation, public works, finance, 
+ economic affairs. Studies. Date financing 
February 93. 
SEM LEB 1044/92 A1,A2 
T.A. to prepare reconstruction 
works. 3rd phase. Resp. Auth.: C.D.R. 
EEC Contribution 1.500 m ECU. Sectors : oil 
and gas, agriculture, industry and non 
• financial services. Date financing Feb-
ruary 93. 
DEM LEB A8a 
MALTA 
Protection of Malta's coastline 
against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil 
Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, training and T.A. 
Project in execution. 
SEM MAT A8f 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre, integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
Water Supply Bseira and Hama Rural 
Regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local 
Administration. Governments of Deir Ez Zor 
and Hama. EEC contribution. 7.5 mECU. 
Drinking water supply. Supply of pipes and 
fittings and electrical-medical equipment. 
• T.A. Date financing February 93. 
SEM SYR 662/91 A2b 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm trees in the Rejim-
Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de 
Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC 
contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. 
Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equip-
ment— Italy. Electrical equipment: Italy. 
Irrigation equipment: int. tender. T.A. Italy 
Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A3a 
Exploitation of water resources in 
the Kasseri ne Governorate. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministère du Plan et du Dév. Régional. 
Commissariat Régional de Développement 
Agricole de Kasserine. EEC Contribution 7 
mECU. Water schemes, dams, drilling. 
Works by ace. tender. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 254/91 A3c, A9b 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance. T.A. for 
follow-up and evaluation. EEC contribution 
40 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A1v 
Water and soil conservation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture — Direc-
tion de la Conservation des Eaux et des Sols, 
EEC contribution 45 mECU. Works by ace. 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY tenders or direct labour. Supplies by int. 
tender. T.A. : ORSTOM (F) funded by 
France. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A3c 
TURKEY 
Improvement of health services. EEC 
contribution 5.8 mECU. Master plan, spe-
cialized medical equipment, scanner, vehic-
les. T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A7ac 
Fight against environmental poll-
ution. Resp. Auth. Prime Minister's Office. 
Directorate General of the Environment. EEC 
contribution 2.8 mECU. Purchase of mobile 
system to measure water, air, surface and soil 
pollution. Supply of laboratory equipment, 
T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A8f 
Vocational training programmes for 
tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programme to broaden relations be-
tween EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation in the Occupied Territories. EEC 
contribution 10 mECU. Various projects, 
lines of credit, supply of equipment, T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM OT 91 A8a, b, e 
Exceptional Aid for the benefit of the 
Palestinian population of the Oc-
cupied Territories. 60 mECU. To counter-
act the negative consequences of the Gulf 
war. Grants to extend credit and to create 
revolving funds, supplies of equipment and 
other materials and contributions to operat-
ing costs, technical assistance and training. 
Project in execution. 
SEM OT 91 E A5e, A8a, b. c 
EURONEWS DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP 
Support for the Arab service for the 
EURONEWS satellite channel. Resp. 
Auth.: Euronews Dev. Group-Lyon. EEC 
Contribution 3 mECU. To improve know-
ledge and comprehension of Europe in the 
Arab world, and in the immigration world in 
the EC member states. Purchase of equip-
ment by int. tender. Project in execution. 
SEM REG 441/92 A1e 
EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNI-
CATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS 
Euro-Maghreb training programme 
in communications. EEC contribution 
1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for 
young professionals from Maghreb coun-
tries. Project on appraisal. 
SEM REG 687.92 A5g 
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ME-
DITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
Support to I.P.P.F. (International 
Planned Parenthood Federation) to 
provide family planning services to 
reduce birth rates. Resp. Auth.: I.P.P.F. 
(UK). EEC contribution 10.500 mECU. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM REG 680-92 A7c 
MED-URBS PROGRAMME 
Programme to support cooperation 
between European and third country 
Mideterranean local authorities. EEC 
contribution 5 mECU. Trans-Mediterranean 
cooperation network to solve specific prob-
lems of urban development: water manage-
ment, transport, environment and waste-
products, energy, urbanism, financial man-
agement, local fiscal system. Project in 
execution. 
SEM REG 480/92 A8a, b 
MED-CAMPUS 
Support programme for develop-
ment cooperation actions among Un-
iversities and High Schools from 
Europe and Mediterranean third coun-
tries. EEC contribution 6.500 mECU. Teac-
her training and continuing training. 62 
networks already selected. Project in exe-
cution. 
SEM REG 729-92 A6b, f 
MED —INVEST 
Programme to support cooperation 
in SME development. EEC contribution 
•10m ECU. Project in execution. 
SEM REG A5e 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
BANGLADESH 
Population and Health IV: Upazila 
Functional Improvement Pilot Project 
(UFIPP). Resp. Auth: : Ministry of Health -
Project Implementation Unit- P.I.U. and 4
e 
Functional Improvement Teams - F.I.T. EEC 
contribution 18.75 mECU. Training, special-
ized T.A. supply of equipment, furniture, 
vehicles, drugs and medical supplies, moni-
toring and evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9112 A7b, c 
Population and Health IV: Contrac-
eptive Supply Project (C.S.P.). Procure-
ment of approximately 840 million condoms 
during the period from January 1993 to 
December 1996. Phase I approximately 30 
million pieces at the rate of about 10 million 
pieces a month, followed by eighteen sub-
sequent shipments up to 1994. The total 
quantity for phase 1 is 210 million pieces. 
Second phase (210 million pieces) in 1995-
96. The project would continue to supply the 
Social Marketing Company 'S.M.C.' with 
the existing 'Panther' and 'Raja' type con-
doms. Given the magnitude, complexity and 
specialised nature of the procurement and 
supply operation and in order to minimise 
risks of delays or other supply problems, the 
project will be implemented with the assist-
ance of a specialised European Procurement 
Agency (P.A.). Condoms will be procured 
by the P.A. through restricted tenders after 
prequalification of EC condom manufac-
turers as well as manufacturers from India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Vietnam. EEC contribution 20 mECU. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA BD 9113 A7c 
Cyclone Shelter-cum-Primary 
Schools Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education. EEC contribution 10.716 mECU. 
Construction and equipment, of about 150 
cyclone shelters-cum-primary schools. 
Work, by ace. tenders. Supply of equipment 
and radio communication equipment. T.A. 
Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9116 A8g 
Import and Internal Resources Sup-
port Project. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh 
Bank. EEC contribution 16 mECU. The 
foreign exchange will be made' available in 
ECU to and through the Central Bank for the 
import by private importers vegetable oils, 
seeds and cement. T.A. for monitoring 
evaluation and audit. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9117 A1c 
Cyclone Protection. Project II. Resp. 
Auth.: Bangladesh Water Development 
Board. Estimated total cost 78 mECU. EEC 
contribution 3.2 mECU. The EC will finance 
the existing T.A. provided by Kampsax 
International - BCEOM and the Danish 
Hydraulic Institute. The investment costs of 
the project will be financed by: Bangladesh 
(2.4 mECU), I.D.A. (19.6 mECU), Japan 
(17 mECU), Saudi Fund for Development 
(11.3 mECU). Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9118 A8g 
BHUTAN 
Support for the Ministry of Agricul-
ture (MOA) for Human Resources De-
velopment. (HRD). Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Agriculture. Human Resources Develop-
ment Unit. Planning and Policy Division. 
EEC contribution 5.5 mECU. T.A. to define 
the training structure and to implement the 
necessary action, to coordinate and assist 
and for management and administration 
locally and abroad. Overseas training. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 
ACABHU9105 A6c, i 
Integrated Pest Management De-
velopment. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agric-
ulture-Dept. of Agriculture (D.O.A.) EEC 
contribution 2.6 mECU. Works by ace. 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. short and 
long term. Project in execution. 
ALA BHU 9212 A3a 
Cultivation of Medicinal Plants for 
Traditional Médecine. Resp. Auth. : Min-
istry of Agriculture (MOA) - Dept. of 
Agriculture (DOA) - EEC Contribution 3.5 
mECU. Short-term and long-term T.A.: 
coordination, agronomist, economist, phar-
macology, processing. Supply of equipment 
by int. tender. Project in execution. 
ALA BHU 9222 A3a 
BOLIVIA 
Integrated development programme 
for the Andean zone and the upper 
Tarija valley (PRODIZAVAT). EEC con-
tribution 14.155m ECU. Works, supplies 
* and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA BO 92/34 A3a 
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Montero. Resp. Auth.: CORDECRUZ and 
SEARPI. Total estimated cost 15.670mECU. 
EEC contribution 12.500 mECU, SEARPI 
0.674 mECU, CORDECRUZ 2.5 mECU. 
(SEARPI: personnel, logistics, ancillary 
services, maintenance of works - COR-
DECRUZ: works - direct labour, logistics, 
operating costs). Studies, monitoring, train-
ing programmes, defence works. Works by 
ace. proc. supplies by int. tender. Date 
financing March 93. 
BO 9235 A8g 
Consolidation — Rural auto-devel-
opment. Rural programme in Oruro 
and Potosí. EEC contribution 12 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Line of credit. 
Project in execution. 
ALA BO 9248 A3a 
BRAZIL 
Pilot programme for the conserva-
tion of tropical forests. EEC contribution 
US$ 1 5 million (equivalentto approx. MECU 
11.9. Contribution to Rain Forest Trust 
Fund. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BR 92/4 A3c, A8f 
CHILE 
Integrated development programme 
for the northern regions. EEC contri-
bution 10 m ECU. Works, supplies and T.A. 
• Project in execution. 
ALA CHI 92/33 A3a 
CHINA (PR.) 
Land reclamation in Ningxia Hui 
autonomous region. Resp. Auth.: Co-
ordinating Committee from Provincial Fore-
ign Economic Relations and Trade Bureau, 
Agricultural Bureau, Water Resources 
Bureau and the Financial Bureau. EEC 
contribution 3.8 mECU. To reduce water 
infiltration in the fields, improve drainage, 
leach out the salt, improve the soil, water 
management and husbandry practices. T.A. 
and supply of equipment, training and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CHN 9132 A3e 
Jiangxi Sandy Wasteland Develop-
ment Project. Resp. Auth.: Nanchang 
Municipal Science and Technology Com-
mission (NMSTC). Institute of Desert Re-
search (IDR). EEC contribution 4 mECU. 
Supply of equipment, irrigation system, 
overseas training and T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA CHN 9214 A3a 
COLOMBIA 
'Job creation' for urban youth. Resp. 
Auth.: National Planning Dept. Consejería 
de la Juventud, Mujer y Familia — Codirec-
tion with European expert. 6.3 mECU. T.A.: 
3 European experts, supply of equipment, 
lines of credit and guarantee, operating costs 
and training. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 911 5 A8e 
Silk production development. Resp. 
Auth. : Secretaría de Integración Popular and 
Unidad de Gestión consisting of a European 
co-director and a Colombian co-director. 
EEC contribution 8 mECU. Specialised T.A., 
supply of equipment for silk plants, revolving 
funds. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CO 91 31 A3a 
Fondo Amazónico. Cofinancíng of pro-
ject with private or public institutions in 
different sectors: mining, forestry, agricul-
tural, environmental, institutional develop-
ment, information, educational, health, tour-
ism. T.A. line of credit: EEC contribution 5 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CO 9213 A3a 
Drinking water - Sanitation - Pacific 
Coast. 7.5 mECU. Water conduits and 
sewers in 57 villages. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 9239 A7c 
ECUADOR 
Rural development in the Bolivar 
region. FOEDERUMA2nd phase. Resp. 
Auth.: FODERUMA - Fondo de Desarrollo 
Rural Marginal. Central Bank and co-
directors (Ecuadorian and European). EEC 
contribution 8.7 mECU. Supply of T.A. 
(director-expert in integrated rural develop-
ment programmes, civil works engineer and 
administrative expert), equipment for road 
maintenance, medical supplies, transport, 
infrastructure, line of credit. Supplies by int. 
tender, works by ace. tender. 
ALA EQ 91 26 A3a 
EL SALVADOR 
Support programme for micro-
enterprises in marginal areas. 7 mECU. 
Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 91 29 A5e 
Programme for the reintegration 
into the productive economy of the 
war wounded. EEC contribution 3 mECU. 
Supply of equipment. T.A., training, limes of 
credit. Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 921 6 A8e 
Basic health and hygiene programme 
in the paracentral region. EEC contri-
bution 10 mECU. Improvement of hygienic 
and sanitary conditions. Supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Works by direct labour. 
Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 9217 A7e 
Urgent programme for productive 
reinstatement of demobilized people 
in agricultural activities. EEC contri-
bution 15 mECU. For about 3,000 families of 
demobilized people from army and from 
FMLN, in the Usulutan department. Rural 
credits via Banco de Tierras, supply of 
equipment and expatriate T.A. Project in 
execution. 
ALA SAL 921 8 A8h 
National programme for vocational 
training. EEC Contribution 5.500 mECU. 
Supply of equipments, T.A., training and 
lines of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 921 9 A6d 
Rural development programme in 
the Chalatenango Department. EEC 
contribution 7 mECU. Cofinancíng with 
I FAD. T.A. for monitoring, coordination, 
commercialisation, soil protection, reaffor-
estation, dynamisation of associations, spe-
cific action for women. Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 9245 A3a 
GUATEMALA 
Rural development programme in 
the Huehuetenango department. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano y 
Rural (MINDES) and local and European 
co-directors. EEC contribution 12 mECU. 
Supply of T.A., infrastructure, equipment 
and vehicles. Works by ace. tender. Supplies 
by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA GUA 9121 A3a 
Support for agricultural reform in 
the Pacific Region (Coatepeque). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministero de Desarrollo (MINDES). 
EEC contribution 9 mECU. supply of equip-
ments, line of credit, T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA GUA 9228 A3a 
HONDURAS 
Credits and T.A. to rural micro-
enterprises (PROCATMER). EEC contri-
bution 9.6 mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA HO 91/24 A3a 
INDIA 
Kerala Minor Irrigation Project. 
Resp. Auth. : Irrigation Dept. of Kerala State. 
EEC contribution 11.8 mECU. Improvement 
of irrigation systems. Tank and lift schemes. 
Supply of equipment and T.A. Training, 
environmental impact studies. Project in 
execution. 
ALA IN 9III A3a 
Sidmukh and Nohar irrigation pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Kajasthan State Govern-
ment. 45 mECU. Extensive irrigation net-
work. Works in irrigation and associated 
agro-forestry and livestock activities. Work, 
by ace. tender. Supplies (equipment and 
vehicles) by int. tender. T.A. for project 
monitoring, agricultural development, 
animal husbandry and forestry and evalu-
ation. The EC financing, except for expatriate 
expertise and contingencies, will be transfer-
red as counterpart funds of commodity aid in 
a fast disbursement procedure (38 mECU). 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA IN 9135 A3a 
INDONESIA 
Irrigation and water supply pro-
gramme in Bali North. Resp. Auth.: 
Directorate General of Water Resources 
Development (DGWRD), of the Ministry of 
Public Works. EEC contribution 10.300 
mECU. Drilling works and supply of equip-
ment. Specialized T.A. and training. Works 
by ace. tender. Supplies by int. tender. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA IND 9119 A3e 
MONGOLIA 
Strengthening of the Veterinary Ser-
vices. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Dept. of veterinary medicine. EEC contri-
bution 2.3 mECU. Purchase of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA MNG 9209 A3a 
NICARAGUA 
Agricultural reform and integrated 
rural development in the Rio Blanco 
region. Resp. Auth.: I.N.RA. Istituto Nica-
ragüeño de Reforme Agraria. EEC contri-
bution 13.500 mECU. Transport and com-
munication infrastructures, rehabilitation 
and creation of dwelling areas, schools, 
health centres, administrative and technical 
infrastructure. Supply of equipment, vehic-
les, materials. Line of credit. T.A. Works by 
ace. tender, supplies by int. tender. Project 
on appraisal. 
ALA NI 9136 A3a 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY PAKISTAN 
Rural roads in the Buner Area. Resp. 
Auth.: Provisional Government's Construc-
tion and Work Dept. (C & W) and District 
Council. 5 mECU. Construction of new 
sections of rural roads, upgrading of existing 
roads. Works by ace. tender. Supervision by 
European Consultant. Project on appraisal. 
AIA PK 9106 A2d 
Rural Electrification in Punjab. Resp. 
Auth.: WAPDA Project Management Unit. 
EEC contribution 21 mECU. Electrification 
of 540 villages. Equipment by int. tenders, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
ALA PK 9211 A2ai 
Institute for Educational Develop-
ment (IED). EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. 
Training and university cooperation. Man-
agement by Aga Khan Foundation-Karachi 
and Aga Khan University. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA PK 9208 A6a, b 
PANAMA 
Cooperation with the Social Emer-
gency Fund (FES). Resp. Auth.: Co-
directors (national and European). EEC 
contribution 4.600 mECU. social infrastruc-
ture, micro-enterprises, line of credit, T.A. 
and technical support to NGO's. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA PAN 9229 A5, A8 
PANAMA — COSTA RICA — 
NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — 
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA 
Regional programme for the collec-
tion and treatment of the hospital 
waste. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Health in each country. EEC contribution 
4.900 mECU. This programme covers the 
hospitals in the various capitals. Supply of 
equipment, incinerators, vehicles and tools. 
Training and European T.A. Supplies by int. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG 9133 A7a 
Regional support programme for 
plant health. Resp. Auth.: O.I.R.S.A.-
Organismo Internacional Regional de Sa-
nidad Agropecuarias in San Salvador. EEC 
contribution 6.4 mECU. Supply of equip-
ment, vehicles, tools by int. tender. Works by 
direct labour or ace. tender. T.A. long and 
short term. Training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG 9137 A3a 
PERU 
Micro-enterprises- Informal sector. 
Resp. Auth.: Banco Central de Reserva del 
Perù (BRC). EEC contribution 
13.200 mECU. To improve capacities of 
micro-enterprises. Lines of credit, revolving 
funds, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALAPE 91 24 A8d, c 
Drinking water / Pueblos jóvenes / 
Lima. EEC contribution 7.8 mECU, France 
2.350 mECU. Works by ace. tender. T.A. by 
France. Project in execution. 
ALA PE 92/7 A2b, A7 
Support for disadvantaged rural 
populations in the RENOM and INKA 
regions. EEC contribution 10 mECU. 
Microprojects, reafforestation, road infra-
structure rehabilitation, improvement of 
production and marketing, educational and 
health programmes. T.A. and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA PE 9244 A3a 
Majes II Programme. Resp. Auth. : The 
Regional Government of the Arequipa De-
partment. EEC contribution 11 mECU. Sup-
port for production (milk, fruit, vegetables), 
livestock, infrastructural works. T.A., line of 
credit. Supply of equipment by int. tender. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing March 93. 
ALA PE 9302 A3a 
PHILIPPINES 
Western Samar - Agricultural Re-
sources Development Programme 
(WS-ARDI). Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Agriculture (DA). Department of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (DENR). De-
partment of Public Works and Highways 
(DPWH). EEC contribution 15 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, agricultural 
inputs, vehicles, long term T.A., training, 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9215 A3a 
Agricultural Support Services for 
Small Islands (ASSSI). EEC contribution 
20 mECU. To support local community 
oriented micro-projects, in agriculture, fis-
heries, livestock, marketing, training, T.A. 
and line of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9232 A3a 
SINGAPORE 
EC—Singapore Regional Institute of 
Environmental Technology. EEC contri-
bution 2.7 mECU. T.A. and Staff: Director, 1 
Head of Division, part-time expatriate ser-
vices. Project in execution. 
ALA SIN 9202 A8f 
COSTA RICA — HONDURAS — 
NICARAGUA 
Action programme for adolescent 
women and young unmarried mothers. 
4 mECU. T.A., coordination, management, 
follow-up. Supply of equipment. Projectin 
execution. 
ALA REG 9246 A8e 
COSTA RICA — EL SALVADOR — 
GUATEMALA — HONDURAS — 
NICARAGUA 
Establishment of a payment system. 
Reorientation to create a trust fund to 
promote export trade in Central 
America. Resp. Auth.: Banco Centro 
Americano de Integración Economica 
(BCIE). EEC contribution estimated for non 
committed funds to 34.3 mECU. Lines of 
credit, training and T.A. to the Bank system. 
Project in execution. 
ALA REG 8912 A5d 
VENEZUELA— EQUATOR — COL-
OMBIA— PERU 
Fishing programme VECEP. EEC con-
tribution 20 mECU. Artisanal fishing, re-
sources evaluation and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9243 A3a 
SRI LANKA 
National Irrigation Rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Project Coordination Commit-
tee. Total estimated cost 41.5 ,mECU. EEC 
3.34 mECU, World Bank 24.67 mECU, 
counterpart funds from EEC Food Aid 7.59 
mECU, local 5.9 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA SRL 9107 A3a 
Moneragala Irrigation and Com-
munity Development. Resp. Auth.: Pro-
ject Management Unit (PMU) — Project 
Steering Committee (PSC) — Ministry of 
Agriculture. Total cost 7.03 mECU — EEC 
contribution 5.76 mECU, Government and 
local 1.27 mECU. Rehabilitation and im-
provement of 8 irrigation schemes, water 
management development, forestry, feeder 
roads, health services, small business, train-
ing, institutional support. T.A. transport and 
equipment. Supplies by int. tender. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
March 93. 
ALA SRL 9210 A3a 
YEMEN 
Fourth Fisheries Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Fisheries. EEC 
contribution 1 3.900 mECU. Construction of 
access roads, facilities for fish handling, 
supply of equipment, engines and fishing 
gear. T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA ROY 91 22 A3a 
ASEAN 
EC-ASEAN Radar Remote Sensing, 
ER S-1 Project. Resp. Auth.: European 
Space Agency (ESA). EEC contribution 3.9 
mECU. To improve radar data acquisition for 
receiving stations. Supply of equipment by 
int. tender. T.A. for training and manage-
ment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9128 A1g, A8f 
EG-ASEAN patents and trademarks 
programme. Resp. Auth.: EPO — Euro-
pean Patent Office. EEC contribution 
6.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9223 A4g 
The Courier no. 138 — March-April 1993 XIII DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6 
Luanda CP. 26S9 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/ 429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEG FED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
Β. P. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17 
Telex 5257 DELEG FED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 315 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 DEC EC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
B.P. 103, Bujumbura 
" 3426/3892  Tel. 
Telex FED BDI 5031 
Fax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
B.P. 847. Yaoundé 
Tel. (237) 20 13 87-20 33 67 
Telex DELEFED 8298 KN 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
C.P. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238) 61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU -
Fax (236) 616535 
BUJUMBURA 
BANGUI 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
B.P. 559— Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEG FED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet. 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent. Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 26 1 5 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel. 251-1-61 25 11 
Telex 21 7 38 DELEGEUR — ET 
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE 
Fax(241) 736554 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 27777 — 28769 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL 
Fax (220) 26219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K.I.A.-Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, C.P. 359, 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245) 251071/251027 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 25 10 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section — Β 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Fax (224) 441874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse breve n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Telex (203) 20018 DELCCEN HN 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEG EC JA 
Fax (1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
National Bank Building 
Harambee Avenue 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. 33 35 92 
Telex 22302 DELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 215925 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100, Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266 — 310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor 
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia 
NOUAKCHOTT 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax(231) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B.P. 746, Antananarivo 
Tel. 242 1 6 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEG FED — BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Ilôt V, Lot 24 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN -
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61 /63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61 /686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306 — MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — MAPUTO 
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-491716 — 1-490271 
1-49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax(258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue 
Windhoek 
Tel.: 264-61-220099 
Fax 35135 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax(227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa. Tonga. Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag, GPO. Suva, Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 3718 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515, Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 231334-21 7885 -
23 47 77 - 23 79 75 - 23 60 64 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE — DAKAR 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
XIV OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Solomon Islands 
2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 — DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
Via Makka Al Mukarram, n° Z-A6/17 
P.O. Box 943, Mogadishu 
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO 
Fax (2521) — 21118 — 21049 — 81118 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road, Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61/62 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51) 46724 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax(228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax(809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR —UG — KAMPALA 
Fax (256-41 ) 233708 
Zaire 
71, Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000, Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Brentwood Drive 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 -25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1 ) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
NCR House (10th Floor) 
65 Samora Machel Ave. 
Harare 
Tel. 470.71.20/39/40/43 
Telex 24811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE 
Fax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG Smith Blvd. 50, (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel. 297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36. Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue,PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tol (357-2)36 92 02 
T. lex (605) 4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2)36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St., 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. 264160/66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
AI Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11 -4008. Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31/32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa 'The Vines', 51 
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front, Ta'Xbiex-Malta 
Tel.: (356) 34 48 91-93-95. 345111 
Telex: (356) 910 EC MLA 
Fax (356)34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 761 2 1 7/761 2 46/761 2 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
73 rue Rachid 
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus 
Tel. 24 76 40-24 76 41 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Telex (963 11 ) 420683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
In A.L.A. countries 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7, Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel. 88 47 30-31-32 
Telex 642501, CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1)532 43 42 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centro Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation ¡η South Asia) 
YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road 
New Delhi 110001 
Tel. 344 222 — 350 430 
Telex 31/61315 EUR-IN 
Fax (91) 352706 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21) 570 6075 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. 82 18 28-82 24 15-82 30 26 
Telex 54044 COMEU PK 
Fax (92) 822604 
Philippines 
Salustiana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 104, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 81 2 66 86 - 81 2 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Fax(66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Edificio Artigas (1<> Piso) — Calle Rincón 487 — Monte-
video 
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-95.36.53 
Venezuela 
Calie Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
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Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redd iff e Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1-809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick St. 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGEC NS 310 
Sao Tomé 8t Principe 
B.P. 132— Sao Tomé 
Tel. (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 Delegfed ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé 
Tel. 23 940 
Telex 2213 DELCAM SZ 
Fax (248) 23890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n° 5-CPO 
Nuku Alofa 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Fax 23869 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15, Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATBE TR 
Fax 1377940 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501 -2) 72785 and fax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Grenada 
Old Fort 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies 
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR G A 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 (Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023, 
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Telex 204 CECOF SX 
Fax (685)24622 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Programme Coordination 
Office. 
South African Republic 
207, Infotech Building 
1090 Arcadia Street 
Hatfield-Pretoria 0083 
Tel.: (012) 436 590 
Fax (012) 436 594 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY BOOKS 
The Price to Pay: a look at debt and 
development - International Develop­
ment Research Centre (BP 8500, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada, K1G3H9), 1992, 
48 pages (Quest for the Future) - Also 
available in French 
This booklet by the Canadian Inter­
national Development Research Centre, 
one of the many works on debt, provides 
a clear, succinct, balanced picture of what 
is at stake. It is particularly interesting 
because of the input from research 
workers in the developing countries 
themselves. 
The authors see the 1980s as a lost 
decade as far as development is con­
cerned, first and foremost because of the 
debt crisis and the disastrous scenarios it 
produced. Repeated borrowing, absurd 
interest rates, multiple restructuring and 
a deterioration in the terms of trade to the 
point where there was a net transfer of 
funds from South to North meant negat­
ive growth and, one by one, the States 
found they were unable to pay up. 
The countries of the North did nothing 
about this until their own banks felt the 
pinch of bad debts. And, even then, their 
only aim was to recoup their losses, which 
made the situation worse. It was not until 
the developed nations ultimately ac­
cepted their share of the responsibility for 
the financial depression in the South that 
the first encouraging signs appeared. 
Most of the decade was wasted on 
sterile invective between North and 
South. It was not until the repeated calls 
for more development aid, better interest 
rates and new methods of borrowing were 
heard that countries in the Third World 
were able to find their way back to growth 
again. All kinds of cooperation are 
needed to solve the debt crisis and set up a 
new world order. In short, there is one 
thing planners and researchers can do — 
collaborate. 
ooo 
Raising and Sustaining Productivity of 
Smallholder Farming Systems in the 
Tropics - Handbook on Agricultural 
Development by Willem C. Beets, AgBé, 
738 pp., 432 illustrations, 143 tables, 
1990-Hardbound, ISBN: 974-85676-1-3 
This book brings together, for the first 
time, most relevant knowledge on the 
various tropical farming systems. The 
approach is multi-disciplinary and em­
phasis is placed on the interactions 
between agro-technical, environmental, 
economic, sociological, institutional, and 
political aspects. Information on climate, 
soils, plant breeding, institutions, etc., is 
given when these factors are crucial in the 
context of overall development. 
The purpose of the book is to provide a 
framework for agricultural development 
in the tropics with an emphasis on raising 
the overall productivity of farming sys­
tems in a sustainable manner. 
The book advocates consideration of 
the farmer's point of view, and also 
development within existing systems, 
rather than recommending the adoption 
of Western-style systems heavily de­
pendent on fossil energy, good communi­
cations, and institutions. 
Self-reliance and self-sufficiency are 
recommended rather than dependence on 
external inputs, and export-oriented 
economies. Another philosophy is that 
farming systems should be environment­
ally balanced, even if only marginally 
economical in the short-run. Considering 
the limited scope for opening up new land 
and global environmental deterioration, 
medium and long-term considerations 
should weigh heavier than quick profits 
and spectacular production gains that 
cannot be sustained. 
Special emphasis is placed on the limit 
imposed by natural and financial re­
sources, and administrative or social 
structures. Those aspects of the agricul­
tural production process that lend them­
selves to improvement are identified and 
the prerequisites and mechanisms of 
change discussed. In particular, the ef­
fects of land-tenure and land-use, fer­
tilisers, irrigation, cultural practices, 
rational crop selection, timeliness of 
planting, extension programmes and 
infrastructure are emphasised. 
This publication is expected to be 
useful to all those involved in agricultural 
development in the Third World, to 
students, research workers and pro­
fessionals, and to government officials at 
every level of policy making and im­
plementation.O 
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